¶ 1 Appellant Robin Motzer appeals from the trial court’s determination of costs and attorney fees after a jury trial in an action between Motzer and appellees Louis and Lori Escalante. Motzer contends the eoui’t abused its discretion by denying her request for attorney fees, as well as certain requested costs. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶2 The underlying facts are undisputed. Motzer sued the Escalantes for breach of contract and unjust enrichment arising out of a home remodeling project, and the Esca-lantes filed several counterclaims. The trial court subsequently dismissed Motzer’s breach of contract claim and three of the Escalantes’ claims because Motzer was not a licensed contractor as required by statute. After a trial, the jury awarded Motzer $10,980.80 on her unjust enrichment claim but awarded the Escalantes $5,075 for their counterclaim of negligent misrepresentation.
¶3 After a hearing on attorney fees and costs, the trial court issued a judgment in which it found Motzer to be the successful party for purposes of costs. The court awarded Motzer some, but not all, of her requested costs and did not award either party attorney fees. This appeal followed.
Attorney Fees
¶ 4 Motzer argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying her request for attorney fees. We review the grant or denial of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion.
Ahwatukee Custom Estates Mgmt. Ass’n, Inc. v. Turner,
¶ 5 Section 12-341.01, A.R.S., states that “the court may award the successful party reasonable attorney fees” in an “action arising out of a contract.”
1
First, the trial court must determine which party was successful and then whether attorney fees should be awarded.
See Sanborn v. Brooker & Wake Prop. Mgmt., Inc.,
¶ 6 Here, the trial court stated that it had considered “the totality of the case,” including a reasonable settlement offer by the Es-calantes, the fact that neither party proposed mediation or a settlement conference and that both parties had prevailed in part. Furthermore, the parties argued before the court whether the denial of the award of attorney fees would discourage future plaintiffs in bringing the lawsuit. All of these are factors the court correctly may consider in exercising its discretion whether or not to award fees to the successful party under
Associated Indemnity,
¶7 Motzer, however, contends the trial court erred because it applied different stan
dards
¶ 8 Motzer further relies on an unpublished memorandum decision of this court both to request this court publish any decision requiring a trial court to “explicitly lay out its basis” for a decision on attorney fees and to support a further argument. “Memorandum decisions shall not be regarded as precedent nor cited in any court” in the absence of specific circumstances including that this court may consider whether to publish a decision as an opinion. Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(e). Because the trial court here orally relied on the
Associated Indemnity
factors, we need not consider imposing any further requirement that a court explain its reasoning. And we will not consider Motzer’s other argument, as it is grounded solely in a memorandum decision.
See Hourani v. Benson Hosp.,
Costs
¶ 9 Motzer also argues the trial court erred by only awarding a portion of her costs, contending her expenses for “deposition-related costs” and jury notebooks were taxable costs. We review de novo whether certain expenses are taxable costs.
Foster ex rel. Foster v. Weir,
¶ 10 Generally, “the parties to a civil proceeding are responsible for their own litigation expenses” unless a statute provides otherwise. Id. ¶ 4. Under AR.S. §§ 12-341 and 12-332(A), a successful party may recover certain taxable costs including the “[e]ost of taking depositions” and “[ojther disbursements that are made or incurred pursuant to an order.”
Deposition costs
¶ 11 Motzer requested $404.10 for transcription and $40 for photocopies of transcripts from the Escalantes’ depositions of Motzer and of her expert witness. Costs of taking a deposition may include expenses such as those incurred photocopying the transcript.
State ex rel. Corbin v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n,
Costs pursuant to an order
¶ 12 Motzer also requested $336.71 for the preparation of exhibit notebooks for the jury. She contends this is a taxable cost because it was incurred pursuant to a court order. Photocopies not required by law are not taxable costs. AR.S. § 12-333;
see also Ahwatukee Custom Estates Mgmt. Ass’n, Inc. v. Bach,
¶ 13 The trial court issued a trial notice setting the jury trial, various pretrial dates, and procedural requirements. Many requirements were phrased in clearly mandatory terms, such as “Applications for trial postponements ... shall comply,” and “counsel must immediately lodge.” The notice also stated, “The Court encourages Juror Notebooks containing exhibits, or portions thereof, admitted by stipulation. They must be indexed and tabbed. Deposition summaries
¶ 14 We interpret a trial court’s language according to the general rules of construction. Cf
. Cohen v. Frey,
¶ 15 Motzer’s belief that this cost would be awarded as a “disbursement[ ] ... incurred pursuant to an order” under § 12-332 is understandable. Many actions allowed or encouraged by the trial court may involve the parties incurring expenses, but allowing reimbursement of such expenses as costs would frustrate the legislative intent of limiting taxable costs.
See Schritter v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
¶ 16 Motzer finally requests “an entry of pre- and post-judgment interest at the rate of 10%” on the net judgment awarded to her, beginning at the date she filed her third supplemental disclosure statement. However, Motzer never presented this request to the trial court. And “arguments not made at the trial court cannot be asserted on appeal.”
City of Tempe v. Fleming,
Appellate Costs and Fees
¶ 17 Motzer requests her costs and attorney fees on appeal under A.R.S. §§ 12-341 and 12-341.01. We note that on appeal, costs may be recoverable under A.R.S. § 12-342 rather than § 12-341. In our discretion, we deny Motzer’s request for attorney fees but award her costs on appeal under § 12-342(B).
Conclusion
¶ 18 For the foregoing reasons we affirm the trial court’s denial of Motzer’s request for attorney fees and for the cost of the jury notebooks, but reverse the court’s denial of Motzer’s request for $444.10 for deposition costs. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
Notes
. The Escalantes do not contest that this lawsuit arose out of a contract.