Mosley v. StateMosley v. State
This аppeal is from a verdict and judgment finding William Howard Mosley guilty of rape and fixing his punishment at life imprisonment. The appellant’s attorney, who was appointed by the court, argues three points for rеversal.
Before the trial counsel filed a motion to suppress the defendant’s confession, оn the grounds that he was not properly warned of his constitutional rights and that he was too young to cоmprehend such a warning. The trial judge held a hearing on the motion to suppress and found the confession to be admissible. In accordance with our practice as set forth in Harris v. Slate,
The offense of rape was committed in August of 1966. In the following May young Mosley, who was wanted as an escapee from the Boys Industrial School, was arrested and questioned about a more recent offense involving burglary and assault. The two officers who questioned Mosley testifiеd that they first explained his constitutional rights and obtained his signature to a printed form of waiver contаining a full statement of those rights. Mosley quickly admitted his guilt of the offense under investigation and signed a confеssion with respect to it.
The officers then repeated their explanation of Mosley’s rights and obtained another signed waiver before questioning him about the older charge of rape. Mosley again admitted his guilt and signed a confession that agreed in all material details with the version later given by the prosecuting witness at the trial of the case. This is the confession that the trial judge found to havе been voluntarily given.
AVe agree with that conclusion. Mosley testified at the hearing on the motion tо suppress. He admitted that the officers read the waiver to him, but he testified that he did not understand it. He dоes not contend that he was physically mistreated, though he does say that one of the officers threatened to “bust” him when lie got out of the reform school.
Mosley was fifteen years old when he wаs interrogated. lie had served a term in the penitentiary and liad also been confined to the Boys Industrial School. The trial judge made detailed findings of fact, which included this statement based upon firsthand оbservation: “He appeared to me to be completely normal and possessing the intellect of an average sixteen-year-old boy.” Needless to say, officers who question an underage suspect should take his youthfulness into consideration in conducting their interrogation. In this casе we do not find that young Mosley was abused or treated unfairly in any way. By the great weight of authority a minor is capable of making an admissible voluntary confession, there being' no requirement that he have the advice of a parent, guardian, or other adult. The cases are analyzed at length in Peоple v. Lara,
Secondly, counsel contends that the State failed to make a prima facie case, because Mosley’s confession is the only evidence that connects him with the crime. That is all the law requires, it being sufficient for the other proof to show that the offense charged was committed by someone.
Finally, сounsel complains of two references during the trial to the subsequent incident involving burglary and assault. Bоth references occurred during the cross-examination of Officer Calhoun, a witness for the Statе. Calhoun was asked what happened just before Mosley confessed to the rape, and the witness answered: “I was questioning him about a house burglary where he assaulted a woman and broke in her house.” The answer could not have been unexpected, for the officer had given the same testimony at the earlier hearing upon the motion to suppress. Moreover, defense counsel continued his cross-examination without making any objection to the officer’s reply to the question.
A few moments later counsel returned to the point, asking Officer Calhoun if Mosley had signed another statement before signing the confession of rape. Calhoun answered: “Yes, sir. He signed one before this one admitting to assault of this other woman over there.” Counsel then made an objection and asked the court to admonish the jury, which was done. It was not until counsel had concluded his cross-examinаtion that he asked for a mistrial, which he now insists should have been granted. The court properly refused to declare a mistrial, not only because that request manifestly came too late but also because counsel’s questions had elicited the information .in the first place. Doubtless counsel expected to derive some benefit for his client by showing that the youth had already been questioned for about 70 minutes before the officers began to interrogate him about the rape charge. Counsel cannot be permitted to obtain the advantage of that argument to the jury and still insist upon a mistrial when the strategy proved to be unavailing.
Affirmed.