delivered the opinion of the court:
This сase is before us on writ of error sued out by Edward Morgan to review a judgment of the criminal court of Cook County dismissing his petition in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis.
The petition alleged that petitioner pleaded guilty to the crime of armed robbery in 1940 and was sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of not less than one year nor more than life imprisonment. It was alleged that petitioner was subjected to physical and mental torture as a result of which he signed a confession and further alleged that he was advised by his attornеy that it would be useless to attempt to repudiate the confession since he had no witnesses to the alleged brutality and the court would not believe him. According to the petitiоn, petitioner’s attorney promised that if he would plead guilty he would receive a sentence of one year to life, which would make him eligible for parole in n months and that if he fought the case hé would get a more severe sentence. It appears from the petition that in 1942, appellant escaped from the Illinois penitentiary and-several months later was arrested in Brooklyn, New York, where he was convicted of robbery and sentenced to the New York State prison for a term of not less than 25 nor more than 30 years. Hе was released from custody in New York in 1957 and returned to the Illinois penitentiary, and several months after his return he filed the present petition. The State moved to dismiss the petition on thе grounds that relief was barred because the petition was not filed within the time prescribed by statute and also because the facts set forth in the petition were insufficient to entitlе petitioner to any relief. In the view which we take of the case, we find it unnecessary to consider whether the facts set forth in the petition were sufficient, for we are of thе opinion that the petition was properly dismissed on the grounds that it was not filed within time.
The common-law writ of error coram nobis has been abolished in Illinois and section 72 of the Civil Praсtice Act provides a statutory substitute therefor. Prior to 1955, it was provided that a petition under - this section must be brought within five years from the date of final judgment, with the provision that if the petitiоner was an infant, non compos mentis, or under duress at the time of passing judgment, the time of such disability should be excluded from the computation of said five years. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, chap, 110, par. 196.) Under the section as it existed prior to L955, we consistently held that the time during which the petitioner was imprisoned was not to be excluded in computing the five-year period. Peoрle v. Rave,
In L955 the section was amended so as to provide that such petitions must be filed within two years from the entry of final judgment, provided that the time during which the person seeking relief is undеr legal disability or duress shall be excluded in computing the said two-year period. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, chap, 110, par. 72.) We held in the Bphraim case that under both the former section and the 1955 amendment, imprisonment did not toll the statute. However, petitioner in the present case contends that the amendment of 1955 created an exception in favor of imprisoned рersons and presents an argument not considered by us in Bphraim. It is petitioner’s contention that the term “legal disability” at common law included imprisonment and that when the legislature omittеd the exceptions in favor of an infant or a person non compos mentis and substituted the term “legal disability” it meant to broaden the scope of the exceptions so as to include all persons who come within the common-law definition of legal disability. In support of this argument petitioner urges that we must look to the ancient common law for a dеfinition of legal disability and cites Blackstone’s Commentaries which states that a person is under legal disability who is “An alien enemy, outlawed, excommunicated, attainted of treason or felony, under a praemunire, not in rerum natura (being only a fictitious person), an infant, a feme covert, or a monk professed.” (Blackstone’s Commentaries, Book III, p. 30L.) By the сommon law all such persons lacked legal capacity to sue and therefore while they were under such disability the Statute of Limitations did not run against them. Many of these disabilities have now been removed. For instance, a married woman may now bring an action in her own right. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, chap. 68, par. 1.) The doctrine of praemunire has no meaning in our present lаw, and neither a person excommunicated, nor a monk professed is under disability. It is quite clear therefore that the term “legal disability” as used in section 72 can not and does not have reference to the common-law definition of legal disability. It is the prevailing view in this country that imprisonment does not suspend the running of a statute of limitations unless the statute expressly so- provides, and this is true even where the statute makes an exception as to persons under legal disability. (34 Am. Jur., Limitation of Action, sec. 214, p. 171.) In Musgrave v. McManus, 24 N. M. 227,
Petitioner also argues we should consider section 72 in connection with section 21 of the general limitation statute which provides as follows: “If the person entitled to bring an action, mentioned in the nine preceding sections, is, at the time of the cause of action accrued, within the agе of twenty-one years, or if a female, within the age of eighteen years, or insane, or mentally ill, or imprisoned on a criminal charge, he or she may bring the action within two years after the disability is removed.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, chap. 83, par. 22.) It is urged that since both sections deal with the same subject matter they should be considered together and since persons imprisonеd are granted an extension of time under this section, they should be excepted from the limitation provision of section 72 of the Civil Practice Act. We are unable to follow this linе of reasoning. Although this section does use the word “disability,” it does not purport to be a comprehensive definition of legal disability for all purposes. In fact, it is significant that in this section the legislature specified that persons imprisoned on a criminal charge had additional time in which to bring an action and no such provision is included in section 72. It is the established rule that exceptions to a statute of limitations will not be implied and if the legislature has not seen fit to except a class of persons from the operation of a statutе, courts will not assume the right to do so. (30 Am. Jur., Limitation of Actions, sec. 186, p. 150.) We are therefore not justified in reading into this section an exception in favor of persons imprisoned on а criminal charge.
Our conclusion is further justified by reference to the comments of the advisory committee whose recommendations were considered by the legislature in enacting the 1955 amendment. In the committee’s comments on subsection 3 of the section, which imposes the period of limitations, the committees states that the purpose of the аmendment was to eliminate the anomaly which formerly existed whereby a bill of review in equity cases had to be filed within one year and a motion in the nature of a writ of error corаm nobis in a law case had to be filed within five years. The committee states that the subsection establishes a uniform two-year period in all cases and goes on to say that the period was extended in certain cases such as periods of duress and legal disability, as it was in the former section. (Smith-Hurd Anno. Stat. chap, 110, sec. 72(3), Joint Committee Comments.) Certainly if it was the intеntion of the committee to add additional exceptions, this important feature would have been discussed in these comments.
The judgment of the trial court which dismissed the petition was correct and the judgment is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.