No. 16SC653, Mountjoy v. People — Aggravated Sentences — Due Process — Jury Trial.
No. 16SC653
The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado
November 19, 2018
2018 CO 92
ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE; Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals; Court of Appeals Case No. 13CA1215; en banc
ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE
November 19, 2018
2018 CO 92
No. 16SC653, Mountjoy v. People—Aggravated Sentences—Due Process—Jury Trial.
This case requires the court to determine if the trial court’s decision to find discretionary aggravation was compliant with Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). In this case, the trial court relied on a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt as to elements of offenses for which there were convictions to aggravate the defendant’s sentences for concurrent convictions.
The court holds that elements of an offense for which there is a conviction are Blakely-compliant facts because they were found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, and, therefore, a trial court can rely on such facts to aggravate a sentence for a concurrent conviction.
Accordingly, the court of appeals’ judgment is affirmed on other grounds.
Judgment Affirmed
en banc
November 19, 2018
Attorneys for Petitioner: Megan Ring, Public Defender Jud Lohnes, Deputy Public Defender Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondent: Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General Brock J. Swanson, Assistant Attorney General Denver, Colorado
JUSTICE BOATRIGHT delivered the Opinion of the Court.
JUSTICE GABRIEL dissents, and JUSTICE HART joins in the dissent.
¶2 Mountjoy appealed his sentences, arguing that aggravating his sentences in this fashion violated his constitutional rights to due process and trial by jury under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). The court of appeals avoided the question of whether Apprendi and Blakely had been satisfied and concluded that, even assuming they were not satisfied, any error was harmless. We granted certiorari1 and now affirm on other grounds. We hold that the trial court did not
I. Facts and Procedural History
¶3 This case arises from a shooting outside of a Sin City Disciples motorcycle clubhouse. On the night of the shooting, Mountjoy was working as the club’s security. The victim of the shooting, V.M., participated in a fight and, as a result, was forced to leave the clubhouse. V.M. drove off with a friend, but they returned to the clubhouse shortly thereafter to reportedly retrieve a wallet he lost during the fight. In returning, the friend parked the car outside the clubhouse with the engine idling. Mountjoy testified that he was concerned that the victim had returned to retaliate. At that point Mountjoy fired eight shots in the direction of the car. As the shots were fired, the car drove away from Mountjoy. One of the fired shots struck and killed V.M. Following the shooting, Mountjoy directed other members of the club to clean up the area, and he deleted text messages from his phone that mentioned the shooting. Subsequently, the People charged
¶4 At trial, Mountjoy was found guilty of (1) reckless manslaughter (the lesser included offense to first-degree murder after deliberation and first-degree extreme indifference murder), (2) illegal discharge of a firearm, and (3) tampering with physical evidence. In sentencing Mountjoy, the trial court determined that there were extraordinary aggravating circumstances that warranted doubling the maximum presumptive range sentence for each of Mountjoy’s three convictions under
¶5 Mountjoy appealed the aggravated sentences, arguing, among other things, that his constitutional rights to due process and a jury trial under Blakely and Apprendi had been violated because the trial court had issued aggravated sentences for each count
¶6 The court of appeals upheld the enhanced sentences. People v. Mountjoy, 2016 COA 86, ¶ 55, __ P.3d __. The majority held that even if the trial court’s actions violated Blakely and Apprendi, the error was harmless because the jury would have found the facts necessary to aggravate each count specifically in connection with each count had it been asked to do so. Id. at ¶ 1. In a special concurrence, Judge Jones argued that no Blakely/Apprendi error had occurred. Id. at ¶¶ 57–68. We granted certiorari and now affirm the court of appeals’ judgment on different grounds.
II. Standard of Review
¶7 We review legal questions and constitutional challenges to sentencing schemes de novo. Misenhelter v. People, 234 P.3d 657, 660 (Colo. 2010); Lopez v. People, 113 P.3d 713, 720 (Colo. 2005).
III. Analysis
¶8 We begin by examining Mountjoy’s sentencing and Colorado’s aggravated sentencing scheme. Next, we discuss the constitutionality of aggravated sentencing schemes under Blakely and Apprendi, and how Colorado’s scheme has been implemented to satisfy constitutional requirements. Finally, we conclude that each of Mountjoy’s aggravated sentences are Blakely-compliant and therefore did not deny him his rights to due process and trial by jury.
¶9 Colorado’s felony sentencing statute,
- Reckless manslaughter, a class four felony with a presumptive range of two to six years imprisonment;
- Illegal discharge of a firearm, a class five felony with a presumptive range of one to three years imprisonment; and
- Tampering with physical evidence, a class six felony with a presumptive range of one year to eighteen months imprisonment.
¶10 A trial court, however, may sentence a defendant in excess of the presumptive range if the court concludes that extraordinary aggravating circumstances are present. In that instance, the trial court can impose a sentence greater than the maximum in the presumptive range; except that in no case shall the term of the sentence exceed twice the maximum authorized in the presumptive range. See
¶11 In 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Apprendi, which held that the
¶12 Four years later, the Court applied Apprendi in the context of an aggravated sentencing guideline analogous to our
¶13 The Blakely Court made two significant holdings regarding aggravated sentencing statutes. First, the Court held that for sentences based solely on the facts reflected in a conviction, the maximum sentence that a trial court may impose is the maximum of the presumptive range, not the aggravated range. Id. at 303–04 (“In other words, the relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding
¶14 Applying these holdings, the Blakely Court found that the exceptional sentence imposed on the defendant violated Apprendi because the facts suggesting that deliberate cruelty had occurred were neither admitted by the defendant nor found by a jury. Id. Since the defendant in Blakely had pleaded guilty to the crime, the Court determined that the only facts admitted by the defendant were those that constituted the elements of the crime. Id. at 304. As a result, the Court held that the trial court could not have imposed a sentence outside of the standard range without pointing to an additional fact, and any such additional fact-finding would be subject to the
¶16 One type of Blakely-compliant fact includes facts that constitute an element of a crime of a conviction—either by guilty plea or jury verdict—separate from the charge being aggravated. See People v. Watts, 165 P.3d 707, 709–12 (Colo. App. 2006) (holding that the facts inherent to a prior conviction can be Blakely-compliant as admissions by the
C. Mountjoy’s Assertions
¶17 Mountjoy contends that Apprendi, read alongside United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995), requires a jury to not only find specific facts beyond a reasonable doubt, but to also make the specific determination of whether these same facts actually constitute “extraordinary aggravating circumstances” when sentencing outside of the presumptive range. In Gaudin, the defendant was charged with making false statements of material fact on Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD“) loan documents. Id. at 508. At trial, the district court instructed the jury that, although the government had to prove that the alleged false statements were material to HUD’s activities and decisions, the issue of materiality was not for the jury to decide; rather the court told the jury that the court itself would determine materiality and that “the statements charged in the indictment are material statements.” Id. at 508. The jury then found Gaudin guilty. Id. at 509.
¶19 We conclude that Mountjoy’s reliance on Gaudin is misplaced. Gaudin is fundamentally different from Mountjoy’s case. His case is about sentencing; Gaudin is about proof of guilt. The judge in Gaudin made the determination of an actual element of the crime charged—materiality—meaning the jury failed to decide each and every element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 508, 523. Here, “aggravation” is not an element of any of the crimes charged. Therefore, Gaudin is inapposite.3 In fact, if Gaudin were as far-reaching as Mountjoy asserts, the Blakely Court would have held that a jury must determine beyond a reasonable doubt not only that
¶20 Next, Mountjoy argues that Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), has “eroded” Lopez, calling into question the constitutionality of
¶21 In Hurst, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, a capital felony, in Florida state court. Id. at 620. In Florida, a conviction for a capital felony, if based on no facts outside of the elements of the conviction, carried a maximum sentence of life in prison. Id. (citing
¶23 In reviewing that decision, the Supreme Court held that Hurst’s death sentence violated the
¶24 Hurst did not modify Blakely and Apprendi. Instead, it merely applied the bedrock principle of Blakely and Apprendi that the facts relied on to aggravate a sentence must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, and that a judge may aggravate a sentence based on such facts. See id. at 621 (“[A]ny fact that ‘expose[s] the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict’ . . . must be submitted to a jury.” (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494)). The issue in Hurst was that the jury recommendation failed to contain any factual findings, and the judge made a death sentence determination that was based on judge-found facts.
D. Application
¶25 Each of Mountjoy’s aggravated sentences is constitutionally sound because each is based on at least one Blakely-compliant fact. As to the conviction for reckless manslaughter, the trial court aggravated Mountjoy’s sentence based on two facts: that he used a weapon and that he tampered with evidence. These facts are category one Blakely-compliant because the jury necessarily found them beyond a reasonable doubt when it found Mountjoy guilty of the other two offenses. That is, because the jury separately found Mountjoy guilty of illegal discharge of a firearm, the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt each element of that crime, one of which was the discharge of a firearm. Similarly, because the jury separately found Mountjoy guilty of the crime of tampering with evidence, it necessarily found beyond a reasonable doubt that he tampered with evidence.
¶26 As to the conviction for illegal discharge of a firearm, the trial court aggravated that conviction based on two facts that are category one Blakely-compliant. The fact that Mountjoy’s firearm discharge resulted in a death is Blakely-compliant because the jury
¶27 Lastly, the aggravated sentence for the tampering with evidence conviction was based on the fact that the tampering was related to a death. Again, this is category one Blakely-compliant. As previously discussed, when the jury returned a guilty verdict for manslaughter, it found beyond a reasonable doubt that Mountjoy caused another’s death.
¶28 Mountjoy points out that the jury did not specifically find these facts in connection with the crimes whose sentences the court ultimately aggravated; e.g., the jury did not find that Mountjoy used a gun as it related to the manslaughter charge. This is immaterial. Lopez and Blakely only require that aggravating facts be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt; they do not require any linkage between the aggravating fact and the crime whose sentence is subsequently aggravated.4 See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301; Lopez, 113 P.3d at 716.
IV. Conclusion
¶30 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals on other grounds.
JUSTICE GABRIEL dissents, and JUSTICE HART joins in the dissent.
No. 16SC653, Mountjoy v. People — Aggravated Sentences — Due Process — Jury Trial.
No. 16SC653
The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado
November 19, 2018
2018 CO 92
JUSTICE GABRIEL, dissenting.
¶31 The majority concludes that the trial court did not deny petitioner Christopher Mountjoy’s rights to due process and trial by jury when it aggravated his sentence based on facts that the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt when it convicted him of the underlying charges. See maj. op. ¶ 2. Because I believe that the majority’s conclusion is inconsistent with the principles set forth in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995), and because I cannot say that the trial court’s constitutional sentencing error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, I respectfully dissent.
I. Factual Background
¶32 The majority sets forth the pertinent facts and procedural history, and I need not repeat its recitation here. I would add, however, that the People never alleged in their pleadings in this case that the crimes at issue were subject to any sentence enhancers or aggravators. Nor did the People in any way suggest to the jurors that the existence of sentence aggravators was an issue before them. To the contrary, the People first gave notice of their intent to seek aggravated-range sentencing after the jury had entered its verdict. In these circumstances, it is difficult for me to see how the aggravated-range sentences that the trial court imposed in this case could have complied with Blakely and Apprendi, which, as pertinent here, required the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt the facts supporting the sentence aggravators.
¶33 I begin by setting forth the applicable law and conclude that Mountjoy’s aggravated-range sentences were imposed in violation of Blakely, Apprendi, and Gaudin. I then address whether this constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and conclude that it was not.
A. Applicable Principles of Aggravated-Range Sentencing
¶34 The Supreme Court has held that, except for the fact of a prior conviction, “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt,” unless the defendant has either stipulated to the relevant facts or consented to judicial fact-finding. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301, 310; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488, 490. A “statutory maximum” is “the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303.
¶35 For purposes of this analysis, no constitutionally significant difference exists between a fact that is an element of a crime and one that is a sentencing factor. See S. Union Co. v. United States, 567 U.S. 343, 358–59 (2012) (noting that the Government’s argument “rest[ed] on an assumption that Apprendi and its progeny have uniformly rejected: that in determining the maximum punishment for an offense, there is a constitutionally significant difference between a fact that is an ‘element’ of the offense and one that is a ‘sentencing factor‘“); Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 220 (2006) (“[W]e have treated sentencing factors, like elements, as facts that have to be tried to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.“); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478, 482–84 (same).
¶37 In Gaudin, the Government had argued that deciding whether a statement was “material” required the determination of two underlying questions of historical fact, namely, “what statement was made?” and “what decision was the agency trying to make?” Id. at 512. The Government had further contended that the ultimate question in the case, i.e., “whether the statement was material to the decision,” required the application of the legal standard of materiality to the historical facts. Id. The Government asserted that the two underlying questions were to be decided by the jury while the ultimate question was for the court. Id.
¶38 The Supreme Court rejected this argument for two reasons. First, the Court observed that “the application-of-legal-standard-to-fact sort of question . . . , commonly called a ‘mixed question of law and fact,’ has typically been resolved by juries.” Id. Second, the Court stated that the Government’s position had “absolutely no historical support.” Id.
¶39 Turning to the facts of this case, I note that
¶40 In my view, this statute makes clear that the sentencing enhancer at issue is the existence of “extraordinary . . . aggravating circumstances,” not, as the majority states, whether a person died, the defendant used a weapon, or the defendant tampered with evidence. See maj. op. ¶¶ 25–28. Accordingly, under the principles set forth in Blakely, Apprendi, and Gaudin, the existence of extraordinary aggravating circumstances was the fact that the jury was required to find, and it is undisputed that it did not do so here.
In reaching this conclusion, I am unpersuaded by the People’s argument that the trial court properly made the determination regarding the existence of extraordinary aggravating circumstances because the existence of such circumstances presented a legal issue requiring the application of law to facts. As noted above, Gaudin expressly rejected such an argument. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 511–12.
¶41 Nor am I persuaded by the People’s argument, which the majority adopts, maj. op. ¶ 19, that Gaudin is distinguishable because it concerned an element of the offense and proof of guilt, whereas here we are dealing with sentencing aggravation. This argument ignores the fact, noted above, that the Supreme Court has long and consistently rejected any distinction between an element of an offense and a sentencing factor. See, e.g., S. Union Co., 567 U.S. at 358–59; Recuenco, 548 U.S. at 220; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478, 482–84.
¶42 Finally, I recognize that, in Lopez v. People, 113 P.3d 713, 726 n.11 (Colo. 2005), we concluded that the determination of extraordinary aggravating circumstances “is a
¶43 For these reasons, unlike the majority, I would conclude that Mountjoy’s aggravated-range sentences were imposed in violation of Blakely, Apprendi, and Gaudin and that the trial court therefore committed constitutional error in imposing those sentences.
B. Harmless Error
¶44 My foregoing conclusion does not end my analysis because I must next determine whether the constitutional error at issue was harmless.
We review preserved constitutional trial errors, like that at issue here, for constitutional harmless error. Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 11, 288 P.3d 116, 119. Such errors require reversal unless we can say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Accordingly, we will reverse if we conclude that there is a reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to the judgment. Id.
¶45 Here, the People did not allege in their pleadings in this case that the crimes at issue were subject to any sentence enhancers or aggravators. Nor was the jury given an opportunity to decide whether facts existed to support a sentence enhancement. Instead, the People first gave notice of their intent to seek aggravated-range sentencing after the jury had entered its verdict. Thus, what the jury would have done had it been asked to determine the existence of a sentence aggravator is speculative at best.
¶47 In perceiving reversible error in this case, I am persuaded by the Washington Supreme Court’s analysis in In re Personal Restraint of Hall, 181 P.3d 799, 800–03 (Wash. 2008), in which the court considered an aggravated sentencing statute like that at issue here. In Hall, the trial court sentenced the defendant to an aggravated-range sentence under a Washington statute allowing for the imposition of an “exceptional sentence” if the trial court found that “substantial and compelling reasons” justified such a sentence. See id. at 800, 802 (quoting former Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.120(2) (1995), recodified and amended as Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.535 (2016)). The Hall court began by recognizing that the trial court had violated Blakely and Apprendi when it, rather than a jury, determined that “substantial and compelling reasons” existed for the imposition of an exceptional sentence. Id. at 800. The court then proceeded to address whether the error was harmless and concluded that it was not because, under the sentencing statute at issue, “no procedure existed whereby the jury could have been asked to find aggravating circumstances.” Id.
¶48 Here, as in Hall, the jury was never given any opportunity to consider whether extraordinary aggravating circumstances existed to justify the imposition of a sentence
III. Conclusion
¶49 For the foregoing reasons, I believe that the aggravated-range sentences that Mountjoy received, which sentences were imposed without ever having had a jury consider whether extraordinary aggravating circumstances existed in this case, violated the principles set forth in Blakely, Apprendi, and Gaudin. I further believe that this constitutional error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. I therefore would reverse Mountjoy’s aggravated-range sentences and remand this case for the imposition of constitutionally valid sentences.
¶50 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that JUSTICE HART joins in this dissent.
Notes
- Whether Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995), require a jury to make the ultimate determination of “extraordinary aggravating circumstances” under Colorado’s residual sentence aggravator, where the requisite finding presents a mixed question of law and fact.
- Whether a violation of the right to jury trial on a sentence aggravator can be harmless under Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 (2006), where the jury probably would have found the historical facts the judge relied on in finding the aggravator was present, but there is substantial doubt the jury would have drawn the ultimate conclusion that the historical facts proved the aggravator.
- Whether a violation of the right to jury trial on a sentence aggravator can be harmless under Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 (2006), where the prosecution neither charged the aggravator in the information nor gave pre-verdict notice it sought aggravation.