124 Ala. 44 | Ala. | 1899
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Arson in either one of the degrees, as defined by statute in this State, is that any person who “willfully sets fire to,” or “willfully burns,” the buildings mentioned, is guilty etc. — Code § § 4336-4341. To constitute the offense, it has been held, that the burning must be Avillful and malicious, otherwise it is not a felony, but only a trespass; therefore no negligence or mischance amounts; to it. “Though malice is a necessary ingredient, its presence need not be specifically proven; it Avill be presumed by the Iuav from the AAdllfulness of the act.” “The State is not bound to proAre malice, or any facts or circumstances besides the unlawful burning. Malice will be presumed from the deliberation of the act. The burden is on the defendant to negative or destroy this presumption.” “Arson is not a crime involving any specific intent in addition to the act done. The intent to burn is the only intent required, and that is necessarily implied in the act, unless some excuse, such as accident appears.” — 2 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d ed.) 918, and authorities there cited; 1 McClain on Cr. Law, § 526; Luke v. The State, 49 Ala. 30; Lockett v. The State, 63 Ala. 5; Stone v. The State, 105 Ala. 61.
Charge 4 was properly refused. — Dent v. The State, 105 Ala. 14; Grant v. The State, 97 Ala,. 35; Wharton v. The State, 73 Ala. 366.
The 6th is a mere argument and was faulty on that account. — Rogers v. The State, 117 Ala. 9, 15; Bryan v. The State, 116 Ala. 445, 452. The 7th was abstract. There was no attempt to prove an alibi. Charge 8 in its first postulate, asserts a correct proposition of law. Salm v. The State, 89 Ala. 56; Jones v. The State, 100 Ala. 88; Gilmore v. The State, 99 Ala. 155; Williams v. The State, 52 Ala. 411. The latter part of the charge, — “and that there is no solution of the question (of guilt) which does not raise a reasonable doubt- as to his guilt,” —-is not clear, and was calculated, to cpnfuse and mislead.
Charge 12 is erroneous. The law- does not require a stronger measure of proof for conviction under circumstantial than under what is term positive proof, but the same measure in each case, — whether the evidence satisfies the mind of the jury of guilt, beyond reasonable doubt. It was also otherwise bad. — Banks v. The State, 72 Ala. 522; Thornton v. The State, 113 Ala. 44. The 13th was properly refused. — Yarborough v. The State, 105 Ala. 44; Dent v. The State, Ib. 14.
We find no error in the record and the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.