381 Pa. 619 | Pa. | 1955
Opinion by
The City and School District of Pittsburgh sought to subject the plaintiff to mercantile license taxes. The Mercantile License Tax Act of June 20, 1947, P. L. 745 and Ordinance No. 488 of December 1, 1947, respectively prescribe a license fee for the privilege of doing business, viz., a millage tax on the volume of the annual gross business transacted by every person engaged in certain specified occupations or businesses in the City of Pittsburgh.
Appellants contend plaintiff is liable for the tax because it is a “dealer”. The word “dealer” is thus defined in the ordinance: “(b) ‘Wholesale dealer’ or ‘Wholesale vendor’ shall mean any person who sells to dealers in, or vendors of, goods, wares and merchandise and to no other persons, (c) ‘Retail dealer’ or ‘Retail vendor’ shall mean any person who is a dealer in or vendor of goods, wares and merchandise who is not a wholesale dealer or vendor.”
Plaintiff is an Ohio corporation with its main office and its manufacturing plants in Ohio. Its business is manufacturing and selling machine tools; it also buys and sells machine tools manufactured by others. It solicits business in Pittsburgh by so-called solicitors who call on the customers at the latter’s
In Law v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 367 Pa. 170, 79 A. 2d 252, the Court said: “While defendant was doing considerable business, as we shall see, in Philadelphia County, the question involved is whether it was 'doing business’ within the meaning of our decisions concerning service of process . . .
“ 'There is no general principle which conclusively establishes in every case what constitutes “doing business”. Each case is governed by its own particular
Lutz v. Foster & Kester Co., Inc., 367 Pa. 125, 79 A. 2d 222, is factually on all-fours with and rules the instant case. In the Lutz, case plaintiff served defendant with a summons in an action of assumpsit which this Court quashed. The Court held that the following facts did not amount to doing business within the Commonwealth: “The defendant’s name appears on the office' door and on the directory of the Broad Street Station Building. The telephone is listed in the defendant’s name and the charges are paid by the defendant. The defendant also pays for the telegraph services used by the branch office. The office is occupied by six employees, including a district sales manager, three salesmen, and two stenographers. The office contains six desks, some chairs,-, twelve file cases and a bookcase. ■. The file cases contain branch office copies of orders, invoices and correspondence. The office equipment was furnished by the defendant. The Philadelphia office is listed on the. defendant’s stationery, and is listed in the defendant’s annual report as a branch office.”
.... The. Court, said: “There must be ‘other activities’ in addition to; the .solicitation of business to make a foreign./ corporation’s conduct, the doing of business withjn.-,the Commonwealth, as,this court recognized in New v. Robinson-Houchin Optical Company, supra, upon quoting-from International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U. S. 310, to like effect. Such ‘other activities’ do not.consist, of acts of courtesy performed
We agree with the Court below that the rent of an office and office equipment, the solicitation of orders and the other activities of this plaintiff did not subject it to the mercantile license tax in these cases.
Judgment affirmed.
Italics, ours.