Mоrris Eugene GRIMES, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
No. S-12-0229.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
July 11, 2013.
2013 WY 84
[¶9] Reversed.
Representing Appellant: Diane Lozano, State Public Defender, PDP; Tina N. Olson, Chief Appellate Counsel; Kirk A. Morgan, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel. Argument by Mr. Morgan.
Representing Appellee: Gregory A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; David L. Dеlicath, Deputy Attorney General; Theodore R. Racines, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Darrell D. Jackson, Faculty Director, PAP; Emily N. Thomas, Student Director, PAP. Argument by Ms. Thomas.
Before KITE, C.J., HILL, VOIGT, BURKE, and DAVIS, JJ.
KITE, Chief Justice.
ISSUE
[¶2] Mr. Grimes presents the following issue on appeal:
- Whether thеre was sufficient evidence to support, beyond a reasonable doubt, a conviction for interference with a police officer in violation of
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(b) ?
The State presents essentially the same issue.
FACTS
[¶3] On February 26, 2012, Mr. Grimes and his mother were guests at the Smart Choice Inn in Gillette, Wyoming. The motel also acted as a bus stop and tickets could be purchased from the motel staff. Gillette police officers Owen Kimberling and Chad Trebby responded to a call from motel staff about a disturbance involving Mr. Grimes. He was arguing with his mother and a motel staff member over bus transportation.
[¶4] The officers pеrsuaded Mr. Grimes to go to his room, but he returned to the lobby a short time later and began shouting profanity. When he ignored the officers’ commands to quiet down, they arrested him for breach of the peace and handcuffed his hands behind his back. Mr. Grimes kicked the front doors of the motеl as the officers were escorting him to Officer Trebby‘s patrol vehicle, so they made him walk backward the rest of the way.
[¶5] Mr. Grimes refused to put his legs inside the vehicle and ignored the officers’ warning that he would be “tased” if he did not comply. Officer Kimberling energized his taser on Mr. Grimes’ lеg, and he put his legs into the vehicle. The officers closed the door and continued to talk outside. Mr. Grimes manipulated his handcuffed hands by moving them from behind his back to his front, broke the overhead light and began pushing on the door and window with his feet, so the officers decided to remove him from the vehicle.
[¶6] Officer Kimberling prepared the taser, and Officer Trebby opened the door. Mr. Grimes immediately kicked Officer Kimberling in the chest causing him to fall backward onto the asphalt pavement. As he was falling, Officer Kimberling tased Mr. Grimes. The officers were evеntually able to restrain Mr. Grimes after employing the taser several more times. Although Officer Kimberling initially stated that he was not hurt, he developed back pain shortly after the incident and went to the emergency room.
[¶7] The State charged Mr. Grimes with felony interference with a рeace officer.1 At
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[¶8] In reviewing a claim that the trial evidence was insufficient to support a jury verdict,
we examine and accept as true the State‘s evidence and all reasonable inferences which can be drawn from it. We do not consider conflicting evidence presented by the defendant. We do not substitute our judgment for that of the jury; rather, we determine whether a jury could have reasonably concluded each of the elements of the crime was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard applies whether the supporting evidence is direct or circumstantial.
Anderson v. State, 2009 WY 119, ¶ 6, 216 P.3d 1143, 1145 (Wyo. 2009), quoting Martin v. State, 2007 WY 2, ¶ 32, 149 P.3d 707, 715 (Wyo. 2007). Dawes v. State, 2010 WY 113, ¶ 17, 236 P.3d 303, 307 (Wyo. 2010).
DISCUSSION
[¶9] Felony interference with a peace officer is prohibited by
(b) A person who intentionally and knowingly causes or attempts to cause bodily injury to a peace оfficer engaged in the lawful performance of his official duties is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years.
Mr. Grimes claims the State failed to prove that he caused bodily injury to Officer Kimberling. He asserts the causation evidence was insufficient because the officer initially said he was unhurt and, although he later complained of back pain and sought medical treatment, there was no medical evidence to explain why there was a delay in the onset of pain. According to Mr. Grimes, there could have bеen an intervening cause of Officer Kimberling‘s back pain, such as slipping on the icy pavement or struggling with Mr. Grimes on the ground.
[¶10] In Allen v. State, 2002 WY 48, ¶ 42, 43 P.3d 551, 565-66 (Wyo. 2002), this Court stated that the state must prove the defendant‘s wrongful conduct was the proximate cause of the injury. Although Allen involved an aggravated vehicular homicide charge, the analysis is apt with regard to the interference with a peace officer charge. “To be the ‘proximate cause,’ the injury must be the natural and probable consequence of the defendant‘s wrongful conduct; a ‘substantial factor’ in bringing about the injuriеs or death.” Id., citing Bloomquist v. State, 914 P.2d 812, 820 (Wyo. 1996), which quoted Glazier v. State, 843 P.2d 1200, 1204 (Wyo. 1992) and McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408, 414 (Wyo. 1983).
[¶11] As we stated earlier, our standard of review requires that we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and give it the benefit of all reasonable inferences. A permissible inference is defined as:
An inference is a process of reasоning by which a fact or proposition is deduced fairly and logically from other facts proven or admitted. An inference is truly evidence. The weight to which it is entitled depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case * * *.
Seeley v. State, 959 P.2d 170, 176 (Wyo. 1998), quoting Story v. State, 721 P.2d 1020, 1025 (Wyo. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 962, 107 S.Ct. 459, 93 L.Ed.2d 405 (1986). In applying this definition, “[t]here must be somе connection between the proven fact and the inference drawn from it.” Mora v. State, 984 P.2d 477, 481 (Wyo. 1999). Thus, a jury‘s inferences cannot be based upon mere speculation or conjecture. Anderson, 216 P.3d at 1147. In addition, we defer to the jury‘s determinations on the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence. Id., ¶ 13, 216 P.3d at 1146-47.
[¶13] Although Officer Kimberling initially denied he was hurt, he testified that he began to feel pain in his lower back and right side while preparing his reports a short time later. Video and audio recordings from the officers’ patrol vehicles corroborate his testimony. Officer Kimberling testified that he went to the emergency room and took two or three days off work as a result of the incident. At the time of the trial, Officer Kimberling stated that he continued to have occasional pain in his back. He also testified:
Q. Now, I noticed that there were a number of comments that you madе regarding whether or not you thought you‘d been hurt?
A. Yes.
Q. Could you tell right off the bat—after you get Mr. Grimes handcuffed and placed in the car the second time, could you tell at that point if [you] were suffering from any pain?
A. No. The only thing that I knew, and I believe you can hear it in the audio, was I had blоod somewhere and it ended up being I had blood all over me, but initially I was out of breath, and, of course, my adrenaline was through the roof . . . and there was no pain initially.
Q. And I take it that later that changed?
A. Yes.
Q. And in what manner did it change?
A. I started having some pain, I would imagine probably from sitting in my vehicle until the drive to the detention center. Once I got out, that‘s when I started having some pain.
I‘ve had pain before, you know, and I didn‘t really think nothing (sic) of it. After being at the detention facility for so long and then going back to the office is when I sat down and we were watching the videos and started reports, that‘s when I really started having bad pain.
[¶14] The jury is charged with weighing the evidence and determining the credibility of the witnesses. Drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence and assuming the jury found Officer Kimberling to be credible, there was sufficient evidence that his injury was “the natural and probable consequence” of Mr. Grimes’ wrongful conduct, and Mr. Grimes’ action was a “substantial factor” in bringing about Officer Kimberling‘s injury. Allen, ¶ 42, 43 P.3d at 565-66. Officer Kimberling‘s testimony allows the reasonable inference that his back was injured when he was kicked to the ground by Mr. Grimes. In fact, there is no evidence of any other potential cause of Officer Kimberling‘s back pain, and Mr. Grimes’ suggestion that the officer was injured by slipping or later in the altercation2 is conjecture and speculation.
[¶15] Mr. Grimes also argues that the lack of medical evidence undermines the State‘s case. Pursuant to
[¶17] In Kent, 67 Ill.Dec. 334, 444 N.E.2d at 572-76, the defendant was charged with murder of her infant daughter after she admitted feeding the baby beer mixed with water. The еvidence established that the medical examiner had not performed tests during the autopsy to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, the cause of the infant‘s death was ingestion of alcohol. In addition, there was evidence that other conditions, such as Reyes Syndrome, malnutrition and Sudden Infant Death Syndrome, could have led to the same autopsy findings. The Illinois court of appeals, therefore, reversed the defendant‘s conviction.
[¶18] In both Moyer and Kent, the evidence supported the conclusion that the defendant‘s actions were not the cause of the injury or death. Here, by contrast, there is no evidence of any cause of Officer Kimberling‘s back injury other than being kicked to the ground by Mr. Grimes. The jury, which was charged with the task of determining the credibility of the witnesses and weighing the evidence, could have reasonably сoncluded the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Officer Kimberling was injured when Mr. Grimes kicked him. We will not interfere with its decision.
[¶19] Affirmed.