Morrisette v. Commissioner Social Security Administration
3:04-cv-01785 | D. Or. | Dec 14, 2005
FILEB'OE\ DEC 14 16=2211®8+3&?
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
MICHAEL R. MORRISETTE, CV. 04-1785 JE
Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATION
v.
JOANNE B. BARNHART
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
JELDERKS, Magistrate Judge:
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Michael Morrisette brings this action pursuant to the Social Security Act, 42
USC § 405(g)(“the Act”), to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of the
Social Security Adrninistration (“Commissioner”) denying his claim for Supplemental Security
Income (“SSI”) benefits For the reasons set forth below, the decision of the Commissioner
should be reversed and remanded for further administrative proceedings
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l - FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Morn`sette filed an application for benefits on June 10, 2002, alleging disability since
December 31, 1999, due to degenerative lower spine issues, carpal tunnel syndrome, mental
illness, obsessive compulsive disorder, and depression . His application was denied initially and
upon reconsideration On September 3, 2003, a hearing was held before an Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ). ln a decision dated January 22, 2004, the ALJ found Morn'sette not disabled and
therefore not entitled to benefits. On November 8, 2004, the Appeals Council denied
Morn`sette’s request for review, making the ALJ's decision the flnal decision of the
Commissioner. Morrisette now seeks judicial review of the Commissioner's decision.
STANDARDS
A claimant is disabled if he or she is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity
by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which . . . has lasted or
can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 USC
§ 423(d)(1)(A). The initial burden of proof rests upon the claimant to establish his or her
disability. Roberts v. Shalala, 66 F3d 179, 182 (9th Cir 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1122" date_filed="1996-04-01" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Jones v. Oklahoma">517 US 1122 (1996).
The Commissionel' bears the burden of developing the record. DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F2d
841, 849 (9th Cir 1991).
The district court must affirm the Commissioner’s decision if it is based on proper legal
standards and the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 42
USC § 405(g); see also Ana'rews v. Shalala, 53 F3d 1035, 1039 (9“‘ Cir 1995). “Substantial
evidence means more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Andrews, 53
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F3d at 1039. The court must weigh all of the evidence, whether it supports or detracts from the
Commissioner’s decision. Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F2d 771, 772 (9th Cir 1986). The
Commissioner’s decision must be upheld, however, if “the evidence is susceptible to more than
one rational interpretation.” Andrews, 53 F3d at 1039-40.
DISABILITY ANALYSIS
The ALJ engages in a five-step sequential inquiry to determine whether a claimant is
disabled within the meaning of the Act. 20 CFR §§ 404.1520, 416.920. Below is a summary
of the live steps, which also are described in Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F3d 1094, 1098-99 (9th Cir
1999):
Step One. 'l`he Commissioner determines whether claimant is engaged in substantial
gainful activity. If so, claimant is not disabled. If claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful
activity, the Commissioner proceeds to evaluate claimant’s case under step two. 20 CFR
§§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b).
Step Two. The Commissioner determines whether claimant has one or more severe
impairments If nc t, claimant is not disabled. If claimant has a severe impairment, the
Commissioner proceeds to evaluate claimant’s case under step three. 20 CFR §§ 404.1520(c),
41 6.920(c).
Step Threei Disability cannot be based solely on a severe impairment; therefore, the
Commissioner next determines whether claimant’s impairment “meets or equals” one of the
impairments listed in the Social Security Administration (SSA) regulations, 20 CFR Part 404,
Subpart P, Appené.ix 1. If so, claimant is disabled. If claimant’s impairment does not meet or
3 - FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
equal one listed in the regulations, the Commissioner’s evaluation of claimant’s case proceeds
under step four. 20 CFR §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d).
Step Four. The Commissioner determines whether claimant is able to perform work he or
she has done in the past. If so, claimant is not disabled. If claimant demonstrates he or she
cannot do work performed in the past, the Commissioner’s evaluation of claimant’s case
proceeds under step five. 20 CFR §§ 404.1520(€), 416.920(e).
Step Five. The Commissioner determines whether claimant is able to do any other work.
If not, claimant is clisabled. If the Commissioner finds claimant is able to do other work, the
Commissioner must show a significant number of jobs exist in the national economy that
claimant can do. The Commissioner may satisfy this burden through the testimony of a
vocational expeit (“VE”) or by reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, 20 CFR Part
404, Subpart P, Appendix 2. If the Commissioner demonstrates a significant number of jobs
exist in the national economy that claimant can do, claimant is not disabled. If the Commissioner
does not meet this burden, claimant is disabled. 20 CFR §§ 404.1520(f)(1), 416.920(f)(l).
At steps one through four, the burden of proof is on the claimant. Tackett, 180 F3d at
1098. At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can perform
jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. Id.
ALJ’s DECISION
At step one, the ALJ found Morrisette had not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since the alleged onset of his disability on December 31, 1999.
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At step two, the ALJ found Morrisette had the medically determinable severe
impairments of degenerative disc disease, depression, and an obsessive compulsive disorder
(“OCD”). This finding is in dispute.
At step three, the ALJ found that Morrisette’s impairments did not meet or medically
equal the criteria of any listed impairments
At step four, the ALJ found that Morrisette was not fully credible and retained the
residual functional capacity to perform a limited range of light exertion work in which he is not
required to have frequent public interaction. This finding is in dispute. The ALJ determined that
Morrisette was unable to perform his past relevant work.
At step five, the ALJ found that Morrisette could perform work existing in the national
economy, specifically small products assembler, packaging line worker, and gate guard/security
guard. This finding is in dispute.
DISCUSSION
Morrisette Was 48 years old at the time of the ALJ ’s decision. He has completed high
school and one year of college. The medical records accurately set forth Morrisette’s medical
history as it relates to his claim. The court has carefully reviewed the records, and the parties are
familiar with them. Accordingly, the details will not be recounted here.
Morrisette contends that the ALJ erred by: (1) failing to find carpal tunnel syndrome a
severe impairment', (2) finding Morrisette not entirely credible; (3) rejecting the opinions of his
treating physicians; (4) failing properly to develop the record; (5) and improperly determining his
RFC.
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l. Step Two Analysis
Morrisette contends that the ALJ erred by failing to assess carpal tunnel syndrome as a
“severe” impairment at step two of the sequential evaluation. Morrisette’s argument fails
because the ALJ did not deny his claim at step two. The ALJ can deny a claim at step two only if
the evidence shows that the individual has no impairments causing more than a minimal effect on
the ability to work. SSR 85-28. Here, the ALJ found that Morrisette did have medically severe
impairments and properly continued the sequential evaluation until he reached a conclusion at
step five. SSR 96-3p.
Morrisette failed to show that carpal tunnel syndrome had functionally limiting effects
during the relevant time period, that is, between December 31, 1999 and December 31, 2001. To
show that an impairment is severe for the purposes of step two, the claimant must show that it
significantly limits his ability to perform basic work activities 20 CFR § 404.1521. These
include physical functions, such as walking, standing and sitting, and mental functions, such as
understanding, remembering, using judgment and responding appropriately to work situations
20 CFR § 404.152 l(b).
Morrisette testified that his carpal tunnel syndrome symptoms bothered him daily, and
that his hands go numb after ten minutes of gripping. Tr. 375. The symptoms affect both
hands, but the right is worse than the left. Tr. 377. However, in determining the severity of an
impairment at step two, the medical evidence alone is evaluated in order to assess the effect of
the impairment on the ability to do basic work activities SSR 85-28.
As the ALJ noted, nerve conduction studies performed by Robert Neuwirth, M.D., in
April 1999 indicated carpal tunnel syndrome on the right, with no evidence of radiculopathy. Dr.
6 - FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
Neuwirth prescribed a wrist splint. Tr. 130. Morrisette testified that he never picked up the
splint. Tr. 373. In October 1999 Glenn S. Chapman, M.D., noted that Morrisette complained of
bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, and prescribed B6 vitamins for “a matter of weeks....” Tr. 298.
Neither physician assessed any functional limitation arising out of Morrisette’s carpal tunnel
syndrome,
Because Morrisette has not shown that carpal tunnel syndrome resulted in any functional
limitations beyond those imposed by the severe impairments identified by the ALJ, the court
should sustain the ALJ ’s findings and conclusion at step two.
Il. Credibility
The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical
testimony, and for resolving ambiguities Ana'rews v. Shalala, 53 F3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir 1995).
However, the ALJ':»; findings must be supported by specific, cogent reasons Rea'a'ick v. Chater,
157 F3d 715, 722 (9th Cir 1998). Unless there is affirmative evidence showing that the claimant
is malingering, the Commissioner's reason for rejecting the claimant’s testimony must be "clear
and convincing." 1 d. The ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence
undermines the claimant’s complaints Id. The evidence upon which the ALJ relies must be
substantial. Reddi<.'k, 157 F3d at 724. See also Holohan v. Massinari, 246 F3d 1195, 1208 (9th
Cir 2001). General findings (e.g., "record in genera " indicates improvement) are an insufficient
basis to support an adverse credibility determination Reddick at 722; see also Holohan, 246
F.3d at 1208. The ALJ must make a credibility determination with findings sufficiently specific
to permit the court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit the claimant’s testimony.
Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F3d 947, 958 (9th Cir 2002).
7 - FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
ln deciding whether to accept a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony, "an ALJ must
perform two stages of analysis: the Cotton analysis and an analysis of the credibility of the
claimant‘s testimony regarding the severity of her symptoms [footnote omitted.] Smolen v.
Chater, 80 F3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir 1996).
Und.er the Cotton test, a claimant who alleges disability based
on subjective symptoms "must produce objective medical evi-
dence of an underlying impairment which could reasonably
be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged...."
Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 344 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A)(1988));
Cot)fon, 799 F.2d at 1407-08. The Cotton test imposes only two
requirements on the claimant (l) she must produce objective
medical evidence of an impairment or impairments; and (2) she
must show that the impairment or combination of impairments
could reasonably be expected to (not that it did in fact) produce
some degree of symptom. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1282 (italics in
original).
There is objective medical evidence that Morrisette suffers from degenerative disk
disease, depression and OCD. These impairments could reasonably be expected to cause some
degree of pain and other symptoms Therefore, the ALJ may not simply reject Morrisette’s
symptom testimony. Id. To determine whether Morrisette’s testimony is credible the ALJ may
consider, for exam ple: (l) ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as a reputation for
lying or prior inconsistent statements; (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek
treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment; and (3) the claimant’s daily activities
Smolen, 80 F3d at 1284.
The ALJ st ated:
In reaching conclusions about the claimant’s “RFC”, I have con-
sidered the claimant’s testimony concerning his subjective complaints
and limitations However, his testimony was not convincing that he
was “disabled” prior to his date last insured. The claimant reported that
his depression “lifted” after he moved to Oregon in August 2001 , al-
8 - FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
though he had had some down times He reported the existence of
depressive periods that last 2 to 3 days But again these episodes
were generally occuning after his date last insured.
The record also fails to establish any disability on or before the
claimant’s date last insured. The claimant was running a private
corporation with his family in 2001. This activity suggests that
the claimant was able to function at a higher level that he perhaps
did not recognize.
As noted earlier in this decision, the medical evidence does not
provide objective findings to support disability prior to the date
last insured. Furthermore, the record suggests some inconsisten-
cies with the allegation of disability. In February 1999, a chart
note states that the claimant suffered pain because he was lifting
weights that were too heavy for too long a period of time [citation
omitted]. ln July 1999, Glenn Chapman, M.D., described the
claimant as “very happy and very muscular” [citation omitted].
In 2003, treating physician Dr. Nilaver reported that the claimant
“...endorses that he is doing quite well”. The doctor described a
physical status that was rather normal [quotation omitted]. Tr. 23.
Morrisette testified that he and his wife separated in January 2000. Tr. 353. As to his
mental state, Morri sette said “I would describe it as poor, depressed. Had a lot of problems with
my obsessive compulsive disorder. Mentally, in a fog l would just say not knowing which way
to go.” Tr. 354. He was treated between 1999 and 2001 by Irving Hoff`man, Ph.D., a
psychologist, at least once a week and sometimes twice a week. Morrisette testified “I just had
no will or desire to get out of bed. I would stay in my room a lot. Get real weepy, very
despondent just not knowing what direction to go in.” Id. He lived on credit cards and the sale
of assets, and considered suicide “quite a few times” Tr. 355.
Morrisette moved from Florida to Oregon in August 2001 to live with his parents He
testified that after he moved to Oregon the depression would lift “[f]or a little time and then I just
would go into different periods of time where I would be down and out for a couple of days and
9 - FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
stay in my room and try to work through that. And try to do things to get things off~problems off
my mind. l would say, on an average, a couple times a month.” Tr. 356-57. Morrisette slips into
depression a couple of times a month for two or three days and becomes weepy and suicidal. Tr.
358. He has been treated by J ames Farley, M.D., a psychiatrist, since shortly after arriving in
Oregon.
The ALJ ’s conclusion that Morrisette’s depression lifted after August 2001 is not
supported by the evidence and is not a legitimate reason to find Morrisette not fully credible.
The ALJ asserts that Morrisette’s assertion of disability is not credible because he “was
running a private corporation with his family in 2001 .” Tr. 23. However, Morrisette testified
that income of $53 ,000 received in 1999 was the distribution of assets from a closely-held
corporation and for which he actually received a boat. The ALJ questioned Morrisette:
Q This is a distribution from the Family Corporation?
A Yeah, what they did is they decided not to do the proj ect. They let it just go for like six
months I didn’t know what was going to happen.
Q You were acting as the consultant running around_
A Yeah, I was just doing management type stuff, you know, making sure guys showed up
for work and -
Q How many were in the crew?
A Anywhei'e between four and six. Ihad-
Q This must have been a big boat.
A Fifty-seven foot Kriscraft ~
Q Wow.
10 - FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
A -yeah, built in 1964.
Q Wow.
A lt was a beautiful boat.
Q Yeah
A The $53,000 was a disbursement to my wife and myself so they could eliminate all the
assets, the company so- Tr. 351.
There is no evidence to support the ALJ ’s conclusion that Morrisette was running a
family corporation in 2001. Morrisette did do some work for the family corporation in 1999, but
this is not a legitimate reason to find Morrisette not credible.
Finally, the ALJ cites a lack of medical evidence of disability and inconsistencies in the
medical record to support his credibility finding Morrisette points to the report of his treating
physician, J ames A. Farley, M.D. On October 2, 2003, Dr. Farley wrote:
Mr. Morrisette was seen for psychiatric evaluation in this office
on November 5“‘, 2001. The initial impression was Obsessive
Cornpulsive Disorder with a history of depression, either re-
current Major Depression or Dysthemia. There was a remote
history of alcohol problems, which were in complete remission.
Since that evaluation I have seen Mr. Morrisette on a roughly
monthly to every two month basis for depression and anxiety.
He has had multiple medication trials and appears to be doing
best on a combination of alprazolam and clonazepam as well
as Depakote, desipramine and trazedone. He has had profound
difficulty with depression and anxiety that have affected his
basic functioning at home. I have recently met with the patient
and his father because of profound depression. He has improved
somewhat since that time. He continues to have problems with
anxiety and depression, which influence his basic daily living
and interfere with socializing. He certainly has difficulty with
pace, concentration and follow through.
He has had marked depression and anxiety problems which have
included periods of anhedonia, appetite disturbance, sleep disturb-
ll - FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
ance, decreased energy, feelings of worthlessness, poor concentration,
and brief thoughts of suicide. He has not had actual psychotic problems,
but he has had some mood swing problems and marked anxiety and
obsessive compulsive symptoms
Based on this information l certainly see Mr. Morrisette as unemployable
due to his mental illness Tr. 334.
The ALJ ’s assertion that there was no medical evidence or objective findings supporting
disability prior to Morrisette’s date last insured is not supported by substantial evidence.
As to the February 1999 chart note regarding excessive weight lifting, Morrisette testified
that he used to lift 'weights, and stopped in 1999, Tr. 386. The chart notes are from “an unknown
source,” include multiple references to depression, and question whether the patient has “any
concerns or expectations about your massage?” Tr. 2, 192. This chart note does not constitute
evidence that Morrisette is not credible.
Glenn S. Chapman, M.D., described Morrisette as “very happy and very muscular” in
July 1999, Tr. 300. In October 1999 Dr. Chapman describes Morrisette as “suicidal with severe
depression.” Tr. 299. The July 1999 chart note does not constitute evidence that Morrisette is
not credible.
Finally, the ALJ cites Morrisette’s report that he was “doing quite well” to Gaj anan
Nilaver, M.D., as inconsistent with Morrisette’s assertion of disability. Tr. 252. Morrisette
suffered a seizure in January 2003, and was seen by Dr. Nilaver in April 2003 in follow-up. Dr.
Nilaver noted that Dr. Farley was treating Morrisette for depression In July 2003, Dr. Nilaver
wrote “Michael Morrissette [sic] is seen in follow-up to day for issues pertaining to seizures He
has done quite well in this regard, but the depression still appears to be a major issue.” Tr. 251.
12 - FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
Morrisette’s April 2003 assertion that he was doing “quite well” does not constitute evidence that
his assertion of disability was not credible,
The ALJ did not identify what portions of Morrisette’s testimony he found not credible,
nor did he offer “clear and convincing” reasons why it was not credible, Reddick, 157 F3d at
724. Accordingly, the ALJ ’s determination that Morrisette is not entirely credible is not
supported by substantial evidence.
III. Treating Physicians
A. James A. Farley, M.D.
Dr. Farley treated Morrisette for depression and OCD from November 5, 2001 through at
least October 2003, As set out above, Dr. Farley opined that Morrisette was “unemployable due
to his mental illness,” and suffered from anxiety and depression that interfered with socializing
and caused difficulties with pace, concentration and follow through. Tr. 334.
The ALJ summarized Dr. Farley’s opinion, and concluded that Morrisette’s depression
and OCD are severe impairments Tr. 20. The ALJ stated:
More recently in 2002, the claimant’s mental status was described
in a Psychiatric Review Technique Form (PRTF) completed by
Pet<:r LeBray, Ph.D., in August 2002 and confirmed by Paul
Rethinger, Ph.D., in November 2002 [citation omitted]. Both
psychologists, although concluding that the claimant evidenced
depression/major depressive disorder and obsessive compulsive
symptoms, found insufficient evidence to conclude that that [sic]
a severe mental impairment existed at any time between the alleged
disability onset date and the date last insured. Tr. 20.
...the evidence has established no restriction of daily activities;
moderate difficulties in maintaining social functioning; no diffi-
culties in maintaining concentration, persistence and pace....
ln reaching these conclusions about the effects of the claimant’s
mental impairments, l again gave him the benefit of the doubt.
13 - FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
In an assessment of the claimant’s mental impairments during the
completion of a Psychiatric Review Technique form in August
200 2, Peter LeBray, Ph.D., stated the evidence was insufficient
to find any functional limitations This assessment was confirmed
by Paul Rethinger, Ph.D., in November 2002 [citation omitted].
Thus, the severity of the mental impairments are next to impossible
to discern in the claimant’s medical record due to the minimal
evidence Tr. 21.
Dr. Farley’s opinion letter was written in October 2003, and was therefore not yet in the
files reviewed by psychologists LeBray and Rethinger.
If a treating physician's medical opinion is supported by medically acceptable diagnostic
techniques and is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record, the treating
physician's opinion is given controlling weight. Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F3d 1195, 1202 (9th
Cir 2001); 20 CFR § 404.1527(d)(2). In general, the opinion of specialists concerning matters
relating to their specialty are entitled to more weight than the opinions of nonspecialists Id.; §
404.1527(d)(5). An ALJ may reject the uncontradicted medical opinion of a treating physician
only for "clear and convincing” reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. Id. at
1202, citing Rea'dick v. Chater, 157 F3d 715, 725 (9th Cir 1998). If the treating physician's
medical opinion is inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record, treating source
medical opinions are still entitled to deference and must be weighted using all the factors
provided in 20 CFR 404.1527. Ia'. citing SSR 96-2p. An ALJ may rely on the medical opinion
of a non-treating doctor instead of the contrary opinion of a treating doctor only if she provides
"specific and legitimate" reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. Id.
Here, the ALJ relied on the opinions of the record- reviewing psychologists instead of the
contrary opinion of the treating doctor, when the psychologists did not have a chance to consider
the treating physician’s opinion The ALJ did not mention Dr. Farley’s opinion that Morrisette
14 - FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
was disabled, nor did he credit Dr. Farley’s assessment that Morrisette had limitations of pace,
persistence and follow through. These opinions are corroborated by Morrisette’s testimony. The
ALJ’s reliance on the reviewing psychologists’ opinions is not supported by specific and
legitimate reasons and is therefore not supported by substantial evidence.
B. Irv Hoff`rnan, Ph.D.
Irv Hoffman, Ph.D., treated Morrisette from 1999 to 2001 for “severe depression and
OCD.” Tr. 340. Dr. Hoffrnan’s chart notes were lost when his office relocated. Dr. Hoff`man
saw Morrisette weekly, and in April 2004 he wrote:
Over the two-year period I worked with Mr. Morrissette [sic],
he struggled with severe depression and OCD. He was extremely
depressed, frequently spending days in bed, unable to get up for
even seemingly simple tasks He was having difficulty maintaining
attention and concentration and was plagued with short-term memory
losses He frequently misplaced his keys, wallet, and glasses, and
spent a great deal of time and energy to find them. At times, Mr.
Moirissette [sic] experienced suicidal ideation. During these times,
we increased our sessions per week. He was also having ongoing
problems with back pain, which contributed to his sense of despair.
Mr. Michael Morrissette [sic] is an intelligent man, however his
difficulty with severe depression, isolative behavior, anhedonia,
hopelessness, concentration and short term memory problems
would have made it impossible for him to have sustained employment
during the years of our treatment Tr. 340.
The ALJ ’s decision was issued on January 22, 2004. Morrisette submitted the evidence
from Dr. Hoff`man to the Appeals Council, which considered the new evidence and denied
Morrisette’s request for review.
This court may consider the new evidence to determine whether the ALJ ’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error. Ramirez v. Shalala, 8 F3d 1449, 1451-
52 (9th Cir. 1993). Morrisette contends that this court must credit this evidence, the opinion of
15 - FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
Dr. Farley, and Morrisette’s symptom testimony, and that crediting the testimony mandates a
finding of disability. However, the ALJ did not have the opportunity to consider the opinion of
Dr. Hoffman. ln addition, the conclusions that Morrisette is disabled are medical rather than
legal conclusions, and here there is no testimony from the vocational expert that the limitations
found by Dr. Farley and Dr. Hoffman would render Morrisette unable to engage in any work.
Harman v. Apfel, 211 F3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, this matter should be
remanded for additional proceedings
RECOMMENDATION
For these reasons, the Commissioner’s decision should be remanded pursuant to sentence
six of 42 USC § 405(g) for further administrative proceedings consistent with these findings
SCHEDULING ORDER
D€¢zw\ l' <’ f
Objections to the Findings and Recommendation, if any, are due November §§ 2005. In
no objections are filed, then the Findings and Recommendation will be referred to a district court
judge and go under advisement on that date.
If objections are filed, then a response is due with 10 days after being served with a copy
of the objections "When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings and
Recommendation will be referred to a district court judge and go under advisement
D€c(£rv\h€ t‘
Dated this _E day of Noslemhor, 2005.
/ ' 4/
JoHNjELDi-;Rks
United States Magistrate Judge
16 - FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION