In these consolidated appeals, defendants appeal by leave granted the circuit court’s order denying their respective motions for summary disposition. Defendants claim that the court erred as a matter of law in interpreting
Plaintiff Julie Morrison sought prenatal care from defendant Timothy K. Dickinson, M.D., at defendant Allegan Medical Clinic, P.C., during the course of her third pregnancy. On May 21, 1992, defendant physician admitted Mrs. Morrison to defendant Allegan General Hospital to deliver the child. Plaintiffs allege that defendant physician failed to properly control the delivery and failed to maneuver the baby’s head over the perineum. As a result of defendant physician’s failures, Mrs. Morrison suffered a fourth-degree laceration, which defendant physician also treated unsuccessfully.
On April 28, 1994, the Morrisons’ attorney wrote to each defendant, stating that the letter’s purpose was to provide notice of the Morrisons’ intent to file a medical malpractice claim against defendant physician, defendant clinic, and defendant hospital. Less than a month later, on May 19, 1994, the Morrisons filed their complaint, alleging medical malpractice against defendant physician, vicarious liability against defendant clinic, ostensible agency against defendant hospital, and loss of consortium against all three.
In lieu of answering the complaint, defendant physician moved for summary disposition, claiming that the Morrisons’ complaint must be dismissed for fail *311 ure to give 182 days’ notice as required by MCL 600.2912b; MSA 27A.2912(2). Defendant hospital moved for summary disposition on identical grounds, and defendant clinic joined its codefendants’ motions.
The circuit court denied defendants’ motions for summary disposition, opining that
Defendants now appeal, challenging the circuit court’s interpretation of § 2912b. We review de novo both questions of statutory interpretation and orders granting or denying motions for summary disposition.
Folands Jewelry Brokers, Inc v City of Warren,
Defendants first argue that the circuit court erred in interpreting MCL 600.2912b; MSA 27A.2912(2) contrary to its plainly stated requirement to provide 182 days’ notice of intent to file a medical malpractice claim. The Legislature made a number of changes to the Revised Judicature Act when it enacted
Except as otherwise provided in. this section, a person shall not commence an action alleging medical malpractice against a health professional or health facility unless the person had given the health professional or health facility written notice under this section not less than 182 days before the action is commenced. [MCL 600.2912b(l); MSA 27A.2912(2)(1).]
Second, the Legislature permitted a tolling of the period of limitation during the 182-day notice period, stating that the applicable period of limitation is tolled
[i]f, during the applicable notice period under section 2912b, a claim would be barred by the statute of limitations or repose, for not longer than a number of days equal to the number of days in the applicable notice period after the date notice is given in compliance with section 2912b [MCL 600.5856(d); MSA 27A.5856(d).]
The third relevant aspect of
(1) Section [ ] .. . 5856 [referring to the tolling provision] of Act No. 236 of the Public Acts of 1961, as amended by this amendatory act, do[es] not apply to causes of action arising before October 1, 1993.
* * *
(4) Section [ ] 2912b [referring to the notice provision] ... of Act No. 236 of the Public Acts of 1961, as amended by this amendatory act, [applies] to cases filed on or after October 1, 1993.
*313 The Legislature did not, however, amend the statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions, which provides:
(1) A person shall not bring or maintain an action to recover damages for injuries to persons or property unless, after the claim first accrued to the plaintiff or to someone through whom the plaintiff claims, the action is commenced within the period of time prescribed by this section.
* * *
(4) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the period of limitations is 2 years for an action charging malpractice. [MCL 600.5805; MSA 27A.5805.]
In summary, the limitation period for medical malpractice actions is two years. MCL 600.5805(4); MSA 27A.5805(4). For causes of action
filed
on or after October 1, 1993, a plaintiff must provide 182 days’ written notice before commencing suit.
Applying the statutory scheme outlined above illustrates the Morrisons’ dilemma, a dilemma that stems primarily from the Legislature’s consideration of the date of filing significant in
The difficulty in the present case arises, however, from the fact that the tolling provision of MCL 600.5856(d); MSA 27A.5856(d) does not apply to plaintiffs. As stated above, their cause of action arose on May 21, 1992, that is, before October 1, 1993. While a tolling provision exists, MCL 600.5856(d); MSA 27A.5856(d), the tolling provision does
not
apply to causes of action arising before October 1, 1993,
In short, though the Morrisons’ cause of action had previously accrued, because of legislative amendment *315 of the pertinent statutes, the Morrisons’ claim, as well as the actions of all those potential plaintiffs similarly situated, was vitiated. Implementation of the notice requirement effectively abrogated the Morrisons’ claim despite the fact that it had already vested.
The circuit court realized the inequity of this result, and, apparently, refused to enforce either the notice requirement or the tolling provision and its limitation. After reviewing the applicable case law, we conclude that the notice requirement should have been applied to the present cause of action, but the limitation of the tolling provision should not have been applied.
As set forth in
Folands,
supra, “[w]hen inteipreting a statute, our goal is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature.” The Legislature is presumed to have intended the meaning it plainly expressed.
Frasier v Model Coverall Service, Inc,
Reading the notice provision and the tolling provision together, it is clear that the Legislature intended to toll the limitation period set forth in MCL 600.5805(4); MSA 27A.5805(4) during the pendency of *316 the notice period. Frasier, supra, p 744. However, the plain language of the related statutes serves to vitiate accrued causes of action under facts such as those in the present case, because though a plaintiff’s action may have accrued, the intervening notice requirement coupled with the absence of a tolling provision effectively abrogates the claim. This the Legislature may not do, whether intentionally or unintentionally.
While the Legislature possesses the authority to expressly extinguish a common-law right,
Dyke v Richard,
Justice Cooley described our responsibility in dealing with such statutes of limitation in Price v Hopkin,13 Mich 318 , 324 (1865):
“The general power of the legislature to pass statutes of limitation is not doubted. The time that these statutes shall allow for bringing suits is to be fixed by the legislative judgment, and where the legislature has fairly exercised its discretion, no court is at liberty to review its action, and to annul the law, because in their opinion the legislative power has been unwisely exercised. But the legislative authority is not so entirely unlimited that, under the name of a statute limiting the time within which a party shall resort to his legal remedy, all remedy whatsoever may be taken away. ... It is of the essence of a law of limitation that it shall afford a reasonable time within which suit may be brought [citations omitted] and a statute that fails to do this cannot possibly be sustained as a law of limitations, but would be a palpable violation of the constitutional provision that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law.”
Since “[i]t is of the essence of a law of limitation that it shall afford a reasonable time within which suit may be *317 brought...Price, supra, a statute which extinguishes the right to bring suit cannot be enforced as a law of limitation.
This rule of law has also been phrased as follows: “It is clear that once a cause of action accrues, —i.e., all the facts become operative and are known — it becomes a ‘vested right.’ ”
In re Certified Questions,
Turning, then, to the present case,
However, to address the tolling provision,
Additionally, we would note that extant case law and this Court’s inteipretation of the 182-day tolling provision serve to preserve the causes of action of all plaintiffs situated similarly to the present plaintiffs. The tolling statute, MCL 600.5856; MSA 27A.5856, applies to prior suits that have not been adjudicated on the merits.
Buscaino v Rhodes,
Reversed and remanded. The circuit court is directed to enter an order granting summary disposition without prejudice in favor of defendants. Plaintiffs are free to refile their cause of action immediately, the 182-day notice period long having expired.