35 Minn. 493 | Minn. | 1886
In June, 1859, plaintiff’s intestate, Foster Mor-rill, became the owner, by assignment, of a judgment for upwards of $500, against the defendant, which had been duly docketed in Wa-seca county. In 1865. an action was brought on such judgment by Foster Morrill, and a new judgment was duly recovered and docketed in the district court of the same county in his favor, and against the
These are the substance of plaintiff’s allegations, upon which he bases a claim for relief in damages against the defendant to the amount of the judgment the lien of which he claims to have lost by trusting to the defendant’s representations and conduct. It will be observed that the alleged fraudulent representations, as set up, are but the continuation and culmination of the alleged attempt on the part of the debtor to secrete his property until after the expiration of the statutory limitation, which it seems was successful. It was never
Again, it is alleged that he represented that the land conveyed to his father was for a full consideration paid. If the judgment creditor believed such statement, he should have taken measures to reach such consideration. Reasonable diligence would have compelled him to seek to reach the property or the consideration, and not to rest implicitly upon his general statement that he had no property. The courts were open for his examination, under oath, by supplementary proceedings, or in a creditor’s suit. Upon this state of facts disclosed, the creditor rested at his peril upon the general and unsworn representations of a hostile and interested party to the suit, as to his own financial condition, till his legal remedies were lost by lapse of time. Insurance Co. v. Reed, 33 Ohio St. 283, 291.
We do not undertake to say that there might not be such fraudulent representations or practices by the debtor as to deceive a reasonably prudent and vigilant person, and to induce him to abandon the pursuit of property to satisfy his judgment until too late to reach it, so as to entitle him to a remedy by an independent action, but we do not think such a ease is here presented. The courts cannot, under ordinary circumstances, extend relief to parties who fail to exercise reasonable diligence or discretion.
Order reversed.