*1 (Utah 1993); Hinckley, H. v. Robert Inc. Comm’n, Tax 17 Utah 2d
State MORTON, William W. Plaintiff (1965). noted, 662, 668 As we have the stat- Respondent, language ap- plain ute’s makes the exclusion plicable phrase. to the entire Commis- otherwise,
sion’s rule cannot do and we do COMPANY, CONTINENTAL BAKING fairly, not find that when read it does so. corporation, Delaware Defendant and Petitioner. reading applies A fair of the rule elementa- ry punctuation grammar. rules No. 950485. expanding Commission oper- defined “new or by setting forth ations” three alternative Supreme Court of Utah. single tests. These tests are listed in a sentence, April 8, separated albeit one into three sub- 1997.
parts by a colon and semicolons. Utah Ad- Rehearing Denied June R865-19-85S(A)(3) (1991). mimCode This sentence is followed sentence that states, subject “This to limita- definition dealing operating replace-
tions normal added). (emphasis
ments.” Id. Because the
preceding containing sentence the three tests expanding operations,”
defines “new or
plain meaning of “[t]his the words definition”
in the last sentence is to refer entire defining expanding “new opera-
sentence
tions,” test, merely to the last alternative argues.
as NAG
Thus, language of both section 59-12-
104(16) 865-19-85S(A)(3) and rule confirm replacements operating the normal limi-. applies expanding
tation to both new
operations. Because the Commission rea-
sonably presses found were normal
operating replacements and because the nor-
mal operating replacements applies limitation expanding operations,
to both new and NAC 59-12-104(16)
is not entitled to the section
exemption. Consequently, ap-
peals overruling erred in the Commission.
We appeals. therefore reverse the court of
HOWE, DURHAM, NOEL, RUSSON
JJ., concur in Chief Justice ZIMMERMAN’S
opinion. himself,
Having disqualified Associate
Chief Justice does not STEWART herein;
participate Judge District FRANK
G. NOEL sat. *2 Snuffer, Jr., plaintiff. Sandy, for C.
Denver Helsten, Plant, Bradley R. Terry Salt M. City, for Lake defendant.
RUSSON, Justice:
I. INTRODUCTION Baking Compa- granted We (“Continental”) petition ny’s for writ Ap- the Utah Court of certiorari review dismissal of peals’ of the trial court’s reversal complaint for Morton’s W. William comply with the trial court’s discov- failure to ery order. We reverse.
II. BACKGROUND against Continen- Morton filed a civil suit 15, 1991, damages July recover tal on injuries as a conse- allegedly sustained involving accident Morton quence of auto by driv- Continental and and vehicle owned employees. en one of Continental’s original trial date was December 9, 1992, September but on motion, In the moved for continuance. asserted that Morton was Morton’s counsel surgery for knee December scheduled properly could not and that Morton damage until after the award calculate grant- surgery and rehabilitation. The the trial for the motion and rescheduled ed 15, 1993, 1993. On June continuance, stating sought counsel another busy more too and needed that counsel was expert depositions of wit- time to schedule nesses, discovery. well as conduct other trial, again The court rescheduled or face- “the dismissal of of Plaintiffs 11,1994. order, January time for claims for relief.” the court made it clear that Morton had “until 5:00 January day On before trial p.m. day” sign o’clock on the tenth from the begin, was to Morton’s counsel initiated *3 ing of the order to comply.1 This order was telephone judge and conference with April mailed to Morton on 12. conference, for In this counsel Continental. ex- Morton’s counsel stated that one of his respond way Morton did not in to pert going present opinions, witnesses was either the notice to submit or the court’s evidence, and at trial that were en- theories discovery responses order. The tirely new different from those which 22, by Friday, April received the deadline. previously pre- Morton stated would be 25, 1996, Monday, April pre- On Continental announcement, sented. As a result of this pared proposed pursuant a order to dismiss again court rescheduled trial allow order, April copy to the a of which was time to Continental conduct additional dis- hand-delivered' Morton. On that same covery light of Morton’s new theories. day, responded first for the time to August The new trial date for was set requests discovery by faxing responses signed Continental. court the order to on dismiss 1994. Morton claims days following telephone A few confer- nothing he knew the court’s activities ence, 14, 1994, January on Continental compel between March 18 motion to interrogatories served on Morton and re- signing judgment a notice that he re- quests production for of documents. Morton 9,1994. May ceived on provide responses discovery faded to to the thirty requests days prescribed by within the Following dismissal, Morton fiied sev- 33(a) rule of the Utah Rules Civil Proce- eral motions with the court aimed 25, 1994, February dure. On Continental overturning the part dismissal. As of Mor- inquiring sent a letter Morton about the efforts, May ton’s an filed affidavit dated discovery responses. status 11, 1994, in which he admitted that he had letter, Continental stated that Morton did both the discovery requests received and the provide by discovery responses compel. rejected motion The trial court Continental file mo- March would a appealed, Morton’s motions. Morton then compel. tion to poured and we the ease to the court of appeals. provide Morton did not re- 18,1994, sponses by March and on March September ap On the court of copy compel, Continental filed motion to peals a memorandum issued decision wherein on which was served Morton. In the that it stated had “reviewed each of the motion, requested that the trial by regarding raised [Morton] issues excuses respond court order Morton to within ten noncompliance for with the trial court’s dis days or face dismissal of his case. Morton order, covery or reasons for extension of the
failed to to this motion. imposed deadline, court found [had] 31, 1994, However, March On Continental filed them to be without merit.” while appeals agreed notice to submit decision its motion to the court of [Morton’s] “that compel, copy sanction,” of which was sent to Morton. conduct merited court indicat respond. court, April suggested Morton did not on its Utah ed that review of case law prepare directed Continental to sanction of rule dismissal under court, requiring respond order Morton to Conti within the discretion of the trial while days requests only applied nental’s ten “in within was a sanction which was so, upon question 1. The order stated: ... and failure to do will days signing Plaintiff shall have 10 from the Rule 37 of suffer sanctions accordance with Order, p.m. Procedure, until 5:00 o'clock tenth will the Utah Rules Civil which 22], day [April [Continental] deliver to full be the dismissal of of Plaintiff's claims for complete responses interrogatories and and relief. requests production of documents in (C) pleadings or striking out neglect an order egregious involving more eases thereof, proceed- further by parts staying displayed Morton. than was misconduct” ,cWe obeyed, dismiss- stated, ings con until the order is are appeals The court any part or approv ing proceeding the action or prior to follow decisions strained thereof, rendering judgment de- Proce or Rule of Civil under Utah dismissal party[.] against the disobedient only circumstances much more fault under dure here.” those evidence egregious than added.) a trial court can (Emphasis Before Thus, appeals held that the rule impose discovery sanctions under its and reversed had abused discretion court part of the noneom- must find on the and remanded. willfulness, faith, fault, plying party bad *4 Osguthorpe, Dep’t Transp. v. 892 Utah argues on certiorari that the Continental (Utah 1995); 4, Sav. & 6 First Fed. P.2d re- in appeals erred its decision court of Schamanek, 684 P.2d Loan Ass’n v. argues trial court. Continental verse the (Utah 1984); Amica Mut. Ins. accord 1266 given trial court is broad discretion that the (Utah.Ct. Schettler, P.2d 961 768 Co. v. imposing such decisions are in sanctions and dilatory tactics “persistent App.1989), or only of discretion. Conti- reviewed for abuse judicial frustrating process,” W.W. & the only requires that argues that rule 37 nental Gardner, Village, Inc. v. Park West W.B. a trial actions be willful before Morton’s (Utah 1977); see also P.2d 738 568 sanctions and that there impose court can Osguthorpe, at n. Once the 892 P.2d support ample in the record was evidence ap are that sanctions trial court determines finding that Morton’s non- trial court’s the appropriate dis choice of an propriate, By “[t]he requiring compliance was indeed willful. responsibili the covery primarily sanction is egregious, be more behavior to Schamanek, judge.” 684 P.2d ty trial of the ig- argues, appeals the court of Continental at 1266. not af- the “willful” standard did nored proper amount of trial court the
ford the though non Even dismissal Further, claims that deference. of the “most complying party’s action is one requiring in not appeals erred potential sanctions that can be severe showing Morton to sustain burden P.2d it is imposed,” Osguthorpe, 892 a clear trial court’s decision was abuse language of rule 37 that it is clear from the discretion. impose court’s within a trial discretion “ trial courts must appeals such a sanction. ‘Because responds that the court Morton dis deal first hand with correctly held that the trial court’s dismissal covery process, they given are broad discre Mor- his was an abuse discretion. claim imposition discovery regarding any delay complying in tion argues that ton ” because, P.2d at 6 892 be sanctions.’ the court’s order should excused Wade, reasons, (quoting Darrington v. 812 P.2d he never received the for various long and, all, (Utah.Ct.App.1991)). Thus we have responses 457 after orders “ were, ‘abuse that we will not interfere unless 25 held faxed to Continental ” most, clearly shown.’ only day [is] of that discretion business late.” “one Pierce, 732 P.2d 93 8 Katz v. (Utah 1986)); Realty, Inc. v. see also Tucker III. ANALYSIS 2d P.2d 16 Nunley, 396 Utah 37(b)(2)(C) of the Utah Rules Rule (1964) (“Unless trial [the it is shown that states, part: in relevant Procedure of Civil support is in rec action without court’s] (2) obey an order If a ... fails to discretion, ord, should plain or is abuse permit provide or disturbed.”). find not We will trial be pending may in the action is court which choosing in has its discretion court abused regard to orders in the failure make such impose only is if there which sanction just, among others the follow- are of law ... either “an erroneous conclusion ing: rul evidentiary no for the trial court’s basis Hardman,
ing.” Askew v. (Utah 1996); Schamanek, complained Morton also the dismissal case, clearly has at 1266. this hardship, considering would be a all of the shown that abused its discre- in time and cost invested case. We think dismissing ease. response perceptive: the trial court’s ample case There evidence stake, why With all this at would counsel support ruling. case the trial court’s This fail to answer interrogatories or at set four different times. provide partial least opposing answers to generously granted The trial court continu they Why counsel when were due? would ances, surgery first for Morton’s knee counsel, knowing that motion to compel depose then to allow Morton time more filed, to the Court in years Finally, two and a half witnesses. way? Why provide would not then case, after the commencement of this Why answers he had? would he not seek trial court allowed continuance as a result surprise of Morton’s extension of time from announcement that one the Court if he experts presenting of his would be an entire having difficulty obtaining the infor- ly theory day. new trial the next The trial Why, ready present mation? he were patience court showed *5 tremendous allow part least of the information trial on ing many delays interrupt so to this case. January produce could he not Yet, this even after third continuance to to counsel within the time limits of the him, nothing did accommodate Morton to mistakes, Any rules? inadvertence show the court that he in was interested neglect may and which have occurred diligently prosecuting his case. Three of office Plaintiffs are counsel not passed, months and Morton made no re- excuse in manner which Plaintiffs sponse whatever to Continental’s counsel has handled this matter. requests, of inquiry, Continental’s letter the various and motions orders filed with argues Morton for relief due to his invest- the court and served on Morton. Morton money ment of time and in this case. But plenty warning of that his case inwas action, there are two to this and both trouble, considering having he admitted to to are entitled fair treatment. Continental received the to compel specifi- motion which not litigation. did seek this of Its investment cally requested requiring a court com- order time and resources toward the resolution pliance threatening and dismissal of Mor- voluntary. this ease not was And it was ton’s case. Morton, Continental, responsi- not who was given great A judge trial is deal delays ble for all three of the in this case— determining in latitude the most fair and delays length which increased the of this efficient manner to conduct court business. years. matter six from months to three judge in position trial is to best judge There comes a time when a trial is cases, evaluate status his as well justified saying in enough enough. attitudes, motives, credibility par and say We eannot under these facts that ties. This case is no different. The trial judge abused in his discretion dismiss- judge had been involved in this case for three ing the complaint. years. time, Over that he met with the attorneys for both sides numerous times. claims did that he not re thoroughly He reviewed all documents filed ceive the court’s order to to Conti in connection with the case and ruled on discovery requests not compel nental’s are numerous motions. He heard consid ling. Morton admitted that he received the comply ered all Morton’s excuses discovery requests as well as the motion to ing with the court’s order and concluded compel. disingenuous It for Morton to he satisfactory had “not offered been argue now of his explanation he was aware by Morton’s counsel” for the noncomplianee. obligation respond. to Morton’s counsel them to be “without merit.” significance of which found understood the
must have
presents
same excuses to this
compel. He should have been Morton
motion to
However,
has not attacked
diligent enough
seek another extension
court.
Morton
or,
least,
very
try
court
at the
appeals’
from the
determination that such
the court
However,
way.
some
contact
“without
On the other
excuses were
merit.”
anything
nor his counsel did
neither Morton
hand,
a motion
because Morton knew that
All of the motions and
filed,
until it was too late.
compel had
which
dis-
threatened
dis-
filed in relation to Continental’s
orders
case,
missal
his
because
covery requests
properly served on
properly
and orders were
served
motions
receiving
Although
some
Morton.
“he denies
Morton,
ample evi-
we think that
there is
them,
given ample
notice of the
support
that Morton’s fail-
dence to
the view
obligations
against him
proceedings
discovery requests in
supply
ure
Osguthorpe,
accident. thereafter, occurred, shortly it shortly before trial that dent when convinced came by to persons plaintiff the by a and all known caused trailer marks were those skid during the that the have visited the accident scene Morton’s truck and attached to days after the accident. had remained demonstrated Morton marks immediately prior to lane of travel within his requested interrogatories detailed Other the collision. the of these as to reasons each statements begin August scene, testimony The trial was rescheduled persons was at any them, court did not enter planned 1994. The trial to elicit from plaintiff discovery, reopening respecting by order became aware means which that is no indication either person’s presence and there at the scene of clarify that matter. Nor attempted to was no reason for Continen- accident. There requests further any particular indication that these propound there tal to theory necessary. sim- Because the new was date. To extent the late information interpretation discoverable, new to be ply related it could have relevant and was (of both applied to skid marks which much and should have been obtained aware), questions or have been were aware should from related Aside earlier. no for Continental to en- directly theory any there was reason or other to Morton’s new any questions evidence, gage in on appears broad from the record that new testimony specifics of related interrogatories other than the of most intent Nevertheless, theory. Morton, on directly re- perhaps to burden harass 14, 1994, propounded January theory Continental presenting his taliation for new discovery demands extensive upon Morton a late date.1 such thirty respond within requiring Morton Feb- counsel asserts Continental’s days. ruary a letter to Morton’s counsel sent discovery requests consisted of inter- demanding response to the an immediate requests. A few rogatories and document threatening discovery requests to file requested re- interrogatories information responses compel those motion any theory and additional lated to the new forthcoming.2 On March Continental of Morton’s other ex- information that two compel.3 moved to On pert offer. But witnesses intended to other signed compel, requir- trial court an order beyond theory the new requests went well dis- to Continental’s any testimony that would be days. covery requests within ten Neither affected theory, requiring detailed nor made at- trial court information virtually every person had been who counsel, about directly tempt contact Morton’s of, or investigation who involved with the hearing was no- and no ever scheduled or *8 to, example, a witness the accident. For was compel The to was issued with- ticed. order interrogatory number one stated: hearing. notice or a stated out comply to every person inexplicably to that Morton’s failure Identify each and known in the sanction of “dismissal plaintiff representative or his who was would result the question on De- claims for relief.” Continen- the in Plaintiffs accident scene 1989, supporting and a 29, motion to dismiss from an hour before tal’s cember filed on question including a memorandum and affidavit were up accident in to and court, 28,1994,4 question. April apparent and the trial accident in This week after the aware point attempt to counsel concedes that he was not an absolve 3. Morton's 1. This is made in any responsibility, but counsel of rather Morton's to counterbalance that he was never made of motion but asserts majority’s characterization aware of the outcome of that motion. any- only party who had done of Morton as the thing questionable of a nature. signed and dated these 4. Continental’s counsel April on documents ap- copy of this was submitted an 2. A letter pendage compel but to motion to Continental’s lodged apparently was filed or time was written. 279 37, ly pursuant to Rule Utah Rules Civil it also stated that unusually “dismissal ‘is an Procedure, entered an order dated the same harsh sanction that should be meted with out day dismissing granting caution,”’ the motion and Mor- id. 1 Dairington v. prejudice. parte Wade, claims with ton’s ex 456 (Utah.Ct.App.1991)), nature of con- the court’s Continental’s and concluded that the imposi- court’s preparation duct continued and en- penalty tion of the of dismissal was an abuse try any without order communication of discretion. at 2. simply
to Morton’s counsel. The trial eourt
II. DISCUSSION
motion for
received the
dismissal and imme-
diately
directed Continental’s
to
Although
possess
trial courts
in
discretion
prepare the order in accordance with its
imposing appropriate penalties for violation
A copy
instructions.
of the order was mailed
discovery orders,
Dep’t Transp.
Utah
v.
day.
to Morton’s counsel on the same
Mor-
(Utah 1995),
Osguthorpe, 6
steadfastly
ton’s counsel has
maintained that
discretion is not without limits.
v.
Hathcock
he never received the notice of the order and
Transp.
Navistar
Corp.,
Int’l
53 F.3d
40
entry
was unaware
its
or the deadline for
(4th Cir.1995) (citing
v. Volkswagen
Wilson
responding to it.
America,
Inc.,
(4th
561 F.2d
503
of
Cir.1977));
Slavens,
see also
v.
Carman
respond
Morton’s counsel failed
to
(Utah
1976); Westinghouse
P.2d
22,1994,
requests by Friday, April
Contractor,
Supply
Elec.
Co. v. Paul Larsen
eourt,
Monday,
deadline set
but
(Utah 1975);
By unpublished disposition, just,” of Court to make such “as orders are and is Appeals v. response. reversed. Morton stereotyped not limited to a Co., Baking 749, 940747-CA, No. The sanctions enumerated in the rule are (Utah 14, 1995) slip op. at Ct.App. Sept. flexible, 2-3 arbitrary exclusive but “appel selective, [“Morton I The plural. ”]. Court stated that The district court sanction,” 2, reason, lant’s conduct merited may, many id. at but use within as and as 280 exceptional Liquid necessary to circumstances.” In re are hold
varied sanctions as Drivers, 819, 822 justice Truck 580 F.2d even. Carbonic the scales of (5th Cir.1978); see Fed. & also Mutual Sav. Miller, 2284, § Wright Federal Practice & Assocs., F.2d Ass’n v. Richards 872 Loan & added) omitted). (footnotes (emphasis 612-13 (4th 88, Cir.1989); Donnelly v. 92 Johns- a trial court’s explicit One limitation on (3d 339, 342 Corp., Manville Sales 677 F.2d may is of discretion sanction dismissal Wilson, 504; Cir.1982); Wright F.2d at “ 561 ‘willful- imposed the absence of not be 2284, Miller, § & Federal Practice ” ness, faith, or fault.’ 892 bad overriding rules of purpose The of modem (quoting & Loan P.2d at 6 First Fed. Sav. de procedure disputes to assure that are is P.2d, 1257, Schamanek, 1266 684 Ass’n v. possible. Ap cided on merits whenever 1984)). (Utah requires a show- “Willfulness” pellate repeatedly stressed that courts have intentional, comply the failure impose penalties trial courts should seek to distinguished negligent or careless from 37 less than the dismissal that Rule severe noncompliance. Id. at 8. v. Navistar Int’l makes available. Hathcock degree accorded trial discretion (4th Cir.1995); 36, Transp. Corp., 53 F.3d 41 severity proportion courts varies Inc., 757, Casinos, Brooks v. Hilton 959 F.2d imposed. It that a trial the sanction follows (9th Foods, Cir.1992); 768 Poulos v. Naas range is narrow court’s of discretion more Inc., (7th 69, Cir.1992); 959 F.2d 75 Ve imposes when it the ultimate sanction Serv., Inc., lazquez-Rivera v. 920 Sea-Land imposes less severe dismissal than when 1072, (1st Cir.1990); F.2d 1076 v. Meade must there- Appellate sanctions. courts (10th Grubbs, 1512, n. 841 F.2d 1520 & 7 entry of a fore examine a dismissal default Cir.1988); Township Patterson v. Grand greater judgment with much care and scruti- (6th Cir.1985); Blanc, F.2d 760 689 majority ny than lesser sanction. Segona, v. 621 F.2d 766-68 Marshall opinion ignores principle. this established (5th Cir.1980). Although are due trial courts afforded defer- sanctions, Indeed, appellate general is extreme ence in their choice of an rule only simply “rubber-stamp employed the deci- sanctions if the court cannot “should be Velazquez-Riv- district court has determined that it could [lower] sions of court.” era, Wilson, 1075; ‘equally but less 920 F.2d at see also 561 fashion effective ” remedy.’ Velazquez-Rivera, F.2d at 506. drastic 920 Pole F.2d at 1076 United States v. Indeed, process rights constitutional due (1st Hopkinton, 642 No. 852 F.2d may if court to hear the be violated refuses Cir.1988)). Thus, “[t]he district court abuses case where there has been a merits imposes- its if it of dis discretion sanction relatively procedural trivial infraction of considering impact missal without first Co., rules.5 v. Motor See Malautea Suzuki adequacy less drastic sanction (11th Cir.1993). 987 F.2d sanctions.” v. National Med. United States Thus, generally imposed only “[dismissal (9th Enters., 792 F.2d 912 Cir. misconduct, egregious repeated for such as 1542; Malautea, 1986); see also 987 F.2d at deposition.” Regional appear failure to (11th Cohan, 142 Navarro 856 F.2d Co., Sys., Inc. v. Inland Reclamation Refuse Cir.1988); 342; Donnelly, 677 F.2d at Mar (6th Cir.1988) (first 150, 155 empha 842 F.2d shall, 621 F.2d 767-68. added); Velazquez-Rivera, sis see also Sears, Co., is, course, distinguish It F.2d at Silas v. Roebuck & essential Cir.1978). (5th the client 586 F.2d Dismissal between the blameworthiness of provided most for in and that of the for a failure to is “the extreme sanction rule, Supreme empha comply and the has with court Flaksa v. Little Court orders. Co., necessity use the River 389 F.2d 888- sized the cautious Marine Constr. (5th Cir.1968). only especially be This rule.... should exercised critical [I]t *10 limitations, 613; yet Osguthorpe, § at also 892 P.2d at "[T]here are constitutional see indistinct, (treating implications be of dis- somewhat on the sanctions can 7-8 missal). constitutional Miller, imposed.” Wright & Federal Practice
281
dismissal,
nearly
when the sanction
effect
draw
amend was made until
four-
disproportionately,
requests
if not
teen months after the
which falls
exclu
had been
year
sively, on the client.
If the client did not made —and over a
after the
had
matters
automatically
if opposing
by op-
contribute to the violation and
deemed admitted
genuine
granted
do not suffer
eration of Rule 36. The trial
severe
motion,
prejudice
attorney’s
allowing
as a result of the
viola
defendant’s
the case to
tion, dismissing
go
rank
Despite
client’s ease makes
forward on the merits.
the limit-
mockery
requirement
that sanctions
ed discretion standard
adopted
we
in that
“
short,
case,
“just.” In
majority
be
the rule is that
‘[d]is-
of the members of this court
generally
upheld
6-9,
inappropriate
missal is
lesser
court’s decision. Id. at
at-(Durham,
J.,
neglect
plainly
joined
sanctions are favored where
by Stew-
art, A.C.J.);
attorney
9, at-(Zimmerman,
attributable to an
than to his
at
rather
id.
Marshall,
C.J.,
result).
concurring
client.’”
621
at
blameless
F.2d
in the
Silas,
385);
768
586 F.2d at
also
Appeals
correctly
The Court of
in this case
Navarro,
141-42; Lolatchy
856 F.2d at
v. noted thát Utah cases upholding a sanction
(4th
Inc.,
Murray,
Arthur
816 F.2d
953
flagrant
of dismissal involved far more
viola-
Cir.1987);
v. Albert
Med.
Carter
Einstein
tions than occurred
here. Cf
(3d
Ctr.,
Cir.1986);
804 F.2d
807-08
Pat
Schamanek,
7-8;
dant’s Plaintiffs, Although Hamilton, minor, defendant tics.” Id. 736. discovery requests responded to some of the (ten subsequent filing of that motion REGAN, Stephen Avin Defendant original for due date months after the Appellant. production discovery requests), requests for Id. The remained unsatisfied. of documents Co., Support Child Enforcement appear at the hear- then failed to defendant Appellee. Intervenor and judgment. for ing on the motion default finding No. 950521. an affirmative trial court made delay prejudiced the had the defendant’s Supreme Court of Utah. ruled, plaintiff’s prosecution case merits, was entitled on 2,May summary judgment. Appeals ruled that the sanc- The Court for the of Morton’s case dismissal by Morton’s counsel was
violation committed conduct,
wholly proportion to his out
say nothing at of Morton’s own innocence. 940747-CA, I, slip I op. at 3. No. Court, court,
agree. and now The trial view, my ignored requirement that the “just” arbitrary capri- and not
sanction be
cious, of the fact that especially view many months
lawsuit issue verge going when
and was on entered, no dismissal and there is
showing that Continental was whatsoever delay by the minor that Morton
prejudiced itself, Indeed, by its
caused.
sweeping demands issues theory” “new bore
unrelated delay. responsibility It is for the
substantial hard to find a order in our
indeed harsh, unreasonable, and
published cases as one-day-
unjust in this case. A certainly drop-dead rule will enhance
late justice authority, judge’s but cost
and fairness is exorbitant. Appeals.
I would affirm the Court
DURHAM, J., concurs.