46 W. Va. 197 | W. Va. | 1899
The questions presented by the record in this case arise out of the following facts: In the month of July, 1895, C. E. Morris, who had been engaged in merchandising in Monroe County, W. Va., made an assignment for the benefit of his creditors, and in a chancery suit, brought for the purpose of settling up the transactions of the trustee in the deed of assignment aforesaid, the Clifton Forge Grocery Company obtained a decree against said Morris for one hundred and ninety-seven dollars and seven cents as of the 17th of March, 1896, and Bowling, Spotts & Co., one for seventy-two dollars as of the same date. The proceeds of the sale under the assignment only paid a per cent., of
Now, among the facts agreed, those I regard as material for the determination of this case are the following, to-wit: That, after getting the two hundred and sixty-five dollars
It is contended by counsel for the defendant in error thatthe record does not showthatthe amount in controversy does not exceed one hundred dollars, exclusive of costs, and for that reason this Court cannot take jurisdiction of this case. Now, the real question involved in this case was the right to the property levied upon, and whether it was subject to levy and sale under the executions levied thereon. The property levied on consisted of one bay horse six years old, one bay horse seven years old, one bay mare ten years old, one buggy, one wagon harness, two ladies’ saddles, three men’s saddles, one open Franklin stove, one set buggy harness, two cases boots, and two chamber sets. The executions in the hands of the officer aggregated two hundred and sixty-seven dollars and nine cents. The sheriff, in performance of his duty, is presumed to have taken enough to satisfjr his judgments, and common experience would teach us that said property would be worth one hundred dollars; and, in addition to this, we have the estimate of the circuit court. When he appointed a receiver to take charge of and sell this property, he required a bond of three hundred dollars, which he would not have done if the property did not exceed in value one
The sole question in the case is whether the property levied on under the statement of facts agreed was liable to levy for and satisfaction of the debts of C. L. Morris under the provisions of section 13, chaper 100 of the Code; and, it appearing that said C. L. Morris transacted his business as a trader, with the addition of the word “agent,” without complying with the requirements of said section, my conclusion is that the property acquired or used by him in said business was liable for his debts, and the court erred in holding that it was not so liable, and in quashing the executions levied on the same for the debts of said C. L. Morris. The judgment complained of is reversed, and the cause remanded.
Reversed.