History
  • No items yet
midpage
Morrison v. Morrison
692 S.W.2d 601
Ark.
1985
Check Treatment

*1 MORRISON, MORRISON Sr. Bеverly Don Billy 85-35 Court of Arkansas

Supreme 1, July delivered Opinion Thrailkill, Danny Tucker & Thrailkill, for appellant. by: Wilson, Corum, & Engstrom appellee. Dudley, is whether

Robert H. Justice. The issue on appeal are marital property retirement benefits spouse’s disability 1983). We affirm Ann. 34-1214 (Supр. under Stat. § are marital trial court and hold that statute at interpret is in Court to Jurisdiction this *2 29(l)(c). issue. Rule Morrison, Sr., Don

During marriage, Billy the appellant, November, 1965, when he was jobs worked at various until Fire In a Angeles cyst the Los еmployed by Department. removed, was but cyst was discovered on his knee. The surgically December, 1977, the retire- a In disabling infection developed. a permanent had suffered 78% appellant ment board found that he ‍‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​​​​​​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‍retire. He was to his knee and that must physical impairment $1,165.00 month. benefits of per awarded During of this his subject Those benefits are the monthly appeal. Los Fire Angеles Department of with the period employment $21,000.00 11% his or to the contributed of salary, retirement fund. Morrison, various jobs worked at Beverly

The appellee, the but was at the intermittently during marriage, unemployed time case heard. this was 719 (1984), 663S.W.2d a Day Day,

In case, retirement benefit we stated: longevity In that Dr. interest in the holding Day’s pension plan case, to is found be marital this we are рroperly the not down inflexible rules for future. attempting lay leeway To Section 34-1214 allows for the contrary, it exercise of the chancellor’s best for judgment, provides all shall divided “unless thаt marital equally be court finds such division to be What we inequitable.” earnings do hold that or other simply property acquired must as marital unless each be treated by property, within one of thе and neither falling statutory exceptions, one can of interest in such any other deprive control, or beyond it his her own by putting temporarily annuities, of in a retirement by purchase pаrticipation device for full of the postponing enjoyment other plan, property.

Id. at 663 S.W.2d 722. at that is the rule for

Appellant Day general concedes but argues retirement benefits that longevity not are and are in the impairment body one’s compensation nature asset of an marital The relationship. fallacy argument is that the benefits come from an annuity during with the purchased marriаge income of one That which annuity, payable became is the upon disability, There is meaningful no distinction between an annuity one payable upon disability payable upon longevity. next argues Appellant distinguishable because Dr. was based Day’s annuity solely upon contributions to the fund, fund while in this case the pension regulations required that out of his annuity be first into the paid payments fund and then of a fund. We do not general find the distinction meaningful. benefits in the case at bar are out of one’s paid own contributions the contributions of all who plus others are not *3 disabled. That of part contributions paid appellant’s precisely Day. the same as in That out of the part paid general is, effect, fund in a mutual paid by assessment We program. the recognize that California Courts have an of adopted analysis benefits ‍‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​​​​​​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‍which as by the are divisible marital only to the property extent that match the benefits they the would have employee received if retirement had been based on is the the longevity. overplus separate of disabled property Jones, 108, See 119 531 P.2d 531 Marriage Cal.Rptr. of (1975); 9, 148 Marriage 582 P.2d Stenquist, 96 Cal.Rptr. of (1978); Webb, Marriage 94 156 Cal.App.3d Cal.Rptr. of Mason, 334 (1979); 93 Marriage 155 Cal.App.3d of Cal.Rptr. (1979); Milhan, 350 and Marriage 166 Cal.Rptr. of 533, 613 (1980). P.2d 812 Illinois has a statute almost identical to the Arkansas statute at issue. Act, Illinois Compare Marriage and Dissolution Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. Sec. 503(a) (1980) Ark. Stat. Ann. 34-1214 § 1983). In (Supp. the construing Illinois statute the same statute, manner we construe the Arkansas the Court of Appellate Illinois, Division, Smith, Third in In Re Marriage of 446, 405 N.E.2d Ill.App.3d stated: the ... As subject disability pension does not expressly fall into an excepted it constitutes marital category, if it can property be categorized as property . marriage . . Further, in rejecting being of concept overplus wrote: the Illinois court of the disabled spouse separate property of those contribution recognize analytical ... We on the basis of distinguishing disability courts believe element but do not of the compensatory some form offers us of law Illinois statutory the framework the Illinois of 503(a) of that Section flexibility aрproach. Act) man- (hereinafter Act Marriage and Dissolution property of all non-excepted dates the characterization mentioned, longevity and as previously marital property, The disa- in Illinois. constitute marital pensions from such longevity pension at bar differs bility pension element, its mode of inception in its only compensatory directive of the classificatory its duration. Given possibly benefits at bar to we hold the 503(a) section marital property. constitute similarly Likewise, not of the flexibility the Arkansas statute does offer that all since our statute mandates simply California approach is marital non-exempted property contends that should be Additionally, the annuity because Dr. contributions to distinguished Day’s were while cоntributions were voluntary mandatory. statute, Under our is marital whether it *4 is or voluntarily involuntarily acquired. next that a that the argues holding disability

Appellant because retirement benefits are inequitablе and one of them each will have one-half spouse only of.the statute, is disabled. Under our the chancellor had the discretion make division other if an division was unfair. than equal equal Here the chancellor first out that had medical pointed severe, been more it would have been that impairment unlikely would have awarded one-half of the disability court appеllee The chancellor then considered the fact pension. with

was a farmer and was self-employed appellee unemployed out other income and ‍‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​​​​​​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‍divided the We сannot pension equally. say was erroneous. decision clearly

Affirmed.

Purtle, J., dissents.

George Smith, J., not participating. Justice, dissenting.

John I. I with strongly disagree Purtle, in majority opinion treating benefits as marital In the first аre not insofar place they acquired as future It is our benefits are concerned. fault that the chancellor ruled as we although he did have not so held. In previously Day Day, 281 we did hold that earned However, retirement benefits were marital property. we were able to an exact dollar and cents place valuation on the retirement benefits awardеd to the Contributions to the had been made from plan Day marital funds. benefits are as

Disability personal as can be. They to the disabled of his represent payment person having part hеr or mental taken physical ability To show the away. unjust results, a 25 inequitable suppose year-old receives spouse injuries in that resulting becoming a and the person quadriplegic healthy obtains a divorce and is spouse awarded half the disability benefits the injured half the spouse receiving. Possibly will not be the invalid enough keep alive. In such a case spouse the state would be with the left burden of maintaining injured party. then remarries and Suppose healthy spouse also continues gainful even more employment, earning than the injured receives. party receives all his healthy ex-spouse half former earnings plus benefits and spouse’s possibly new earn even more than spouse may either of the others.

Furthermore if the remarried dies thеn his heirs are owners of half the disability payments due the If we injured party. simply acknowledged these benefits have not been there is ‍‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​​​​​​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‍no problem. The common sense and is to equitable approach treat benefits as income when received. Such benefits should be considered when awards for making support alimony.

Even before this court has decided the issue some trial courts are treating such benefits as on hand. It is true the *5 statute does not require to be divided and we equally have pointed in our provision opinions. We should now correct any errоneous our have impressions created. opinions Trial courts should not divide mechanically disability between the as if were certificates of parties they deposit. injured spousе’s half of the

If we are to award going well and award we ahead may go benefits to the other disability be received which are to apt security half the social too. the burial insuranсe the lifetime and add half from taking make in the income What difference does it community if the state is a benefits from a disability person one? There are or one that is in all practiсality state states which do not decisions from community property many v. Bugh, See Bugh treat benefits as marital disability 1980) and Hicks v. (Ariz. 125 Ariz. 608 P.2d 329 App. Hicks, 1976). I see no reason ‍‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​​​​​​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‍(Tex. why Civ. App. 546 S.W.2d 538 S.W.2d 36 is not still v. 260 Ark. Lowrey Lowrey, personal injury law. In we held that good Lowrey unliquidated divided in divorce actions. benefits were not properly Potter, We stated in Potter v. that benefits or claims not

(1983), Day, yet and supra, from classified аs marital being received were not exempt deny if were with the intent acquisition delayed non-injured other benefits. In the case the spouse just present obtaining will not contribute in manner in future аny nor to award the just equitable benefits. It neither work, half the who is able and healthy spouse, qualified for payments injured receiving pain party suffering. judge-made

If there is ever law this is not the justification case for it. I would reverse and remand with directions to consider awarding alimony such benefits in support.

Case Details

Case Name: Morrison v. Morrison
Court Name: Supreme Court of Arkansas
Date Published: Jul 1, 1985
Citation: 692 S.W.2d 601
Docket Number: 85-35
Court Abbreviation: Ark.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.
Log In