Thе defendant has not, in the amendment of his answer, presented a case which entitled him to the favorable consideration of the Court. It has been held by many courts, and the text writers seem to adopt the principle as settled by the great weight of authority, that perjury being intrinsic fraud, is not ground for equitable relief against a judgment resulting from it, but the fraud which warrants equity in interfering with such a solemn thing as a judgment must be such as is practiced in obtaining the judgment and which prevents the losing party from having an adversary trial of the issue. Perjury is a fraud in obtaining the judgment, but it does not prevent an adversary trial. “The losing party is before the court and is well able to make his defense. His opponent does nothing to prevent it. This rule seems harsh, for often a party will lose valuable rights because of the perjury of his adversary. However, public policy seems to demand that there be an end to litigation. If perjury
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were accepted as a ground for relief, litigation might be endless; the same issues would have to be tried repeatedly. As stated in the leading ease, ‘the wrong, in suqh case, is of course a most grievous one, аnd no doubt the Legislature and the courts would be glad to redress it if a rule could be devised that would remedy the evil without producing mischiefs far worse than the evil to be remedied.’ Endless litigation, in which nothing was ever finally determined, would be worse than occasional miscarriages of justice; and so the rule is, that a final judgment cannot be annulled merely because it cаn be shown to have been based on perjured testimony; for if this could be done once, it could be done again and again
ad infinitum."
6 Pomeroy’s Eq. Jur., sec. 656, and cases cited in note;
U. S. v.
Throckmorton,
In the case of
Dyche v. Patton, supra,
the proofs had been taken upon bill and answer, but the court refused to examine them upon the ground that the bill was fatally defective in not alleging a conviction of the imputed perjury, although it was charged directly and explicitly that a witness, who was called by thе plaintiff in the suit at law, had testified falsely and corruptly to a material matter with the knowledge of said plaintiff, who wilfully and corruptly suborned and procured the witness thus falsely to testify in his behаlf, and that the fact of the falsity Of the testimony had come to complaintant’s knowledge just before he filed his bill of complaint. The bill was dismissed as upon demurrer
ore tenus.
It was in that case Chief Justice Nash quoted with approval the words of his predecessor, Chief Justice Buffin, used by him when at the bar as counsel for the defendant in
Peagram v. King,
When this case was here before we held that fraud in procuring the judgment in the Virginia court could be set up as a defense in this action, but that no such fraud had been properly pleaded. We do not think the defendant has yet presented a case of frаud which a court of equity recognizes as sufficient for its intervention.
The other question is easy of solution. An issue was submitted to the jury as to the jurisdiction of the Corporation or Hustings Court of Manchester, Virginia. The statutes of that State were introduced without objection, and it appears therefrom that it is a court of superior and general jurisdiction in that city, and has the sаme jurisdiction as the Circuit Courts in the counties. The jurisdiction of the suit in Virginia clearly appears from an inspection of the statute. The charge of the court as to the law in this respect was correct.
We find no error in the several rulings of the court.
No error.