Mount Spokane Skiing Corp. v. Spokane CountyMount Spokane Skiing Corp. v. Spokane County
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Kurtz
FACTS
In 1976, Mount Spokane Skiing Corporation (Spokane Skiing) entered into an exclusive 20-year agreement with the State Parks and Recreation Commission to operate a sports,
In September 1995, the Board of Spokane County Commissioners held a public meeting to discuss creation of a public corporation to operate the facility at Mount Spokane State Park. Members of Mount Spokane 2000 expressed support for creating such a corporation, while Spokane Skiing’s attorney voiced opposition to the idea. On October 3, the Board adopted Resolutions No. 95-1121 and 95-1122 which created the Public Development Authority, authorized its charter and by-laws and named its initial board of directors. A majority of the Authority’s board members are directors or members of Mount Spokane 2000.
WAS THE COUNTY ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF ITS AUTHORITY UNDER
Spokane Skiing contends the authority of the county commissioners is limited to expressly granted powers and to powers necessarily implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted, along with the powers essential to the declared purposes of the corporation.
City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma,
108 Wn.2d 679, 695, 743 P.2d 793 (1987).
Spokane Skiing argues that the operation of a ski area does not improve the administration of federal grant funds, nor is it a recognized governmental function. In Spokane Skiing’s opinion, the operation of the ski area has nothing to do with the improvement of the general living conditions in the urban areas of the state because the ski area is not located within an urban area. Because the Authority fails to satisfy any of the stated purposes set forth in
As additional grounds, Spokane Skiing states the Authority fails to meet all the requirements set forth for public authorities under
Moreover, Spokane Skiing argues the Authority was not created for a public purpose. Government action and expenditures must further public, not private, interests. In re Marriage of Johnson, 96 Wn.2d 255, 258-59, 634 P.2d 877 (1981). An action or expenditure is for a public purpose when it confers a benefit of reasonably general character to a significant part of the public. United States v. Town of N. Bonneville, 94 Wn.2d 827, 621 P.2d 127 (1980). Spokane Skiing believes the creation of the Authority is for the private purpose of empowering the Mount Spokane 2000 group with county authority to compete with a particular private enterprise.
Finally, Spokane Skiing argues that in creating the Authority, the commissioners acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. It points to the lack of evidence substantiating a public need justifying creation of the Authority. The commissioners took no testimony, Spokane Skiing notes, other than from counsel for Mount Spokane 2000.
Standard of Review. This court reviews an order of summary judgment de novo, engaging in the same inquiry as the trial court. RAP 9.12; Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wn.2d 434, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982). Summary judgment is appropriate if the parties’ pleadings, affidavits, and depositions establish there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c).
A statute is presumed constitutional and a challenging party has the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt the statute is unconstitutional. Leonard v. City of Spokane, 127 Wn.2d 194, 197-98, 897 P.2d 358 (1995). When the constitutionality of a statute is attacked, it is the duty of the court to construe the statute so as to uphold its constitutionality, wherever possible. State v. Browet, Inc., 103 Wn.2d 215, 219, 691 P.2d 571 (1984).
The interpretation of a municipal enactment is a question of law. Ball v. Smith, 87 Wn.2d 717, 722-23, 556 P.2d 936 (1976). Municipally enacted law is subject to the same rules of construction as statutes. World Wide Video, Inc. v. City of Tukwila, 117 Wn.2d 382, 392, 816 P.2d 18 (1991) . If stated facts justifying a resolution can be reasonably conceived, such facts should be presumed to exist and the resolution will be presumed to have been passed in conformity with those facts. Silver Shores Mobile Home Park, Inc. v. City of Everett, 87 Wn.2d 618, 624, 555 P.2d 993 (1976). “If possible, an enactment must be interpreted in a manner which upholds its constitutionality.” City of Tacoma v. Luvene, 118 Wn.2d 826, 841, 827 P.2d 1374 (1992) . As such, this court employs the assumption the Authority was properly created, unless it is shown otherwise.
The Provisions of
In order to improve the administration of authorized federal grants or programs, to improve governmental efficiency and services, or to improve the general living conditions in the urban areas of the state, any city, town, or county may by lawfully adopted ordinance or resolution:
(4) Create public corporations, commissions, and authorities to: Administer and execute federal grants or programs; receive and administer private funds, goods, or services for any lawful public purpose; and perform any lawful public purpose or public function.
Spokane Skiing urges that the Authority was not properly created because it fails to fulfill any of the listed purposes. Spokane Skiing’s interpretation of the statute is too narrow. The court should not narrowly construe a statute by restricting its interpretation to a literal and technical construction of only a part of the statute and ignore other relevant parts.
Graham v. State Bar Ass’n,
86 Wn.2d 624, 627, 548 P.2d 310 (1976). It is clear from a plain reading of the statute that a public corporation need not fulfill all the contemplated purposes set out in the opening paragraph of
Here, the created Authority arguably meets two of the purposes. First, the Authority was created to improve government services provided at the state-owned Mount Spokane ski area. A recent study found the concession services provided at the ski area were substandard. Resolution No. 95-1121 specifically states the Authority was created in an effort to improve governmental services by improving, operating and maintaining the services provided at Mount Spokane ski area. Because the Authority was created to improve the services provided at the ski area, a purpose of the Authority is to improve governmental services.
The Authority meets a second purpose set forth in the opening paragraph of
Spokane Skiing also argues the Authority was improperly created because it fails to meet all the requirements of
Certainly the Authority will perform a lawful public purpose or public function by maintaining and operating the public recreational ski area. Public recreational facilities constitute a public purpose and function.
See In re City of Seattle,
104 Wn.2d 621, 624, 707 P.2d 1348 (1985). Further, counties have express statutory authority to establish parks for public recreational purposes and to maintain various other types of recreational facilities.
Finally, Spokane Skiing contends the commissioners acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in creating the Authority because no facts or evidence were presented at the public hearing justifying the creation of the Authority. A court will not overturn a municipal corporation’s exercise of its legislative authority, except for a manifest abuse of discretion, or arbitrary and capricious acts. Duckworth v. City of Bonney Lake, 91 Wn.2d 19, 34, 586 P.2d 860 (1978). Arbitrary and capricious action is willful and unreasoning, without consideration, and in disregard of the facts and circumstances. Equitable Shipyards, Inc. v. State, 93 Wn.2d 465, 611 P.2d 396 (1980).
The court will accept as a verity any declaration of a statute’s public purpose unless it is arbitrary and unreasonable. Public Employment Relations Comm’n v. City of Kennewick, 99 Wn.2d 832, 836, 664 P.2d 1240 (1983). As noted previously, the burden is upon Spokane Skiing in challenging this statute. Essentially, Spokane Skiing offers only its opinion the Authority was not necessary and was created to provide government power to small groups of private individuals. At least one study performed indicated to the County the services provided by Spokane Skiing were substandard. The County’s decision the concessions at the ski area should be improved and would be improved by the creation of a public authority is reasonable and not arbitrary. Spokane Skiing has failed to meet its burden and the Authority should be upheld.
DOES THE CREATION OF THE AUTHORITY VIOLATE THE LENDING OF CREDIT CLAUSE OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION?
Spokane Skiing contends expenditure of county credit may not be used in aid of private enterprise under article VIII, section 5 of the Washington constitution which provides in part: “The credit of the state shall not, in any manner be given or loaned to, or in aid of, any individual, association, company or corporation.”
Further, article VIII, section 7 provides:
No county, city, town or other municipal corporation shall hereafter give any money, or property, or loan its money, or credit to or in aid of any individual, association, company or corporation, except for the necessary support of the poor and infirm, or become directly or indirectly the owner of any stock in or bonds of any association, company or corporation.
The purpose of article VIII, sections 5 and 7 is to prevent public funds from being used to benefit private interests where the public interest is not primarily served. Japan Line, Ltd. v. McCaffree, 88 Wn.2d 93, 98, 558 P.2d 211 (1977); Tacoma, 108 Wn.2d at 701 n.13. However, this prohibition applies only to loans to private agencies and has no application to a loan of credit to a state agency. State ex rel. Wash. Toll Bridge Auth. v. Yelle, 56 Wn.2d 86, 104, 351 P.2d 493 (1960).
Here, the Authority was created to serve a legitimate public purpose. As such, any loans of credit to the Authority are by definition not used to benefit a private interest. Moreover, the Authority is not a private agency. The creation of the Authority and the subsequent appointment of individuals involved in Mount Spokane 2000 to the board of the Authority does not change the character of the public corporation to a private interest. As a result, the constitutional prohibition against lending of credit is not implicated.
IS THE AUTHORITY AN UNLAWFUL DELEGATION OF POWER BY THE COMMISSIONERS?
Spokane Skiing states when a statute requires a public officer to exercise his discretion, such public officer cannot re-delegate his authority.
State ex rel. West v. City of Seattle,
61 Wn.2d 658, 379 P.2d 925 (1963). The
West
court held an appointing authority which had the responsibility of discharging employees could not delegate that responsibility. Recreation authority, according to Spokane Skiing, is granted to the county commissioners directly and cannot be delegated.
Municipal corporations, as creatures of the state, derive their authority and powers from the Legislature. Town of Othello v. Harder, 46 Wn.2d 747, 752, 284 P.2d 1099 (1955). A municipal corporation’s powers are limited to those powers conferred in express terms or those necessarily implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted, along with the powers essential to the declared objects and purpose of the corporation. State ex rel. Port of Seattle v. Superior Court, 93 Wash. 267, 269, 160 P. 755 (1916). Where the Legislature confers specific powers and duties to the legislative body of a municipal corporation, that body may not delegate such powers and duties absent specific statutory authorization. Municipality of Metro. Seattle v. Division 587, Amalgamated Transit Union, 118 Wn.2d 639, 643, 826 P.2d 167 (1992).
Spokane Skiing argues recreational authority is granted to the county commissioners and that authority cannot be delegated except as provided by the specific recreational statutes (e.g.,
Additionally, where discretion is granted to the legislative authority, here the commissioners, the method adopted to perform the activity in the exercise of that discretion should not be questioned by the courts. Haga v. City of Seattle, 3 Wn.2d 31, 39-44, 99 P.2d 623 (1940). If the purpose and object of the County’s action is authorized by law and there are no express limitations in carrying out the purpose and object, then the choice of the means for operating the facility is discretionary and not subject to review by the court. Judicial review is limited to whether the action was arbitrary or capricious. Tacoma, 108 Wn.2d at 695. Evidence was presented to the commissioners that the ski area concessions were being poorly run by a private corporation. It has not been shown the commissioners’ discretion in choosing a public corporation to remedy the problems with the concessions at the ski area were arbitrary and capricious. The decision was not an unlawful delegation of power.
IS THE COUNTY AUTHORIZING THE MOUNT SPOKANE PUBLIC DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY TO ENGAGE IN UNAUTHORIZED TRANSACTIONS?
Spokane Skiing contends the County has no authority to force it to sell its possessory interest in the assets which comprise the concessions. Spokane Skiing states that under the contract, it will be forced to sell its property to the Authority which works as a condemnation of the property.
Spokane Skiing believes the County has no authority to condemn property for park purposes.
The state, acting through the Commission, and Spokane Skiing were parties to the concession agreement for the operation of the Mount Spokane ski area concession that lies on state land. In the event a concessionaire loses its concessionaire rights,
Spokane Skiing’s argument is speculative and premature. The concession agreement was awarded to Mount Spokane 2000 and the County has done nothing to acquire the interest of Spokane Skiing. Even if the County, as opposed to the Authority, were seeking Spokane Skiing’s possessory interest, the County has authority to acquire property for parks and recreational purpose by condemnation.
See, e.g.,
Because the County is authorized to acquire the concessionaire’s assets through the provisions of
DOES THIS USE OF THE PUBLIC CORPORATION STATUTE VIOLATE THE UNIFORMITY PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE XI, SECTION 4 OF THE WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION?
Spokane Skiing believes
. Article XI, section 4 provides:
The legislature shall establish a system of county government, which shall be uniform throughout the state except as hereinafter provided, and by general laws shall provide for township organization, under which any county may organize whenever a majority of the qualified electors of such county voting at a general election shall so determine; and whenever a county shall adopt township organization, the assessment and collection of the revenue shall be made, and the business of such county and the local affairs of the several townships therein, shall be managed and transacted in the manner prescribed by such general law.
According to Spokane Skiing, this provision has been interpreted to mean one system applicable alike in all its parts and continuously operating equally in all of the counties of the state. Coulter v. Pool, 187 Cal. 181, 201 P. 120, 125 (1921). See also Op. Att’y Gen. 11 (1987). For that reason, Spokane Skiing argues the differing public corporations create a lack of uniformity of government throughout the state and, thus, should be held to be a violation of the uniformity provisions of the state constitution. See, e.g., State ex rel. Maulsby v. Fleming, 88 Wash. 583, 153 P. 347 (1915).
IS
Article II, section 19 provides that “[n]o bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title.” In applying this constitutional provision there are two issues—whether the bill contains one title and one subject matter. State Fin. Comm. v. O’Brien, 105 Wn.2d 78, 711 P.2d 993 (1986). The title must give notice of the bill’s contents. See Washington Toll Bridge Auth. v. State, 49 Wn.2d 520, 523, 304 P.2d 676 (1956). In addition, there must be a “rational unity” between the subject of the title and the incidental subdivisions within the bill. See State v. Grisby, 97 Wn.2d 493, 498, 647 P.2d 6 (1982).
Spokane Skiing argues the amendatory act title did not give adequate notice of its contents, nor was there rational unity between all of the bill’s provisions. It notes the amendatory act embraced several subjects because it amended the public corporations act, which added to the municipal services to new cities and towns and provided for short-term obligations of municipal corporations. The title of this act was “AN ACT Relating to Local Government: amending
Spokane Skiing states the varied subjects in the amendatory act do not deal with local
It is well established that the title of an act need not be an index to the contents, nor express every detail contained therein.
Rourke v. Department of Labor & Indus.,
41 Wn.2d 310, 312, 249 P.2d 236 (1952). The test of sufficiency is whether the title gives notice of its object so as to lead to a reasonable inquiry of the content.
State v. Lounsbery,
74 Wn.2d 659, 664, 445 P.2d 1017 (1968). “All that is required is that there be some ‘rational unity’ between the general subject and the incidental subdivisions. If this nexus can be found, the act will survive the light of constitutional inspection.”
Kueckelhan v. Federal Old Line Ins. Co.,
69 Wn.2d 392, 403, 418 P.2d 443 (1966). The Laws of 1985, ch. 332 describe the legislation as relating to local government. While the subdivisions within the act deal with different aspects of the power of local government, all sections relate to the general subject matter of local government as it pertains to cities and towns. Because the contents of the bill are encompassed within the general subject matter of the title, the act does not violate the pro
hibition against multiple subjects.
HOLDING
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Schtjltheis, A.C.J., and Thompson, J., concur.
Review denied at 133 Wn.2d 1021 (1997).