162 Misc. 2d 984 | New York Court of Claims | 1994
On January 11, 1986, claimant sustained severe personal injuries when the two-man bobsled he was driving crashed during the National Bobsled Championship at the Olympic bobsled run on Mount Van Hoevenberg, Town of North Elba, Essex County. The crash occurred in the exit chute section of the run beyond the finish line. The gravamen of claimant’s negligence cause of action rests upon the purportedly dangerous condition of the exit chute. The trial was bifurcated and thus issues related to liability are currently before the court.
It merits noting at the outset that claimant was an experienced bobsledder. He started bobsledding at Mount Van Hoevenberg when he was 8 years old. He was 30 years old at the time of the accident. His father had competed in bobsledding and 9 of claimant’s 10 siblings had been involved in the sport of bobsledding. Indeed, one of claimant’s brothers died in a tragic bobsledding accident in 1981, vividly illustrating the extreme risk and danger inherent in a sport where competitors come down a mountain on ice at speeds approaching 100 miles per hour.
The bobsled run at Mount Van Hoevenberg was the only bobsled run in North America at the time of claimant’s accident.
Another change made in the bobsled run, which is particularly critical to the instant claim, involved a redesign of the area in which bobsleds traveled after crossing the finish line. The area immediately following the finish is of obvious importance since bobsleds often reach their maximum speed at the finish.
[The portion of the opinion in which the court addressed a jurisdictional issue raised by defendant has been omitted for purposes of publication.]
The court now turns to the issue of liability. Claimant, who
The exit chute was lengthened as part of the reconstruction of the bobsled run. The new exit chute took the sleds over a flat area following the finish, then up the first hill, onto a second flat area, and then up a second hill. The exit chute, which was longer than before reconstruction, was composed of concrete. After the first hill, in the second flat area, a 20-foot opening was created in the left concrete wall. The bobsleds were removed from the track from such opening, and testimony established that in a normal run the sleds would be stopped by the time they reached the opening.
During competition, the entire exit chute had snow in it to help slow the bobsleds after they crossed the finish line. Bales of hay were placed at the two ends of the opening in the left wall of the exit chute to afford protection in the event a sled came in contact with the concrete abutment. The condition and composition of the exit chute when it was not covered by ice and snow is depicted by claimant’s exhibits 5 through 9. Its appearance during competition is reflected by defendant’s exhibits C through I. Defendant’s exhibit J, a videotape with footage of, inter alla, bobsled competition during the 1980 Winter Olympic Games, also provides a brief glimpse of the exit chute and the opening in the concrete wall as it appeared during the Olympics.
On the date of the accident, claimant was the driver of a two-man bobsled competing in the National Championship. His brakeman was Pat Murphy. Claimant had competed in bobsledding since the early 1960s and had been licensed as a driver in 1978 by the Federatione Internationale de Bobsleigh et de Tobaganning (hereinafter F.I.B.T.) after completing a
Claimant recalled that the race commenced at about 9:30 a.m. on Saturday, January 11, 1986. The race involved two runs on Saturday and two runs on Sunday. He completed the first run on Saturday without incident. Approximately an hour after completion of the first run, he began his second run. Claimant stated that he went into turn number 2 "too late,”
Claimant testified that after crossing the finish line the sled started to hug the left wall of the exit chute and would not steer to the right. At approximately the beginning of the first hill of the exit chute, claimant attempted to move back to the second seat in the bobsled so he could apply the brakes. However, he was not able to get completely into the brakeman’s seat and thus could pull the brake handles only about half way up. He recalled that the sled was moving back and forth striking both walls of the exit chute while he was attempting to apply the brakes. The sled proceeded up the first hill and into the second flat area. As the sled reached the opening in the left wall of the exit chute it moved to the left, partially into the opening, and then "hit the abutment” where the left wall continued at the end of the opening. Several bales of hay had been placed in front of the abutment. Claimant was knocked unconscious by the impact. The instant claim, premised upon negligence, ensued.
In the absence of pertinent precedent directly addressing accidents by bobsled competitors, the court turns to cases involving sports-related injuries. The basic principles were set forth by Judge Cardozo in Murphy v Steeplechase Amusement Co. (250 NY 479, 482-483), as follows:
"Volenti non fit injuria. One who takes part in such a sport accepts the dangers that inhere in it so far as they are obvious and necessary * * * The timorous may stay at home.
"A different case would be here if the dangers inherent in the sport were obscure or unobserved * * * or so serious as to justify the belief that precautions of some kind must have been taken to avert them.”
More recently, the Court of Appeals has explained that the nature of the risk assumed is a measure of the defendant’s duty of care (Turcotte v Fell, 68 NY2d 432, 439). Thus, participants in a sporting competition, whether professional or amateur, generally are deemed to have consented to "those injury-causing events which are known, apparent or reasonably foreseeable consequences of the participation” (supra; see, Owen v R.J.S. Safety Equip., 79 NY2d 967; Benitez v New York City Bd. of Educ., 73 NY2d 650; Maddox v City of New York, 66 NY2d 270; Arbegast v Board of Educ., 65 NY2d 161). The owner of the premises is held to the duty of reasonable
Claimant’s purpose on January 11, 1986 was clear. He was an experienced bobsledder seeking to come down the mountain on a sheet of ice faster than any other competitor so that he could become a national champion and ultimately an Olympian. His experience had taught him that bobsledding was not a sport for the timorous or the wary. He had been in prior accidents, had witnessed accidents by other competitors and had experienced the tragedy of a sibling dying while competing in the sport.
The extreme risk inherent in the sport of bobsledding is apparent. Indeed, it is in part that risk that draws a rare breed of individuals to the sport. The commentator on the professional promotional video of the bobsled run introduced by defendant as exhibit J declares at the beginning of the presentation that the bobsled run at Mount Van Hoevenberg is "the fastest and most dangerous run in the world.” While the validity of such opinion is irrelevant, it is fitting to note it is the elements of speed and danger that ostensibly draw participants and spectators to the sport. It is unlikely that any bobsled run would be characterized by its promoters as the slowest and safest in the world.
The fact that the sport is driven by unusual speed and danger was perhaps best exemplified at trial by the testimony of Gary Sheffield. Mr. Sheffield’s extensive experience in bobsledding included, among many other accomplishments, the following: a gold medal in the 1959 World Championships in St. Moritz, Switzerland; a silver medal in the 1961 World Championships at Mount Van Hoevenberg; a member of the 1964 and 1968 United States Olympic Bobsled Teams; and the coach of the 1980 United States Olympic Bobsled Team. When asked by the court about the opening in the exit chute at Mount Van Hoevenberg, Mr. Sheffield candidly stated that "it could be improved.” He further explained that conditions exist at various facilities throughout the world that he does not like, but added, "that is the part of the sport that I really enjoy, running that fine edge” (emphasis supplied).
As was reflected by the testimony of Mr. Sheffield, the conditions at Mount Van Hoevenberg in January 1986 were not ideal. Consistent with such testimony was that of John F.
The bobsled run received international approval and was used for the 1980 Winter Olympic Games. At the time of the accident, there were only a handful of bobsled runs in the entire world. One was in Lake Placid and the other three were in Europe. There was no evidence indicating that any of the runs had similar openings in the exit chute.
This case presents a difficult factual determination for the court, a determination upon which reasonable fact finders, albeit a jury or court sitting alone, may disagree. Bobsledding is a sport in which only a few unique individuals on the face of the globe choose to participate. No one with any experience in the sport could be so naive as to not realize the extreme risk presented by participation. Ordinarily, liability cannot fairly attach. Yet, at some point, those who control the track may create a danger so great that it would constitute negligence even in this sport where competitors seek to "run[ ] that fine edge.”
One of the arguments militating against a recovery by claimant is that the risk created by the 20-foot opening and exposed concrete abutment in the exit chute ostensibly was within the risk of acceptability in the bobsledding community. The entire bobsled run had been approved by the F.I.B.T. National championships, world championships and the 1980 Olympic Games were conducted on the bobsled run. Apart from the issue of the danger posed by the subject 20-foot opening and exposed concrete abutment, claimant knew the risks inherent in bobsledding generally and the specific risks at Mount Van Hoevenberg.
Turcotte v Fell (68 NY2d 432, supra) requires further consideration. The Court of Appeals observed that the statement whether there is or is not a duty in an assumption of risk case begs the essential question whether an injured party’s interests are entitled to legal protection against a defendant’s conduct. It further explained that a determination of the existence of a duty and the concomitant scope of that duty involves not only a consideration of the wrongfulness of a
The same analysis must be applied to a bobsledder, and claimant concedes that certain inherent risks exist in the sport of bobsledding, including the risk of losing control of a sled, that can preclude the existence of a duty or the finding of liability. Essentially, claimant accepts the careful analysis of Judge Simons in Turcotte (supra) that certain risks are assumed in sporting events and that in the most basic sense the participant has given his consent in advance to relieve the defendant of an obligation toward him and to take his chances of injury from a known risk arising from what a defendant is to do or leave undone. However, claimant contends that the "primary” assumption of risk referred to in Turcotte has no application to his claim since it is predicated not upon the risks inherent in operating a two-man bobsled on the run at Mount Van Hoevenberg and injury-causing events which were known, apparent or reasonably foreseeable consequences of his participation in bobsledding, but instead upon the negligence of the State in creating and allowing the continued existence of a dangerous condition in the exit chute caused by the 20-foot opening in the left concrete wall and the concrete abutment at the end of the opening. The court agrees.
Another category of assumption of risk is "embraced within the CPLR article 14-A concept of 'culpable conduct attributable to the claimant’ * * * [and is] akin to comparative negligence; it does not bar recovery, but diminishes recovery in the proportion to which it contributed to the injuries (CPLR 1411)” (Lamey v Foley, 188 AD2d 157, 163). The application of such category to the present claim will be hereafter discussed.
The court concludes that apart from the lack of duty or nonliability of the owner of a bobsled run to a bobsledder for risks inherent in or the reasonably foreseeable consequences of participation in the sport of bobsledding, the owner nevertheless owes the duty of reasonable care in the construction and maintenance of the bobsled run as do owners of real property generally (see, Turcotte v Fell, supra, at 442; Akins v
On October 10, 1978, Joseph A. McKillip, himself a former renowned American bobsledder, an international bobsledding judge, and the bobsled technical director for the 1980 Winter Olympic Games, in a letter to the site engineer of the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, advised:
"As per our conversation of today, concerning the sled handling area at the outrun, in the area where the wall is open, it would be my suggestion to place a wing wall approximately 10 feet in length at the upper end of the opening. This wing wall would be set at an angle approximately 30 degrees to the Bobsled Run itself. It seems to me that this would climate [sic] a serious hazard to the bobsledders in the configuration as planned. The wall end presents a very dangerous situation.
"I experienced a very similar situation at Innsbruck, Austria where a sled came down, lost control and ended up astraddle the end of the wall, and the driver in this case spent over a year in the hospital with two broken legs.” (Claimant’s exhibit 11.)
Such advice presaged the unfortunate accident in which claimant was injured.
Although Mr. Sheffield disagreed with Mr. McKillip concerning placement of a wing wall since he felt a more dangerous condition would have been created, he acknowledged that no opening existed on the old run in the exit chute area and the obvious fact that if a gate had been in place where the 20-foot opening was present on the accident date, the bobsled driven by claimant would not have left the bobsled run. Significantly, James Lamy, who worked for ORDA as manager of the Mount Van Hoevenberg Recreation Area, also known as the Olympic Sports Complex, and himself a former bobsledder, acknowledged at an examination before trial that a partition or gate could have covered the 20-foot opening.
In the present case, the court credits not only the testimony of claimant that the sled remained out of control after the brakeman was ejected from the bobsled when it tipped over but also his previously recited version concerning the movement of the bobsled down the bobsled run, including its return to an upright position, then through the exit chute until it moved to the left, partially into the 20-foot opening, and struck the exposed concrete abutment at the end of the opening.
Claimant testified that at one time prior to the accident date a gate or barrier had covered the 20-foot opening but that it had been removed prior to 1986. As previously noted, the proof also demonstrated that prior to reconstruction of the bobsled run around 1979, no opening existed in the outrun area and thus no danger of collision with a concrete abutment existed. Apparently no other world bobsled run had a similar opening in the exit chute area.
That a bobsled out of control might strike the subject exposed concrete abutment was reasonably foreseeable by the State during reconstruction. Significantly, the fact that several bales of hay customarily were placed in the 20-foot opening in front of the concrete abutment demonstrates that the inherent danger created by the concrete abutment was indeed perceived.
But, assuming, arguendo, claimant’s culpable conduct in the operation of the bobsled as it plunged down the bobsled run, the existence of the 20-foot opening in the left concrete wall with an exposed abutment at the end of the opening constituted a foreseeable, superseding cause of the accident and did not constitute a risk inherent in the sport of bobsledding. A claimant (or plaintiff) will not be held to have assumed risks that are not inherent in the sport in which he or she engages (Lamey v Foley, 188 AD2d 157, 164, supra). Claimant’s assumption of those risks inherent in the sport of bobsledding did not encompass the inherent danger posed by the exposed concrete abutment at the end of the 20-foot opening in the left concrete wall of the exit chute. The present record is devoid of proof that "the danger was 'ordinary and necessary’ to the sport and thus inherent in the activity itself’ (Cole v New York Racing Assn., 24 AD2d 993, 994, affd 17 NY2d 761).
The Cole case (supra) is instructive. The deceased, a well-known jockey, was killed when, after being thrown from his mount, struck his head on certain footings that rose three to five inches above ground level and held certain metal posts angled away from a railing. As so elevated, the footings were nonexistent at any other racetrack in America. A verdict in favor of the deceased’s administratrix was upheld. In commenting upon the decision in Cole, the Court of Appeals, in Turcotte v Fell (supra) stated: "The decedent in Cole could not have consented to the danger created by the footings because
Reference to proof of prior accidents should be considered briefly. When Mr. Lamy was deposed before trial and asked whether he had ever observed or been informed of any other accident at the bobsled run since its reconstruction in 1979 in which a bobsled had struck the subject concrete abutment, he answered: "Yes, sir.” He was unable to tell claimant’s counsel the date of the accident or how many times such an accident had occurred. Although he indicated that a record was kept of every accident that occurred on the bobsled run, no other proof was offered at the trial by either party concerning other accidents.
Proof of prior accidents at the same place under substantially similar circumstances, or the absence of prior accidents, may be offered on the issues of foreseeability of danger and notice (see, e.g., Brady v Manhattan Ry. Co., 127 NY 46; Lafflin v Buffalo & Southwestern R. R. Co., 106 NY 136; Goldstein v C. W. Post Ctr., 122 AD2d 196; Hyde v County of Rensselaer, 73 AD2d 1021, affd 51 NY2d 927; PJI2d 2:12, 2:90). Here, sufficient proof was not elicited by claimant concerning prior accidents for the court to consider them on the issues of foreseeability and notice. Nor was proof offered by the State to demonstrate claimant’s knowledge of prior accidents of the same or similar nature at the same location. Indeed, had claimant been aware of prior accidents of the same or similar nature, the court would find that he had assumed the risk of injury as regards the 20-foot open area and exposed concrete abutment.
The burden of proof of claimant’s culpable conduct under CPLR 1411 rested upon the State, and it failed to demonstrate by a fair preponderance of the evidence claimant’s awareness of the dangerous condition or risk posed by the 20-foot opening and concrete abutment of the exit chute.
To the extent that the State contends that expert proof was required to sustain claimant’s burden of proof as to the State’s negligence, the court rejects such contention. Although experts are often called to offer testimony in liability claims involving negligence, the admissibility of opinion evidence as
[The portion of the opinion addressing other defenses asserted by defendant has been omitted for purposes of publication. The court found the defenses unpersuasive and directed entry of an interlocutory judgment finding defendant liable to claimant.]
[Portions of opinion omitted for purposes of publication.]
. Another run was constructed for the 1988 Winter Olympic Games in Calgary, Canada.
. Unless otherwise indicated, quotes are from the court’s trial notes.
. The State’s argument that the brakeman was negligent in failing to remain with the bobsled when it tipped over and thus unable to perform his appropriate function and that such failure was a competent producing cause of the accident assumes that the brakeman had the option of remaining on the sled and, in any event, requires no further discussion.