31 S.C.L. 573 | S.C. Ct. App. | 1846
The first ground of appeal is, that the words were not proved on the trial as laid in the declaration. The rule is now well settled, that if the words be proved substantially as laid, it will be sufficient; Hogg ads. Wilson, 1 N. & McC. 216. So too, “ where the words are, in themselves, actionable, it is sufficient to prove some of them which are actionable, provi
The counsel for the defendant do not deny this; but they contend that Giles Martin, Esq., before whom the false oath was taken, who is described in the declaration as a justice of the peace, was not, in fact, a justice of the peace, but a magistrate; inasmuch as, by the Act of 1839, the office of justice of the peace was abolished after the 1st March, 1841, and that of magistrate substituted. It is a sufficient answer, to say that no such ground was taken on the trial; nor is any such ground indicated in the notice of appeal. The trial, it seems, took place in October, 1841 ; there is, however, no time laid in the declaration, and the proof certainly corresponded with the allegation in the declaration; viz: that Giles Martin was a justice of the peace, at the time of the trial of the case in which the plaintiff was sworn. The declaration alleges that he had jurisdiction of the case. After a verdict, the legal implication is, that all these matters were proved as laid, and therefore, no advantage can be taken of them. In 1 Tidd Pr. 451, it is said, “ a verdict will aid the omission of that which was necessary to be proved at the trial ; and without which, the jury could not have found for the plaintiff.” In this case, unless the oath of the plaintiff had teen taken before one clothed with legal authority to administer the oath and try the case in which he was examined, the jury could not have found the verdict which they did. Such a verdict being found, we are bound to conclude, either that the proof was exactly according to the averment in the declaration, or, if that was defective, that the proof made out the case, and supplied the defect.
The second ground is, that the words are not actionable. There can be no doubt, that with the averment and colloquium in the first and second counts, the words laid in
It is not necessary that . the words, in terms, should charge a larceny. If, taking them all together, in their popular meaning, such is the necessary inference, then there is no doubt that they are actionable. In Davis vs. Johnston, 2 Bail. 579, the words were, “ tell him he is riding a stolen horse, and has a stolen watch in his pocket they were held to be a plain charge- of horse stealing and larceny. .The words here, beyond all doubt, as plainly point to sheep stealing, and stealing beef. But if the words were doubtful and ambiguous, the plaintiff had the right to inquire of the by-standers, how did you understand the words ? and if they said they understood them as charging larceny, and such an understanding might fairly have been received from the words — it would pre
The witness proving the publication, said he could not give the precise xvords, but that he understood the defendant — and any person hearing him, would have understood him — as charging the defendant with prostitution, <fec. It is in reference to this, that Savage, C. J. says, it is important that the rule, that the plaintiff should prove so much of the words laid as will sustain his cause of action, should be adhered to, “ that the defendant may know what he is to meet; and that he may not be held accountable for the misunderstanding of witnesses, as he might be, if they were permitted to testify to the import of his words. The court and jury are to construe his words, and not the witnesses.” There is no doubt that the dictum of C. J. Savage is good law. It requires that the words used by the defendant should be proved ; but it by no means excludes the position, that after the words are proved, if they be ambiguous or uncertain in their meaning, the witness may be asked, how he understood the words thus proved. Nor does the case of Gibson vs. Williams, 4 Wend. 320, interpose any obstacle. That case merely afflrms that the opinions of witnesses, that the plaintiff was meant and intended by the words, are not competent evidence. That may be law, and still it does not affect this case' — for it does not rule, that when the words are capable of two meanings, one charging the plaintiff, and the other not, the witness may not say how he understood them. After a full review of the cases, I am satisfied that the witness was allowed, very properly, to say in what sense he understood the defendant to use the words; and having answered, that he understood him, by the words he used, to make a charge of larceny, there can be no reason why we, after a jury have concurred with the witness, should ■ say the words were used in some innocent sense, and are, therefore, not actionable.
The first and second grounds of the defendant’s motion for a new trial, are certainly misconceived. .-The action
There is nothin in the fourth ground, when it is understood, It may be, that the defendant’s question to Col. Denny, how much did Wade Dennis direct you to claim from the defendant ? was waived. But in fact, the same thing was asked in the question, how much did you claim before suit brought1? For Denny was the guardian of the negro, and said, of his own knowledge, he knew nothing of the claim. But the testimony objected to in the fourth ground, did not come out until after Giles Martin was examined, and was in reply to it. Martin proved for the de
The fifth ground, which complains that the damages found are excessive, cannot help the defendant. Having known both parties before they left Newberry, I was, perhaps, more than ordinarily anxious that exact justice should be done; and in that spirit I presented every consideration to the jury, to induce them to find a.much smaller verdict than they did find for the plaintiff. But it was all in vain — for the malice of the defendant was apparent; it was, too,, probable, that his desire to possess Morgan’s land, had led him to publish many of the slanders which he did, during a course of several years. Even after the suit, he had avowed the truth of his words, and his intention to prove them. On the trial, although he did not justify, he approached it as near as he could, and seemed to say, although the plaintiff may not be legally guilty, yet, I then had, and still have, good grounds to believe him to be guilty. So, too, the fearful onslaught made on the plaintiff’s character, if the jury believed, as they probably'did, that the defendant’s own slander was the principal cause of the reproach cast upon the plaintiff, was a very aggravating circumstance, especially when it was shewn by many witnesses oi character and intelligence in the neighborhood, that the plaintiff had so lived, after the beginning of the reports against him, as to shew
The motions for non-suit and new trial, are dismissed.