Morgan Sinclair Goodwin v. Commonwealth of VirginiaMorgan Sinclair Goodwin v. Commonwealth of Virginia
the taint arising from the unlawful entry was sufficiently attenuated by the consent”).
IV. Conclusion
Concluding as I do that the trial court erred in its holding that reasonable suspicion existed to justify the seizure of the vehicle and its occupants under the Fourth Amendment, I would reverse and remand for a new trial including а determination by the trial court regarding the applicability of the exclusionary rule if the Commonwealth is so advised.
Virginia B. Theisen, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: PETTY, BEALES and DECKER, JJ.
DECKER, Judge.
Morgan Sinclair Goodwin appeals his three cоnvictions for uttering a public record, in violation of
I. BACKGROUND
On appeal of a сhallenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court views the record in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial. Stevenson v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 485, 488, 522 S.E.2d 368, 368 (1999); Henry v. Commonwealth, 63 Va.App. 30, 35, 753 S.E.2d 868, 870 (2014). To do so, we “‘discard all evidence of the accused that conflicts with that of the Commonwealth.’” Henry, 63 Va.App. at 37, 753 S.E.2d at 871 (quoting Holcomb v. Commonwealth, 58 Va.App. 339, 346, 709 S.E.2d 711, 714 (2011)). The Court also accepts as true all the credible evidence favorable to the prosecution as well as all fair inferences in support of the conviction that may be drawn from the record. Id. Viewed under this standard, the evidence is as follows.
On November 8, 2012, Deputy Scott Craig of the Augusta County Sheriff‘s Department stopрed the appellant’s vehicle for a speeding violation. Before Deputy Craig approached the automobile, the appellant, who was driving, got out of the car. The appellant turned, placed his hands behind his back, and
The deputy assured him that driving withоut a license did not necessarily warrant an arrest. The appellant identified himself as Christopher Venable, stated that he was from New York, and provided Deputy Craig with a date of birth and social security number. Due to technical difficulties with equipment, Craig was unable to vеrify the out of state information with dispatch.
The deputy issued three summonses to the appellant in the name of Christopher Venable for speeding, driving without an operator’s license, and failure to wear a seatbelt. The appellant signed the summonses as “Christopher Venable” and returned them to Deputy Craig. He signed each document below two pre-printed sentences: “I promise to appear at the time and place shown above, signing this summons is not an admission of guilt. I certify that my current mailing address is as shown below.” Two of the documents included “checked” boxes informing the recipient that he could avoid going to court if he followed the accompanying instructions.
Over a month later, Deputy Craig learned the appellant’s true identity. The appellant had represented himself as Christopher Venable during a separate encounter with Officer Robert Dean of the Waynesboro Police Department. When Dean saw the name Christopher Venable on a recent record, he contacted Deputy Craig and provided the deputy with the appellant’s actual name.
At the completion of the Commonwealth’s case, the appellant moved to strike the uttering charges, alleging that the evidence was insufficient to support them. He argued that the Commonwealth failed to prove that hе sought to obtain an “object mentioned in the [forged] writing.” The court denied the motion. During closing arguments, the appellant renewed the motion. The trial court again denied the motion, holding that the forgeries were “the signature[s] of Christopher Venable.” The court further explained that the appellant “intended to have the officer believe that” he was Christopher Venable “and handed [them] back with that false impression” and “that was the object of his uttering.”
The court convicted the appellant of three counts of uttering a рublic record, in violation of
II. ANALYSIS
The appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove uttering.2 Relying on Bennett v. Commonwealth, 48Va.App. 354, 357, 631 S.E.2d 332, 333 (2006), he suggests that an uttering occurs only when the act was “made in the prosecution of the purpose of obtaining the [object] mentioned in the said writing.” The Commonwealth responds that “uttering,” as used in the statute at issue, is complete upon proof of “an assertion by word or action that a writing known to be forged is good and valid.”
The relevant facts are not in dispute. Rather, the question in this appeal is whether the facts of this case meet the definition of “uttering” under
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law which this Court reviews de novo on appeal. Baker v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 656, 660, 685 S.E.2d 661, 663 (2009); Belew v. Commonwealth, 62 Va.App. 55, 62, 741 S.E.2d 800, 803 (2013). “Generally, an undefined statutory term ‘must be given its ordinary meaning, given the cоntext in which it is used.’” Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187, 237, 738 S.E.2d 847, 875 (2013) (quoting Meeks v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 798, 802, 651 S.E.2d 637, 639 (2007)).
The Supreme Court of Virginia considered the definition of “uttering” in Bateman, 205 Va. 595, 139 S.E.2d 102. The Court referenced Black’s Law Dictionary’s entry on uttering, “‘[t]o put or send [as a forged check] into circulation[;] ... to utter and publish.’” Id. at 599-600, 139 S.E.2d at 106 (first and second alterations in original) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1716 (4th ed.1957)). See generally Elliott v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 457, 463, 675 S.E.2d 178, 182 (2009) (“When the language of a statute is unambiguous, courts are bound by the plain meaning of that language and may not assign a construction that amounts to holding that the General Assembly did not mean what it actually has stated.”). The Court ultimately defined an uttering as “an assertion by word or action that a writing known to be forged is good and valid.” Bateman, 205 Va. at 600, 139 S.E.2d at 106.
In Bennett, this Court applied the definition of uttering provided in Bateman in the context of
The appellant cites specific language in Bennett as controlling. The Bennett opinion does, as the appellant suggests, include language that an uttering is comprised of an assertion that a forged writing is true if the assertion “‘was made in the prosecution оf the purpose of obtaining the [object] mentioned in the said writing.’” 48 Va.App. at 357, 631 S.E.2d at 333 (alteration in original)
that this language signifies that in order for an action to constitute an uttering, it not only must be an assertion that a forged writing is good and valid, the action must also be done in pursuit of a goal specifically mentioned in the forged document. A full reading of the opinion, however, demonstrates that the actual analysis did not consider the purpose stated in the writing to which the defendant affixed his false signature.
The reference to the purpose mentioned in the writing was “not essential tо the Court’s judgment” in Bennett and, as such, “is unbinding dicta.” Sarafin v. Commonwealth, — Va. -, -, 764 S.E.2d 71, 77 (2014). In other words, the language relied upon by the appellant does not bind this Court. See, e.g., Cooper v. Commonwealth, 54 Va.App. 558, 571, 680 S.E.2d 361, 367-68 (2009) (explaining that dicta can be persuasive but is not controlling). Consequently, while the Bennett holding is instructive and consistent with the common definition of uttering, it compels a result contrаry to the appellant’s argument. We decline to hold, as the appellant suggests, that an uttering occurs only when the action is done in pursuit of a purpose specifically mentioned in the forged writing.
Our conclusion that Bennett did not place an additional requirement on the general statutory meaning of “uttering” and, instead, applied the common definition, is supported by Bateman and the many Virginia appellate opinions that reviewed uttering convictions without discussing the “purpose of obtaining the object mentioned” in the forged writing. See, e.g., Oliver v. Commonwealth, 35 Va.App. 286, 295-96, 544 S.E.2d 870, 874-75 (2001) (affirming uttering conviction under
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must affirm the decision below unless the trial court’s decision was plainly wrong or lacked evidence to support it. See, e.g., Allison v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 810, 811, 153 S.E.2d 201, 202 (1967); Henry, 63 Va.App. at 37, 753 S.E.2d at 871. In our review of the record, we accord the trial court’s factual determinations “great deference.” See, e.g., Towler v. Commonwealth, 59 Va.App. 284, 297, 718 S.E.2d 463, 470 (2011).
During a routine traffic stop, the appellant identified himself as Christopher Venable to Deputy Craig. The appellant told the deputy that he was from New York and provided him with a date of birth and social seсurity number. Based on the appellant’s representations, the deputy issued three summonses to the appellant under the name of Christopher Venable. The appellant signed the summonses as “Christopher Venable” and returned them to Deputy Craig. The trial court found thаt the appellant uttered the forged summonses when he handed them back to Deputy Craig with the intent to convey that the false signatures were true. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the record supports the reasonable conclusion that, through his actions, the appellant asserted that his forged name was true and that the forged summonses were good and valid. Thus, the trial court’s finding was not plainly wrong, and the convictions were supported by the evidence.
III. CONCLUSION
We hold that the definition of uttering is “an assertion by word or action that a writing known to be forged is good and valid.” Bateman, 205 Va. at 600, 139 S.E.2d at 106. Under this definition, the evidence was sufficient for the trial court to conclude that the appellant uttered the summonses. Therefore, we affirm the convictions for uttering a public record.
Affirmed.