Opinion op the Court by
Affirming.
Thе question is essentially one of power of a county in substitution of a non-profit private corporation to accept title to school property, issue revenue-liquidating bonds to cover the cost and lease the рroperty to the County Board of Education under similar terms of amortization and lease as the original scheme of financing the construction of the improvements.
Several years ago the Fayette County Board of Education in оrder to secure new school buildings caused a non-profit corporation, known as the Payette County High School Company, to be organized. The Board conveyed certain land to it for the purpose of having the comрany erect the buildings thereon, issue revenue bonds for the cost and lease the same back to the board for one year, -with the option of renewal and upon such other terms that in time the bonds would be paid, the lien re
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leased and the • property conveyed back to the board with the improvements. The plan had been previously approved as within the general powers of boards of education. Waller v. Georgetown Board of Education,
The Kentucky Bevised Statutes bring together what were originally the separate acts, above cited, pertaining to the financing by city, independent school districts and county boards of education of the erection or acquisition of school buildings and equipment by this method. In this comprehensive chapter, the word “city” is used also to mean “county” or other municipal corporation. KBS 162.300. No clear-cut distinction appears in this group of sections as between financing the erection of buildings by issuing bonds to cover the cost and by other means. Though complementary acts, thе difference between Chapters 14 and 15, Acts of the 1934 extra session, relating to counties and county boards of education (pub
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lished as Sections 4421-20 to 4421-38, Kentucky Statutes) is shown in Franklin County v. Franklin County Board of Education,
So it was said in Van Hooser & Company v. University of Kentucky,
“The primary purpose of the aсt is to enable state educational institutions to erect buildings and to pay for them with bonds payable out of the revenues derived from the buildings. Viewing the act as a whole, it was clearly the intention of the Legislature to enable the governing bodies of such institutions to finance the construction of necessary buildings upon the best terms possible, and at the lowest rate of interest obtainable. The provision in section 2, relating to the borrowing of money from the Public Works Administration, is not mandatory.”
It was accordingly held that the money could be obtained from private individuals and bonds could be issued to them therefor. This was followed in Piggott v. Kasey,
It is the same kind of question that has arisen in this case, viz., one of the extent of the powers conferred by *602 the statute. It is whether the statute is broad enough to authorize the acquisition of school property on which the buildings have already been erected and the issuance of bonds of the same character in payment, or, strictly speaking, in substitution thereof. Bearing in mind the general purpose of the enabling act, we examine the terms of the statute to ascertain whether the transfer of title and substitution of bоnds can be said to be within the intention of the Legislature or whether that body in expressing its intention made the statute so restrictive that it cannot be done.
The county was authorized to “establish and erect” buildings and appurtenances “for the purpose of supplying the board of education * * * with adequate buildings necessary to carry out its duties and powers. ’ ’ KRS 162.150. That is the primary and real purpose of the entire authority. The power was granted the county as a municipal corporation to borrow money and issue the bonds “for the purpose of defraying the cost of constructing or acquiring any school buildings and appurtenances thereto.” KRS 162.170. It is prescribed by that section that the ordinance or resolution of the governing body relating to the matter, shall provide that such properties “are to be constructed or acquired’’ undеr the provisions of KRS 162.150 to 162.280. Several of those sections speak not only of the erection of school buildings but in the alternative to their “establishment” or their “acquisition,” or to “obtain” them. The word “establish” is apt in the sense of to creаte or originate in some way other than to build or erect in the manner specifically declared. The word “acquire” is comprehensive and includes the meaning of “to gain by any means; to get as one’s own, ’ ’ and is synonymous with to obtain аnd to procure. Webster’s International Dictionary.
The development of this plan of financing public properties has been from private corporations acting as holding companies to municipal corporations under statutory sanction. As said in Franklin County v. Franklin County Board of Education, supra [
The judgment so declares the powers and rights. It also dеclares that several buildings or properties may be included in one mortgage and one issue of bonds as at present. This is in accord with the ruling in Scott County Board of Education v. McMillen, supra. The judgment also declares that the bonds may be exchanged at par, with no higher rate of interest, and the re-financing done upon other terms as favorable to the board of education as the present arrangement, including the elimination of the provision by which the schoоl board as lessee assumed liability for the refund of taxes which might have to be paid by the holders of the bonds under certain circumstances. It declares that if such exchange is not accomplished the bonds may be sold at public salе after due advertisement, and the proceeds used to pay and retire outstanding bonds of the holding company which may have matured or may be called for payment. We concur in these declarations, but do not deem it well to pass upon other questions.
The judgment is affirmed.