208 Conn. 576 | Conn. | 1988
The issue on this appeal is whether an award made pursuant to General Statutes § 7-433C
The basic facts are not disputed. On or about April 15, 1955, Morgan became a uniformed employee of the East Haven fire department. Prior to his employment, Morgan underwent a physical examination that did not reveal any evidence of hypertension or heart disease. By the time of his retirement from the fire department, Morgan had attained the rank of chief.
On December 31, 1981, while in the employ of the East Haven fire department, Morgan suffered “congestive heart failure with underlying cardiomyopathy.” Morgan retired from the fire department on January 15,1982, at a salary of $21,700 per year. His pension benefits from the town were $931.40 per month.
Morgan died on January 12, 1985, survived by his wife of forty-two years, Doris K. Morgan. Morgan had no minor children at the time of his death. After his death, the town of East Haven continued payments under the award to Doris K. Morgan until her death on March 2,1986. No payments were made after that date. The parties stipulated that upon Doris Morgan’s death there were no surviving dependents, but there were two surviving adult children. The defendant, the town of East Haven, had made a total payment of 233 weeks of benefits: twenty-three weeks at $203.37 per week; fifty-two weeks at $235.78 per week; 135 weeks at $278.33 per week; and forty-six weeks at $154.05 per week commuted to a lump sum of $7086.30.
Following the defendant’s cessation of payments, the fiduciaries of the estates of William and Doris Morgan applied for an execution, pursuant to General Statutes § 31-300.
The history of Connecticut’s statute providing benefits for police and fire personnel who suffer from hypertension or heart disease has been “rather tumultuous.” Plainville v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 178 Conn. 664, 667, 425 A.2d 131 (1979). The statute in its original form in 1951 established a rebuttable presumption that a uniformed firefighter of a paid municipal fire department who, prior to employment, passed a physical examination without evidence of hypertension or heart disease, and who later suffered from such disease, was presumed to have been injured in the line of duty for purposes of retirement benefits. General Statutes (Sup. 1951) § 175b.
The real turmoil regarding the statute began in 1969, when the legislature amended the provision to include a conclusive presumption of injury in the line of duty for those police or fire personnel who suffered from
Following the Ducharme decision, the legislature passed the current hypertension and heart disease provision which has been amended only once.
General Statutes § 7-433c states that if a uniformed member of a paid municipal police or fire department, who successfully completed a physical examination prior to employment, suffers from hypertension or heart disease, on or off duty, and as a result dies or is disabled permanently or temporarily, partially or totally, “he or his dependents, as the case may be,”
“We have consistently held that if a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for construction.” Murray v. Lopes, 205 Conn. 27, 33, 529 A.2d 1302 (1987), citing State v. James, 197 Conn. 358, 363, 497 A.2d 402 (1985); State v. Smith, 194 Conn. 213, 222, 479 A.2d 814 (1984); Moscone v. Manson, 185 Conn. 124, 128, 440 A.2d 848 (1981); Zimmer v. Essex, 38 Conn. Sup. 419, 421, 449 A.2d 1053 (1982) (“[w]hen applying this provision [7-433c], we are bound to effectuate the intent of the legislature as expressed by the words contained within it; where the terms of the statute are, as here, unambiguous, we cannot speculate as to any unexpressed legislative intent”); see 2A J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th Ed. Sands 1984) § 46.04. The language of § 7-433c is clear and unambiguous. The statute has mandatory language requiring that the municipal employer compensate the afflicted police or fire department employee and that person’s dependents.
Even if we were persuaded that this issue could not be resolved solely by statutory interpretation, the alternative analysis proffered by the plaintiffs would not alter our result. The plaintiffs suggest that once the compensation is awarded under § 7-433c, there are vested property rights in that award that enable the deceased recipient’s estate to receive the benefits upon the recipient’s death. According to the plaintiffs, the award in this case vested in the recipients because it was a “specific” award, as opposed to a “special” award.
On the other hand, a special award is one that is not compensation for the loss or loss of use of a body part, but is compensation for the inability to work as a result of the disability. See Bassett v. Stratford Lumber Co., 105 Conn. 297, 307, 135 A. 574 (1926) (Haines, J., concurring); J. Asselin, supra, p. 119 (the author refers to these benefits as “continuing wage benefits”).
The benefits provided under § 7-433c are more similar to special benefits than to specific benefits under the workers’ compensation statute.
In the instant case, the compensation commissioner awarded Morgan 585 weeks of benefits at the rate of $278.33 per week. Forty-six weeks of benefits at $154.05 per week were commuted at and paid in a lump sum of $7086.30. Had the commuted payment been outstanding at the time of Doris Morgan’s death, there is little dispute that the outstanding balance of the commuted amount would be due and payable to the estate. At the time of commutation, that portion of the compensation that was commuted became mature and, thus, immediately due and owing. See General Statutes § 31-302.
The plaintiffs also challenged the authority of the trial judge to deny their application for execution under General Statutes § 31-300.
In summary, the trial court properly denied the application for an execution in this case. General Statutes § 7-433c does not require the payment of benefits to the estate of a deceased recipient; compensation is restricted to the employee and that person’s dependents.
There is no error.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
General Statutes § 7-433c provides: “benefits for policemen or firemen DISABLED OR DEAD AS A RESULT OF HYPERTENSION OR HEART DISEASE. In recognition of the peculiar problems of uniformed members of paid fire departments and regular members of paid police departments, and in recognition of the unusual risks attendant upon these occupations, including an unusual high degree of susceptibility to heart disease and hypertension, and in recognition that the enactment of a statute which protects such fire department and police department members against economic loss resulting from disability or death caused by hypertension or heart disease would act as an inducement in attracting and securing persons for such employment, and in recognition, that the public interest and welfare will be promoted by providing such protection for such fire department and police department members, municipal employers shall provide compensation as follows: Notwithstanding any provision of chapter 568 or any other general statute, charter, special act or ordinance to the contrary, in the event a uniformed member of a paid municipal fire department or a regular member of a paid municipal police department who successfully passed a physical examination on entry into such service, which examination failed to reveal any evidence of hypertension or heart disease, suffers either off duty or on duty any condition or impairment of health caused by hypertension or heart disease resulting in his death or his temporary or permanent, total or partial disability, he or his dependents, as the case may be, shall receive from his municipal employer compensation and medical care in the same amount and the same manner as that provided under chapter 568 if such death or disability was caused by a personal injury which arose out of and in the course of his emloyment and was suffered in the line of duty and within the scope of his employment, and from the municipal or state retirement system under which he is covered, he or his dependents, as the case
William T. Morgan, to whom the award was originally made, died on January 12,1985. William J. Morgan is the administrator of his estate. Doris K. Morgan, the widow of William T. Morgan, died March 2, 1986. Betty G. Levy is the administrator of her estate.
The language upon which the plaintiffs rely, a short clause in a lengthy statutory section, is as follows: “The court may issue execution upon any
General Statutes (Sup. 1951) § 175b was part of chapter 48, entitled “Retirement of Municipal Employees.” General Statutes § 7-433c is part of chapter 113 which simply- is entitled “Municipal Employees.”
In 1977, the legislature amended General Statutes § 7-433e to clarify that the benefits under this section are in lieu of other benefits under chapter 568 or a state or municipal retirement system. Public Acts 1977, No. 77-520, Si.
See footnote 5, supra.
General Statutes § 7-433c provides that the employee or the dependents “shall receive” compensation from the municipal employer. Absent express intent to the contrary, “shall” denotes a mandatory duty. Graham v. Zimmerman, 181 Conn. 367, 371, 435 A.2d 996 (1980).
The parties stipulated that the adult children of the Morgans are not dependents, and it is not contended that the estates should be considered dependents.
Our review of the legislative history of General Statutes § 7-433c did not disclose any information relating to compensation of dependents, although resort usually is not made to legislative history where the statute is clear and unambiguous on its face. Additionally, the predecessor statutes to § 7-433c did not contain a limitation of payments to employees and their dependents. It is logical to infer from the inclusion of “dependents” in the current statute that the legislature intended to restrict the benefits that were available under the previous statute. To do otherwise would make the word “dependents” mere surplusage and such an interpretation has been proscribed by this court. See Harris Data Communications, Inc. v. Heffernan, 183 Conn. 194, 197, 438 A.2d 1178 (1981).
Morgan’s disability was not included in the scheduled injuries under General Statutes § 31-308. Rather, his compensation rate was established through a list of “non-scheduled injuries” that the commissioners have devised under the authority of § 31-308 (d). See General Statutes § 31-308 (d); J. Asselin, Connecticut Workers’ Compensation Manual (1985) pp. 153-57.
In the context of a workers’ compensation claim, as opposed to a General Statutes § 7-433c claim, a distinction often is made between specific and special benefits based on the certainty of the award. Awards that are fixed for a certain period of time may be categorized as specific, and claims of uncertain duration may be categorized as special. Bassett v. Stratford Lumber Co., 105 Conn. 297, 307, 135 A. 574 (1926) (Haines, J., concurring). Underlying this distinction is the notion that specific awards for the loss of a body part are not contingent on incapacity, and thus, the compen
Although the benefits under General Statutes § 7-433c are calculated by a compensation commissioner in accordance with chapter 568, it is significant that the two statutes are recognized as “separate and distinct legislation.” Bakelaar v. West Haven, 193 Conn. 59, 67, 475 A.2d 283 (1984). Reference is made to chapter 568 only for legislative efficiency: to avoid duplication of an administrative mechanism. Plainville v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 178 Conn. 664, 671-72, 425 A.2d 131 (1979). Accordingly, the substantive law of § 7-433c governs claims under that section; chapter 568 is used only for purposes of computation.
The other major type of economic loss is costs for medical care; see 2 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts (1956) § 25.8, p. 1316; 22 Am. Jur. 2d, Damages § 1; which also are compensable under General Statutes § 7-433c. Loss of a body part, although compensable by money damages, is not an economic loss under § 7-433c.
Although the benefits in this ease were certain as to the amount payable, thus having a characteristic of a specific benefit, because the substantive provisions of General Statutes § 7-433c are determinative in a claim made under that section, the limiting language in the preamble overrides the specific benefit notion which is a feature of workers’ compensation law. See footnotes 11 and 12, supra.
General Statutes § 31-302 provides: “payment of compensation, commutation into monthly, quarterly or lump sums. Compensations payable under this chapter shall be paid at such particular times in the week and in such manner as the commissioner may order, and shall be paid directly to the persons entitled to receive them unless the commissioner, for good reason, orders payment to those entitled to act for such persons; but, when he finds it just or necessary, the commissioner may approve or direct the
General Statutes § 31-300 provides in part: “The court may issue execution upon any uncontested or final award of a commissioner in the same manner as in cases of judgments rendered in the superior court; and, upon the filing of an application to the court for an execution, the commissioner in whose office the award is on file shall, upon the request of the clerk of said court, send to him a certified copy of such award.”