Mosso v. MossoMosso v. Mosso
Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Montgomery County (Jung, J.), entered February 20, 2003, which, inter alia, granted petitioner’s applications, in two proceedings pursuant to Family Ct Act article 6, to find respondеnt in violation of a prior order of visitation.
The parties are the parents of three unemancipated children. Since the parties’ divorce there have been various proceedings rеgarding visitation with the children. In December 2001, the parties entered into a stipulation in Family Court resulting in an order finding respondent in contempt of court for willful violations of orders of visitation. Respondent was sentеnced to six months’ incarceration for the violations, however, Family Court suspended 5/2 months contingent on respondent’s compliance with the visitation orders. In June 2002, the parties entered into a further stipulаtion modifying petitioner’s visitation with the children. During July and October 2002, petitioner filed two petitions alleging that rеspondent failed to comply with the terms of the June 2002 order. He alleged that respondent failed to permit the children to make phone calls to him, denied certain visitation and was consistently latе for the visits.
In November 2002, Family Court held a fact-finding hearing at which respondent appeared without an attorney. Although she cross-examined petitioner and was called as a witness by the Law Guardian, respondent presented no evidence. Following proof, Family Court found respondent in willful violation of the оrder and scheduled a dispositional hearing. At that hearing, with respondent now represented by counsel, she and the Law
Upon review of this record, we conclude that respondent was not given an adequate opportunity to present evidence supporting her defense and, therefore, the matter must be remitted fоr a new hearing. It is true that respondent, as a pro se litigant, represented herself at her own risk and аcquired no greater rights than other litigants (see Davis v Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.,
Specifically, we note that throughout her cross-examination of petitioner, respondent made several stаtements giving her contrary view of petitioner’s testimony and attempted to confront petitioner with dоcumentary proof that allegedly supported her defense, but was not offered into evidence. Family Court properly sustained an objection by petitioner’s counsel, who noted that respondent could raise the information “on her own case.” After petitioner rested, the following colloquy tоok place:
“the court: All right. [Respondent], the case is with you. Do you have any additional proоf?
“[respondent]: Just that on June 12th I did receive a, a—
“the court: No, do you have, do you have witnesses to call?
“[respondent]: Oh. Oh, no. No, Your Honor.
“the court: Evidence to produce?
The court assumed that respondent was resting her case without testifying and the Law Guardian then stated, “7 think, Your Honor, that [respondent] may have intended to take the stand.” Unfortunately, the issue was not pursued and the Law Guardian proceeded with his proof.
In our view, based upon respondent’s answers to Family Court’s questions and the statement from the Law Guardian, the court should have inquired further of respondent as to whether she, in fact, wanted to testify. Notably, due process requires that, in contempt proceedings, the cоntemnor be afforded “an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner” (16D CJS, Constitutional Law § 1425; cf. Hickland v Hickland,
Given the above conclusions, it is unnecessary to consider the remaining argument that the penаlty of incarceration was harsh and excessive under the circumstances (see e.g. Fuerst v Fuerst,
Peters, Spain, Rose аnd Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, without costs, and matter remitted to the Fаmily Court of Montgomery County for a new hearing.
Notes
. It was previously established at the November 2002 hearing that a home study concluded that petitioner’s home was unsuitable for overnight visitations.
. Additionally, Family Court imposed a second six-month sentence of incarceration which was suspended in exchange for respondent’s future compliance with the court’s visitation order.