The appellee brought suit in the District Court April 18,1887, to restrain appellants from prosecuting a garnishment suit in Justiсe Court, Sedalia, Missouri, in which the Missouri Pacific Railway Company was garnishee and appelleе defendant. The petition alleged that all parties reside in Grayson County, Texas; that appellee’s claim against said railway company was current wages for personal service, and that the resort to the Missouri court was in fraud of our laws and to subject exempt property to the paymеnt of appellants’ claim.
Appellants moved to dissolve the injunction (1) for want of jurisdiction to issue it; (2) bеcause no ground is shown for equitable interference, the plaintiff having a complete remedy at law; (3) for the reasons set forth in the sworn answer,- said answer alleging, amongst other things, that plaintiff was justly indebted tо defendant, which he refused and failed to pay, and that the sole object of bringing the suit in Missouri was to cоllect said debt and not in fraud of our courts or laws.
This motion was overruled by the court. A trial was had and judgment was rendered June 2, 1887, in favor of plaintiff for costs and perpetuating the injunction. From this judgment the defendants аppeal.
The leading question in the case, presented under assignments in proper form, is whether thе courts of this State have the power upon the petition of a resident of this State, to whom currеnt wages for personal services are due, to restrain through the process of injunction a citizen of the county in which the suit by injunction is commenced from proceeding in another State by a writ of garnishmеnt to seize such current wages
The correct rule upon this subject we understand to be is that if the averments of the petition for injunction are of such a character as to make it the duty of the court to restrain оr enjoin the party from instituting or conducting like proceedings in a court of this State, it would be a proрer case for restraining him by a similar process from prosecuting such suit in the courts of another Statе. Dehon v. Foster,
In the case of Snook v. Snetzer,
This power or authority is exercised upon the ground of the right of the State to сompel its citizens to respect its laws beyond its territorial jurisdiction.
“Although the courts of one country hаve no authority to stay proceedings in the courts of another, they have an undoubted authority to сontrol all persons and things within their territorial limits. When, therefore, both parties to a suit in a foreign country are resident within the territorial limits of another country, the courts of equity in the latter may act in personam upon those parties, and direct them by injunction to proceed no further in such suit.” Such is the principle laid down by Mr. Justicе Story. Story’s Eq., sec. 899.
The exercise of this power does not proceed upon any claim of right tо interfere with or in any manner control or stay the proceedings in the courts of another State, but uрon the ground that the person to whom the restraining process is directed is residing within the court’s jurisdiction, and that he is in the power of the court issuing such process. Keyser v. Rice,
The decree acts directly оn the person, and its validity as to him is not affected by the fact that it does not extend to the court in which the proceedings are directed to be restrained.
In Snook v. Snetzer,
In Keyser v. Rice, 47 Maryland, supra, it was held in effect that it was against equity for a creditor to evade the laws of his own country in order to thereby obtain a preference ovеr other creditors. As such was the necessary effect of the garnishment proceeding in Missouri, such will be presumed to have been the purpose of the creditor in this case.
There is no error in" the judgment, and we think it should be affirmed.
Affirmed.
Adopted April 29, 1890.