69 So. 817 | Miss. | 1915
delivered the opinion of the court.
Appellants, as complainants in the court below, instituted this suit in the chancery, court of Covington county to quiet their title to the lands described as the northeast quarter of the north-east quarter of section thirteen, township seven north, range fifteen west, and the southwest quarter of the north-west quarter of section eighteen, township seven north, range fourteen west, in said Covington county, and to cancel as a cloud the claim of the defendants. Complainants deraigned title through foreclosure by the trustee of a deed of trust given by the defendant ~W, W. Gandy to secure an attorney’s fee of seven hundred and fifty dollars contracted with and owing complainants as the attorneys for the defense of W. W. Gandy, at that time charged with the murder of one Rutland. After W. W. Gandy was arrested, and while incarcerated, he employed the complainants to defend him, and in order to secure the fee he executed a deed of trust on the eighty acres of land involved in this suit to one Lott, as trustee. This deed of trust was foreclosed, and the land purchased by complainants, who deraigned title from the United States government by mesne conveyances to W. W. Gandy and from Gandy to themselves through said foreclosure. It appears that on the trial of the murder case appellants, as attorneys for W'. W. Gandy, interposed the defense that at the time of the homicide the defendant was partially insane, being afflicted with what is known as “paranoia.” The jury, on the trial of. the criminal charge, found that the defendant was insane at the time of the homicide, and so certified by their verdict, and upon this verdict or finding of the jury W. W. Gandy was committed to the insane hospital.
The testimony shows that one Augustus Gandy, father of (the defendant "Wl W. Gandy, owned lands adjoining the lands in controversy, lying to the east of the forty acre tract in section eighteen and to the north and east of that portion of the land in--controversy lying in section thirteen. In 1909 W. W. Gandy, then a member of his father’s household, married a girl of tender years,
A careful examination of the entire record convinces us that the decree of the chancellor is manifestly wrong’. Upon the claim of exemption the proof shows conclusively that W.. W. Gandy and his wife resided with the husband’s parents and as members of the elder Gandy’s family. W. W. Gandy never owned any dwelling-house of any kind. He had no farm of his own upon the lands in controversy. ' There were no out houses incident to the usual homestead situated on the lands. The little cotton house, it is true, may be upon the south forty; but this cotton house, though purposely located on "W". W. Gandy’s land, would not characterize the lands as a homestead. There is no pretense that appellees ever lived in the cotton house, or pretended to do so. Even though the father’s field extended one hundred feet across the line and onto the south forty claimed by the son, yet this was The occupancy of the father and a part of his field. The testimony of W. W. Gandy himself is clear, forceful, and convincing. He testifies that the lands in question never constituted his homestead, and that when he executed the trust deed he so represented to appellants. The testimony of the young wife shows that she never claimed the land as a homestead before the trust deed was executed. Pressed on this point, she says:
“I just claimed it as "Widney’s land; that is all I know about it.”
“My crop was right around the house mostly; around the house forty.”
He states further: .
“As one of the children I lived there in the house with him (the father). I never had left the house.”
The proof fails to show that W. W. Gandy ever established a homestead on either of the forty acre tracts. His residence during his entire married life was upon the father’s lands, and at the date of the trust deed he and his wife were residing under the parental roof.
Homestead laws are liberally construed in favor of the exemptionist, but never as a pretext to claim that which- does not really .and substantially exist. All the many liberal opinions of the court on this subject are vitalized by the principle, well expressed by Takbble., J., in Campbell v. Adair, 45 Miss. 170, in the following language:
“One of the leading objects of these statutes is to create, preserve, and protect a home for the family, for the wife, mother, and children, as well as for the husband and father. A characteristic feature of borne is a place of residence, of which occupancy is an essential element. As a general rule, to constitute a homestead there must be actual occupation and use of the premises as a home for the family. The premises must be appropriated, dedicated, or used for the purpose designated by the law, to wit, as a home, a place to abide and reside on, ‘a home for the family.’ ”
The alleged incapacity of W. W. Gandy to execute a valid deed of trust has not been shown or established by the proof. The verdict of the jury in the criminal case in no wise estops or concludes appellants. The issue and parties in that case were entirely different. It appears that Mr. Gandy suffered from what is commonly known as “paranoia,” which is “a form of mental distress
If the trust deed executed by Mr. Gandy was valid without the joiner of his wife, it follows that the title acquired by appellants through the foreclosure thereof is also valid, and that they are entitled to the relief prayed for in their original bill. We are of the opinion that the decree of the court below should be set aside, and decree entered here cancelling the claim of appellees, and confirming appellants’ title.
Reversed and decree here for appellants.
Reversed.