Moshe Rozenblit v. Marcia V. Lyles
A-41/42-19 (083434)
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
February 3, 2021
245 N.J. 105
PATTERSON, J., writing for the Court.
Argued October 13, 2020
This syllabus is not part of the Court‘s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized.
Moshe Rozenblit v. Marcia V. Lyles (A-41/42-19) (083434)
Argued October 13, 2020 -- Decided February 3, 2021
PATTERSON, J., writing for the Court.
In this appeal, the Court considers statutory and constitutional challenges to provisions in a collective negotiations agreement (CNA) between the Jersey City School District (District) and the Jersey City Education Association (Association) that authorized two teachers, or “releasees,” employed and compensated by the District to work full-time on the Association‘s business, a practice known as “release time.”
The CNA states that “[t]he president of the [Association], and his/her designee, shall be permitted to devote all of his/her time to the Association business and affairs.” The two employees designated as releasees receive full-time salaries and benefits from the District. The releasees’ duties include facilitating labor-management relations, resolving disagreements, promoting effective communications between teachers and administration, promoting harmonious employer/employee relationships, and helping set and clarify school policies with the administration. The releasees keep an appropriate Associate Superintendent apprised of the work they are doing and their location.
Plaintiffs, as taxpayers, filed this action contending that the CNA‘s release time provisions violate the
The Appellate Division reversed. 461 N.J. Super. 20, 31-32 (App. Div. 2019). Declining to address the constitutional issue on which plaintiffs based their claim, id. at 24-25, the Appellate Division concluded that the Jersey City Board of Education (Board) acted beyond the scope of its statutory authority when it paid the salaries and benefits of the two releasees, id. at 31-32.
The Court granted the petition and cross-petition for certification. 240 N.J. 551 (2020); 240 N.J. 552 (2020).
- The Court first considers the statutory question raised by the Appellate Division -- whether the Legislature granted the Board the authority to pay the salaries and benefits of the two releasees. Local boards of education may exercise only those powers granted to them by the Legislature. Title 18A of the New Jersey Statutes, the Education Code, includes several provisions addressing the scope of the legislative grant of authority to boards of education. The Court reviews
N.J.S.A. 18A:11-1(c) ,N.J.S.A. 18A:27-4 , and the provision at the center of this appeal --N.J.S.A. 18A:30-7 . Entitled “Power of boards of education to pay salaries,”N.J.S.A. 18A:30-7 provides: “Nothing in this chapter shall affect the right of the board of education to fix either by rule or by individual consideration, the payment of salary in cases of absence not constituting sick leave, or to grant sick leave over and above the minimum sick leave as defined in this chapter . . . .” The Legislature did not define “absence not constituting sick leave,” or limit leaves of absence other than sick leave that a board of education may authorize school employees to take. The EERA also informs the determination of this appeal. In the EERA, the Legislature declared, in part, that “the best interests of the people of the State are served by the prevention or prompt settlement of labor disputes.”N.J.S.A. 34:13A-2 . The Court considers the Education Code and the EERA in tandem. (pp. 17-22) - By its plain language,
N.J.S.A. 18A:30-7 confers on boards the authority to grant leaves of absence -- in addition to and distinct from sick leave -- to school employees. The Legislature could have limited the boards’ power in this regard by enumerating specific categories of leaves of absence in the statute, but it declined to do so. The legislative goal is clear: to afford to boards expansive authority to make rules with respect to such leaves of absence. A releasee is “absent” from ordinarily assigned duties within the meaning of the statute. And the mandatory leave prescribed inN.J.S.A. 18A:30-8 for elite athletes competing internationally does not constitute “absence not constituting sick leave” underN.J.S.A. 18A:30-7 , which school boards are permitted at their discretion -- but not required -- to grant. Nothing inN.J.S.A. 18A:30-8 suggests legislative intent to limit boards’ discretion to grant leaves of absence in other settings underN.J.S.A. 18A:30-7 . (pp. 23-25) - Interpreting
N.J.S.A. 18A:30-7 to encompass release time furthers the Legislature‘s intent that boards of education make rules “for the government and management of the public schools . . . and for the employment, regulation of conduct and discharge of [their] employees.”N.J.S.A. 18A:11-1(c) . It also comports with the Legislature‘s grant of
- The Court next considers plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge to the payment of the releasees’ salaries and benefits pursuant to the CNA. The Gift Clause provisions relevant here --
N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 3, ¶¶ 2 ,3 -- reflect the fundamental doctrine that public money should be raised and used only for public purposes. Under the standard prescribed in Roe v. Kervick, 42 N.J. 191, 218-19 (1964), and later case law, a court addressing a Gift Clause challenge must first determine whether the transaction is for a public purpose, and second, whether the means to accomplish that public purpose are consonant with it. For purposes of the first inquiry, courts consider whether the disputed activity serves as a benefit to the community as a whole and is directly related to the functions of government. The second inquiry requires the resolution of two subsidiary questions: (1) whether the transaction is contractual and involves some obligation on the part of the private entity that is intimately tied to fulfilling the public purpose, and (2) whether the accomplishment of the public purpose is the paramount factor in the contract with any private advantage being merely incidental or subordinate. (pp. 28-32) - Here, the release time serves public purposes expressly recognized by the Legislature in
N.J.S.A. 34:13A-2 . And the releasees work to enhance the collective bargaining process, recognized to “promote labor stability in the public sector and enhance the delivery and avoid the disruption of public services.”N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.12 . As to the second prong, the release time is part of an agreement arrived at through collective negotiations in which the Association made concessions. The releasees’ duties directly relate to the resolution of employer-employee disputes, and the District maintains sufficient oversight to ensure that the public purpose is served. Finally, the public purpose of the release time provisions is the paramount factor in the agreement. The releasees’ primary assignment is to engage with District personnel and Association members to resolve labor disputes at an early stage. The releasees are routinely asked by District or school officials to intervene, and they report to the District on the results achieved. The release time provisions conform to the two-part standard and do not constitute gifts to the Association in violation of the State Constitution. (pp. 33-36)
REVERSED. The judgment of the trial court is REINSTATED.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and PIERRE-LOUIS join in JUSTICE PATTERSON‘s opinion.
A-41/42 September Term 2019
083434
Moshe Rozenblit, and Won Kyu Rim,
Plaintiffs-Respondents/Cross-Appellants,
v.
Marcia V. Lyles, in her official capacity as Superintendent of the Jersey City Board of Education, Vidya Gangadin, in her official capacity as President of the Jersey City Board of Education, and Jersey City Public Schools of the City of Jersey City,
Defendants,
and
Jersey City Board of Education,
Defendant,
and
Jersey City Education Association, Inc.,
Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Respondent.
On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 461 N.J. Super. 20 (App. Div. 2019).
| Argued October 13, 2020 | Decided February 3, 2021 |
Jonathan Riches, of the Arizona bar, admitted pro hac vice, argued the cause for respondents/cross-appellants (Law Offices of G. Martin Meyers and Scharf-Norton Center for Constitutional Litigation at the Goldwater Institute, attorneys; Justin A. Meyers and Jonathan Riches, on the briefs).
Steven R. Cohen argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Education Association (Selikoff & Cohen and New Jersey Education Association, attorneys; Steven R. Cohen, Keith Waldman, Hop T. Wechsler, Daniel R. Dowdy, and Aileen O‘Driscoll, on the brief).
Flavio L. Komuves argued the cause for amici curiae Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, the American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, the International Federation of Professional and Technical Employees, AFL-CIO and the Public Employee Committee of the New Jersey State AFL-CIO (Weissman & Mintz, attorneys; Flavio L. Komuves, Ira Mintz, and Steven P. Weissman, on the brief).
Christine Lucarelli argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission (New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission, attorneys; Christine Lucarelli, on the brief).
Sanford R. Oxfeld submitted a brief on behalf of amici curiae East Orange Education Association and Wayne Education Association (Oxfeld Cohen, attorneys; Sanford R. Oxfeld and William P. Hannan, of counsel and on the brief).
Arnold Shep Cohen submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae IFPTE, Local 195, AFL-CIO (Oxfeld Cohen, attorneys; Arnold Shep Cohen, of counsel and on the brief).
JUSTICE PATTERSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this appeal, we consider statutory and constitutional challenges to provisions in a collective negotiations agreement (CNA) between the Jersey City School District (District) and the Jersey City Education Association (Association). The disputed provisions authorized two teachers, or “releasees,” employed and compensated by the District to work full-time on the Association‘s “business and affairs,” a practice known as “release time.”
Plaintiffs Moshe Rozenblit and Won Kyu Rim sought a declaratory judgment holding that the District‘s payment of the salaries and benefits of employees on release time is contrary to the Gift Clause provisions of
The Appellate Division reversed the trial court‘s judgment and invalidated the CNA‘s release time provisions on statutory grounds. Rozenblit v. Lyles, 461 N.J. Super. 20, 25-32 (App. Div. 2019). It held that
We do not share the Appellate Division‘s view that the Board‘s agreement to the disputed provisions exceeded its statutory grant of authority. In the Education Code, the Legislature empowered boards of education to make rules governing the compensation of teachers,
We concur with the trial court that the Board did not violate the Gift Clause of the New Jersey Constitution when it agreed to the release time provisions in the CNA. Applying the standard prescribed in Roe v. Kervick, 42 N.J. 191, 218-19 (1964), and later case law, we conclude that the release time provisions serve a public purpose and are so consonant with the accomplishment of that public purpose that they do not offend the Gift Clause.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and reinstate the trial court‘s order dismissing plaintiffs’ claims.
A.
We summarize the facts based on the record submitted to the trial court in connection with the cross-motions for summary judgment filed by plaintiffs and the Association.
On May 10, 2010, the District and the Association executed the CNA, which was effective from September 1, 2013 to August 31, 2017.1 Two provisions of the contract‘s Article 7, which addresses “Association Rights,” are relevant to this appeal. First, Section 7-2.3 stated that “[t]he president of the [Association], and his/her designee, shall be permitted to devote all of his/her time to the Association business and affairs. The [p]resident shall continue to be granted adequate office and parking facilities.” Second, Section 7-2.4 stated that “[t]he president‘s designee shall carry out appropriate Association business, provided that the aforesaid business shall not disrupt the educational process. The designee shall notify the Superintendent or his/her
During the period relevant to this appeal, the two employees designated as releasees pursuant to Sections 7-2.3 and 7-2.4 were the Association‘s president, Ronald Greco, and its second vice president and Grievance Chair, Tina Thorp. It is undisputed that Greco and Thorp received full-time salaries and benefits during the contract term.
According to a certification submitted by Greco to the trial court, since 1969 or before, the collective negotiations agreements between the District and the Association have provided that the Association‘s president would be a full-time employee on release time. Greco certified that in 1998, school administrators requested that a second releasee be designated to work full-time on the resolution of labor disputes and other Association duties, and the Association agreed to that request.
Greco described his release time duties to include “facilitating labor-management relations, informally and formally resolving disagreements, promoting effective communications between teachers and administration, improving education quality and personnel skill, promoting harmonious employer/employee relationships, helping set and clarify school policies with the administration, and working with the staff to understand and comply with
Greco estimated that he and Thorp spend approximately seventy percent of their working hours attempting to resolve grievances and other disputes between teachers and school administration, and both releasees certified that they spend ninety percent of their school day personally interacting with District personnel in school buildings or Board headquarters. Greco represented that he is “regularly asked by central administrative staff to travel to a school to conciliate a dispute, and then report back on the results of those efforts.”
Greco and Thorp certified that they are required to work a specified number of days per year. Greco stated that he “keep[s] an appropriate Associate Superintendent apprised” of the work he is doing and his location,
In deposition testimony, Celeste Williams, the District‘s Chief of Talent responsible for human resources issues, testified that to the best of her knowledge, the District did not direct the daily activities of Greco or Thorp, formally evaluate them, or assign them a supervisor.
B.
1.
Plaintiffs, who asserted standing based on their status as taxpayers, filed this action against the Jersey City Public Schools, the Superintendent of the Jersey City Public Schools, the Board, the Board‘s President, and the Association. They contend that the CNA‘s release time provisions violate the
The Association filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e). The trial court denied that motion, reasoning that plaintiffs had stated a claim for a violation of the Gift Clause
The parties conducted discovery and then cross-moved for summary judgment in accordance with Rule 4:46-2. Applying this Court‘s decision in Roe, the trial court held that the release time provisions of the CNA represented the District‘s implementation of its right under
The trial court found that the Board‘s grant of the challenged release time serves public purposes important to the District‘s educational mission: the facilitation of effective collective bargaining, disciplinary hearings, and grievance procedures; avoiding the expense of prolonged arbitration; and ensuring effective labor-management communications. The court also held that the District exercises sufficient control to ensure that the releasees would serve those public purposes. It concluded that plaintiffs did not demonstrate
The trial court denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and granted the Association‘s motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ claims.
2.
Plaintiffs appealed the trial court‘s judgment. The Appellate Division granted the application of the Pacific Legal Foundation to participate as amicus curiae.
The Appellate Division reversed the judgment of the trial court. Rozenblit, 461 N.J. Super. at 31-32. Invoking the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, the court premised its determination on statutory grounds. Id. at 24-30. It concluded that the Association had cited to no statute authorizing “the Board to pay the salaries of teachers whose job duties are exclusively devoted to the service of another organization.” Id. at 30.
The Appellate Division construed
The Appellate Division further noted that
The Appellate Division accordingly held Section 7-2.3 of the CNA to be against public policy and unenforceable, and found the Board‘s disbursement of public funds pursuant to that provision to be ultra vires. Id. at 31-32. It declined to reach plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge to the release time provisions. Id. at 24-25.
We granted the Association‘s petition for certification, 240 N.J. 551 (2020), and plaintiffs’ cross-petition for certification, 240 N.J. 552 (2020). We also granted several individual and joint applications for amicus curiae status.
II.
A.
The Association contends that the Appellate Division improperly determined that there is no statutory authority for the time-honored and widespread practice of negotiating release time in collective bargaining between school boards and their employees.
In the Association‘s view,
The following amici curiae concur with the Association‘s arguments: the New Jersey Education Association; the International Federation of Professional and Technical Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 195; the East Orange Education Association, participating jointly with the Wayne Education Association; and the Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, participating jointly with the American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, the International Federation of Professional and Technical Employees, AFL-CIO, and the Public Employee Committee of the New Jersey State AFL-CIO.
Amici contend that the Appellate Division misconstrued
C.
Plaintiffs urge the Court to affirm the Appellate Division‘s judgment. They concur with the Association that the Court should decide the
Plaintiffs also assert a statutory argument not raised before the trial court: they contend that
D.
Jointly participating amici curiae the Pacific Legal Foundation and Americans for Prosperity - New Jersey concur with plaintiffs that release time is unauthorized by any New Jersey statute. Amici view release time in the setting of this appeal to constitute an unconstitutional gift of public funds for which the District received no consideration and over which it exercised no control.
E.
The New Jersey Public Employment Relations Committee (PERC) asserts as amicus curiae that the Appellate Division improperly made a scope-
III.
A.
We review the trial court‘s determination of the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment in accordance with the standard that governed the court‘s analysis. See Rule 4:46-2; Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995). A court should grant summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.” Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 449, 471-72 (2020) (quoting Rule 4:46-2(c)).
1.
We first consider the statutory question raised by the Appellate Division‘s determination. See Rozenblit, 461 N.J. Super. at 24-30. Our review of issues involving statutory construction is de novo. Christian Mission John 3:16 v. Passaic City, 243 N.J. 175, 184 (2020).
In that inquiry, “our goal is to ‘ascertain and effectuate the Legislature‘s intent.‘” Kean Fed‘n of Tchrs. v. Morell, 233 N.J. 566, 583 (2018) (quoting Cashin v. Bello, 223 N.J. 328, 335 (2015)). To that end, we first look to the statute‘s language and ascribe to the Legislature‘s chosen words their ordinary meaning. Mason v. City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 68 (2008) (citing DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)). If “the statutory language is ambiguous, we may consider extrinsic materials such as legislative history, committee reports, and other relevant sources.” Kean Fed‘n of Tchrs., 233 N.J. at 583 (citing Cashin, 223 N.J. at 335-36).
We “take into consideration the entire scheme of which a provision is a part.” Headen v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 212 N.J. 437, 450-51 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). In reading “[a]n enactment that is part of a larger statutory framework,” we are mindful of that context “so that a sensible meaning may be given to the whole of the legislative scheme.” Wilson ex rel.
Manzano v. City of Jersey City, 209 N.J. 558, 572 (2012). Accordingly, “[w]e may also turn to extrinsic guides if a literal reading of the statute would yield an absurd result, particularly one at odds with the overall statutory scheme.” Ibid.2.
Declining to address the constitutional issue on which plaintiffs based their claim, the Appellate Division concluded that the Board acted beyond the scope of its statutory authority when it paid the salaries and benefits of the two releasees. Rozenblit, 461 N.J. Super. at 31-32.2 Accordingly, we consider whether the Legislature granted the Board the authority to agree to the disputed contractual provisions, and to pay the salaries and benefits of the two releasees.
As this Court has held, “[l]ocal boards of education are creations of the State and, as such, may exercise only those powers granted to them by the
Title 18A of the New Jersey Statutes, the Education Code, includes several provisions addressing the scope of the legislative grant of authority to boards of education. In
[m]ake, amend and repeal rules, not inconsistent with this title or with the rules of the state board, for its own government and the transaction of its business and for the government and management of the public schools and public school property of the district and for the employment, regulation of conduct and discharge of its employees, subject, where applicable, to the provisions of Title 11, Civil Service, of the Revised Statutes.
The Legislature further addressed board of education oversight of teaching staff members’ employment in
make rules, not inconsistent with the provisions of this title, governing the employment, terms and tenure of employment, promotion and dismissal, and salaries and time and mode of payment thereof of teaching staff members for the district, and may from time to time change, amend or repeal the same, and the employment of any person in any such capacity and his rights and duties with respect to such employment shall be
dependent upon and governed by the rules in force with reference thereto. [
N.J.S.A. 18A:27-4 .]
In Chapter 30 of the Education Code, the Legislature addressed the topic of leaves of absence for public school employees. Several provisions in Article 1 of that chapter mandate that boards of education provide sick leave for certain school employees, and provide for accumulated sick leave under certain circumstances.
In Article 2 of Chapter 30, the Legislature considered additional sick leave “or other leaves of absence.” Among the statutes set forth in Article 2 is
Nothing in this chapter shall affect the right of the board of education to fix either by rule or by individual consideration, the payment of salary in cases of absence not constituting sick leave, or to grant sick leave over and above the minimum sick leave as defined in this chapter or allowing days to accumulate over and above those provided for in section 18A:30-2, except that no person shall be allowed to increase his total accumulation by more than 15 days in any one year.
The Legislature did not define the term “absence not constituting sick
The Legislature specifically addressed one form of leave other than sick leave. It required boards of education to grant a limited “leave of absence with pay and without loss of rights, privileges and benefits” to “[a]ny school district employee who qualifies as a member of the United States team for athletic competition on the world, Pan American or Olympic level, in a sport contested in either Pan American or Olympic competitions.”
The EERA also informs our consideration of this appeal. “The EERA affords public employees a vast array of rights, including the ability to appoint a majority representative to represent their interests and negotiate agreements on their behalf with an employer.” In re County of Atlantic, 230 N.J. 237, 252 (2017) (citing
the best interests of the people of the State are served by the prevention or prompt settlement of labor disputes, both in the private and public sectors; that
strikes, lockouts, work stoppages and other forms of employer and employee strife, regardless where the merits of the controversy lie, are forces productive ultimately of economic and public waste; that the interests and rights of the consumers and the people of the State, while not direct parties thereto, should always be considered, respected and protected; and that the voluntary mediation of such public and private employer-employee disputes under the guidance and supervision of a governmental agency will tend to promote permanent, public and private employer-employee peace and the health, welfare, comfort and safety of the people of the State. To carry out such policy, the necessity for the enactment of the provisions of this act is hereby declared as a matter of legislative determination. [
N.J.S.A. 34:13A-2 .]
Pursuant to the EERA, “[p]roposed new rules or modifications of existing rules governing working conditions shall be negotiated with the majority representative before they are established.”
As a general rule, “the [EERA] and Title 18A, the education statute, are ‘in pari materia and should be construed together “as the unitary and harmonious whole.““” Bd. of Educ. of Neptune v. Neptune Twp. Educ. Ass‘n, 144 N.J. 16, 23 (1996) (quoting Red Bank Bd. of Educ. v. Warrington, 138 N.J. Super. 564, 569 (App. Div. 1976)); see also Dunellen Bd. of Educ. v. Dunellen Educ. Ass‘n, 64 N.J. 17, 24-25 (1973) (recognizing “our clear judicial responsibility to give continuing effect to the provisions in our Education Law (Title 18A) without, however, frustrating the goals or terms of the [EERA]“). Accordingly, we consider the Education Code and the EERA in tandem in our determination of this appeal.
3.
We do not concur with the Appellate Division‘s holding that when the Board agreed to the release time provisions of the CNA and paid the releasees’ salaries and benefits, it acted outside of its statutory authority. See Rozenblit, 461 N.J. Super. at 31-32. The Appellate Division construed too narrowly the Legislature‘s grant of discretionary authority to school boards in
We view
We are unpersuaded by the Appellate Division‘s interpretation of the word “absence” in
We do not share the Appellate Division‘s view that
Our construction of
Finally, interpreting
Further, our construction of
In short, we view the Board‘s agreement to the CNA‘s release time provisions to be authorized by the plain language of
C.
1.
We next consider plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge, based on the Gift Clause, to the payment of the releasees’ salaries and benefits pursuant to the CNA. We review the trial court‘s constitutional determination de novo. Gormley v. Wood-El, 218 N.J. 72, 87 (2014).6
Two provisions of the New Jersey Constitution -- Article VIII, Section 3, Paragraph 2, and Article VIII, Section 3, Paragraph 3, are relevant to our determination.7 The first of those provisions states that
[n]o county, city, borough, town, township or village shall hereafter give any money or property, or loan its money or credit, to or in aid of any individual, association or corporation, or become security for, or be directly or indirectly the owner of, any stock or bonds of any association or corporation.
[
N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 3, ¶ 2 .]
The second states that “[n]o donation of land or appropriation of money shall be made by the State or any county or municipal corporation to or for the use of any society, association or corporation whatever.”
The Gift Clause provisions were “added to the Constitution when it was amended in 1875 because of a number of abusive practices that occurred
In Roe, this Court upheld the constitutionality of the New Jersey State Area Redevelopment Assistance Act,
(1) Is legislative provision for financial aid to relieve unemployment a public purpose, and (2) if so, is the method of relief provided in this instance so consonant with the accomplishment of that public purpose as to be beyond the limitations on the use of public money laid down by Article VIII of the Constitution?
As we recently summarized the test, a court addressing a Gift Clause challenge “must first determine whether the provision of land or financial aid is for a public purpose, and second, whether the means to accomplish that public purpose are consonant with it.” Gourmet Dining, 243 N.J. at 18.
For purposes of the first inquiry, courts consider whether the disputed activity “serves as a benefit to the community as a whole” and is, at the same time, “directly related to the functions of government.” Roe, 42 N.J. at 207; see also Horsemen‘s Benevolent & Protective Ass‘n v. Atl. City Racing Ass‘n, 98 N.J. 445, 452-53 (1985) (holding that the record demonstrated that payments to a private association served a public purpose, because that association “contributes to the maintenance and well-being of the horseracing industry,” which in turn “contributes to the general welfare of the State“); N.J. Mortg. Fin. Agency v. McCrane, 56 N.J. 414, 421-24 (1970) (recognizing that a state agency that gave the proceeds of tax-exempt bonds to private lenders for residential mortgage loans served the public purpose of addressing a residential housing crisis).
In Roe, the Court held that the second inquiry required the resolution of two subsidiary questions. Id. at 212. First, a court deciding a Gift Clause challenge must determine whether “the transaction, involving the transfer of
understood as having two parts: “whether the transaction is contractual and involves some obligation on the part of the private entity that is intimately tied to fulfilling the public purpose, and whether the accomplishment of the public purpose is the paramount factor in the contract with any private advantage being merely incidental or subordinate.”
[Gourmet Dining, 243 N.J. at 18-19 (alteration omitted) (quoting State Bar Ass‘n, 382 N.J. Super. at 318).]
As the Court noted in Roe, “the circumstance that some private benefit may be derived from the loan of public money as an incident of its use in the execution of a paramount public purpose will not bring the statutory
2.
We apply that two-pronged constitutional standard in the setting of the argument advanced in this appeal.
The record presented in this case establishes that there is a CNA between the union and Board, and a challenge to a particular benefit that we are urged to analyze in isolation. We address the constitutional issue as raised; however, in assessing the alleged impermissible private benefit, the challenged benefit cannot be entirely severed from its context. The provision is part of an agreement as a whole.
With that context in mind, and to address the specific argument advanced by plaintiffs, this record demonstrates, first, that the challenged release time serves public purposes expressly recognized by the Legislature. Cf. Davidson Bros., 121 N.J. at 218-19 (remanding for factfinding because the affidavits in the record articulated a public need for a proposed supermarket only “in very general terms,” and the record was inadequate). The releasees’ intervention in grievances, disciplinary issues, and other employer-employee matters facilitates “the prevention or prompt settlement of labor disputes,” thus promoting “employer-employee peace.”
The releasees also work to enhance the collective bargaining process, recognized by the Legislature to “promote labor stability in the public sector and enhance the delivery and avoid the disruption of public services.”
In short, the District‘s payment of salaries and benefits to the releasees serves a public purpose, thus satisfying the first prong of the Roe test. See Gourmet Dining, 243 N.J. at 18-19; Roe, 42 N.J. at 207.
With respect to the second prong, the transaction at issue is indeed “contractual and involves some obligation on the part of the private entity that is intimately tied to fulfilling the public purpose,” thus entailing sufficient consideration to satisfy the Gift Clause. See Gourmet Dining, 243 N.J. at 18; see also Roe, 42 N.J. at 218-19. The release time arrangement is part of an agreement arrived at through collective negotiations in which the Association
Although that agreement does not set forth in detail the manner in which the releasees fulfill their responsibilities, their duties directly relate to the resolution of employer-employee disputes and the promotion of labor peace. Indeed, as Greco noted, a second full-time releasee was added in 1998 at the request of school administrators, not the Association.
As Greco‘s certification indicated, his and Thorp‘s work assignments regularly originate with a request by the District or school administrator. He certified that he and Thorp report to the District about those assignments and any leaves of absence they take, and that they routinely apprise a District official of the nature and location of their work at any given time. The two releasees are routinely required to attend meetings initiated by the District or school officials.8 In short, the record supports the Association‘s contention that the District maintains sufficient oversight of the releasees’ duties to ensure
Finally, we address the question whether achieving the public purpose is the paramount factor in the disputed agreement, “with any private advantage being merely incidental or subordinate.” Gourmet Dining, 243 N.J. at 18-19; see also Roe, 42 N.J. at 218. Here, the Association indisputably benefits from the full-time contributions of Greco and Thorp, and the releasees clearly perform tasks at the Association‘s direction. The record makes clear, however, that the releasees’ primary assignment is to engage with District personnel and Association members in an effort to resolve labor disputes at an early stage, that they are routinely asked by District or school officials to intervene in specific settings, and that they report to the District on the results achieved. We view the public purpose of the release time provision to be the paramount factor in that provision, as it is applied in the day-to-day operations of the District.
In sum, we hold that the release time provisions conform to the standard of Roe and Gourmet Dining, and that those provisions do not constitute gifts to the Association in violation of
The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed, and the trial court‘s judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ claims is reinstated.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and PIERRE-LOUIS join in JUSTICE PATTERSON‘s opinion.