179 Iowa 853 | Iowa | 1917
Plaintiff’s father, and grantor, obtained title to this east 15 acres from C. A. McWilliams, in the fall of 1896, and moved on in .the spring of 1897, and he and his grantees have been in possession ever since. One Joseph P. Smith was the owner of the west 25 acres, and in 1896, sold it to defendant’s grantor, Mary Murphy. Smith had owned and occupied this land for 18 years prior to the sale to Mary Murphy, and the defendant and his grantors, ever since. There is no controversy between these parties as to the ownership of the fractional parts hereinbefore described. The only question now between them is as to the dividing line that separates these tracts. To divide them, there must be a line of demarcation. The line in dispute is shown in the following plat:
one claimed by the plaintiff. The east line is where the line should be to give to each one the quantum of land called for by his deed. The plaintiff brings this action, and claims that the west line appearing upon the plat is the one that should be recognized as the dividing line, for the reason that, on this line, a fence was built more than 30 years ago, and that the fence was recognized and acquiesced in by both parties as the line dividing these two fractional parts of this forty. The plaintiff does not bottom his case on adverse possession, and apparently admits that, if the line is established at the fence, he gets more than 15 acres, and the defendant less than 25 acres. To separate or segregate
Our statute, Section 4228 of the Code of 1897, provides that, when one or more owners of land, the corners and boundaries of which are in'dispute, desire to have the same established, they may bring an action in the district court of the county where such disputed corners or boundaries, or part thereof, are situated, again'st the owners of the other tracts which may be affected. In such proceeding, either party may, by proper plea, put in issue the fact that certain boundaries or corners are the true ones, or that such have been recognized and acquiesced in by the parties or their grantors for a period of 10 consecutive years.'
Code Section 4238 provides that, if that issue is presented, the commissioners shall take testimony as to whether the boundaries and corners alleged to have been recognized and acquiesced in for 10 years or more have in fact been recognized and acquiesced in, and Code Section 4236 says:
“If it is found that the boundaries and corners alleged to have been recognized and acquiesced in for ten years
It is apparent that this statute touching corners and boundaries acquiesced in, deals with a situation that may arise, in which, by reason of acquiescence, one party, or the other may be given more or less than he would be entitled to under a strict recognition of the original boundary lines as established by the government.
It is' apparent, however, that, under this statute, .the right to claim the land Avithin the limits of the government survey is invested in the purchaser. This right he may surrender or lose by his OAvn conduct. If he acquiesces, for the statutory period, in a line dividing his land from others, different from the line of the government, he thereby creates for himself and against himself a line other and different from that which the government created, and he is bound by it, eA^en though it in fact gives him less land than hq would be entitled to if he had insisted upon his right to hold to the line fixed by the government. 'The statute so provides. Boundaries of land were originally fixed by the
We have examined the evidence submitted in this record, in which the court found that the line alleged to be in dispute had been recognized and acquiesced in by the parties for more than the statutory period. We find that the judgment of the court, based upon the evidence, has ample support. The evidence establishes the following factsr
That Louis A. Morley bought the east three eighths in 1896, bought it from C. A. McWilliams, and moved on the land in March, 1897; that he and his grantees have been in possession ever since; that, when Morley moved on the land, a division fence was there, such as is shown on the plat hereinbefore set out; that, at this time, Joseph Smith and Mrs. Smith owned and occupied the land to the west; that the fence had been on there for some years before Morley took possession; that On neither side had any question been raised as to its being on the trué line; that both parties farmed and cultivated up to the fence on either side; that the fence remained there as the dividing line until the spring of 1915, when the defendant undertook for the first time to remove it; that Smith continued to own the west 25 acres until he sold it to' Murphy in 1906; that on the north end of this fence the land on either side was cultivated up to the fence. The land along the south end of the fence was in pasture. Smith had it fenced in and used the southern part as a pasture, using the fence in controversy as his east fence. The south half of the 15 acres was also fenced in, using the fence .in question as the wést fence of the pasture. North of this, both on the 15 acres and the 25 acres, the land was cultivated up to the fence. The fence has been in the same location, as is shown upon this plat, even since 1896. This is shown by the positive testimony of living witnesses, and not disputed. There is a strong
In Miller v. Mills County, 111 Iowa 654, at 659, Judge Ladd, speaking for the court, said:
“Reference is had to the government survey as pointing out the lines by which the lands described in the patents passed from the government, and by which they are ordinarily transferred by deeds. But if the coterminous owners have adopted another line as their division line, and have occupied up to it and recognized it as such for a period of 10 years, there appears to be. no reason for not regarding it as the true boundary line, notwithstanding it is not that fixed by the government survey,” citing authority. '
“There was no express agreement between the parties to this case, or their grantors, that the fence be regarded as marking the boundary between their respective tracts of land, but the circumstances are such that an agreement-ought to be implied. For more than 18 years they have occupied up to and acquiesced in the division fence, and maintained it as the true boundary line between them. They adopted it by their unmistakable acts, which, in any other transaction, would have all the force of implied contracts. * * * The authorities quite generally hold that, in the absence of controlling circumstances, acquiescence in a division line, assumed or established, accompanied by actual occupancy by the adjoining owners in' accordance therewith for a period equal to that prescribed in the statute of limitations within which an entry may be barred, is conclusive evidence of such 'an agreement. The rule will be found perspicuously stated in Sneed v. Osborn, 25 Calif. 626. ‘The acts of the parties might not amount to an agreement between them to locate the tract as surveyed, and it is unnecessary to consider them in that view; but do they not show an acquiescence by the parties in those lines between the two tracts of land? If they do show such acquies
The opinion then proceeds:
“The great current of authority sustains our conclusion that, in the absence of other controlling circumstances, the inference is conclusive that the division line between adjoining tracts, definitely marked by the erection and maintenance of a fence or other monuments, recognized by the owners as such, and up to which they have occupied and cultivated the land on either side more than ten years, * * * is the true boundary between them.”
This Miller case has been cited with approval and followed ever since, and controls the rights of the parties here. See Laughlin v. Francis, 129 Iowa 62; Klinkner v. Schmidt, 114 Iowa 695, 699; Griffin v. Brown, 167 Iowa 599; Dwight v. City of Dos Moines, 174 Iowa 178; McGovern v. Heery, 159 Iowa 507.
On the whole record, we think the judgment of the court was right, and it is — Affirmed.