813 A.2d 813 | Pa. | 2002
Lead Opinion
OPINION
This direct appeal involves a declaratory judgment action brought by Mosaica Academy Charter School to compel Philadelphia School District to pay its tuition subsidies due under the Charter School Law (CSL)
The facts of this case are undisputed. On March 31, 1998, Bensalem Township School District received Mosaica Academy’s charter school application. The application stated that Mosaica Academy intended to contract with its affiliate company, Mosaica Education, Inc., (MEI), to receive educational and administrative services. Bensalem Township School District reviewed the application and, on June 24, 1998, granted the
On September 4, 1998, Mosaica Academy, along with Lisa Mayo and Desiree McCall (collectively Mosaica), filed a petition for review in Commonwealth Court against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Education, Eugene Hickok, in his capacity as Secretary of Education, the School District of Philadelphia Board of Education, and David Horn-beck, in his capacity as Superintendent of the School District of Philadelphia (collectively Philadelphia School District). The petition for review requested that the Commonwealth Court:
(1) Compel the Philadelphia School District to provide statutorily required transportation to and from school for the Philadelphia children who attend Mosaica; or, in the alternative;
(2) Order the Department of Education to pay Mosaica the transportation reimbursement subsidies intended to be paid to the Philadelphia School District for Mosaica students, as well as the cost of educating the enrolled Philadelphia School District children;
(3) Declare the scope of the responsibilities of the Commonwealth, Department of Education set forth in the Charter School Law as well as the scope of the responsibilities of the Philadelphia School District under the Charter School Law.4
On May 12, 1999, the Commonwealth Court overruled the preliminary objections of Mosaica and MEI without opinion. That same day, the Commonwealth Court issued an opinion and order sustaining in part and overruling in part BTSD’s preliminary objections.
As to declaratory relief, the Commonwealth Court ordered Philadelphia School District to provide transportation to Philadelphia students who attend Mosaica and reimburse Mosaica for the cost of educating the enrolled Philadelphia residents. The Commonwealth Court ruled that if Philadelphia School District does not meet its statutory obligation under the CSL,
On December 18, 2000, the Commonwealth Court entered an order pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 7538 and 7541(b), granting Mosaica’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $265,221.52. The court noted that, although a finding of obdurate or vexatious conduct on the part of Philadelphia School District is not necessary here, it would have granted Mosaica attorneys fees and costs on that basis as well.
Philadelphia School District filed a direct appeal to this Court pursuant to Section 723 of the Judicial Code. Id. at § 723(a).
Because these are issues of law, our review is plenary. Phillips v. A-Best Products, 542 Pa. 124, 665 A.2d 1167, 1170 (1995). In addressing these issues, we keep in mind that in construing statutory language, “[w]ords and phrases shall
Philadelphia School District argues that summary judgment was improperly entered against it because it has no obligation to pay Mosaica tuition subsidies, notwithstanding the fact that sixty percent of Mosaica’s student body resides in Philadelphia. This claim is based upon Philadelphia School District’s underlying challenge to the propriety of BTSD’s grant of Mosaica’s charter. Although we shall address Philadelphia School District’s arguments in this regard, the resolution of this issue is clear. Section 17-1725-A. of the CSL mandates that charter school funding be derived in part from the per pupil subsidies paid by the enrolled student’s school district of residence. 24 P.S. § 17-1725-A.(a)(2). Those payments are to be made monthly and flow directly to the charter school. Id. at § 17-1725-A.(a)(5). Philadelphia School District intentionally failed to comply with these clear statutory mandates and therefore summary judgment was properly entered in favor of Mosaica. .
Philadelphia School District argues that the Commonwealth Court’s decision effectively insulates the grant of a charter application from administrative and judicial review. It concedes that the CSL is silent as to any appeal procedure from the grant of a charter, but argues that such silence does not denote the lack of any right to appeal. It contends that the Legislature could not have intended to grant local school boards unfettered discretion in this regard. We disagree.
Most significantly, the CSL vests the discretion to grant or deny an application for a charter in the hands of the local board of school directors of the district where the charter school will be located. Id. at § 17-1717-A.(c). It further grants accountability over the charter school to the chartering school district. See id. at § 17-1728-A.(a). The General Assembly has created and vested the CAB with the “exclusive review of an appeal by a charter school applicant, or by the board of trustees of an existing charter school, of a decision made by a local board of directors not to grant a charter.” Id. at § 17-1717-A.(i)(l) (emphasis added).
The CSL is explicit as to the procedure a charter applicant must utilize to appeal the local board of directors’ decision to deny a charter application. Id. at § 17-1717-A.(i)(2)(5). It also delineates the procedure to be utilized by the CAB on appeal from such decisions, id. at §§ 17-1717-A.(6)-(8), and directs that all decisions of the CAB be subject to appellate review by the Commonwealth Court. Id. at § 17-1717-A.(i)(10). The CSL simply does not provide for an appeal from a local board of directors’ decision to grant a charter. Upon examination of the CSL in its entirety, we agree with the Commonwealth Court that the Legislature’s omission in this regard was deliberate. We decline to recognize an appeal procedure when the Legislature did not see fit to create one.
As we have concluded that there can be no direct attack on a local board of directors’ grant of a charter, Philadelphia School District’s attempt to collaterally attack or revoke BTSD’s grant of Mosaica’s charter in the instant declaratory judgment action must likewise fail. Accordingly, we hold that Philadelphia School District’s challenge to BTSD’s grant of Mosaica’s charter does not constitute a defense to Mosaica’s claim for tuition subsidies.
We further note that the Declaratory Judgments Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 7532-7541, expressly prohibits Philadelphia School District’s challenge to the validity of the charter. Section 7541(c) precludes granting of relief with respect to any proceeding within the exclusive jurisdiction of a tribunal other than a court. Id. at § 7541(c)(2). Section 7541 contains no qualification regarding the ability of the litigant to pursue alternative avenues of relief.
The second issue for review is whether the CSL requires a school district to provide transportation to resident students attending a charter school located outside of its district. Prior to amendments in 1999 and 2000,
Students who reside in the school district in which the charter school is located or who are residents of a school district which is part of a regional charter school shall be provided transportation to the charter school on the same*204 terms and conditions as transportation is provided to students attending the schools of the district. Nonresident students shall be provided transportation under section 1361. Districts providing transportation to a charter school outside the district shall be eligible for payments under section 2509.3 for each public school student transported.
24 P.S. § 17-1726-A (emphasis added).
This provision directs that students attending charter schools located within their district shall receive the same transportation privileges that are provided to students attending schools of the district. It separately addresses the transportation to be afforded to those attending a charter school outside their resident district, as is the case here, and states that transportation shall be provided under Section 1361.
In Babcock, a student and his parents commenced an action in mandamus to compel his school district to provide him transportation to a public school located outside the district. We recognized that Section 1361 was designed to ensure the adequate transportation of resident pupils attending non-public school under circumstances where a district has determined to transport public school children. We concluded, however,
The Commonwealth Court in the instant case held that charter schools are not “public” schools as defined by the Public School Code or the CSL and therefore our decision in Babcock is not controlling. Contrary to this holding, the parties appear to concede that a charter school is in fact a “public” school by definition.
Philadelphia School District argues that, according to Babcock, it has the statutory discretion to provide transportation to its resident students attending Mosaica, but is not required to do so. Mosaica and the Department of Education contend that although Babcock is generally the controlling law on the issue of out-of-district transportation of students to public schools, when the Legislature enacted Section 17-1726-A. of the CSL, it carved out an exception to the Babcock holding. Mosaica and the Department of Education rely on the portion of Section 1361 that states: “When provision is made by a board of school directors for the transportation of public school pupils to and from such schools ... the board of school directors shall also make identical provision for the free transportation of pupils who regularly attend nonpublic kindergarten, elementary or high schools.... ” They submit that the reference in the CSL to Section 1361 demonstrates that the Legislature’s clear intent was to require that students be transported to out-of-district charter schools that are located within ten miles of the district’s boundary, just as transportation is to be provided to nonpublic school students. They further assert that Babcock was decided fourteen years before charter schools were developed in this Commonwealth and
Although Philadelphia School District’s approach has superficial appeal, we find the arguments presented by Mosaica and the Department of Education more consistent with the legislative intent behind the charter school system. There is a degree of ambiguity in the Legislature’s cross-reference to Section 1361 in Section 17-1726-A. of the CSL. While it is true that the precise language in Section 1361 relied upon by Mosaica and the Department of Education applies to nonpublic schools, it cannot be ignored that the sole statutory provision the Legislature referred to in addressing the transportation of charter school students outside their district, i.e., Section 1361, was designed to provide adequate transportation to resident pupils attending nonpublic schools. Babcock, 466 A.2d at 617. The CSL also states that funding for the transportation of students to charter schools is provided pursuant to Section 2509.3, which deals exclusively with private schools. Thus, although the General Assembly was clear in defining a charter school as a public school, it went to great lengths to treat the charter schools akin to private schools for purposes of transportation. Finally, as noted, the CSL defines charter school as an “independent public school,” 24 P.S. § 17-1703-A., distinguishing it from traditional public schools, which were at issue in Babcock. Thus, we conclude that the General Assembly elected to require transportation to resident students attending a charter school located outside of its district by incorporating Section 1361 to define the level of transportation to be provided to non-resident students. There is no other logical purpose for the Legislature’s reference to Section 1361 and the disparate treatment between students attending a charter school inside their district as opposed to a charter school outside their district.
The third issue for review is whether the Commonwealth Court erred in awarding Mosaica attorneys’ fees and costs as “ancillary relief’ under Sections 7538 and 7541(b) of the Declaratory Judgments Act. The American Rule states that a litigant cannot recover counsel fees from an adverse
We begin our analysis with an examination of Section 7538, entitled Applications for relief, which states,
(a) General Rule.—Judicial relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted whenever necessary or proper, subject to Chapter 55 (relating to limitation of time). If an application for supplemental relief is deemed sufficient the court shall, on reasonable notice, require any adverse party whose rights have been adjudicated by a previously entered declaratory judgment or decree to show cause why further relief should not be granted.
(b) Form of application.—An application for relief or supplemental relief under this subchapter shall be in the form prescribed by general rules.
42 Pa.C.S. § 7538 (emphasis added).
Finding that subsection (a) provided for relief where the rights of a party have been adjudicated by a “previously entered declaratory judgment,” the Commonwealth Court noted that it had granted Mosaica declaratory relief and ordered Philadelphia School District to provide transportation to Phila
Philadelphia School District argues that there is no case in this Commonwealth granting attorneys’ fees as “ancillary relief’ under the Declaratory Judgments Act. It concedes that “supplemental relief’ may be granted, but submits that such term does not encompass attorneys’ fees, but rather refers to any further relief that may be necessary to carry out and enforce the court’s decree. It maintains that there is no case in this Commonwealth holding that “supplemental relief’ under the Declaratory Judgments Act includes a right to recover attorneys’ fees.
Our research has revealed that counsel fees have been awarded as supplemental relief pursuant to the Declaratory
On appeal from the lower court’s grant of attorneys’ fees, the insurance company argued that the Declaratory Judgment Act contained no specific authorization for an award of counsel fees. The Superior Court held that while that was true, the Act has been “declared to be remedial ... and is to be liberally construed and administered.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 7541(a). The court further noted that the Act provides for “supplemental relief’ in Section 7538 and permits the court to “take such other action as may be required in the interest of justice,” pursuant to Section 7541(b), the same provisions relied upon by the Commonwealth Court in the instant case. The Kelmo court concluded, “the mere fact that this is a declaratory judgment action will not preclude an award of attorneys’ fees and costs.” Kelmo, 426 A.2d at 684.
The Kelmo court recognized the general rule against the imposition of counsel fees, but held that it would be anomalous to grant an insured attorneys’ fees expended in defense of the underlying tort action, but to deny the fees in an action brought to vindicate the contractual duty to defend. Accordingly, it held that “an insured who is compelled to bring a declaratory judgment action to establish his insurer’s duty to defend an action brought by a third party may recover his attorneys’ fees incurred in the declaratory judgment action if the insurer has, in bad faith, refused to defend the action brought by the third party.” Id. at 685.
Thus, the court in Kelmo utilized Sections 7538 and 7541(b) to award counsel fees as supplemental relief under the
In summary, we affirm those portions of the Commonwealth Court’s orders that entered summary judgment in favor of Mosaica, MEI, BTSD, and the Commonwealth, Department of Education, and dismissed all the claims against them, on the ground that Philadelphia School District cannot collaterally attack the charter BTSD granted to Mosaica. We also affirm that portion of the Commonwealth Court’s orders that declared that Philadelphia School District must provide transportation to its resident students attending Mosaica, which is located outside the district. Finally, we reverse the order of the Commonwealth Court that granted attorneys’ fees and costs to Mosaica.
. Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, added by the Act of June 19, 1997, P.L. 225, as amended, 24 P.S. §§ 17-1701-A. to 17-1732-A.
. Section 17-1725-A. of the CSL requires the district of residence of each student enrolled in a charter school to pay the charter school a statutorily formulated amount per student. 24 P.S. § 17-1725-A.
. As discussed in detail infra, Section 17-1726-A. of the CSL requires the district of residence to provide transportation to its students attending a charter school outside the district in accordance with Section 1361 of the Public School Code. 24 P.S. § 17-1726-A.
. Also on September 4, 1998, Mosaica filed an application for temporary and special injunction, seeking an immediate, temporary order
. Therein, Philadelphia School District sought: (1) an injunction ordering BTSD to revoke or terminate Mosaica’s charter and a declaratory judgment that the charter was improperly granted; (2) indemnification from BTSD for all amounts the Department of Education diverted from Philadelphia School District to Mosaica; and (3) a ruling that Philadelphia School District was denied due process in accordance with the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
. The' court sustained BTSD's preliminary objection to Philadelphia School District's claim regarding the competitive bidding provisions of Section 7-751 of the Public School Code, 24 P.S. § 7-751. It also
The court overruled BTSD’s preliminary objection as to lack of standing. It overruled the preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer as to Philadelphia School District's claim regarding the alleged "for-profit” status of Mosaica and its claim that Mosaica was a de facto regional school. It also overruled BTSD's preliminary objections based upon Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure 2102(b), 2252, 2253 and 1028.
. The Commonwealth Court dismissed without prejudice BTSD’s motion for summary judgment seeking indemnification from Mosaica for any award that Philadelphia School District may receive for the amount of money expended to provide transportation to Philadelphia resident children attending Mosaica.
. This section provides that "if a school district fails to make a payment to a charter school as prescribed in this clause, the secretary shall deduct the amount, as documented by the charter school, from any and all State payments made to the district after receipt of documentation from the charter school." 24 P.S. § 17-1725-A.(a)(5). Thus, a portion of the funds earmarked for Philadelphia School District was diverted to Mosaica upon Philadelphia School District’s refusal to submit tuition subsidies.
. Section 723(a) of the Judicial Code gives this Court exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from final orders of the Commonwealth Court entered in matters originally commenced in the Commonwealth Court. 42 Pa.C.S. § 723(a).
. Whether mandamus or similar relief would be available in the appropriate case is not before us. We acknowledge that school board
. Moreover, we note that this Court recently examined the substance of Philadelphia School District's underlying claims in West Chester Area School District v. Collegium Charter School, Nos. 89 and 90 MAP 2001 (J-169-2001), 812 A.2d 1172 (Pa.2002). This Court rejected the claim that a charter school had to seek a regional charter if it intended to recruit students outside of its district. We held that “the CSL unquestionably directs the applicant to file a charter school application in the district where the facility is to be located and grants accountability over the charter school only to the chartering school district.” Id. at 1183. We recognized that this statutory procedure may result in a non-chartering school district incurring financial obligations to the charter school when it has no control over the decisions being made on behalf of the charter school. We noted, however, that the school district’s concerns over the wisdom of such a procedure should be directed to the General Assembly. Id. This Court further rejected the claim that the charter school’s proposed contractual agreement with for-profit corporation Mosaica Education, Inc., did not violate the CSL because the CSL expressly permits the charter school to make contracts and leases for the procurement of services. 24 P.S. § 17-1714-A.(a)(5). Thus, even assuming Philadelphia School District could appeal BTSD's grant of Mosaica’s charter, its substantive grounds are meritless.
. Philadelphia School District dedicates a substantial portion of its brief to dispute the Commonwealth Court's alternative holding that it
. The provision now reads as follows:
Students who reside in the school district in which the charter school is located or who are residents of a school district which is part of a regional charter school shall be provided transportation to the charter school on the same terms and conditions as transportation is provided to students attending the schools of the district. School districts of the first class shall also provide transportation to the students if they are the same age or are enrolled in the same grade, grades or their grade equivalents as any students of the district for whom transportation is provided under any program or policy to the schools of the district. Such transportation shall be provided to charter school students each school day whether or not transportation is provided during the same school day to students' attending school of the district. Nonresident students shall be provided transportation under section 1361. Districts providing transportation to a charter school outside the district shall be eligible for payments under section 2509.3 for each public school student transported.
24 P.S. § 17-1726-A.(a). It is clear that the amendments to this provision did not alter the fact that nonresident students shall be provided transportation under Section 1361.
. Section 1361 provides, in relevant part:
The board of school directors in any school district may, out of the funds of the district, provide for the free transportation of any resident pupil to and from the kindergarten, elementary school, or secondary school in which he is lawfully enrolled, provided that such school is not operated for profit and is located within the district boundaries or outside the district boundaries at a distance not exceeding ten miles by the nearest public highway.... When provision is made by a board of school directors for the transportation of public school pupils to and from such schools ... the board of school directors shall also make identical provision for the free transportation of pupils who regularly attend nonpublic kindergarten, elementary or high schools.... The board of school directors shall provide such transportation whenever so required by any of the provisions of this act or of any other act of Assembly.
24 P.S. § 13-1361.
. Section 17-1703-A. defines charter school as an independent public school established and operated under a charter from the local board of school directors and in which students are enrolled or attend. 24 P.S. § 17-1703-A.
. The Commonwealth Court stated several times in its opinion that it "could have” found the imposition of attorneys' fees appropriate pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 2503(7), which permits the imposition of counsel fees "as a sanction for dilatory, obdurate or vexatious conduct during the pendency of a matter.” We find, however, that it did not base its award on Section 2503(7), as it stated: "The School District of Philadelphia was ably represented in this litigation, and the award of attorneys fees is granted solely pursuant to the Declaratory Judgments Act.” Slip op. dated December 18, 2000 at 6 (emphasis added). Thus, we do not examine the propriety of the award under Section 2503(7).
. Although the Commonwealth Court cited Section 7541(b) in support of its award of counsel fees, it did not recite the statutory language or provide any analysis as to why this section is relevant or controlling. Section 7541(b) states in its entirety:
(b) Effect of alternative remedy.—The General Assembly finds and determines that the principle rendering declaratory relief unavailable in circumstances where an action at law or in equity or a special statutory remedy is available has unreasonably limited the availability of declaratory relief and such principle is hereby abolished. The availability of declaratory relief shall not be limited by the provisions of 1 Pa.C.S. § 1504 (relating to statutory remedy preferred over common law) and the remedy provided by this subchapter shall be additional and cumulative to all other available remedies except as provided in subsection (c). Where another remedy is available the election of the declaratory judgment remedy rather than another available remedy shall not affect the substantive rights of the parties, and the court may pursuant to general rules change venue, require additional pleadings, fix the order of discovery and proof, and take such other action as may be required in the interest of justice.
42 Pa.C.S. § 7541(b).
. The insureds additionally sought, an award of counsel fees for the private defense they had obtained in the underlying action in which the insurer failed to defend. The court granted such relief, holding that in an action in assumpsit for the breach of a covenant to defend, recovery includes the costs of hiring counsel and other costs of defense. Kelmo, 426 A.2d at 683 n. 4.
. As we have determined that the Commonwealth Court erred in awarding counsel fees against Philadelphia School District under the Declaratory Judgments Act, we need not examine the final issue in this appeal as to whether the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8541, et seq., precludes the assessment of attorneys' fees and expenses against a school district.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
I join the Majority in concluding that the Philadelphia School District: (1) may not collaterally attack the grant of a Charter School application; (2) is obligated to fund the transportation of its resident students attending Mosaica Academy Charter School; and (3) is not required to pay counsel fees and costs. However, 1 write separately to reflect my view that there is a more direct and straightforward statutory mandate for the Philadelphia School District to provide transportation for its resident students to the Mosaica Academy Charter School contained in Section 1361 of the Public School Code of 1949, Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, as amended, 24 P.S. § 13-1361, and Section 17-1726-A of the CSL, 24 P.S. § 17-1726-A.
The Majority reasons that, while by definition a charter school is a public school, the General Assembly intended that it be treated as a private school for the purposes of transporting non-resident students. It holds that, because the CSL indicates that transportation for non-resident students must be provided by Section 1361 [relating to transportation to other than regular public schools], the General Assembly intended that charter schools be treated like private schools for transportation purposes and, if the district transports its students to public schools, as the Philadelphia School District does, then it must transport students to other than public schools, including charter schools.
Section 1726-A of the Charter School Law clearly delineates between transportation for students residing in the district in which the charter school they attend is located, and transportation for students residing in a district other than the district in which the charter school they attend is located. Section 1726-A of the CSL provides as follows:
Students who reside in the school district in which the charter school is located or who are residents of a school district which is part of a regional charter school shall be provided transportation to the charter school on the same terms and conditions as transportation is provided to stu*212 dents attending the schools of the district. Nonresident students shall be provided transportation under section 1361. Districts providing transportation to a charter school outside the district shall be eligible for payments under section 2509.3 for each public school student transported.
24 P.S. § 17-1726-A (emphasis added). It is uncontroverted that students residing in the district in which the charter school is located are to be transported to their charter schools in like manner to the students attending public schools within the district. There is also agreement that, for students attending charter schools outside the district in which they reside, transportation must be provided pursuant to Section 1361. It is the intent of the General Assembly in referencing Section 1361 for non-resident transportation that forms the basis for the controversy before us. Section 1361 provides, in relevant part:
The board of school directors in any school district may, out of the funds of the district, provide for the free transportation of any resident pupil to and from the kindergarten, elementary school, or secondary school in which he is lawfully enrolled, provided that such school is not operated for profit and is located within the district boundaries or outside the district boundaries at a distance not exceeding ten miles by the nearest public highway.... When provision is made by a board of school directors for the transportation of public school pupils to and from such schools ... the board of school directors shall also make identical provision for the free transportation of pupils who regularly attend nonpublic kindergarten, elementary or high schools.... The board of school directors shall provide such transportation whenever so required by any of the provisions of this act or of any other act of Assembly.
24 P.S. § 13-1361 (emphasis added). Pursuant to Section 1361, a school board may exercise its discretion in determining whether or not to transport students within its district. In point of fact, the school board may decide not to provide transportation to any pupil in its district. Roberts v. School District of City of Scranton, 462 Pa. 464, 341 A.2d 475 (1975).
Accordingly, I believe that there is a clear mandate to the Philadelphia School District contained within Section 1726 A of the CSL and Section 1361 of the Public School Code to provide transportation services to its resident students attending charter schools located outside the district.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
In West Chester Area School District v. Collegium Charter School, 812 A.2d 1172, 2002 WL 31852855 (Pa. 2002), I outlined my position that the Charter School Law (“CSL”), 24 P.S. §§ 17-1701-A. to 17-1732-A., requires a charter school applicant to seek a regional charter whenever the “applicant plans at the outset to actively recruit students from select school districts other than that in which the school is physically located.” 812 A.2d 1172, 1190 (Nigro, J., dissenting). Here, Mosaica Academy Charter School (“Mosaica”) sought a local charter from Bensalem Township School District (“BTSD”), where its school would be physically located, but specifically planned for the vast majority of the students to come from neighboring districts. In my view, Mosaica was therefore obligated to apply for and obtain a regional charter as a prerequisite to requiring the neighboring school districts to finance Mosaica’s charter school with their residents’ tax dollars.
Significantly, in the charter school application that Mosaica submitted to BTSD, it projected that just 80 of its 400
Nevertheless, after BTSD granted Mosaica’s application for a local charter on June 24, 1998, Mosaica immediately began accepting hundreds of applications for enrollment from students in the Philadelphia School District. Almost - exactly as predicted, by July 14, Mosaica had accepted 449 students—256 from the Philadelphia School District, and the remainder from Bensalem, Neshaminy and Bristol Townships.
According to the majority, the Philadelphia School District cannot defend itself against this claim for over $1.4 million in annual tuition subsidies and transportation services because the CSL does not specifically provide for an appeal from a local board of school directors’ decision to grant a charter.
Here, of course, Mosaica did not utilize the regional charter school application procedures and thus did not give the Philadelphia School District the opportunity to vote on its charter application. Nevertheless, Mosaica drew approximately 60% of its students from Philadelphia and sought to divert to its independent venture over $1.4 million in Philadelphia taxpayers’ money that was presumably already budgeted for the
. It is not clear from the record how many students resided in BTSD.
. The majority also contends that “the legislature’s decision to permit an appeal only from the denial of a charter application is not offensive to individual rights because all private citizens had a right to attend and participate in BTSD's July 7, 1998 open public forum.” Op. at 818-19. However, this public forum took place almost two weeks after BTSD granted the charter. Accordingly, to the extent that individual rights had been violated by the unilateral grant of the charter, I do not see how this forum could have ameliorated those violations.