Mors v. PetersonMors v. Peterson
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Vickers
delivered the opinion of the court:
Sarah Mors and numerous other persons claiming to be heirs and devisees of Elizabeth Spruill filed their bill against Clarissa Peterson and others, as defendants, in the circuit court of Fayette county, for the purpose of setting’ aside a deed executed by Mrs. Spruill to Clarissa Peterson on August 23, 1911, conveying to Mrs. Peterson 190 acres of land, estimated to be worth about $50 per acre. The bill alleged fraud, undue influence and want of mental capacity as grounds for the relief sought. Clarissa Peterson filed an answer to the bill, in which she denied all of the charges contained therein upon which complainants predicate their right to relief. The cause was heard upon testimony submitted in open court and a decree was rendered setting aside the deed, to reverse which Mrs. Peterson has prosecuted this appeal.
The errors assigned question the several findings of the court below upon which the decree canceling the deed rests.
Elizabeth Spruill died April 23, 1912, at the age of eighty years. She had been married but her husband had been dead about twenty years. She never had any children. In addition to the real estate conveyed to appellant she had some notes and other personal property. Her business affairs had been managed during her widowhood first by John A. Bingham, who acted as her attorney in fact to loan her money and to look after the leasing and collecting of rents from her real estate. Afterwards, in 1902, the deceased appointed J. J. Brown as her attorney in fact to look after her business affairs generally. Brown continued to represent the deceased until her death. The- business transacted by him for her consisted mainly of making loans of her funds, collecting the interest and receiving rents and paying
The evidence as to the mental condition of Mrs. Spruill during the last few years of her life is conflicting. It can not be said that the weight of the evidence shows that her mental powers were more impaired than would ordinarily be expected in one of her age and condition of health. The evidence on this point shows that she had the physical and mental weakness that are usually incident to old age. Her mental condition is proper to be considered as strengthening the inference of undue influence which the law draws from an established fiduciary relation. The constant and intimate association of appellant with this feeble and helpless old lady for the last ten years of her life gives rise to an irresistible conclusion that there was trust and confidence on the one hand and influence and domination on the other. While the bill sets out all the circumstances connected with the execution of the deed and alleges undue influence and mental incapacity and prays for a cancellation of the deed, it is not, strictly speaking, a bill, as appellant’s counsel appear to treat it, for the rescission of a contract on the ground of mental incapacity of the party to enter into it. The bill alleges a state of facts which are fully established by the proof, which show that a fiduciary relation existed between these parties; that while such relation existed the deed in question was executed without any adequate consideration; that by said deed appellant acquired title to real estate worth between $9000 and $10,000, and the bill calls on the appellant to rebut the presumption which the law draws from the fiduciary relation established, and show, by clear and convincing proof, that she acted with good faith and did not betray
Courts of equity have refused to set any bounds to the circumstances out of which a fiduciary relation may spring. It not only includes all legal relations, such as guardian and ward, attorney and client, principal and agent, and the like, but it extends to every possible case in which a fiduciary relation exists in fact, and in which thére is confidence reposed on one side and resulting domination and influence on the other. (Beach v. Wilton, 244 Ill. 413.) It-is not necessary that the relation and duties involved be legal. They may be either moral, social, domestic, or merely personal. (Roby v. Colehour, 135 Ill. 300; Walker v. Shepard, 210 id. 100.) When a confidential or fiduciary relation is established between parties, courts of equity scrutinize very closely any transaction or contract between the parties by which the dominant party secures any profit or advantage at the expense of the person under his influence. All transactions between parties in this relation are presumptively fraudulent and void, and before a court of equity will permit such contract to stand, the proof must be clear and convincing and satisfy the conscience of the chancellor that good faith has been exercised and that the confidence reposed in the beneficiary of the contract has not been betrayed by him. Beach v. Wilton, supra, and authorities there cited.
The circumstances connected with the execution of the deed in question, as disclosed by the evidence, are: Appellant called upon an attorney and had him prepare a deed. After having the deed written up, the appellant telephoned Sidney Bagley and asked him to come over to the house. Bagley was a justice of the peace. He went to appellant’s house and after consulting with appellant a notary public was
When all of the circumstances surrounding this transaction are considered we can come to no other conclusion than that reached by the court below, that there was here an unusually intimate fiduciary relation existing between these parties, and that the conveyance to appellant of substantially all of the property that the deceased owned must be held to be the result of a violation of the confidence and trust reposed by this old lady in appellant. At all events, the evidence introduced on behalf of appellant fails to convince us, any more than it did the chancellor below, that this transaction is free from any suspicion of undue influence.
The deed contains a covenant on the part of appellant that she would take care of Mrs. Spruill as long as she lived and provide her with a good home, board, food, shelter and care during her life. Appellant contends that even though the court properly set aside the deed it was error to
There being no error’ in the decree of the circuit court of Fayette county it will be affirmed.
Decree affirmed.