171 P. 584 | Or. | 1918
“Beginning at (state intermediate points) and terminating at a point on the East line of Edgar Locke property, 1734+ North of the Center of Section 32, Township 3 North, Range 10 East of the Willamette Meridian. Said point being designated as Sta. 1006:30 of the Columbia River Highway survey; Thence Easterly along said survey as follows: N. 87 deg. 47 min. E. to Station 1012: 57.6", giving calls, directions, distances, curves and stations, and concluding as follows: “Thence 50 deg. 36 min. E. to Sta. 1081:75, point, of Ending 845 ft. West of Sec. Cor. common to Secs. 28, 27, 33 and 34, Township 3 N. Range 10 E. W. M., said road being 60 feet wide.”
Taken in its entirety this description is absolutely definite and cannot be mistaken. The notice was probably prepared upon one of the blank forms furnished
That such a description is sufficient is settled in this state by Nelson v. Yamhill County, 41 Or. 560 (69 Pac. 678). There is no claim that the petition did not follow the notice; in fact it is shown that they coincide as to the description. While the County Court, when acting upon a petition for the establishment of a county road, is a court of special and limited jurisdiction, yet when that jurisdiction is once obtained the same presumption applies to its acts as to those of a court of general and superior jurisdiction: 11 Cyc. 693.
“the board of county road viewers did not mark the trees on said proposed road in accordance with the requirements of the statutes of the State of Oregon.”
The allegation states a mere legal conclusion. It does not state that the trees were not marked in some way, but merely that they were not marked in “accordance with the statute.” Waiving this objection to the pleading, we are of the opinion that this requirement in this respect is not jurisdictional, and no substantial right of plaintiffs has been invaded by such omission. . •.
“That said County Court met on the fifteenth day of March, 1917, without notice to said plaintiffs, and out of the regular order provided by law and illegally proceeded to order said county road laid out, opened and established to the injury of said plaintiffs.”
With the exception of the statement that the court met on the fifteenth day of March without notice to plaintiffs, this allegation contains nothing but a series of legal conclusions. Why a meeting of the court on the fifteenth day of March, or even the historic seventeenth day of March, should be “out of the regular order provided by law” is not disclosed.
Upon consideration of the whole case we are of the opinion that the petition states no substantial error in the proceedings, and the judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed. Afeirmeu.