The defendant was indicted and tried for murder. He was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to serve 10 years. Defendant appeals. Held:
1. Defendant contends a shotgun, bush-axe and shovel were illegally admitted in evidence because same were "tainted fruit from the poisoned tree,” obtained illegally as a result of an illegal confession, which confession was excluded. He contends these items should also have been excluded, citing Wong Sun v. United States,
While these exhibits were not conclusively proven to have been the actual instruments involved in the crimе, defendant admitted in his unsworn statement that he was forced to shoot the victim, dig a grave, and he stated that other persons chopped off the victim’s legs. Defendant did not object upon the ground that no proper basis, or connection with the crime, had been laid by the state as to these toоls, but only as "tainted fruit.” See
Crider v. State,
2. The search of the Morrison farm was not illegal, because the owner (defendant’s father) invited and requested the search. The defendant did not own the farm, hence the immunity from unreasonable search and seizure (which is a privilеge personal to those whose rights are about to be violated) does not, in this case, extend to the alleged unreasonable search of the farm of defendant’s father.
Marsh v. State,
3. The defendant had been arrested earliеr and his car impounded as a consequence of illegal drugs. Therefore, when his car was searched by the officers following discovery of the grave, the shotgun, the bush-axe and the shovel, etc., said search was not subject to the objection that same was an illegal search and seizure. It is not unreasonable to search a car which is being legally held for use as evidence in a forfeiture proceeding. Cooper v. California,
Further, thе car was an instrumentality used in the commission of the crime, and the articles were seized under Code Ann. § 27-301 (Ga. L. 1966, p. 567), and by the time of the search the defendаnt had been charged with murder. See
Abrams v. State,
4. When defendant was brought to the jail to be fingerprinted, photographed and personal data taken, he made a partially inculpatory and partially exculpatory statement to the jailer, claiming two other persons committed the crime. This was not thе result of an interrogation by the police officers; it was not elicited or induced by the officers and was therefore admissible in evidence. See
Jenkins v. State,
5. Defendant contends the court erred in denying his request for disclosure of the name of the informant whose information helped to secure a search warrant for discovery of marijuana on
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the Morrison farm on July 11,1972. He contended this discovery was essential to his defense. The public policy of this State supports the nondisclosure privilege. See Code § 38-1102;
Scull v. State,
6. During an interview of a newly discovered witness, an assistаnt district attorney showed the proposed witness a photograph of the defendant to ascertain if he could make a photographic identification. Defendant objected to this identification at the time it was offered in evidence, contending it violated his Sixth Amendment rights to counsel at а photographic line-up which is a critical stage of a criminal prosecution. In United States v. Wade,
7. Whether or not there was evidence present to support the charge on manslaughter, the court did not err in giving the dеfendant’s requested charge on manslaughter.
Panter v. State,
8. The court did not err in refusing to quash the indictment because citizens who are Negro, female, and age 18-21 were allegedly underrepresented and systematically excluded from the grand *561 jury. The evidence showed both Negroes and females served on the grand jury. There was opinion testimony, expert and otherwise, that Negro and female citizens did not serve on the grand jury in the same proportion as to the whole population of Fulton County, including a female jury commissioner who held the opinion that the other jury commissioners were reluctant to put women on the grand jury. This fails to prove a systematic exclusion of these three classes of citizens sо as to demand a reversal here.
9. The admission of defendant that the body of the deceased had been placed in the trunk of his car; the evidence that the deceased’s legs were chopped off, and evidencе as to the presence of (Type A) blood in the trunk of the car, renders harmless the admission of the deceased’s military medical records showing Type A blood, even if erroneously admitted.
Shelly v. State,
10. There was evidence, both direct and circumstantial, connecting the defendant with the killing of the deceased. The evidence was sufficient to support the verdict of guilty, and the court did not err in refusing to direct a verdict of not guilty.
Judgment affirmed.