101 Ga. 389 | Ga. | 1897
It appears in the present case, that there was an equity proceeding under which a fund was brought into court for distribution; that the court had under consideration the mafter of the allowance of counsel fees as expenses incurred by the plaintiffs in bringing the fund into court, and had adjudged that they were entitled to such expenses, and a decree had been rendered that certain amounts should be paid to the attorneys who appeared of' record as their counsel. So far as the record shows, the amount fixed was, in the judgment of the court, reasonable and sufficient remuneration for the entire services rendered in the matter of bringing the fund into court. Subsequently other attorneys, who had not appeared of record in the case, but who claimed to be original counsel for the plaintiffs, made application for an allowance of fees. Their clients united with them in this application.
It was within the discretion of the judge to reopen the question of allowance of expenses, and if the amount already allowed was not sufficient remuneration for the services rendered, to allow the plaintiffs an additional amount as counsel fees. Where the judge, as he did in this case, after hearing all of the evidence, declined to reopen the matter, and refused to allow additional fees, this court will not interfere, unless it plainly appears that he abused his discretion. In the light of the facts which are contained in the record, we can not say that there has been any abuse of discretion in this case. Ample opportunity to be heard was given the plaintiffs when the matter of
Judgment affirmed.
