Morrison v. HallMorrison v. Hall
Kaye E. McDonald, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, Oregon, attorney for the defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Michael R. Hogan, Chief District Judge, Presiding D.C. No. CV 94-06383-MRH
Before: Harry Pregerson, Warren J. Ferguson, and Michael Daly Hawkins, Circuit Judges.
On a motion by the defendants for summary judgment, the district court found that the mail regulations challenged by [Morrison] are constitutionally appropriate. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
I. BACKGROUND
In November 1993, Morrison filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to
In February of 1993, the mailroom at O.S.P. [Oregon State Penitentiary] returned a Montana Outdoors magazine sent to Patrick Morrison (Plaintiff) to the publisher stating that the address is incorrect when [in fact] the address was correct. This action resulted in the magazine not being delivered to Patrick Morrison until the month of September 1993 after Patrick Morrison contacted the publisher.
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Plaintiff‘s claims are against the mail procedures, and the rules that have been placed in effect by the Oregon Department of Corrections governing the procedures for the processing and handling of inmate mail.
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Actions of defendants stated [above] violate plaintiff‘s Constitutional Rights of the First . . . and Fourteenth Amendments . . . by requiring parties corresponding with inmates to disclose their [full] name and address on the front of the envelope as a return address in order for the inmate addressee to receive the correspondence. If the return address is not displayed on the front of the envelope, the mailroom refuses the letter, and the inmate addressee is not notified that the mail was rejected and no hearing is offered.
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Actions of defendants stated [above] violate plaintiff‘s Constitutional Rights of the First . . . and Fourteenth Amendments . . . by refusing to deliver correspondence to inmate addressee and not notifying the inmate addressee of the refusal of the correspondence, thus denying the inmate addressee the knowledge of the refusal, and a hearing on the reason for the refusal of the correspondence.
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Actions of defendants stated [above] violate plaintiff‘s Constitutional Rights of the First . . . and Fourteenth Amendments . . . by refusal of Bulk-Rate mail and Third Class mail sent to inmates. . . . by not delivering mail to inmates in a reasonable time. . .. [and] by conspiring to isolate inmates from family and friends, as well as, [acquaintances], media, courts, attorneys, government officials and agencies by use of stringent procedures and rules for the processing of mail.
The amended complaint prays for monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief.2
Following remand to the district court, the defendants once again moved for summary judgment on Morrison‘s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court granted the defendants’ motion and dismissed the action with prejudice on April 3, 1998. Once again, Morrison timely appealed pro se.
Upon reviewing Morrison‘s appeal, we deemed this case appropriate for the appointment of pro bono counsel. Accordingly, pursuant to an order of this court, Morrison was represented on appeal by certified law students through a clinical program run by the University of California, Davis, School of Law. Following the appointment of counsel, additional briefs from both parties were filed with the court.4
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo a district court‘s decision to grant summary judgment. Botosan v. Paul McNally Realty, 216 F.3d 827, 830 (9th Cir. 2000). Our review is governed by the same standard used by the trial court under
III. ANALYSIS
A. Did the District Court Err in Finding the OSP Mail Regulation Prohibiting Bulk Rate, Third, and Fourth Class Mail Constitutional?
Morrison first argues that
Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987). Thus, when a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts will discharge their duty to protect [prisoners‘] constitutional rights. Mauro v. Arpaio, 188 F.3d 1054, 1058 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (internal citation omitted). Nevertheless, prisoners’ constitutional rights are subject to substantial limitations and restrictions in order to allow prison officials to achieve legitimate correctional goals and maintain institutional security. Walker v. Sumner, 917 F.2d 382, 385 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal citations omitted).
In Turner v. Safley, the Supreme Court set forth the standard for evaluating prisoners’ constitutional claims. Id. Turner held that a regulation that impinges upon a prisoner‘s constitutional rights is valid if the regulation `is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’ Frost v. Symington, 197 F.3d 348, 354 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89). To guide courts in evaluating whether a challenged regulation is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, Turner established the following four-part test:
(1) whether the regulation is rationally related to a legitimate and neutral governmental objective; (2) whether there are alternative avenues that remain open to the inmates to exercise the right; (3) the impact that accommodating the asserted right will have on other guards and prisoners, and on the allocation of prison resources; and (4) whether the existence of easy and obvious alternatives indicates that the regulation is an exaggerated response by prison officials.
Prison Legal News [v. Cook], 238 F.3d [1145] at 1149 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90). Although all four Turner factors are relevant to our analysis, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that [t]he first of these factors constitutes a sine qua non. Walker, 917 F.2d at 385 (emphasis added).
Our court recently relied on the Turner test in an as-applied constitutional challenge to the same OSP regulation prohibiting prisoners from receiving bulk rate, third, and fourth class mail. Prison Legal News, 238 F.3d at 1146-48. In Prison Legal News, inmate subscribers and publishers of the nonprofit newsletter Prison Legal News challenged the same OSP mail regulation as applied to subscription non-profit organization mail. Id. at 1146. The plaintiffs argued that because it was not feasible, economically or otherwise, for prisoners to have publishers send non-profit publications first or second class,
Applying the first Turner factor to the facts of Prison Legal News, we held that tying the receipt of subscription non-profit newsletters to postal service rate classifications is not rationally related to any legitimate penological interest put forward by the [defendants]. Id. at 1149-50. Based on this finding, and in recognition of the fact that the first Turner factor is the sine qua non, we stated: Because the [defendants] have failed to show that the ban on standard mail is rationally related to a legitimate penological objective, we do no consider the other Turner factors. Rather, we are required to reverse. Id. at 1151. With this background in mind, we turn now to the merits of the present case.
As set forth above, the first Turner factor directs us to consider whether the regulation is rationally related to a legitimate and neutral governmental objective. Id. at 1149. This, in turn, requires us to: (1) determine whether the [defendant‘s] regulation is legitimate and neutral; and (2) assess whether there is a rational relationship between the governmental objective and the regulation. Id.
In the present case, Morrison does not challenge the neutrality of
After the district court decided this case, however, Prison Legal News rejected all four of these arguments as applied to non-profit subscription publications. For example, Prison Legal News rejected the argument that prohibiting non-profit subscription publications from entering prisons prevents the introduction of contraband because the defendants in that case presented no evidence supporting a rational distinction between the risk of contraband in subscription non-profit organization standard mail and first class or periodicals mail. Prison Legal News, 238 F.3d at 1150. Similarly, in the present case, although the defendants presented evidence that contraband is sometimes included in bulk rate, third, and fourth class mail, the defendants have failed to present any evidence that the risk of contraband in first or second class mail is any lower than the risk of contraband in mail that is sent bulk rate, third, or fourth class.
Prison Legal News also rejected the argument that a ban on bulk rate, third, and fourth class mail reduces fire hazards. As we explained in that case, [i]t is irrational to believe that delivering the small amount of subscription non-profit organizational standard mail that comes into Oregon prisons would significantly contribute to paper accumulation and increased fire hazard, as the total amount of mail prisoners may store in their cells is currently limited by property regulations. Id. (emphasis added); see also Crofton v. Roe, 170 F.3d 957, 960 (9th Cir. 1999) (discussing the prison property regulations which limit the quantity of possessions that prisoners may have in their cells). Although the number of subscription for-profit publications that enter the OSP may be greater than the number of subscription non-profit publications, because the OSP already regulates the quantity of possessions that prisoners may have in their cell, it is similarly irrational to prohibit prisoners from receiving subscription for-profit mail on the theory that it reduces fire hazards. Cf. Prison Legal News, 238 F.3d at 1150.
Likewise, Prison Legal News held that the same prison property regulation limiting the total amount of property in a cell also defeated the defendants’ claim that
The [defendants] assert that the ban on standard mail allows mailroom staff to concentrate its efforts on timely processing acceptable mail and thoroughly inspecting such mail for content and contraband. Publisher and Prisoners respond that processing subscription non-profit organization standard mail would not substantially deplete prison resources and would not add significantly to the mailroom staff‘s workload. We agree. The reality is that all incoming mail must be sorted. The record shows that distinguishing between non-profit organization standard mail and regular/commercial standard mail is not unduly cumbersome, particularly in light of the relatively insignificant amount of incoming non-profit organization standard mail received at the Department‘s several facilities.
Id. Thus, we held that the efficient use of staff time argument cannot justify an effective ban on non-profit subscription publications. Id.
In this case, the defendants have failed to submit any evidence regarding the quantum of for-profit subscription publications received at the Oregon prisons. The declaration of John Grill, the Deputy Assistant Director of the Oregon Department of Corrections, states that Oregon prisons receive massive volumes of bulk rate, third, and fourth class mail, and that prior to the adoption of
Grill‘s declaration acknowledges, however, that these statistics relate only to unsolicited and non-privileged junk mail (emphasis added). There is no evidence in the record regarding the impact that processing pre-paid, for-profit subscription publications would have on prison resources.
The defendants have also failed to submit any evidence demonstrating a rational connection between the postage rate at which a publication is sent and the risk of contraband. This is significant because the defendants assert that incoming mail that may contain contraband drains prison resources by requiring the prison to: (1) spend staff time searching the incoming mail to insure that contraband does not enter the prison; and (2) provide prisoners with a hearing each time incoming contraband is confiscated. But there is no evidence that the risk of contraband is greater in the case of subscription, for-profit publications than it is in the case of mail that is sent first or second class. Indeed, the defendants acknowledge that Morrison could receive subscription, for-profit publications such a Sports Illustrated, The New York Times, or Montana Outdoors if the publisher agreed to send the issues by first or second class mail.
At oral argument, counsel for the defendants acknowledged that at its core,
As in Prison Legal News, because the rational relationship factor is the sine qua non, our finding that the first Turner factor favors Morrison is sufficient to reverse the district court‘s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the constitutionality of
The second Turner factor requires us to consider whether there are alternative avenues that remain open to inmates to exercise their rights. Id. at 1149. The defendants assert that any materials may be received by [an] inmate if sent to him or her by first or second class mail. According to the defendants, this provides an alternative avenue by which inmates may exercise their First Amendment rights. But Prison Legal News rejected this argument, stating paying a higher rate is not an alternative because the prisoner cannot force a publisher who needs to use, and is entitled to use, the standard rate to take additional costly steps to mail his individual newsletter.6 Prison Legal News, 238 F.3d at 1149.
The defendants also cite the district court‘s finding that alternative avenues remain available because inmates may still listen to the radio or watch television. We reject this argument. Although radio and television are alternative media by which inmates may receive information about the outside world, they should not be considered a substitute for reading newspapers and magazines.7 Thus, we find that the second Turner factor also favors Morrison.
The third Turner factor focuses on the impact that accommodating the asserted right will have on other guards and prisoners, and on the allocation of prison resources. Prison Legal News, 238 F.3d at 1149. Here, the defendants essentially rehash their arguments regarding the first Turner factor, focusing once again on the impact of the challenged regulation on prison staff time and other prison resources. For the reasons discussed above in the context of the first Turner factor, we find that the third factor also favors Morrison.
Finally, the fourth factor requires us to consider whether the existence of easy and obvious alternatives indicates that the regulation is an exaggerated response by prison officials. Id. This factor strongly favors Morrison. The defendants acknowledge that
Furthermore, the existence of the CDC regulation provides evidence of an easy and obvious alternative to
In sum, we conclude that all four Turner factors favor Morrison. Accordingly, we find that
B. Did the District Court Err in Finding OAR 291-131-025(1) Constitutional?
Morrison also challenges the constitutionality of
Before reaching the merits of Morrison‘s claims, however, the defendants argue as an initial matter that
With respect to the merits of Morrison‘s claims, Morrison first argues that
Morrison‘s final argument is that
I have been forced to display my full name and address on the outside, front of all correspondence I have sent to him in order for him to receive it. The displaying of my full name and address on the outside of the envelope does cause me extra concern of some unwanted party obtaining information about me.
Despite the fact that there may be legitimate reasons for an individual to resist the requirement that they include their complete name and address on all incoming mail, we must analyze the constitutionality of this requirement under the four-part Turner test. With respect to the first Turner factor, the defendants offer two legitimate penological interests supporting this requirement: (1) that the complete name and return address facilitates the return of mail to the sender if necessary, and allows the prison to inform the sender of prison mail requirements; and (2) that the complete name and return address assists the OSP in investigations.
This second reason alone provides a sufficient justification for the rule. The defendants submitted sufficient evidence to demonstrate that [a] return address is an invaluable and necessary tool in gathering intelligence and conducting investigations. As the declaration of Brad Halverson, the Manager of the Drug Investigation Unit, states:
The return address is an integral part of the package of information we rely on when conducting investigations: inmate mail, inmate telephone conversations and activity on inmate trust accounts. Our ability to investigate would be drastically affected without it. An influx of controlled substances into [Oregon Department of Corrections] institutions is a likely outcome of not requiring incoming inmate mail to bear a return address. Increased drug usage and trafficking obviously threatens the good order, safety and security of [the] institutions.
Because maintaining security is a legitimate penological interest, Procunier, 416 U.S. at 412, we find that the first Turner factor favors the defendants. Furthermore, because the regulation passes muster under the first Turner factor, and first factor is the sine qua non of the Turner test, we need not consider the remaining factors. Prison Legal News, 238 F.3d at 1151.
In sum, because the defendants submitted sufficient evidence to demonstrate a rational connection between requiring that all incoming mail include the sender‘s complete name and address and the goal of facilitating investigations, which in turn enhances prison security, we affirm the district court‘s grant of summary judgment to the defendants on this issue.
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Each party to bear its own costs.