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Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Public Service Commission
861 P.2d 414
Utah
1993
Check Treatment

*1 argues also that the motion for a trial Cabututan new without the availabil- ity transcripts of continuance his of denial rendered of the other trials. They he insuffi counsel ineffective because had are now available. We therefore re- a prepare Denying denying cient time to a defense. verse the order a new trial and continuance result the violation of remand the case to the trial court con- right defendant’s Amendment hearing Sixth duct anew on the motion for a interpreting counsel. In the standard set new trial. Washington,

out in Strickland v. U.S. (1984), 104 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d PREJUDICE claiming we stated that when ineffective decline to consider defendant’s asser- counsel, assistance of the defendant has prejudice of part jury, tions on the (1) demonstrating of that coun burden court, justice system and the because representation “objec sel’s falls below an provide legal analysis he failed of (2) tive standard reasonableness” these issues. deficiency prejudicial Frame, defendant. v. State in part Affirmed and reversed and re- (Utah 1986). Although Cabututan part. manded charges several instances of conduct his attorney objective which fell below an stan HALL, C.J., STEWART, DURHAM reasonableness, dard of he fails to show ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. alleged how preju these deficiencies were result, dicial to him. As a find

violation Cabututan’s Sixth Amendment

right to effective assistance of counsel.

DENIAL OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

Cabututan next contends that the

trial court abused its in denying discretion his motion for new trial that he made on MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY

the ground newly discovered evidence. Petitioner, COMPANY, testimony He asserts that his three co- gave subsequently defendants at their held exculpates supports trials him and his PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION claim of self-defense. The co-defendants UTAH, Respondent. OF testify trial, refused to at Cabututan’s in No. 910051. voking the protection of the Fifth Amend ment. He if trial new Supreme Court Utah. granted him again and the co-defendants Sept. testify, refuse transcript of their testi mony at their trials could be relied on. hearing

At the time on Cabutu- trial,

tan’s motion transcripts for a new

the other being prepared trials were but yet

were not arguing available.

motion, only Cabututan’s counsel could

generally testimony refer to the of the co- attempted

defendants. Counsel to show testimony

that their corroborated Cabutu-

tan’s testimony at his own trial that he had

acted in self-defense.

We conclude that the trial court was

unable fairly determine the merits *3 21, 1990, establishing new

ed November charges gas delivery for natural rates (i) challenges in Utah. Mt. Fuel “an historical test mission’s decision use rates; utility’s new year” determine (ii) “a fu- its refusal to admit evidence of (iii) refusal to make year”; ture test its adjustments on information obtained based (iv) year; after the historical average year- than a rate base rather base; (v) to reduce end rate its decision *4 rate of return on the Mt. Fuel’s authorized equity. Under the relevant shareholders’ decisions, for standards of review has not hold that the Commission com- making mitted reversible error However, because these determinations. the basis for the Com- we cannot discern the rate of decision reduce mission’s did, quantity so return it we remand may explain rea- that the Commission any necessary findings of soning make and fact. setting charged

The Commission Fuel, gas public the rates for Mt. a natural must establish utility. The Commission “just and reasonable” rates that are adjudication. through formal Utah 7—12(2)(b); id. 54-3-1. On see § 54— 31, 1989, notified the Commission October commencing it an inves- Mt. Fuel was utility’s and ordered tigation into the rates Gary E. G. Sackett and Charles Green- prehearing conference. it to attend hawt, City, for Mountain Fuel Salt Lake held on prehearing conference was Supply. allowing any 7, 1989. Before November Dam, Gen., Atty. David S. R. Paul Van its in- discussion, declared the Commission Christensen, Stott, Walgren, Kent David L. specifi- year, test an historical tent use Noda, Gen., Attys. L. Salt and Laurie Asst. year, to new test establish cally, City, and Lake for Public Service Com’n recognizing utility.1 While for the rates Utilities, intervenors Div. of Public Com- year test was of an historical use Services, Energy mittee of Consumer issue,” rea- significant the Commission “a Office. supported its decision was soned that it had used or was “precedent” because

ZIMMERMAN, Justice: year in two other using an historical test (“Mt. The Commission also rate-making cases. Supply Company Mountain Fuel although had used a future Fuel”) for of a Public Ser- noted that petitions review rate-making proceedings (“Commission”) past year dat- test order vice year projec- year” relies on generally 12- recorded. A future test The "test refers 1. utility's operations, Eugene period Rasmus- month costs, revenues, over which a M. Howe & F. tions. See Keith analyzed sen, investment are Utility 70-72 Economics and Finance Public year An determine new rates. test (1982) & Rasmussen]. Howe [hereinafter that have been concluded relies on events Fuel, involving an historical test On petitioned March relief, justified arguing was because there was “less[] that the Commission at least pressure inflation” and on rates” should use a “less year-end rate base4 and should make past. Finally, in the than adjustments number of noted that the choice of a changes compa- account various policy decision committed to its discretion ny's operations Following since 1989. 54-4-4(3). Nonetheless, by Code section evidentiary hearings, number of hearing the Commission ordered a to allow mission issued an order November argue Mt. Fuel to for the of a future 1990, setting period Mt. Fuel’s rates for the beginning December setting 21, 1989, On November is- rates, relied on sue came before the Commission. Mt. Fuel year, 1989 historical test did make argued that the Commission should use a post-1989 proposed adjustments, future test because would better average used an rate base rather than approximate period2 than rate-effective year-end rate base. The Commission also an historical test Mt. Fuel offered to reduced Mt. Fuel’s authorized rate re- *5 submit evidence of years, stating both test turn equity on from 12.2% 12.1%. that the evidence would show that a future petitioned rehearing, which the given test “makes more sense” “a full Commission denied. Mt. Fuel now seeks presentation analysis.” However, and ... review the Commission’s order. Mt. Fuel admitted that it did not know challenge We view Mt. Fuel’s as compris- give higher “which the two would or ing claims, five distinct which we address Although lower answers.” both Utah the following First, the order: we consider (“Division”) Division Public Utilities and Mt. Fuel’s on attack the Commission’s deci- the Committee of Consumer Services sion to use a 1989 (“Committee”)3 agreed that some evidence Second, we address Mt. con- Fuel’s related issue, should be on taken the the tention that the Commission improperly re- Commission ruled would not take company’s proffer fused the of future-test- any evidence on the matter and would use Third, data. we consider whether the the 1989 historical The Commis- in refusing Commission erred to make ad- sion provide any did not rationale other justments to the historical test based suggesting than “dueling models” post-1989 Fourth, on data. turn we to Mt. would consume too much “regulatory Fuel’s de- Commission’s closed, the hearing time.” Before average cision to use an year- rather than a taking said mission that it was official no- end supported by rate base is not the evi- previous tice of the years’ budget five fil- Finally, dence. we company’s address the ings made Mt. Fuel and the Division and claim that the Commission’s decision to re- rate of inflation for the last five duce the rate equity of return on is years. within statutory power 2. The period period during gating compliance rate-effective is the with Commission orders. which new rates would be in effect. At the Utah Code Ann. § 54-4a-l. The Committee proceedings, time of the November the rate- Legislature "was created to serve as 'ad period given effective was unknown. positions advantageous vocate ... of most to a ” filing, the time of the the earliest the rates were majority of residential consumers.’ MCI Tele. likely to become effective about De- Comm’n, Corp. Public v. Serv. 840 P.2d 767 1, 1990, expiration 240-day cember of the (Utah 1992) (quoting Utah Code §Ann. 54-10- imposed limit on final Commission action 4(3)); Dep't see also Utah Admin. Servs. 54-7-12(3)(b) (c). section Comm’n, Public Serv. 2 604 n. 54-7-12(3)(b), (c). (Utah 1983). with, alia, charged repre The Division is inter senting sion, public 4.Rate base interest is the investment base on before Commis which cases, investigating making policy rec is entitled earn a return. See & Howe Commission, ommendations and investi Rasmussen at 88. year is and Mt. alternative, moot and, unsupported by request for appeal simply the evidence. generally opinion, which is disfa advisory the standard of review. We first state by this v. Jack court. See McRae vored Adminis- parties agree The that the Utah (Utah 1974). son, 526 P.2d (“UAPA”) governs Procedures Act trative concludes, Therefore, the 63- present Code Ann. case. Utah §§ the issue of the should refuse to address -22; Corp. v. Pub- 46b-l to see MCI Tele. ques- related appropriate test (Utah 840 P.2d lic Serv. tions. 1992). provides in relevant The UAPA suggestion. decline the Commission’s part: Fisher, Wickham v. (4) appellate grant shall re- court 1981), recognized exception this court if, only agency’s lief basis “is the mootness rule when issue record, person seek- determines interest, concern, wide affects the ing substantially judicial review has been manner, and, likely to recur in a similar following: any of the prejudiced by person of the brief time one because affected, likely escape ju- would otherwise (e) agency engaged in an un- (citations dicial Id. at 899 omit- review.” decision-making pro- procedure lawful below, ted). For the reasons discussed cess, prescribed or has failed to follow all instant case meets four criteria. procedure; To consider whether the Wickham crite- here, met we must first determine

ria are of the Commission’s decision nature upon a (g) the action is based *6 Com- regarding the issue. The fact, implied by or determination of made historical decision to use the 1989 mission’s agency, supported the is not sub- essentially the result of year test was two light stantial evidence when viewed in of actions. The first discrete administrative court; the the whole record before policy action a decision to create a was (h) agency is: the action using of historical presumption in favor (i) an discretion dele- abuse the rate-making proceed- in all future year test statute; gated agency to the application the ings. The second was (ii) contrary agency; to rule to case. policy Mt. Fuel’s (iii) prior contrary agency’s Commission’s Our characterization practice, justifies unless the presump- first the creation action as giving inconsistency by facts and favoring year test is dic- tion an historical reasons that demonstrate a fair and the Com- proceedings before tated inconsistency; rational basis for the or final order. mission and the Commission’s (iv) capri- arbitrary otherwise 7, 1989, prehearing con- At the November cious. ference, the Commis- before discussion 63-46b-16(4). Ann. We will § use an that it intended to sion announced apply pertinent ap- UAPA as standard explained that its historical test It propriate. based, part, in on the fact that decision claims, using an test turning used or was Before to Mt. Fuel’s had rate-making year in other cases. first two address parties appeal invited the in this case is moot. The Commission nonetheless year points why test would be out that Mt. Fuel has to show another hearing case more and scheduled requested that we remand the spe- the November require the to consider a to air that issue. At argu- 1989, hearing, presented Fuel its period cific and that the Mt. future test why should year sought by detailing the Commission future test the ment Thus, is no evi- proceedings passed. future test There below now contends, dispute suggest over dence before us adopted a interpretive not have future Understood as mission would argued year company guideline, if the had suc- the commission’s to use test decision cessfully year year test pre that the future would an historical test as a rebuttable approximated sumption easily have better the rate-effective meets the Wickham crite facto, period. adopted challenge. De the Commission ria avoid mootness Obvi year pre- rebuttable ously, concern, the historical as a “is of decision wide sumption. interest, affects the likely [and] Wickham, recur.” 629 P.2d at 899. The supports The Commission’s final order “likely escape judicial decision also is [to] this view: sought review” year because a future test proceedings, In future utility aby may go come and before an concerning year, will decide issues appellate court review the Commis base, out-of-period adjustments, rate reject sion’s decision future test matters, prior related onset of year. Therefore, Id. we hold that hearings and based on the then [the] present appeal properly before us. existing conditions and the We now reach Mt. Fuel’s claims. economy operating. in which it is challenge treat its to the Commission’s de- statement, context, This taken indicates cision to use the 1989 historical test as pre- that an historical test will be comprising general complaints, two one general regulatory ferred as a matter challenging adoption of the historical- although implies policy. And test-year presumption and the other chal- always Commission will use an historical lenging application. We first address making, for future we think challenge Commission’s it is fair to assume that the Commission adoption historical-test-year pre- will use a future test when warranted sumption. Specifically, by existing Indeed, economicconditions. sup- that the Commission’s decision is not court, its brief to this the Commission char- ported by evidence, substantial Utah Code approach creating acterized its a “nor- 63-46b-16(4)(g), change and is a mal period.” or default test prior practice supported by “a fair and 46b—16(4)(h)(iii). pre rational basis.” Id. Because the Commission’s § 63— *7 sumption using in favor of an historical year promulgated Turning

test was not as a formal first to claim that the rule policy interpretive guideline but constitutes a favoring decision of an historical application, year broad it is an rule supported by informal or test is not substantial interpretive guideline. evidence, Gray See v. De we conclude that Mt. Fuel cannot partment Sec., Employment rely particular ground 681 P.2d on this for relief in (Utah 1984). recognized We have challenging guideline. interpretive An interpretive guidelines that the guideline agency’s creation is the interpre informal legitimate practice. is a administrative See tation of a or formal rule. statute See Congress 815-16; Salt Lake Citizens v. Gray, Mountain P.2d at Ken see also Co., 1245,1252- Davis, States Tel. Tel. 846 P.2d & neth C. Administrative Law the (Utah 1992); 7:5, (1989). see also Eighties such, SEMECO State at 235 As it is § Comm’n, Tax 849 P.2d essentially legal policy 1172-74 a or determination. (Utah 1993) (Durham, J., dissenting). Gray, Although Of See P.2d at 815. course, agency certain setting guideline may adopted decisions have been with cer policy mind, must be made formal rule mak adopting tain factual scenarios See, ing. e.g., agency typically Williams v. Public Serv. does not look to the evi (Utah 1986). it, 776-77 dence before nor does it to. Be need case, In however, the instant Mt. 63-46b-16(4)(g) Fuel does cause section restricts the not claim that the Commission should inquiry have substantial evidence situations promulgated preference using for an agency upon which “the action is a based year fact,” as a formal ground rule. determination of for re- minimizing the of forecasted data de- a facial use invoked to mount lief cannot be guideline. rived technical and debatable methods.” challenge interpretive order, Also in the final eontrary-to-prior- As Mt. Fuel’s for major had had a noted that Mt. Fuel practice it fails on the merits. argument, proceeding since which com- 46b—16(4)(h)(iii)permits relief Section 63— mented “unusual” and “undesirable.” was “contrary agency from action that using The Commission stated that an his- prior practice” unless the agency’s year torical better allow it to would demon “giv[es] facts and reasons that of a learn the actual circumstances for the a fair and rational basis strate thoroughly that “had examined At 7th hear inconsistency.” the November years.” some prior admitted that its ing, the Commission year practice a future test had been sum, foregoing that the we hold Fuel. setting rates for Mt. when adequate provide a more than fair and gave think that the Commission both rational for the. Commission’s deci- basis demonstrating a fair and reasons facts is buttressed sion. Our conclusion adopting the historical- rational basis adopted an histor- fact that the test-year presumption. presumption. year only ical test noted the No- The Commission also at indeed, encouraged Fuel was free— —to hearing 7th of test vember choice convince the Commission that a future test year policy decision within its discre- appropriate. be more tion, does not proposition importantly, contest. More the Commis- however, argues, although a future test sion indicated supporting record is devoid of appropriate when interest rates and reasoning to use his the Commission’s unstable, inflation are an historical test torical test rather than future case be- in the instant rec example, For it asserts rates are rela- cause interest and inflation ord contains indication of actual tively grounds static. These were more rate, changed it has over inflation how formally adopted at the November 21st time, approach to how a standardized hearing, in which the Commission stated in a result stan test-year issue would taking it was official notice Mt. approach to issue dardized filings budget and the rate of infla- manageable in more would result years. tion over the last five See This argu proceeding. less burdensome 63-46b-8(l)(b)(iv). First, interpretive too ment asks much. guidelines, especially flexible ones such as hearing, At the November 21st presumption favor *8 using stated it an mission also that was year, do not need to using historical test an year regulato- as historical test a standard by quantum same of rea supported be increasing ry approach to bureaucratic effi- formal rule soning that a and evidence explained ciency. The Commission that a 815-16; P.2d at requires. .Gray, 681 See approach lengthy standardized would avoid Frohnmayer, Trends in Dave National evidentiary hearings regarding the most cf. Action: Agency Review Some Court year. The order re- appropriate test final of on Model Adminis State proceed- future flected decision: “[I]n Reflections Act New Utah Ad Procedure and trative decide con- ings, the Commission will issues Act, 3 B.Y.U. J. Procedure ministrative cerning year on the then test ... based 1, (1989)(“Many the theoretical 6 Pub.L. existing conditions of the and the process— the administrative values economy it operating.” in which The efficiency, superior expertise and speed, “Actual Commission reasoned: quasi-legisla if lost flexibility advantages simplicity has and data —can process is excessive over general, tive fossilized accountability. such data can lays required procedure.”). analysis, thereby be used for case 422 Second, Dep’t perhaps impor more Reg., and Utah Business 614 P.2d at 1248; City tantly, reasoning County do not think that the see & we San Francisco ’n, interpretive v. Public Util. 39

underlying the Commission’s Comm Cal.3d 217 43, 49, Cal.Rptr. (1985) guideline year historical test 387 favoring an (en banc); admits, must, Ayres as L.S. & Indianapo- Co. v. unsound.5 Mt. Fuel Co., Ind.App. 652, lis granted Light Power & legislature that has the Com (1976). However, 351 N.E.2d 828-29 public utility mission discretion under the why we see no reason the Commission can- year. code to choose the adopt historical-test-year not an presump- 54-4-4(3).6 However, § goal.7 Moreover, tion still reach this in point anything Mt. Fuel does not cited, Mt. Fuel nor we have found grounds record that undermines relied any authority supporting, an establishing an presumption that such somehow under- interpretive guideline favoring the use of goal.8 mines this an historical test appli- We now consider the Commission's level, aOn more fundamental the historical-test-year presump- cation of Fuel that Commission must tion to Mt. Fuel’s case. claims choose the “as nearly arbitrarily that the Commission acted representative pos of future conditions as capriciously, engaged proce- in an unlawful Dep’t Reg. sible.” Utah Business dure, company’s pro- and violated the due ’n, Public Serv. Comm rights refusing cess proffer (Utah 1980). principle, From this future-test-year The data. Commission ar- apparently contends the commission gues properly excluded the evidence presumption cannot establish a in favor of explain because Mt. Fuel had failed to and, historical test for each rate- degree pro- “how and what the use of making proceeding, must make factual jected opposed data as data actual demonstrating findings that the test [change] the Company’s require- revenue approximates chosen pe rate-effective ultimately ment or rates arrived at agree riod than better other. We Commission.” goals one of the fundamental of rate mak ing is to select a reasonably agree Commission that approximates period. the rate-effective Mt. Fuel failed to establish the relevance of 5. The standard of practice, review under the UAPAfor an tional unless the Commission deter- guidelines agency’s interpretive is unclear. Be- mined that economic called conditions for the parties cause the have briefed the issue and use of a future test answer, suggests our own research no clear we attempt appropri- do not at this time to set the traditionally service Public commissions have only ate standard. We note that even under the years, used historical test and the use of histori- rigorous UAPA’smost standard for review of years predominates today. cal test See Howe & determinations, agency policy find Com- surprising; at 71. Rasmussen This is not mission’s rationale to be sufficient. 1935, ”[P]rophecy, Justice Cardozo wrote in honest, states, 54-4-4(3) commission, generally poor 6. Section however "The substitute rates, just experience.” its determination of and reasonable West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public may changes utility’s 79, 82, consider 324, 325, recent fi- Util. 294 U.S. 55 S.Ct. adopt appro- nancial condition ... (1935). L.Ed. priate period." future test Utah Code Ann. 54-4-4(3) added). (emphasis legislature *9 only 8. The authorities Mt. Fuel cites stand for provision added this in 1975. 1975 Utah Laws proposition public the that service commis- 166, time, ch. 1.§ Prior to that the Commis- rely particular year sion cannot on a as an year an sion used in all rate- exclusive standard when the evidence shows making proceedings similar to that at issue approximate that another test would better legislative history respect here. The See, period. e.g., the rate-effective West Ohio change sparse, appears is but it Co., 81-82, Gas 294 U.S. at at 55 S.Ct. 325. As change was made to allow the Commission to text, explained we have the Commission’s high rap- better take into account idly increasing inflation and suggests using presumption in favor an historical test costs. This that the only presumption. that —a legislature envisioned that apply year, would an historical test as was tradi- Second, recognizes, as At the November proffered the evidence. utility law that the public tenet of basic offered to submit hearing, Fuel 21st Mt. establishing “just utility the data, has burden future-test-year historical- and both Dep’t rates. and reasonable” Utah filings “give would the stating that the two 1245. It would Reg., 614 P.2d at Business every opportunity to decide with this tenet to allow a be inconsistent representative test what the utility engage the Commission to to force attempt argue Fuel did not year.” Mt. rate-making analysis in an of two models ap- better why a future test would utility any itself does have when the period than proximate the rate-effective actually will analysis idea what such an year, commenting only that historical test produce. what that we can show that “we believe year.” projected sense is ... a makes more Third, reviewing for a court added.) Indeed, Mt. ex- (Emphasis Fuel UAPA, it must deter grant relief under having knowledge pressly disavowed “substantially party mine that the been fact evidence would in regarding what the prejudiced” complained-of agency Company doesn't know establish: 63-46b-16(4). “[T]he Ann. action. Utah Code give which of two would even now words, In other we must be able to deter ” higher or lower answers.... alleged mine error was not harm Int’l, v. Auditing less. Morton Inc. See Mt. that as a matter Fuel (Utah 1991). Thus, Div., 814 P.2d law, utility the Commission should aggrieved party must able to demon be put it on the have allowed future-test- preju agency’s action has strate how Otherwise, be year evidence. we would (noting 584 n. 3 diced it. id. at Cf. seeking relief “impos[ing] utility 63-46b-16(4) patterned after the section pres- impossible evidentiary standard of Procedure Act Model State Administrative This has no in law.” cience that basis showing “requires provision argument is unfounded. appellate court prejudice for an substantial case, grant relief”). In instant noth First, authority legal Fuel cites ing in indicates that the Commis the record supporting position, explain nor does proffer, even rejection sion’s “impossible” it to why would be error, substantially prejudiced the util if show, evidence, putting on short of ity. traditional harmless er Applying our the use of a future test would better formulation, simply say cannot ror period. approximate the rate-effective Un- preclude decision to UAPA, the Commission has discre- der assuming it future-test-year evidence— immaterial, “irrelevant, to exclude tion our confidence incorrect—undermines unduly repetitious” evidence. Utah See, e.g., v. Fire Crookston the outcome. 46b—8(l)(b)(i); Ann. see also § 63— (Utah Exch., 796-97 Ins. why no reason this R.Evid. 403. We see 1991). should more constrained discretion in this than other administrative context Finally, of exhaustion the doctrine that, at a proceedings. It seems to us may require Mt. remedies of administrative minimum, utility infor- could take the relevancy of the demonstrate the models, mation calculate general, party two excluded evidence. generated requirements rates and revenue administrative remedies must exhaust its model, inform the Commission seeking judicial each prerequisite review. 46b—14(2); This at least alert of the difference. S & Utah Code See § 63— in G, Commission that the models result 797 P.2d Morgan, Inc. 1990); (Utah also could sum- v. Iver different rates. Tax Comm’n State 1989). son, comparative 524-25 Un marize for the Commission the principle derpinning doctrine is the strengths and weaknesses of each model *10 ap on an error is considered economy the and the needs that before relation to opportuni- the peal, should have company. the 424 See,

ty Iverson, argues 782 P.2d Mt. Fuel also that e.g., to correct it. the Commis- 524-26; Express unlawfully to post-1989 at Intermountain sion refused make Pacific Comm’n, 15, adjustments v. 7 Utah 2d to the historical test Co. State Tax 19, 549, (1957). party 552 order 316 P.2d If The Commission’s final recites seven relevancy post-test-year adjustments proposed to attempt by does not establish the it, of evidence it seeks to introduce but is Fuel. Based on the evidence before the challenge agen the allowed on review Commission determined that the effect cy’s finding adjustments irrele in- decision evidence these “would be a small vant, abridged. period in test principle this South crease revenues and a much Cf. Corp. larger period land 23 increase in expenses.” v. Industrial 96-97, (1969) Nonetheless, rejected Utah 2d the the (recognizing petition adjustments company’s proposed rule that for rehear- because ing sup- they certainly evidence be “almost the upset based on new must [would] revenues, ported by give proffer enough expenses, detailed match of itself). agency opportunity implicit to correct This It investment.” the Commis- particularly agency’s the ex- order that it post- true when sion’s also found that pertise gauge signifi- test-year adjustments it to required would allow the were not reasonably proffered approximate cance of the evidence than better future circum- a reviewing court. As we said in Union stances. Steel Railroad Structural & Pacific Forge Mt. Fuel the essentially contends that Co., 2d 9 Utah refusing adopt Commission erred in the (1959), raising “In issues fact not cases post-1989 adjustments because the Com- experience within the conventional showing did not findings mission make judges ..., agencies the created unadjusted historical test legislative regulating branch sub- approximate better would the rate-effective

ject matter should first be Id. at heard.” period adjusted than an one. Mt. Fuel 318, 344 P.2d at part this general makes of its claim that the Commission’sdecision to requiring Mt. Fuel sup- historical test is not it to significance proffered show the ported substantial evidence. We have evidence is inconsistent with “the character already ruled on respect this issue with legislative rate-making as function.” adopt Commission’s decision to Although agree making guideline favoring an historical test function, largely legislative Dep’t guideline’s application and the to Mt. Fuel’s Reg., Business P.2d at of does not entitle case. we have not considered present what Mt. Fuel’s lack-of-substantial-evidence ever having evidence it wishes at without respect claim with to the de- Commission’s least some firm idea of what it show. will cision to use an unadjusted 1989 historical hand, On the other if a utility makes a post-1989 the face evi- proffer, sufficient put dence Mt. Fuel it. before obligated be accept the evidence and necessary make the findings. factual Such To the extent that Mt. Fuel’s made, a showing example, could challenge rejecting post- decision demonstrating proffered data test-year adjustments is meant to be significant would result in a difference claim that the was not decision based showing, rates. After such the Commis evidence, substantial such an attack fails sion accept should the evidence. because Fuel has marshaled short, prepare supporting wanted to the Commission’s deci case at presented UAPA, the same time it it. The aggrieved sion. Under the par well ty sup acted within its discretion “must marshal all the evidence in refusing porting to invest its time in such an findings despite and show that facts, endeavor. supporting See Utah 63-46b- the [agency’s] find 8(l)(b)(i). ings supported by are not evi- substantial *11 31,1989, day last v. December the of the 1989 Bank Boston First Nat’l dence.” of 799 P.2d historical test the Commis- County Equalization, Bd. of 1990); 1163,1165 (Utah adopted average accord Hales rate Sand sion an base the Div., is, Gravel, average year, Inc. v. Audit that the value of the & test court, 1992). In its briefs to over 1989. The Commission rea- rate base final only Fuel the Commission’s (i) methodology Mt. cites that had soned used this neglects any to cite of the evi- order and most recent West the U.S. Communica- record, paginated contained Light dence Company tions and Utah Power & 3,000 pages long. nearly Howev- cases; which (ii) average rate rate an base allows er, itself indicates that evidence the order matching expenses, of revenues and where- supported the Commis- presented that was year-end poten- as rate creates a the base post-1989 adjust- of the rejection sion’s tially misleading picture of the rate base at pre- the example, ments. For Committee (iii) point; year-end the use of a one testimony showing post-test- that sented substantial, requires difficult ad- rate base necessary period adjustments were justments expenses. to revenues and approximate future circumstances. reasons, Fuel indi- Mt. that these that Mt. Fuel’s chal To the extent concert, vidually or in are insufficient to the lenge is the Com reasonableness decision to use support Commission’s unadjusted use an test mission’s decision to average Again, an rate base. Mt. Fuel company’s claim fails. year, the also We primarily theme relies on the that there already rejected Mt. Fuel’s have claims showing must be substantial evidence that adopted improperly an that the Commission using selected test an —calculated basis, From this we average rate base—best models rate- say cannot that the Commission’s decision period. effective adjust not to historical test response, contends In Commission persuaded unreasonable. We are improperly if it had ordered an that even making that selec Commission’s rationale base, average rate not shown post-test-year adjustments tive to the his required by section prejudice as substantial result in a torical test chosen would 63-46b-16(4) provision the UAPA. This revenues, in mismatching expenses, if, grant “only on the courts to relief allows importantly, more Perhaps vestment. record, it agency’s determines basis show, argue, Fuel much less failed judicial review has person seeking post-test-year adjustments proposed its substantially prejudiced” by the com- been In would not result in such mismatch.' 63- plained-of action. Utah Code sum, challenge to the Commis 46b-16(4). brief, its rejecting post-test-year sion’s decision average use of an demonstrated using unadjusted adjustments and year-end re- than a base rate base rather year fails. $148,290 in revenue. additional sulted argument, Mt. closely In a related agree with the improperly claims the Commission showing belies a of sub average rather than a that this increase used an rate base prejudice.9 Mt. Fuel makes at rate to calculate the value of stantial year-end base calcula purpose tempt dispute company’s for the assets company explain or to how determining the authorized rate return. tions by an increase in filing substantially prejudiced Mt. Fuel made its rate on the basis we basis company’s rate Nor do see obvious the value of the base revenue. so, made certain factual done Mt. Fuel admits that decision base, findings support appropri- its decision aver- like for the rate base, age findings Fuel now year, basically policy which Mt. decision com- ate text, stated the reason mitted discretion. Howev- contests. For to the Commission’s er, here, rejection not reach Mt. Fuel’s lack-of-substantial- unlike Commission’s need data, future-test-year because we find error had taken Having year-end rate base. harmless. evidence as *12 matter, determining in for Fuel As the record Mt. a threshold we note Mt. substantially prejudiced. would be Conse- Fuel does not claim that the Commission’s if the quently, even Commission erred in decision to lower the rate authorized of base, average using an rate we are return confiscatory any way or in vio- grant relief on permitted ground. this lated the United States or the Utah Consti- Int’l, Inc., 814 P.2d at 584. See Morton Rather, primary argu- tution. Mt. Fuel’s ment is that the Commission’s decision is argument final Mt. Fuel’s is that statutory not authorized or case setting in erred the authorized agree law. We Mt. with Fuel equity of at rate return The 12.1%. Commission does not have inherent Commission found that Mt. Fuel’s “cost of regulatory powers. See Kearns-Tribune equity” was 12.2%. Commis- Corp. Public Serv. sion ordered the rate of return on equity to (Utah 1984). However, we think 12.1%, just be a rate determined to be legislature granted and The ex- reasonable. mission utility’s discretion to a set rate of plained: long return so range as it is within a of why There eq- are reasons the cost of reasonableness. uity may obtained from a model differ from a fair rate of return allowance. We reach this conclusion for rea- several compensate Where we wish to out- for First, although public sons. utility standing management performance, or to specifically code does not mention Com- provide an or efficiency, incentive for powers respect mission’s with to the rate of risk, compensate extraordinary for return, give it does discre- by setting do greater can so a return tion to of consider host factors estab- equity. than the minimum of cost The lishing utility’s just and reasonable rates. converse of this is also true. canWe provides: Section 54-3-1 adjust where we have reason to believe charges All by any public made ... management has not adequately met its utility any product commodity ... or public obligations. service furnished, furnished or to be for any or The Commission’s concern centered on rendered, service rendered or to be shall reasonable_ corporate Mt. Fuel’s relationships its with just Every pub- and parent, Questar Corporation, and certain lic utility furnish, provide shall and affiliates from which it received various service, maintain such instrumentali- goods and present- ties, services. Evidence was equipment and as will facilities suggesting ed that these re- relationships health, promote safety, and comfort sulted overinflated costs created an public, convenience ... and as of undue risk to Mt. Fuel and its customers. will be all respects adequate, effi- Accordingly, the Commission established cient, just scope and reasonable. The the lower of encourage rate return of “just definition and reasonable” [the] Fuel to modify corporate relationships. its include, to, but shall be limited providing cost of service to each cate- Mt. Fuel assails the Commission’s deci- gory customer, impact economic First, sion on grounds. two it argues that charges category customer, on each statutorily Commission is not autho- and on well-being of the state of rized lower the penal- rate of return as a Utah; reducing methods of periodic wide ty against relationship its variations in products, demand such company. Second, an affiliate it contends services, commodities and means of that even if the Commission had such au- encouraging conservation resources thority, there showing energy. relationships affiliate actually resulted in mismanagement or reduc- Utah Code Ann. (emphasis 0.1% 54-3-1 add- tion in the ed). rate return is an appropriate grants Code also measure to correct mismanage- such power in exercising considerable this rate- ment. We examine each making authority: in turn. points hereby to several cases vested with

The commission holding that a service commission supervise and jurisdiction power utility’s authority has no decrease state, public utility regulate every equity penalty of return on for mis supervise all of the business and to *13 management. especially It relies on South state, utility in this and every public such Utility Telephone Regu Bell Co. v. Cent. specifi- herein things, do all whether to Commission, (Ky. 637 S.W.2d 649 latory thereto, cally designated or in addition 1982), and v. Utility Public necessary convenient in are or which Co., Lighting & Power 715 Houston power jurisdic- such and the exercise of part (Ct.App.1986), 98 in & S.W.2d aff'd tion. ... (Tex.1987). part, in 748 S.W.2d 439 rev’d added). (emphasis 54-4-1 Id. § distinguishable. readily cases are These First, governing provisions of the Utah view, provisions these In our Utility appear grant Code to discre Public in grant broad discretion the Commission to the Commission to consider tion broad equity. setting the rate of return on Cf. determining just range er of factors and Corp., 682 P.2d at 860 Kearns-Tribune analogous reasonable rates than the Ken supervisory (noting Commission’s “broad provisions in effect tucky and Texas at rates”). powers primary in relation Second, those were time cases decided.10 on the Commission’s limitation substantive in this found that the the Commission case rate authority is it cannot establish a that just rate of return was and reason reduced insufficient to assure con of return that is able, that a conclusion does integrity in the financial of the fidence Kentucky challenge, whereas in both the undermine its utility, such that cases, Texas the commission first es and Federal Power capital. credit and See just and reasonable rate tablished Co., v. 320 Hope Natural Gas Comm’n imposed ex and a reduction return then 591, 281, 288, 603, 64 S.Ct. 88 L.Ed. U.S. pressly penalty. as South Cent. See (1944); Im 333 Water Works & 651; Bell, Lighting Bluefield 637 S.W.2d at Houston provement v. Public Co. Serv. Co., 715 S.W.2d at 101. This & Power 675, 678-79, 679, 692-93, 43 262 U.S. S.Ct. question of implicitly raises the whether think, (1923). however, 67 L.Ed. 1176 just adjusted were still and rea rates may that the Commission reduce the sonable, in question not at issue prompt utility as of return a method to Indeed, recog the Texas court case. stant mismanagement inefficiency and to correct its commission had nized that service running rule without afoul of this or authority adjust the rate return brought that other restrictions have been long so management concerns address See, In re e.g., our attention. Kauai just and reasonable. Hous the result was Co., Co., 60 Haw. at Elec. Div. Citizens Utils. Power 715 S.W.2d Lighting & ton 166, 524, (1978); Co., 102; 542 652 North Car re General Tel. accord In 1200, (N.M.1982).11 v. We there olina ex rel. Utils. Comm’n General 1209 P.2d Co., determining utility’s 285 208 S.E.2d 686- hold Tel. N.C. fore that when Co., (1974); Pub. rate of return on “just re Tel. 37 and reasonable” In General (Cal.Pub.Serv.Comm’n authority equity, the Util.Rep.4th 127 utility’s relation- 1980). consider the affiliate 54-3-1, advertising requiring that Compare Code -4-1 rule §§ 10. Ann. 278.030, .260, .040(2), institutional, Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. political §§ promotional, or in nature .270, Bell, Cent. 637 S.W.2d at 652 cited in South funding. clearly identify source We held its 1446c, §§ Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. regu- rule had no nexus that because this Co., Lighting & Power cited S.W.2d Houston service, had lation rates at 102. authority. statutory See id. at 860. exceeded case, instant there is little doubt In the holding today is inconsistent with Our mismanagement type identified Corp. in Kearns-Tribune this court’s decision quality Commission, affect the of service Service Public case, 1984). ratepayers. provided to Fuel’s a Commission In that set aside they ships quality example, and how For affect Division witness testified service. clear” given that Mt. Fuel “has “[i]t preference to providers goods affiliate question pre A more difficult He services.” stated that he had claim sented Mt. alternative found “no instance where an affiliated enti- the Commission’s decision to reduce the ty required compete open supported by rate of is not return 0.1% market situation the business contract requires evidence. The UAPA substantial transactions had with Mountain Fuel action be based “substantial Supply.” light viewed in of the whole when record.” Utah 63-46b- that none of the *14 16(4)(g). haveWe defined “substantial evi presented evidence to the Commission es quantum quality dence” as “that and of ratepayers tablishes actually incurred adequate relevant that is evidence to con increased as a corporate costs result its support vince a reasonable mind to a con Questar relationship with and its affiliates. Boston, clusion.” First Nat’l Bank Although our review of sug the record P.2d at 1165. gests true, that this assertion impli record, our

From review of we cation of the evidence before the Commis find that there is sion, substantial evidence to by suggested excerpts above, as support the Commission’s decision to de bottom, obvious. At say we cannot crease the rate of return as a means to the Commission must to act wait until modify encourage Mt. Fuel to its affiliate specific there is irrefutable evidence of the relationships. ample There was evidence impact on consumer costs. suggest before the Commission to that Mt. However, question of whether the relationships Questar with and vari support evidence is sufficient to ous affiliates potential carried the for costs mission’s decision to decrease rate of and risks Mt. Fuel they to customers that by return remains. The 0.1% incur in setting. a true market attempt explain does not to or to refer us For one example, Division witness testified any suggesting to why evidence a 0.1% that Mt. was a “captive customer” of appropriate, opposed to, decrease is as for Questar Questar and therefore had no in example, a decrease. 0.05% Rath- 0.2% centive to deliver service efficient to Mt. er, the Commission contends that it can Fuel. The witness also said because any establish the rate of return at level it Questar engaged in other businesses in long range determines so as it is within the competitive markets, may “there be an in by expert testimony established and is not higher proportion centive to allocate a Thus, confiscatory. the Commission ar- Furthermore, the costs” to Mt. Fuel. gues, because Fuel does not claim that Division, witness testified that the based on reduction instant case is confisca- investigation, its had observed “a number tory and the rate of return 12.1% autho- examples of [Questar] policy decisions rized falls to range within 11.6% 13% and actions that to appear contrary ... by expert testimony, established Mt. Fuel’s to the best interests of the customers” of rejected. must be Mt. Fuel. true, asserts, It is as Mt. Fuel recognize that it be diffi approved Mt. Fuel’s relation- cult why particular to articulate decrease ship Questar with in a 1984 order formally of return rate is more authorizing reorganization than prompt result- another as a to method ed in the current corporate utility mismanagement structure. to correct or ineffi However, one ciency. condition of order was the Commission must that Mt. Fuel maintain “arms-length” provide choice, some rationale for its if for Questar relationship with and its affiliates. no other reason than insure its testimony power Commission heard equitably that this respect is exercised with condition been had several jurisdiction. violated times. all under its utilities See Co., substantially prejudiced show that it was Lighting & Power Houston Otherwise, decision to use an once the at 104. Com- S.W.2d average year-end in- rate rather than a utility mismanagement or base mission finds judicial any it rate and thus not entitled to efficiency, it could order reduction base wishes, (v) ground; long so as relief the Commis- reason wishes to reduce rate return is within the sion acted within discretion resulting testimony. rate of return a method range expert Without some the authorized mismanagement or ineffi- cannot be assured that correct explanation, we arbitrary capricious. ciency explain adequately failed but has such action is 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv); of return why see reduced rate 0.1%.12 Therefore, Lines, affirm the Commission’s or- Truck Inc. Public also Milne explanation der remand but Serv.

1986). reasoning respect to Commission’s issue. rate-of-return

Here, attempt the Commission makes explain why it reduced the authorized HALL, C.J., HOWE, C.J., Associate 0.1%, of return much less cite concur. supporting its decision. We *15 think, however, not this failure do J., STEWART, in concurs the result. setting the aside Commission’s warrants Justice, DURHAM, dissenting: rate of re- determination the authorized rejected respectfully have all the I dissent. Utah Code Ann. turn. Because we order, 63-46b-16(4)(g) appellate an challenges requires to the Commission’s other opportuni- to the record to deter should have the court review whole explain why supported the action ty to it settled on mine whether is 0.1% reopen party chal being reduction before forced to the substantial evidence. “[The] findings rate-making proceeding. lenging re- the of fact We therefore [Commission’s] may explain mand so that the Fuel this must marshal Commission case] [Mountain and, any supporting findings make all the the reasoning possible, if evidence supporting facts, findings. despite the and show that light conflicting and in or contradic (i) sum, following: In we hold the The evidence, findings sup the are not tory improperly did act decid- not ported by substantial evidence.” Grace ing to use an historical deter- Drilling v. Board Review Indus. of 63, rates; utility’s (ii) mine the the new Com- (Utah Ct.App. in re- mission did not abuse its discretion 1989) (emphasis original); Cornish cf. fusing to admit evidence of a future test Roller, Town (iii) year; Mt. Fuel has failed to marshal 1988) (to the trial mount an attack on challenge sufficiency evidence to the the fact, appellant must findings of “an court’s supporting the Commission’s deci- evidence supporting the trial marshal the evidence utility’s proffered reject post- sion to the findings”). court’s test-year adjustments, and the Commis- persuades the me unadjusted My record sion’s decision review reasonable; (iv) competent simply there evidence Fuel failed dissent, see the Commission’s deci- In her Justice Durham first states And we cannot how future-test-year accept she not to the data finds no substantial evidence in the sion it supporting Fuel admitted that did decision to unreasonable when Mt. record rely goes know would show. Under on an historical test and then on what data view, utility apparently, say the had no reasonable Justice Durham’s possibly ger- justification refusing put to take fu- on or rational ture-test-year entitled rate-making proceeding arguments without Both miss evidence. mane any clear, showing opinion the evidence has the As our makes the whether mark. adoption Nothing probative of the historical-test- value. Commission’s year presumption code, UAPA, supports interpretive guide- law such a the or our case created such, finding. it as a rule of position, As nor does make sense was not factual line: substantial evidence standard is procedure. inapposite. administrative supporting put to to regarding Commission’s decision on evidence then, rely on an historical test in this issue. ease. Even was only appears only basis for decision responding to the request Committee’s precedent, speculation potential about that the Commission take official notice models, problems competing economic budget inflation rate all filings given and some financial considerations the Division and Mountain Fuel only cursory after treatment the Commis- past years. The response five re- to that sion denied proposal. Mountain Fuel’s quest simply that “the Commission None of these considerations rise to the passing will do so on whether it is ... of satisfying level the substantial evidence necessary or interpretation an accurate test. statement, responsive APA.” This rendered, made after its decision was does years The fact that historical test have not indicate that the Commission took eco- past rate-making been used in some cases nomic into circumstances account in decid- reasonably support does not itself ing to use an historical test test-year period decision to use such a fact, case. Commission has Mountain main argument at years used both and future 21, 1989, hearing November was that in prior Indeed, rate-making cases. since opportunity should have the present 1970s, general approach has been data it believed was to estab- for Mountain Fuel’s rates to be determined just lish and reasonable rates for the 1990s. the basis of future test Mountain proposed that it file both an case, historical- future-test-year and a al- expressed The Commission concern at lowing parties to make pre- whatever hearing November pos- about *16 arguments sentations they and fit problems saw “dueling” sible with models used based on the in information from fil- future-test-year those possibility case. The ings. might The Commission problems then consider purely speculative such giv- filings, along both any presentations en that the models were not even exis- arguments, and and make tence a reasonable at the time the Commission deter- judgment as one representative most mined to year. use an historical test Fur- period ther, for which the rates were to Mountain Fuel indicated that compet- apply. Although ing Mountain Fuel present indicated problems models would not argue it would for the future test past have arisen because year, propose it did not that the now uses a Commis- technique “budgeting called the simply sion process.” future-test-year pe- choose explained Mountain Fuel riod. go Mountain Fuel was willing this is superior method to those used forward with both an previously histori- straightfor- because it more cal and a future test ward The Commis- analysis. and more amenable Ne- sion, however, rejected vertheless, Mountain Fuel’s explore the Commission did not proposal, thereby declining budgeting process, details of undertake nor any comparative analysis of did it the historical raise further concerns about and point, future At dueling majori- data. models. ty’s assertion that the Commission was only plausible The basis for the Commis- merely relying presump- on a “rebuttable sion’s impact general decision is the eco- tion” in favor of historical test circumstances, nomic such as inflation fails. Simply put, Mountain de- Fuel was rates, period. brief, on a test-year In its opportunity nied an to rebut the Commis- it took into sion’s “presumption.” account economic deciding circumstances in There was no reasonable or jus- rational the record indicates that the Commission in tification for the Commission’s refusal fact never raised or discussed parties economic take evidence from on the test- circumstances until it rendered its issue. record The reveals that after rejecting decision involved, Mountain proposal parties other the Division and the

431 other treated Committee, reach issues position that it would took the majority opinion. appropriate for the helpful probably and on the issue to take evidence as to the determination then make its and test-year period. Committee

proper “there should be a specifically that

stated hearing so that the Commis- factual

brief something to base its conclusion

sion ha[s] has some Although the Commission

on.” period,1 choosing discretion Utah, Appellee, Plaintiff and STATE of upon rest some sound its decision must basis, upon evidentiary fiat. First v. County Bd. Boston v. Nat’l Bank DELI, Defendant Edward Steven (Utah P.2d Equalization, Appellant. 1990); Review In Hurley v. Board of (Utah P.2d 526-27 dus. No. 910306. 1988). The abused its discre- Supreme Court of Utah. opportu- denying Mountain Fuel tion nity fully to be heard. Oct. competent

Because the record reveals no justification for

basis was, view,

decision, in my unrea- action arbitrary capricious as an act.

sonable

In Milne Truck Lines Public Service

Commission,

1986), this court found essential findings subsidiary

Commission make so as demonstrate a

sufficient detail con-

logical legal basis its ultimate “[Findings sufficiently

clusions: should be *17 steps by which the

detailed to disclose conclusions, or conclusions

ultimate factual law, are Id. I mixed fact and reached.” case, Milne, this that in this

believe “perform findings needs

court detailed reviewing the Commission’s

its dut[ies] legal with established

order accordance protecting parties

principles arbitrary capricious from Id.; action.” see also administrative Found, v. Legal States Public

Mountain Comm’n, 636 P.2d

Serv.

1981) legitimacy of the Com- (legality and rest well-articulated

mission’s orders reasons).

findings and The Commission sufficiently findings

has not made detailed case. foregoing,

Based on the I would reverse order, for a remand hear-

ing test-year question, and decline to on the 54-4-4(3).

1. Utah Code Ann.

Case Details

Case Name: Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Public Service Commission
Court Name: Utah Supreme Court
Date Published: Sep 28, 1993
Citation: 861 P.2d 414
Docket Number: 910051
Court Abbreviation: Utah
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