93 A.2d 288 | D.C. | 1952
Two suits were presented to the trial court, one by a landlord for possession for non-payment of rent and the other by a tenant against the landlord for statutory rent overcharges. They were consolidated for trial.
Since there was no dispute that the rent was unpaid the controversy centered around the question as to whether there had been an overcharge. Two defenses were presented to that charge: (1) that defendant (owner of the premises) was merely an undisclosed principal; and (2) that because new housing accommodations had been created there was no violation of any preexisting ceiling. Both defenses were rejected by the trial judge who filed a memorandum summarizing the facts and the law. Landlord appeals.
From the evidence, most of which was uncontradicted, the judge could have found the following, facts: The tenant Mary Harris entered into a contract on February 1, 1950 with a real estate broker named Fletcher for the rental of a house at $125 per month.
We do not think the defendant landlord was entitled to prevail on its defense of undisclosed principal. In essence the theory of that defense was that there was no privity between plaintiff and defendant. But the action was not in contract; it was brought to recover a statutory obligation.
The Rent Act provides that if any “landlord” receives rent in violation of a maximum rent ceiling, the tenant paying such rent may bring an action for double the amount by which the rent paid exceeds the ceiling.
On the evidence before him the trial judge would have been fully justified in finding that the defendant not only knew the amounts being collected by the agent Fletcher but directed him to collect those amounts. This is borne out by the testimony of Fletcher, his letter to defendant quitting his agency, and the fact that defendant thereafter continued to collect $100 a month from plaintiff. We rule that notwithstanding the fact that defendant may (for a very brief period) have been an undisclosed principal its affirmative actions have brought it within the liability imposed by the statute.
We turn to the contention that the landlord had created new housing accommodations. We are satisfied that it cannot be said as a matter of law that changing the heating system, removing the kitchen to another part of the house, sealing off the basement to the tenant, and the subsequent redecoration made the premises new housing accommodations as a matter of law. Landlord’s showing was not so compelling as to require such a ruling under Delsnider v. Gould, 81 U.S.App.D.C. 54, 154 F.2d 844. The question was one of fact.
Appellant argues that it should not be held liable for any rent overcharge after March, 1951, the date it applied to the Administrator for an adjustment in the rent ceiling. This contention is necessarily predicated on an assumption that new housing accommodations had been created, and that the parties could legally contract for an interim ceiling, pending the Administrator’s action on the petition for increase.
But the trial court found as a fact that the landlord did not prove its claim of new housing accommodations, and
We conclude that the defendant is liable in the amount found by the trial court for rent overcharges. That being more than sufficient to offset ühe rent due the defendant, the trial court was right in denying defendant’s claim for possession. Lalekos v. Manset, D.C.Mun.App., 47 A.2d 617.
Affirmed.
. Notwithstanding that the lease provided for a rental of $125 Mrs. Harris paid only $100 per month.
. The statutory, freeze date. Code 1951, Supp. I, § 45-1602.
. Code 1951, Supp. I, § 45-1610.
. Code 1951, Supp. I, § 45-1611 (g).
. Code 1951, Supp. I, § 45-1605(a).
. Wilner v. Vartanian, D.C.Mun.App., 55 A.2d 88; Moore v. Coates, D.C.Mun.App., 40 A.2d 68.