This is an appeal from the jury verdict and judgment for defendant/appellee State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) in a suit brought by appellant for PIP or “no fault” benefits, penalties, punitive damages, and attorney fees allegedly arising from the processing of a claim based on an insurance policy issued by appellee and insuring appellant. There are nine enumerations of error. Held:
1. Appellant asserts the trial court erred in refusing to charge appellant’s request no. 17 (a) “that the issue of the insurer’s good faith is to be determined by the events and circumstances during the thirty-sixty day time period.” Although this charge comes from
Lawson v. State Farm &c. Ins. Co.,
2. Appellant asserts the trial court erred in refusing to charge appellant’s request no. 10 (a). Pretermitting the question of whether the first part оf the requested charge was a complete and accurate statement of the law (compare, e.g.,
State Farm &c. Ins. Co. v. Ainsworth,
3. Appellant asserts the trial court erred in refusing to charge ap
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pellant’s request no. 13 (a) “that if the insurer has not made a good faith investigation, this in itself is evidence of bad faith.” “A requested charge needs to be given only where it embraces a correct and complete principle of law adjusted to the facts and which is not otherwise included in the general instructions given.” (Punctuation omitted.)
State Farm Fire &c. Co. v. Morgan,
4. Appellant asserts the trial court erred in charging the jury as to defendant’s charge request no. 5, which appеars to adopt certain language found in OCGA § 51-12-5.1 regarding the standard for awarding punitive damages (OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (b)) and the purpose of awarding punitive damages (OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (c)). Although we have been presented with no direct authority fоr the giving of such a charge, we find that the trial court did not err as asserted. See
Collins v. State Farm &c. Ins. Co.,
5. Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in charging defendant’s request to charge no. 7 that “good faith on the part of the defendant can be evidenced by defense to a claim because of a possible preexisting medical condition, because of complex and first impression legal issues and becausе there exists a bona fide issue of dispute.” The record reflects that after appellant took exception to request to charge no. 7, he withdrew the exception after being advised the рarticular charge had not been given. The record reflects that request to charge no. 7 was not in fact given by the trial court, rather a modified version of the charge request was given which made no mention of possible preexisting medical conditions or of complex and first impression legal issues.
In these circumstances, we find appellant should not have been misled regarding whether charge request no. 7 had been given, and that his withdrawal of exception was valid and binding. Having failed to take and maintain a timely exception to defendant’s request to charge no. 7, this issue is not preserved for appеllate review. OCGA § 5-5-24 (a). Moreover, the charge as given, although not a model for instruction crafting, does not contain a substantial error harmful as a matter of law within the meaning of OCGA § 5-5-24 (c). Additionally, appellant’s enumerations fail to assign as error the modified charge
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actually given by the trial court, and an enumeration cannot be enlarged on appeal by statements in briefs regarding issues not made in the enumeration.
City of College Park v. Ga. Power Co.,
6. Appellant asserts two specific errors in his sixth enumeration. This practiсe is prohibited by statute. OCGA § 5-6-40. Although we could refuse to address any error not set out separately
(Murphy v. State,
Although we have elected not to review the additional assertiоn of error contained in enumeration no. 6, regarding the trial court’s failure to charge appellant’s request no. 4 (a), we note the charge as a whole is somewhat confusing, appears to inсorporate without adequate transition two unrelated legal contentions regarding “pain” and witness credibility, and the last portion thereof also appears to be argumentative. Hill, supra; Mattox, supra; Jones, supra.
7. Appellant asserts the “trial court erred in admitting over objection the report of findings the CT scan performed by” two doctors. We need not resolve whether appellant’s objection at trial solely on the grounds of hearsay without any specific objection as to lack of foundation for the introduction of the medical records pertaining to the CT scan would suffice to preserve this issue for appеllate review. The record reflects that apparently the issue of CT scan results initially was called to the jury’s attention, during direct examination, by appellant’s medical expert and then by appеllant. It matters not that this procedure may have been prompted by a trial tactic adopted by
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appellant to minimize the effect of the anticipated later admission of CT scan results by aрpellee, as it is well established that a party cannot complain of a judgment, order, or ruling that his own procedure or conduct aided in causing.
West v. Nodvin,
supra at 829 (3e);
Stephenson v. Wildwood Farms,
8. Appellant enumerates that the trial court errеd in its ruling as to the time for determination of bad faith. We observed in Division 1 above that ultimately the issue as to the time for determination of bad faith was substantially covered in the charges given the jury.
Mattox,
supra. However, appellant asserts he was prejudiced by being unable to argue his position to the jury, because the trial court did not reverse its erroneous position until after argument was completed. The recоrd reflects that after closing argument when the trial court informed counsel of its change of position and of its intent to modify its charge to the jury, neither party requested reargument. “If the appellant was mislеd by the court’s action, it was incumbent on him to request to reargue. . . . Failure to do so acts as a waiver.”
Hall v. State,
9. Appellant asserts the trial court erred in admitting over objection a certified copy of а complaint filed in a 1982 accident and the interrogatories and certain discovery pertaining thereto. The trial court admitted these documents for purposes of impeachment.
As a generаl rule, a party may show anything which may, in the slightest degree, affect the credit of an opposing witness.
McGriff v. McGriff,
We are satisfied that appellant was not impeached as to wholly immaterial matters, but was attempted to be impeaсhed as to matters at least indirectly if not directly material as to appellant’s testimony and to issues in this case. The evidence in issue had some relevancy and materiality for purposes of tending tо disprove certain facts to which appellant had testified. A trial court enjoys a wide discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence.
Spencer v. State,
260 Ga.
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640, 645 (8) (
Judgment affirmed.