Mortell v. StateMortell v. State
Keith Anton Mortell pleaded guilty to three counts of second degree vehicle prowl and three counts of third degree theft. Upon conviction, the district court ordered the sentences on all counts to run consecutively for a total of 585 days in county jail. The State appeals the granting of a writ of habeas corpus releasing Mortell from custody and voiding the portion of his sentence that exceeded one year. We hold that
This case was heard on stipulated facts. During the early morning of September 2, 2001, Keith Anton Mortell entered three vehicles, without permission, and stole several items from each. Each of the three vehicles belonged to different victims. Mortell was charged in Clark County District Court with second degree vehicle prowl and third degree theft for each incident, for a total of six counts.
Mortell pleaded guilty to all six counts. He received 365 days in jail with 185 days suspended on each of the vehicle prowls. He also received 365 days in jail with 350 days suspended for each of the theft charges. The court ordered that all counts run consecutive to each other. Mortell was ordered to serve 585 days in jail before being placed on probation for two years. Mortell was in continuous custody of the Clark County Sheriff from September 2, 2001, until his temporary release on June 11, 2002. At all times, he was held in jail as defined in
Mortell filed a writ of habeas corpus in Clark County Superior Court for the State to show cause why his custody should not be terminated. The writ was granted, and the court voided the portion of Mortell‘s sentence imposing more than one year in jail.
The district court shall have jurisdiction: (1) concurrent with the superior court of all misdemeanor and gross misdemeanors committed in their respective counties and of all violations of city ordinances. It shall in no event impose a greater punishment than a fine of five thousand dollars, or imprisonment for one year in the county or city jail as the case may be, or both such fine and imprisonment, unless otherwise expressly provided by statute.
The issue lies in the word “event“: that is, the district court “shall in no event impose a greater punishment than a fine of five thousand dollars, or imprisonment for one year in the county or city jail.”
In interpreting a statute, the court seeks to ascertain the legislature‘s intent. State v. J.M., 144 Wash.2d 472, 480, 28 P.3d 720 (2001). Such intent is discovered through principles of statutory construction and relevant case law. Kilian v. Atkinson, 147 Wash.2d 16, 21, 50 P.3d 638 (2002). Courts do not construe an unambiguous statute because plain words do not require construction, Davis v. Dep‘t of Licensing, 137 Wash.2d 957, 963, 977 P.2d 554 (1999), and meaning must be derived from the wording of the statute itself. State v. Tili, 139 Wash.2d 107, 115, 985 P.2d 365 (1999). All language within the statute must be given effect so that no portion is rendered meaningless or superfluous. Davis, 137 Wash.2d at 963, 977 P.2d 554. Related statutory provisions must be harmonized to effectuate a consistent statutory scheme that maintains the integrity of the respective statutes. State v. Chapman, 140 Wash.2d 436, 448, 998 P.2d 282, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 984, 121 S.Ct. 438, 148 L.Ed.2d 444 (2000). Statutes relating to the same subject matter will be read as complimentary. State v. Wright, 84 Wash.2d 645, 650, 529 P.2d 453 (1974). Furthermore, statutes should be construed to avoid unlikely, absurd, or strained consequences.
Analyzing the language of
Several provisions comprise this sentencing scheme.
According to Mortell‘s argument, district courts would frequently be unable to comply with
Courts seek to avoid unlikely, absurd, or strained consequences. State v. Fjermestad, 114 Wash.2d at 835, 791 P.2d 897. Mortell argues that it is impossible to be sentenced to county jail for more than one year. Mortell‘s reasoning would create the absurd consequence of numerous gross misdemeanor convictions brought in one action to be limited to an aggregate sentence of one year. Ad infinitum a defendant could be convicted on dozens of discrete, severable gross misdemeanor counts and receive no greater jail time than one year in county jail. The statute requires that any person convicted of a gross misdemeanor must be punished in county jail.
The Washington Practice Series comports with the above discussion. “The sentence for a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor must be served in the county jail. This remains true even if the defendant receives consecutive sentences exceeding 1 year.” 13B SETH A. FINE AND DOUGLAS J. ENDE, WASHINGTON PRACTICE: CRIMINAL LAW § 4201 (2d ed.1998) (citing State v. Besio, 80 Wash.App. 426, 907 P.2d 1220 (1995); State v. Linnemeyer, 54 Wash.App. 767, 776 P.2d 151 (1989)). California has reached the same understanding.
A person who commits two or more misdemeanors is subject to the possible imposition of two or more separate punishments. He may be tried separately and sentenced separately on each, or he may be charged with a number of crimes in separate counts in one information. The use of a single information is sanctioned by law and is a decided convenience, but in no way does it change the separable character of the offenses charged, nor does it alter the rules governing punishment.
People v. Carr, 6 Cal.2d 227, 57 P.2d 489, 489 (1936). It is clear that sentence restrictions for gross misdemeanors apply to discrete and severable crimes rather than aggregate consecutive sentences. Thus, we interpret the languages “[i]t shall in no event” to mean that the punishment for a specific charge shall not exceed one year.1
Reversed.
We concur: ARMSTRONG, J., and QUINN-BRINTNALL, A.C.J.