Adams, J.

Tbe plaintiff took a voluntary nonsuit as to Morgan & Perry, and with tbe question of their liability we are not concerned.

An entirely different relation exists between tbe plaintiff and Mrs. Owen. His Honor twice denied her motion for nonsuit, and thereby held as an inference of law that tbe evidence raised issues for tbe jury. Accordingly, issues were submitted to tbe jury and were answered in favor of tbe plaintiff. When tbe verdict was returned bis Honor expressed tbe opinion as a matter of law that tbe plaintiff was not entitled to judgment on tbe verdict because tbe negligence of Mrs. Owen could not have been a proximate cause of tbe plaintiff’s injury, and then adjudged that tbe plaintiff take nothing by bis action and pay tbe costs.

Tbe record thus presents an unusual situation. Tbe essential elements of actionable negligence are injury, negligence, and proximate cause. Tbe court’s denial of the motion to nonsuit was in effect an adjudication that tbe evidence tended to show a causal relation between tbe defendant’s negligence and tbe plaintiff’s injury; and this relation was established by the jury’s answer to tbe first issue. Tbe latter *36 opinion, set out in the judgment, is altogether inconsistent with the former opinion of the court and with the finding of the jury. It is to be noted that the verdict was not set aside; it is undisturbed. The action was not dismissed as in case of nonsuit; but by a final judgment it was declared that the plaintiff should take nothing by his action. The plaintiff is denied judgment, although there is no interference with the verdict awarding him damages.

Substantially the same conditions arose in Jernigan v. Neighbors, 195 N. C., 231. In that case we remarked, “If we simply reverse the judgment, the verdict will stand, and in that event the plaintiff will recover damages to which, according to the judgment, he is not entitled upon the evidence; and as the motion to dismiss the action cannot now be allowed, we are of opinion that the judgment should be reversed, the verdict set aside, and a new trial awarded.”

The decision is controlling in this case. The judgment, as it stands, nullifies the verdict; if it is vacated and the plaintiff requests another in accordance with the verdict, he will be confronted with the court’s adverse expressions of opinion concerning his right to relief. We, therefore, follow the course pursued in Jernigan/s case. The judgment is vacated, the verdict set aside, and a new trial ordered.

New trial.