135 Ala. 251 | Ala. | 1902
Apart from the office it may perform in evidencing the contract of carnage, the chief use of a passenger ticket is to identify the holder as a person AA'bo has paid his fare or lias otherwise complied with conditions entitling him to carriage, and this use of it is ordinarily made aaíicu the holder offers himself to he carried; lienee. AA'here nothing is expressed to the contrary a stipulation purporting to limit the use of a ticket to a specified time is construed as fixing that time as the latest for commencing and not for completing the journey.—Auerbach v. N. Y. C. R. Co., 89 N. Y. 281; 42 Am. Rep. 290; Lundy v. C. P. R. Co., 66 Cal. 191; 56 Am. Rep. 199. Accordingly, the clause in plaintiff’s ticket declaring- it ‘‘Amid after May 20th, 1900,” implied a stipulation merely for plaintiff’s commencement of the trip from Pensacola before the expiration of that day. He a right to assume, and to roly upon the assumption that defendant Avouhl conform to its schedule for running trains, and Avas prevented from entering upon his journey on May 20th only by delay until after midnight, of the train scheduled to leave Pensacola at the hour of 11 :20 p. m. of that day. Defendant Avas not entitled to treat its oaaui default as defeating its obligation to the' plaintiff, nor was that obligation discharged by placing him at Flomaton. Defendant operated the road from Flomaton to Mobile as Avell as that from Pensacola to
Reversed and remanded.