Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Public Utilities Commission of the State of Colorado, et al., Mountain Plains Congress of Senior Organizations, Citizens Utilities Company, et al., and Colorado Association of Commerce & Industry v. Public Utilities Commission of the State of Colorado, et al., Mountain Plains Congress of Senior Organizations, Citizens Utilities Company, et al.
No. 28151
Supreme Court of Colorado
January 29, 1979
Rehearing denied February 26, 1979.
(590 P.2d 495)
J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, David W. Robbins, Deputy, Tucker K. Trautman, Assistant, for defendants-appellants, Public Utilities Commission of the State of Colorado, Edwin R. Lundborg, Edythe S. Miller and Sanders G. Arnold, Commissioners.
Irvin M. Kent, for intervenor-appellant, Mountain Plains Congress of Senior Organizations.
Walker D. Miller, Robert T. James, John J. Conway, for amicus curiae, The Colorado Rural Electric Association.
John Fleming Kelly, James L. White, Jeffrey C. Pond, B. Lynn Winmill, Holland and Hart, for petitioner-appellee, Colorado Association of Commerce & Industry.
John R. Barry, for Iowa Electric Light & Power Company.
T. N. Wright, A. R. Madigan, for Peoples Natural Gas, Division of Northern Natural Gas Company.
Jones, Meiklejohn, Kehl & Lyons, Arthur R. Hauver, for Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas.
En Banc
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HODGES delivered the opinion of the Court.
Plaintiffs-appellees, Mountain States Legal Foundation and Colorado Association of Commerce and Industry, commenced separate actions in the trial court challenging Public Utilities Commission (PUC) decisions which established a reduced gas rate for low-income elderly and low-income disabled persons. The trial court entered a judgment which set aside these decisions. It held that the adoption of this special reduced rate exceeded the PUC‘s authority under
On November 8, 1977, the PUC, in two decisions, ordered gas utilities under its regulatory authority to implement a discount gas rate plan for low-income elderly and low-income disabled persons.1 The resulting revenue loss for the discounted services would be recovered by higher rates on all other customers.
We give full recognition to the fact that many of our state‘s elderly live on fixed incomes which are severely strained by today‘s inflationary economy, as are low-income disabled persons who are often shut out of the employment market. While efforts to provide economic relief to such needy persons are laudatory, the PUC has limited authority to implement a rate structure which is designed to provide financial assistance as a social policy to a narrow group of utility customers, especially where that low rate is financed by its remaining customers.
To conclude, although the PUC has been granted broad rate making powers by
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
MR. JUSTICE PRINGLE and MR. JUSTICE CARRIGAN dissent.
MR. JUSTICE PRINGLE dissenting:
I respectfully dissent because I agree in principle with the views enunciated by Mr. Justice Carrigan in his dissenting opinion.
MR. JUSTICE CARRIGAN dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
The question is whether, in adopting reduced gas rates for two classes of low-income customers — the elderly and the disabled — the P.U.C. has established preferential and unjustly discriminatory rates forbidden by
The majority opinion acknowledges that the determination of utility rates is a purely legislative function which has been delegated, in the first instance, to the P.U.C. by
Unfortunately, the majority opinion fails adequately to recognize that the P.U.C.‘s legislative authority includes the power to initiate public policy in the narrow, specialized area of ratemaking, subject to the General Assembly‘s power to overrule any P.U.C. rate policy with which it disagrees. As I read the law, only the General Assembly, and not this Court, has authority to overrule the public policy embodied in a rate plan adopted by the P.U.C.
The majority opinion depends entirely on characterization of the special rate classification here involved as a “preference” forbidden by
Clearly the Colorado General Assembly could not actually have intended to outlaw the practice under review when it adopted the “preference” prohibition in 1913 (Colo. Sess. Laws 1913, ch. 127, § 18 at 473), for the P.U.C. did not create this rate plan until 1977 and it did not take effect until 1978. Obviously the 1913 General Assembly never contemplated and did not intend to prevent the P.U.C. from establishing lower gas rates for these two classes of customers, the low-income elderly and low-income handicapped.
Apparently, the purpose of
The issue, therefore, becomes whether the statutory language so clearly forbids the P.U.C.‘s rate classification plan that this Court, as a matter of law, must outlaw it rather than leaving the decision whether to overrule it to the General Assembly as a matter of state policy.
This rationale is further buttressed by
Whether a particular classification among ratepayers is “unreasonable” or “unjust” is a question on which this court has no more expertise than the P.U.C. or the General Assembly. Indeed we probably have less. Such questions are at bottom fact issues, or at best mixed law-fact issues. They involve social policy determinations rather than legal decisionmaking.
The P.U.C. as a specialized, quasi-legislative agency is a particularly appropriate body to effectuate — at least in the first instance — the legislative factfinding and policymaking function incident to setting rates. It possesses unique expertise and the capacity to analyze the complex technical, economic, and social information necessary to set public utility rates intelligently and fairly. The constitution, as well as the statute governing P.U.C. rate regulation, wisely leave to the P.U.C. the initial authority to determine policy.
Moreover,
To summarize, it seems clear that the constitutional framers recognized that the factfinding and policy choices involved in utility ratemaking require highly concentrated analysis of complex, detailed factual and statistical information. Thus the constitution wisely left the initial policy aspects of ratemaking to the P.U.C. Of course, since the General Assembly is elected to represent the people in declaring the state‘s overall policy, the constitution recognized that the General Assembly may, by statute, overrule any policy adopted by the P.U.C. In my view the majority opinion has invaded this legislative function by, in effect, holding that the rate classification plan under attack creates an “unreasonable difference as to rates” or constitutes an “unjust discrimination” and therefore amounts to a “preference” forbidden by
Although there is apparently no authority squarely in point, some light may be shed on the intent of the 1913 General Assembly in choosing the word “preference.” In 1889, this Court decided Bayles v. Kansas Pac. Ry. Co., 13 Colo. 181, 22 P. 341 (1889). That case dealt with the term “preference” in the ratemaking context. It was there asserted to be unlawful for a railroad to grant a particular shipper special freight rates lower than those generally charged. The issue was whether that practice, on its face, constituted a “preference” as the trial court had held, or whether the trial court had a duty to consider all the facts and circumstances which might render the discrimination in rates reasonable in the particular situation and therefore not a preference.
While acknowledging that the railroad clearly intended to give the appellant a “special rate,” the Court noted that there had been no showing that others who brought themselves within the same class of shippers by shipping under “like circumstances and conditions” would not have been granted the same special rate.
Holding that there was no “unjust discrimination,” and therefore that no “preference” had been granted, this Court declared:
“It is a well-settled elementary principle of the law of common carriers that mere inequality in charges does not amount to unjust discrimination. The requirement of the law is that the charge made shall be reasonable. A claim against a common carrier cannot be predicated upon the bare fact that the amount paid by one is greater than the amount
paid by another. At common law the question is whether, under all the circumstances, the charge is reasonable. Complete uniformity in charges is not obligatory. This principle prevails in all states, except where it has been modified by legislative enactment. In the administration of the law the principle itself has never been modified, but the courts have declared in many cases that there must be no unjust discrimination. This, too, has come to be an elementary principle. Charges, therefore, must not only be reasonable, but equal, when the circumstances and conditions are the same. Privileges tending to give a shipper a monopoly, which may injuriously affect those engaged in like pursuit, are declared to be unjust. Contracts which tend to create such preferences are held to be void as against public policy.” 13 Colo. at 186-87, 22 P. at 342 (emphasis added).
The similarity between the language in the 1889 Bayles opinion and that in the 1913 statutory scheme adopting the term “preference” is indeed striking. Even more striking is the disimilarity between the meanings accorded the same words in the 1889 opinion and in today‘s majority opinion.
Other state courts have followed the Bayles reasoning that only unreasonable classifications of customers resulting in unreasonable differences in rates are forbidden as “preferences.” Columbia Gas of N.Y. v. N.Y. Elec. & Gas Corp., supra; Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Passaic Valley Water Comm‘n, 84 N.J. Super. 197, 201 A.2d 398 (1964). Discrimination per se need not be eliminated; only unjust discrimination is prohibited.
Seen in the light of the Bayles rationale, the bottom line issue here is whether according a special gas rate to a class comprised of elderly poor and disabled poor customers constitutes unreasonable classification or unjust discrimination as a matter of law. Surely it does not.
Our state law is replete with instances where the legislature or quasi-legislative bodies spend state funds to benefit classes comprised of the aged, disabled or poor regardless of the cost or value of the services provided. For example, the Colorado Public Assistance Act provides payments and other social services to old age pensioners and the needy disabled.
Nor can this Court declare that such a classification scheme is unreasonable as a matter of law. High costs of utility service may effectively result in total denial of gas service to customers who cannot afford those high rates. Such a denial of natural gas service in the homes of elderly and disabled poor persons would have a serious, adverse impact on the health, safety and comfort of that class of customers to whom the P.U.C. proposes to offer special, lower rates.2 The General Assembly may well conclude that these factors justify the P.U.C.‘s consideration of ability to pay in setting rates. Such a classification of consumers is not per se unreasonable nor arbitrary and therefore does not necessarily create a preference prohibited by the statute.
It is not for this Court, but for the P.U.C., and ultimately the General Assembly, to decide whether to grant special utility rates to the classes of citizens here involved. Absent a showing that the classification plan adopted by the P.U.C. is unreasonable or amounts to unjust discrimination, this Court should not interfere.
