Morrison v. Wilder Gas Co.

91 Me. 492 | Me. | 1898

Wiswell, J.

This action is to recover the purchase price of certain materials furnished by the plaintiffs for the construction of a gas plant at Rockland. The defendant' denied that it had ordered the goods, or received them, or that it had any connection whatever with the construction of the gas plant.

For the purpose of showing that the defendant did construct this plant, and that it received and used these articles in the construction, the plaintiffs were allowed to introduce in evidence, against the defendant’s objection, a written instrument which purported to be executed by the defendant corporation and which provided for the construction of the plant. The attestation clause and form of execution were as follows:— “In witness whereof, said Wilder Gas Company by the hands of its chairman of the executive committee, Luke A. Wilder, thereunto duly authorized, has hereunto set its corporate name and affixed its corporate seal, and said Knox Gas and Electric Company by the hand of A. D. Bird, its Treasurer, thereunto duly authorized, has set its corporate name and affixed its corporate seal the year and day above written.

The Wilder Gas Co., by Luke A. Wilder

Chairman of Executive Committee (L. S.)

Knox Gas & Elec. Co., by A. D. Bird, Treas. (L. S.)”

Objection was made to the introduction of this instrument upon. two grounds; because it was not a contract between the parties to the suit, and because there was no evidence showing that the contract had been authorized by the defendant corporation. We-have no doubt that a contract between the defendant and the owner of the plant, if shown by competent testimony to have been authorized by the defendant, was admissible in evidence for the purpose for which it was introduced.

But was there any evidence showing that this instrument was the contract of the defendant? The signature of Luke A. Wilder,, and the fact that at the time he .was a member of the board of directors and of the executive committee of the defendant corporation, were proved and admitted; but there was no evidence by record or otherwise, outside of the instrument itself, and the fact that it bore the corporate seal, that the contract was ever authorized by the corporation, or that Wilder had authority to execute this contract or contracts of this general description, or that the executive committee or any member thereof had any authority to make contracts of this nature.

Some cases and text writers have laid down the rule that the presence of the corporate seal upon an instrument that purports to be the contract of a corporation gives rise to a prima facie presumption that it was affixed by proper authority; while others very materially limit the rule by saying, that when the seal is affixed by a proper official, in the line of his authority, it is evidence of the assent and act of the corporation.

Here the only proof was that Wilder was a director and member of the executive committee. But a director, as such, has no authority to make contracts for his corporation. He may of course have such authority,—it may be either express or implied, and it may be shown by record or parol,—but it does not follow that he had, merely from the fact of his being a director. It is a familiar rule, which requires no citation of authority, that directors of a corporation, as such, have no implied authority to act singly; they can only act as a board, unless there be an express or implied delegation of authority to act individually. So far as this case shows, Wilder had no such authority; he was not the proper official, either to sign the corporate name or to affix the corporate seal; it was not within the line of his authority.

We can see no reason why the presence of a corporate seal, which does not appear to have been affixed by one having authority, or by a proper official in the general line of his authority, should be even prima facie evidence that a contract, signed and sealed by a person, who, so far as the case shows, had no authority to make or execute this or such a contract, was the contract of the corporation.

We very much prefer the doctrine laid down by Mr. Morawetz in his work on Private Corporations. We quote from that work a portion of section 340: “It has sometimes been said, that, if the seal of a corporation appears to be affixed to an instrument, the presumption is that it was rightfully affixed,—that the seal is itself prima facie evidence that it was affixed by the proper authority. The meaning of these statements is not perfectly clear. The seal of a corporation certainly has no mysterious virtue not possessed by other seals; and a contract under seal executed by the agents of a corporation is subject to the same rules of evidence, and of law, as a similar contract executed by the agents of an individual. In order to prove the execution of a contract purporting to have been executed under the corporate seal, two facts must be shown. First, it must be shown that the agents by whom the contract purports to have been executed were in fact agents of the corporation, having authority to execute the contract in question, or contracts of that general description; and, secondly, it must be shown that the signatures are genuine, or, in other words, that these agents did actually execute that particular contract. The mere circumstance that a seal was affixed to the contract would evidently not tend to establish either one of these facts.”

Here there was sufficient evidence that Wilder executed the contract in the name of the corporation and affixed thereto the corporate seal. There was no evidence whatever that he had any authority, express or implied, to execute this contract, or contracts of this nature, or any contract whatsoever for the defendant corporation. We think, therefore, that the instrument was improperly admitted.

Exceptions sustained.