[1, 2]
Charge 1 refused to the defendant ignores the burden resting upon bim, essential to bis right to plead self-defense, to show that be was in impending peril of life or limb at tbe time be fired on Givan witb a deadly weapon. It also assumes that Givan, after defendant’s withdrawal in good faith, pursued him, or renewed the difficulty and became the assailant. Brewer v. State, 160 Ala. 66, 49 South. 336.
[3, 4]
Charge 2, as worded, has a tendency to mislead to the conclusion that the court entertained the view that Givan assaulted or threatened to assault defendant. It was subject to tbe further objection that it predicated the right of self-defense on a “threatened assault made by bim,” leaving out of consideration the presence of an overt act or attempt to carry into effect such “threatened assault,” thereby producing impending peril, real or apparent, to tlie defendant’s life or limb.
[5, 6]
There was no exception to tbe oral charge of the court, and no objection to the verdict of tbe jury or tbe action of the court in sentencing the defendant, and hence nothing to review. McPherson v. State (Sup.) 198 Ala. 5, 73 South. 387; Woodson v. State, 170 Ala. 87, 54 South. 191.
