SAMANTHA LYNN MORRIS v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Record No. 052654
Supreme Court of Virginia
November 3, 2006
OPINION BY SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR.
PRESENT: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and Agee, JJ., and Stephenson, S.J.
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the evidence is sufficient to support a mother‘s conviction of felonious child neglect in violation of
I
In a bench trial, Morris was found guilty of two charges of felony child neglect. The court sentenced Morris to two years’ imprisonment, with one year and nine months suspended, on each offense and directed that the sentences run concurrently.
In an unpublished opinion, a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the convictions and dismissed the charges. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals granted the Commonwealth‘s petition for a rehearing en banc and affirmed the convictions.
II
In considering whether evidence is sufficient to sustain a criminal conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at trial and grant to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible from that evidence. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 178, 204, 590 S.E.2d 520, 535 (2004). When thus viewed in the light most fаvorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence established that, as of September 29, 2003, Morris had two children, both boys, L.J., age five-and-a-half years, and S., age two-and-a-half years. L.J. had hearing and speech impairments and wore hearing aids.
On the morning of September 29, 2003, Richard Goodin, a family support worker at L.J.‘s elementary school, learned that L.J. was not in school. When Goodin was unable to contact Morris by telеphone, he went to the trailer court where Morris lived. Goodin arrived about 9:30 a.m. and knocked on Morris’ door. Despite knocking “for a significant amount of time,” Goodin raised no response, except for a dog‘s barking, and left Morris’ trailer.
About 11:15 a.m. that day, Goodin returned to Morris’ residence and again raised no response to his knocking. Goodin looked around the neighborhood and saw two children playing in
Goodin knocked on several doors in the neighborhood, hoping to ascertain where the children lived. When he got no response from any residences, Goodin called Child Protective Services and 911. While waiting for the police to arrive, Goodin decided to take custody of the younger child because the child had started to climb on an automobile that appeared to be awaiting repair. Goodin thought the area was “dangerous” due to the presence of the car as well as еngine blocks and a weight lifting bench with weights on it, all of which were “closer to the road.”
Two police officers arrived within five to 15 minutes after Goodin‘s call. Officer Raleigh Anderson knocked on the doors of several residences, including Morris’ trailer, but received no response. When he knocked on the door to Morris’ trailer, however, the door came open. Anderson yelled, “[C]ounty police,” several times, аnd, when no one responded, he “pulled the door closed” and continued his search for the children‘s home.
As Larkin and L.J. walked away, the younger child became “рretty visibly upset,” “started calling mommy,” and ran toward a particular trailer. Anderson followed the child to the trailer. The child pushed the door open and ran into the trailer and toward one of the rear bedrooms, still “calling mommy.” Anderson followed and, in the darkness, saw a man and a woman lying on the bedroom floor. Upon seeing them, Anderson stopped and “announced county police a couple of times.” When he received no response, Anderson backed out of the trailer.
Anderson then began “pounding on the door” with his fist while “announcing county police.” Ultimately, the man came to the door. When Anderson asked about the children, the man went to get the woman. The woman came into the living room, identified herself as the children‘s aunt, and said that she was just watching the children for her sister, Samantha Morris. The younger child, however, kеpt calling the woman, “Mommy.” When the woman asked Anderson where the five-year-old child was, Anderson radioed Larkin that he had found the children‘s residence, and Larkin brought L.J. to the residence.
At trial, Morris testified that L.J. had “great hearing loss . . . in his left ear” and a lesser hearing loss in his right ear and that he had lost one of his hearing aids. She explained that L.J. also had chronic asthma and a painful condition in his left leg. She said that, because of these conditions, L.J. “had been up the couple nights before” September 29, which caused him to “be tired in the mornings.” When L.J. awokе on September 29, he told Morris that he did not feel well, so Morris decided to let him stay home from school.
According to Morris, she and her two children were sitting on the couch watching television when the younger child appeared to be getting sleepy. She asked L.J. if he wanted to take a
Morris admitted that, at the time of trial on February 3, 2004, she had a “significant substance abuse problem.” However, she denied being under the influence of drugs or alcohol on September 29, 2003. She further stated that she had last used drugs “[a]bout three days prior” to thаt date.
III
Any parent, guardian, or other person responsible for the care of a child under the age of 18 whose willful act or omission in the care of such child was so gross, wanton and culpable as to show a reckless disregard for human life shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony.
In explaining his reasons for finding Morris guilty of felonious child neglect under the statute, the trial judge stated the following:
[T]he [question] the Court‘s confronted with is . . . did she omit prоper care of her children and [was] this omission, this negligence, . . . so great that it was wanton and likely to cause injury or which would make it not improbable that injury would be occasioned[.] [T]he facts that I‘ve got are that somehow, she was so sound asleep, she was so deep in sleep that nothing would arouse her to alert her that
her children were getting up and going outside and were outside for forty-five (45) minutes and that there were knocks at the door by Mr. Goodin . . . . There were knocks at the door by the police. There was shouting and whatever sleep she was in, it was so sound, it almost would require an earthquake to wake her up, and going to sleep in that fashion, and whatever caused that, with a five-year-old who I‘ve heard is speech impaired, hearing impaired, had leg pain and a limp with chronic asthma and a two-year-old who can‘t communicate. So we‘ve got kids that are wandering outside who cannot communicate, cannot tell anybody who they are, there are no other responsible adults around, the two-year[-]old‘s unclothed, Mr. Goodin says he finds them in a dangerous area and he searches for the parents, and she‘s so asleep that she can‘t be awakened to check on her children or know where her children are, and I think that meets the definition, coupled with what-that the neighbors [previously] brought the children back, that it was seventy (70) degrees, that she had awakened that morning, but couldn‘t remain alert enough to omit being negligent in caring for her children or . . . to be negligent in the omission of the care of her children, so I find her guilty . . . . [A]nd I add to that her credibility about not even being their mother. I think that factors in, too, in her omission in the care of her kids.
As previously stated, we must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial. Jackson, 267 Va. at 204, 590 S.E.2d at 535. Additionally, the trial court‘s judgment is presumed to be correct and will be reversed only if it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. Id.;
In order for a person to be convicted of felony child neglect, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed a “willful act or omission in the care” of a child. The Commonwealth also must prove that the act or omission is “so gross, wanton and culpable as to show a reckless disregard for human life.”
We have said that “[t]he term ‘willful act’ imports knowledge and consciousness that injury will result from the act done. The act done must be intended or it must involve a reckless disregard for the rights of another and will probably result in an injury.” Barrett v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 170, 183, 597 S.E.2d 104, 111 (2004). We have also said that the term “willful,” as used in the statute, refers to conduct that “must be knowing or intentional, rather than accidental, and [undertaken] without justifiable excuse, without ground for believing the conduct is lawful, or with a bad purpose. . . . Thus, the term ‘willful’ . . . contemplates an intentional, purposeful act or omission.” Commonwealth v. Duncan, 267 Va. 377, 384-85, 593 S.E.2d 210, 214-15 (2004) (citations omitted). Accord Barrett, 268 Va. at 183, 597 S.E.2d at 111.
Additionally, we have stated that the term “gross, wanton and culpable” describes conduct, whether by action or omission.
In Barrett, a ten-month-old infant was drowned when he was placed in a bathtub by his two-year-old sister. Barrett, the children‘s mother, was charged with felony neglect of her daughter under
The evening before the tragic incident, Barrett was out all night drinking beer. She admitted that, when she drove her car
We affirmed Barrett‘s conviction of felony child neglect under
IV
The Commonwealth contends and the Court of Appeals’ majority held that the present case is governed by our decision in Barrett. We disagree.
In Barrett, the mother had knowledge of many facts that should have forewarned her that an injury was likely to occur. She also was tired and intoxicated from a night of drinking beer and totally unable to protect her children from a tragedy. In the present case, Morris had no reason to believe her children
V
When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and considered in light of all the circumstances preceding and surrounding the events of September 29, 2003, we conclude, as a matter of law, that Morris’ conduct was not a willful act or omission in the care of her children that was so gross, wanton, and culpable as to show a reckless disregard for their lives. Therefore, we hold that the evidence is insufficient to sustain Morris’ convictions. Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and dismiss the charges against Morris.
Reversed and final judgment.
I respectfully disagree with the majority‘s conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to sustаin Morris’ two convictions for felonious child neglect in violation of
When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, this Court is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at trial, in this case the Commonwealth, and accord to that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences fairly deducible from the evidence. Viney v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 296, 299, 609 S.E.2d 26, 28 (2005); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 178, 204, 590 S.E.2d 520, 535 (2004); Zimmerman v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 384, 386, 585 S.E.2d 538, 539 (2003). “Additionally, this Court has the duty to review the evidence that tends to support the conviction . . . .” Correll v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 3, 12, 607 S.E.2d 119, 124 (2005). “The judgment of the trial court is presumed to be correct and will be reversed only upon a showing that it is ‘plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.‘” Viney, 269 Va. at 299, 609 S.E.2d at 28 (quoting
The majority contrasts the facts in the case at bar with those in Barrett v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 170, 597 S.E.2d 104 (2004), by focusing on Barrett‘s knowledge of her two children‘s prior behavior that should have forewarned Barrett abоut the likelihood of injury to one or both of her children and her state of fatigue resulting from intoxication on the evening before the incident at issue in that case. The majority asserts that, unlike Barrett, “Morris had no reason to believe her children would be in any danger while she was asleep.” Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, I disagree.
Morris was indeed on notice about her children‘s propensity to wander from the trailer without her knowledge or any adult supervision. Morris admitted to one of the police officers that a similar episode had occurred “a few days prior to [the incident at issue], [and] that somebody in the trailer park had to return [the children] home.” Despite this notice, Morris
Despite the overwhelming evidence about Morris’ coma-like sleep on the day in question, the majority concludes there was no evidence presented to show that Morris was under the influence of drugs or alcohol when her children wandered out of the trailer. At trial, Morris acknowledged, however, that she had used cocaine about three days prior to the incident, and when asked if she has a significant substance abuse problem, Morris answered, “I do.” Furthermore, when questioned about the nature of her substance abuse problem, she replied, “I was using cocaine.” Yet, the majority concludes that “[i]t is mere speculation . . . to say that Morris’ sleep was likely drug or alcohol induced.”
Given Morris’ greater concern about an arrest warrant than the condition of her children or their whereabouts, and her lying to conceal her identity, the fact finder was entitled to give little wеight to Morris’ testimony. In fact, the trial court noted her lack of credibility, evidenced by her denying that she was the children‘s mother. “The factfinder need not believe an accused‘s explanation and, if that explanation is not believed, may infer that the accused is lying to conceal [her] guilt.” Phan v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 506, 511, 521 S.E.2d 282, 284 (1999). Moreover, this Court is not free to re-weigh the evidence. See Virginian Ry. Co. v. Bell, 118 Va. 492, 495, 87 S.E. 570, 572 (1916) (appellate court “cannot consider the weight
The saga does not end here. The older child had certain disabilities that caused him to be unable to respond to the police officer‘s inquiries about where he lived. The child was not even able to give his name to the officer. Furthermore, the сondition of the younger child, in particular his state of nakedness with dried fecal matter on his legs and chafing on his posterior, demonstrates that the child had been left unattended for a significant period of time. In fact, because of the child‘s condition and the dangerous automobile parts around which the children were playing, the family support worker from the elementary school was so concerned that hе called child protective services and then “9-1-1.”
As this Court stated in Barrett, we must view “all the circumstances preceding and surrounding” the incident on the day in question. 268 Va. at 184, 597 S.E.2d at 111. In light of the older child‘s disabilities, the young age of the other child, Morris’ knowledge of the prior incident when her children wandered from the trailer, and her coma-like sleep on the day in
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent and would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.