This litigation arises from a motor vehicle accident. The plaintiffs-appellees, Barbara A. White, Individually and as the Adminis-tratrix of the Estate of James T. White; Kathleen White Murphy; Thomas James White; and William H. White (“Plaintiffs”), commenced a wrongful death action in the Superior Court. The defendants were the appellants, Moss Rehab, Moss Rehabilitation Hospital, and Moss Rehab Driving School for the Disabled (collectively “Moss Rehab”); and other persons, who are not parties to this appeal. After a jury trial, the Plaintiffs were awarded a total of $371,900. Thus far, the Plaintiffs have received $200,000 from the non-appealing defendants.
Moss Rehab raises two issues on appeal. First, Moss Rehab argues that the Superior Court improperly denied their motion for summary judgment. Specifically, Moss Rehab contends that the Plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action under Delaware law. Second, Moss Rehab asserts that the Superi- or Court erred by denying Moss Rehab’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. According to Moss Rehab’s arguments, the Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof either in establishing the standard of care or that a breach of that standard was the proximate cause of Plaintiffs’ injuries.
This Court has concluded that the Superi- or Court should have granted Moss Rehab’s motion for summary judgment. The Plaintiffs’ complaint failed to assert a claim upon which relief could be granted under Delaware law. Accordingly, the judgment against Moss Rehab must be reversed. Consequently, it is unnecessary to address the merits of Moss Rehab’s second contention.
Substantive Facts
Moss Rehab Driving School for the Disabled (“Moss Driving School”) provides driver evaluation and training for individuals with physical disabilities. Moss Driving School is authorized to operate in Delaware by the Department of Public Instruction. 1 Moss Driving School receives referrals for driver evaluation and training from individuals, physicians, hospitals, vocational rehabilitation facilities, and workers’ compensation facilities.
Moss Driving School conducts a formal assessment to determine whether the disabled applicant is capable of learning to drive a motor vehicle, before the actual training program begins. The assessment consists of visual, perceptual and reaction-time testing, as well as a review of the applicant’s medical records. If the applicant has a learner’s permit, the assessment also includes a road test. If the applicant’s assessment is not satisfactory, Moss Driving School will not accept that person for driver training.
In April 1984, John Matthew Sharp (“Sharp”) was fifteen years old. He was in a car accident that left him in a coma for one week. Over the next three years, Sharp received medical treatment for the consequences of a severe closed head trauma. That injury affected many parts of Sharp’s brain.
In March 1990, Sharp’s mother referred him to the Delaware Division of Vocational Rehabilitation (“DVR”) for job training. After successfully completing job training, Sharp obtained employment as a credit au-
Sharp’s training at Moss Driving School began on January 15, 1991. After his initial training lesson, Sharp’s instructor noted in his file that Sharp possessed knowledge of some driving skills. Over the course of Sharp’s training, his instructor noted several problems in Sharp’s file. Those problems included being a “little jerky with the steering wheel,” needing to slow down, being a “wise guy,” and exhibiting problems when making right-hand turns. 3
According to Moss Rehab’s records, by the time Sharp completed his driver training, his demonstrated problems had been corrected. Sharp’s instructor testified at trial that Sharp had been appropriately evaluated and trained to independently operate a motor vehicle. Sharp’s instructor also testified that she never had a concern about Sharp’s reaction time.
The record reflects that, notwithstanding Sharp’s completion of the Moss Driving School’s program, Sharp failed the first driver’s test administered to him by the Delaware Department of Public Safety, Division of Motor Vehicles. That failure was the result of hitting a cone during the driving test. Sharp passed the Delaware driving test when he took it for a second time on May 7,1991. The test administered to Sharp was the same test that is given to non-handicapped drivers.
On July 12, 1991, Sharp was driving his automobile in New Castle County. After exiting a highway, he kept his car close to the right-hand side of the exit ramp roadway. In doing so, Sharp’s right front tire hit the cement curb. Sharp reacted by steering to the left and collided with a car in the left lane of the exit ramp. Still moving to the left, Sharp reached and merged into the right lane of the highway, where the left rear quarter-panel of his car was struck by the right front fender of a “second car.” Sharp’s vehicle traveled another 200 feet up the road where he brought the car to a controlled stop.
The collision with Sharp’s vehicle forced the second car into the path of a truck. The truck collided with the second car. James T. White (‘White”), the passenger of the second car, was fatally injured from the collision with the truck.
Procedural Facts
Plaintiffs commenced a wrongful death action on May 17, 1993 against Sharp, the driver of the truck, and other defendants. The complaint alleged that the driver defendants had negligently operated their motor vehicles. The complaint asserted that the defendant drivers’ negligence was the proximate cause of White’s death.
On July 8, 1993, Plaintiffs commenced an additional wrongful death action against Moss Rehab. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that Moss Rehab had failed to properly evaluate Sharp and train him to drive a motor vehicle. In November 1993, the Superior Court consolidated the proceedings against the defendants named in the original action and Moss Rehab.
On April 28, 1995, Moss Rehab filed a motion for summary judgment. Moss argued, inter alia, that Plaintiffs’ complaint failed to state a legally cognizable cause of action against Moss Rehab; that Moss Rehab’s conduct was not a proximate cause of White’s injury or death; and that, as a matter of law, a driving school did not owe a duty to protect third parties in the general public from the negligent conduct of one of its students. The Superior Court denied Moss Rehab’s motion for summary judgment.
On November 2, 1995, the jury returned a verdict for Plaintiffs in the amount of $371,-900. 4 On November 15, 1995, Moss Rehab filed a motion requesting judgment as a matter of law. The Superior Court again denied the motion. This is Moss Rehab’s direct appeal from the final judgment of the Superi- or Court.
Plaintiffs ’ Allegation Educational Malpractice Claim
Moss Rehab contends that Plaintiffs’ complaint stated a third-party claim for educational malpractice. Moss Rehab further asserts that such a cause of action has not been, and should not be, recognized in Delaware as a matter of common law. Therefore, Moss Rehab argues that the Superior Court improperly denied their motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs, however, assert that their complaint was not based upon educational malpractice. Instead, they contend that their complaint set forth allegations of well-established common-law negligence by Moss Rehab.
This Court has concluded that, although the Plaintiffs’ complaint did not use the words “educational malpractice,” it asserts such a cause of action. The complaint alleges that Moss Rehab was negligent in evaluating, recommending and training Sharp to drive a motor vehicle. The terms of those allegations encompass the traditional aspects of education. Therefore, despite Plaintiffs’ contention to the contrary, this Court concludes that the allegations against Moss Rehab in the complaint constitute a claim of educational malpractice.
Cf. Brantley v. District of Columbia,
D.C.Ct.App.,
A claim for educational malpractice is generally brought directly by a student against an educational institution. These cases involve allegations that, as a result of the institution’s negligent instruction, the student received an inadequate education. See gem erally John G. Culhane, Reinvigorating Educational Malpractice Claims: A Representational Focus, 67 Wash.L.Rev. 349 (1992).
Educational malpractice claims may also be brought by a third party. Id. In those cases, third parties allege that they were injured by the school’s former student due to the school’s negligence in educating that student. The present case against Moss Rehab is a third-party claim for educational malpractice.
This case presents a question of first impression. We must determine whether a third-party claim of educational malpractice against a driving school is a cognizable common-law cause of action in Delaware.
6
In
Other Jurisdictions Educational Malpractice Claims
Courts in at least ten states and the District of Columbia have considered and declined to hold that a claim for educational malpractice is a cognizable common-law cause of action.
7
Most of those educational malpractice claims involved
direct
causes of action brought by a student against an educational institution. One case, however, did address a
third-party
educational malpractice claim.
Moore v. Vanderloo,
Iowa Supr.,
In Moore, the plaintiff sued both her chiropractor and the educational institution he had attended, claiming the institution negligently failed to properly educate its student. 8 Id. at 111. The Iowa Supreme Court held, in Moore, that a third-party educational malpractice claim is not a valid cause of action at common law in Iowa. In doing so, it noted that, with one exception, the courts that have addressed the issue have refused to recognize a direct common-law cause of action for educational malpractice. Id. at 114. Although the. Iowa Supreme Court acknowledged that the direct cause of action cases arose in different factual contexts, it concluded that the public policy considerations were the same. 9 Id.
Dram Shop Cases Analogous Precedents
The operation of motor vehicles and the distribution of alcohol beverages are two activities that are highly regulated by statute in Delaware. Although this Court has never been called upon to address a common-law claim for education malpractice, it has considered both direct and third-party common-law theories of Dram Shop liability.
10
Samson v. Smith,
Del.Supr.,
In
Wright,
an intoxicated patron brought suit against the tavern that had served him alcoholic beverages. After leaving the tavern, the intoxicated patron was struck by an automobile. In
Wright,
the plaintiff argued that this Court should recognize a
direct
common-law Dram Shop cause of action, as part of our “historic function of developing the law in light of the circumstances in which an issue arises.”
Wright v. Moffitt,
In
Samson,
this Court declined to recognize a common-law cause of action against a tavern operator for injuries to a
third party
caused by an intoxicated patron. In
Samson,
an intoxicated patron left a bowling establishment where he had consumed eight beers in a three and one-half hour period. Shortly after leaving the establishment, he failed to stop at a red light and his vehicle struck another vehicle. The driver of the other automobile, who sustained serious bodily injury, brought suit against the intoxicated driver and the establishment where the intoxicated driver had been drinking. On appeal, this Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment, holding that there is no common-law cause of action against a tavern operator by a third party, who is injured off the premises of the tavern by a patron who became intoxicated at the tavern.
Samson v. Smith,
In
Samson,
this Court relied upon its prior decision in
Wright,
stating: “ ‘[I]n our view, the General Assembly is in a far better position than this Court to gather the empirical data and to make the fact finding necessary to determine what the public policy should be as to a Dram Shop law, and the scope of any such law.’ ”
Id.
at 1027 (quoting
Wright v. Moffitt,
Dram Shop Liability Rationale Third-Party Educational Malpractice Claims
This Court’s prior decisions in the cases involving causes of action against tavern owners are particularly didactic to the issue of third-party educational malpractice that is before the Court in the case
sub judice. See Acker v.
S.W.
Cantinas, Inc.,
Del.Supr.,
In Delaware, driver competency is also extensively regulated by statute. The General Assembly regulates the necessary qualifications to obtain a driver’s license. 21 Del.C. § 2707. The General Assembly mandates the examination of applicants for a driver’s license. 21 Del.C. § 2713. The General Assembly, by statute, specifically provides for the medical evaluation of drivers. 21 Del.C. § 2724. The General Assembly has given the Department of Public Safety the power to issue drivers’ licenses with restrictions suitable to the licensee’s driving ability. 21 Del.C. § 2722.
The General Assembly also regulates commercial driver training schools by statute. 21 Del.C. ch. 83. The General Assembly has given the Secretary of Public Safety (“Secretary”) the power to adopt and prescribe such regulations concerning commercial driving schools as are necessary to protect the public. 21 Del.C. § 8302(a). The General Assembly also directed the Secretary to inspect the school facilities and equipment and to examine the applicants for instructor’s licenses. 21 Del.C. § 8302(a). Additionally, the General Assembly has mandated that no driver training school shall be established and no person shall act as an instructor unless the school or person applies for and obtains a license from the Secretary. 21 Del. C. §§ 8303(a), 8304(a). The General Assembly has set forth the basic requirements, to be adopted by the Secretary, for licenses to operate a driving school and to serve as a driving instructor. 21 Del.C. §§ 8303(b), 8304(b). Finally, the General Assembly has given the Secretary the authority to cancel, suspend, revoke or refuse to issue or renew a driving school’s or driving instructor’s license if the school or instructor has violated any provision set forth by the General Assembly or any regulation adopted by the Secretary. 21 DelC. § 8306.
Third-Party Claim Driver Education Malpractice Not Cognizable at Common Law
This Court has been vigilant in discharging its responsibility to preserve and advance Delaware’s common-law heritage.
See, e.g., Beattie v. Beattie,
Del.Supr.,
Just as the General Assembly has exercised its statutory power to license and regulate the sale of alcoholic beverages, the General Assembly has exercised its statutory power to oversee the licensing of drivers, and the licensing of driver training institutions.
See, e.g.,
21
Del.C.
ch. 27 (Driver’s Licenses); 21
Del.C.
ch. 83 (Commercial Driver Training School Licensing). The General Assembly is best able to address the competing public policy issues that must be reconciled with regard to recognizing a third-parly claim for educational malpractice by a driving school. Accordingly, this Court declines to recognize a common-law third-party cause of action for educational malpractice against a driving school.
Accord Moore v. Vanderloo,
Iowa Supr.,
Conclusion
A third-party claim for educational malpractice against a driving school is not a cognizable common-law cause of action in Delaware. Accordingly, the decision of the Superior Court denying Moss Rehab’s motion for summary judgment is reversed. This matter is remanded to the Superior Court for the purpose of entering judgments in accordance with this opinion.
Notes
. Moss Driving School is also regulated in Pennsylvania by the Department of Education.
. In August 1989, Sharp was evaluated by one of his physicians to determine if Sharp had the neurologic motor capability to be referred to a driving evaluation program. The physician determined that Sharp was an appropriate candidate.
. The Moss Driving School records reflect that Sharp repeatedly turned wide when making right-hand turns from a two-lane one-way street on to a similar two-lane one-way street. When turning from the inside or right-most lane onto the other street, Sharp would end up in the outer or left-most lane.
. To date, Plaintiffs have collected $100,000 from Sharp, representing the policy limits of his automobile insurance. Plaintiffs have also collected $100,000 from another driver defendant, pursuant to the terms of a pre-verdict high-low agreement.
.
See also Armstrong v. Data Processing Inst., Inc.,
Fla.Dist.Ct.App.,
. As the Court of Appeals of New York recognized:
The fact that a complaint alleging "educational malpractice" might on the pleadings state a cause of action within traditional notions of tort law does not, however, require that it be sustained. The heart of the matter is whether, assuming that such a cause of action may be stated, the courts should, as a matter of public policy, entertain such claims. We believe they should not.
. See, e.g., Blane v. Alabama Commercial College, Inc.,
Ala.Supr.,
. In
Moore,
the Iowa Supreme Court considered whether an injured third party can successfully assert a negligence action against an educational institution for improperly teaching a student.
Moore v. Vanderloo,
. First, the court noted that there was not a satisfactory standard of care by which to measure the educator’s conduct.
Moore v. Vanderloo,
. Dram Shop cases assert either direct or third-party causes of action against tavern owners for injuries caused to or by intoxicated patrons.
.
See also Travelers Indem. Co. v. Lake,
Del. Supr.,
. This Court has acknowledged that the two primary purposes of the Workers’ Compensation law are to provide prompt payment of benefits without regard to fault and to relieve employers and employees of the burden of civil litigation.
Champlain Cable Corp. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co.,
Del.Supr.,