125 Wis. 148 | Wis. | 1905
It is strenuously urged by the defendant that this action cannot be maintained, because the cause of action pleaded is covered and concluded by a judgment of this court on an appeal in a former action, and that therefore the rule of res adjudícala applies to all questions involved in this case. This action is wholly independent of and in no way connected with the other and former action referred to. Nothing in the case shows that it is the same cause of action as is embraced in the judgment so relied on. It appears that this is an original action, which has not been before this court, and that it has never been prosecuted to judgment in the trial court or in this court. On this appeal we are confined to the record and pi’oceedings in this case, and therefore no question of res adjudicada is involved.
In stating the facts the pleader employed language which somewhat confuses the purpose of the complaint. The terms employed charge the defendant with ordinary negligence in the management and conduct of its business in running the train in question, and then characterizes the conduct of the persons in charge of the engine as “reckless, wanton, and unlawful,” without clearly indicating whether or not it is intended to charge an intentional wrong. This form of
It is contended tbat under tbe facts stated in tbe complaint it appears as a matter' of law tbat tbe negligence charged was not tbe proximate cause of tbe injury. Tbe specific grounds of negligence charged are tbat defendant negligently ran its train over tbe crossing at an illegal rate of speed; tbat it negligently omitted to give tbe required signals by ringing tbe bell or blowing tbe whistle to give' warning to persons near or upon tbe crossing; and tbat in running its train across tbe street in question it negligently failed to keep a lookout for tbe purpose of avoiding collision with persons or vehicles using tbe same. Liability is asserted under these facts upon tbe ground tbat such acts of negligence caused tbe plaintiff to become unconscious and helpless from fright, at tbe unexpected and sudden danger, and tbat such negligence, through this unconsciousness and helplessness, produced tbe injuries complained of. Since it must be beld tbat tbe complaint alleges a cause of action for ordinary negligence only, we cannot perceive bow, in any aspect of tbe situation, tbe alleged failure to keep a proper lookout could be found to be tbe proximate cause of tbe injury, in view of tbe claim tbat plaintiffs helpless condition and consequent injury were caused bj- tbe unlawful speed of tbe train and tbe failure to
The suggestion that it is beyond reasonable probability that the specific injury might have been anticipated does not meet the question. It is not required that the “specific” injury or “such” an injury as is complained of was or ought to have been specifically anticipated as the natural and probable consequence of the wrongful act. It is sufficient if the facts and -circumstances are such that the consequences attributable to. the wrongful conduct charged are within the field of reasonable anticipation; that such consequences might be the natural and probable results thereof, though they may not have been specifically contemplated or anticipated by the person so «causing them. Mauch v. Hartford, 112 Wis. 40, 87 N. W.
Tbe question whether plaintiff was guilty of a want of ordinary care, under the facts and circumstances alleged, which contributed to produce the injury complained of, is one for the jury. The allegation that plaintiff stopped to look and; listen before attempting to cross the tracks and again while-in the act of crossing over the tracks, and that he saw no train approaching when he last looked, and heard no noise or • signal of an approaching train or engine until he suddenly saw the train approach under the circumstances alleged, which caused him to fall and become helpless through defendant’s wrongful conduct, presents a situation of which we cannot say, as matter of law, that his conduct is so variant from that of ordinarily prudent persons as to constitute negligence per se. Bohn v. Racine, 119 Wis. 341, 96 N. W. 813.
By the Court. — The order appealed from is reversed, and' the cause remanded with directions to enter an order overruling the demurrer, and for other proceedings according to-law.