48 Mich. 326 | Mich. | 1882
The bill in this case was filed for tñe purpose of winding up the affairs of a co-partnership which was alleged to exist between the parties for the purpose of keeping a hotel in a building known as the Barnard House. The bill prayed for an accounting and a receiver. The defendant answered to the merits and proofs were taken.
It was not disputed that a partnership had existed between the parties, but the defendant claimed that complainant had voluntarily taken himself out of the business. On both sides it was agreed that defendant was in possession of the Barnard House while the suit was in progress, and keeping it as a hotel. What property in the house belonged to the parties respectively or to the partnership was the subject of controversy, and evidence was gone into respecting it.
The case being in readiness for hearing on pleadings and proofs, was called up and the following order or decree made:
*328 Title oe Cause.
“ On reading the pleadings and proofs in this cause, and after having heard the arguments of counsel, and on motion ■of Isaac H. Parrish, the solicitor for the complainant, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that David L. Stivens be and hereby is appointed receiver of property now in the Barnard House, so called, and which was in said house when this bill was filed, and which belonged to the firm of Morey & Grant, being all of the furniture and property therein except the private property of the defendant, John Grant.
That such receiver make a careful inventory of all.the property and file the same with the register of this court; that before such receiver take possession of such property he must execute and file with the register of this court a bond in the sum of two thousand dollars, to be signed by at least two sufficient sureties, to be approved by such register; and it is further ordered that such receiver hold said property to be disposed of according to the order of this court,' but that he do not remove the same from said Barnard House, or interfere with the use of the same by defendant before the 12th day of January next.”
It is to be observed of this order:
But if complainant expected to bring the case to further hearing, and to ask for an accounting, that very fact was
It is said, however, that it is not a final decree or order, and therefore not appealable. Rut, as we have seen, it does not purport to be interlocutory, and we gather from inference only that complainant expected to move further. It was made at the time for final decree, and when a final adjudication might have been had. Had the adjudication taken place, it would unquestionably have been appealable; and we cannot agree that defendant is cut off from the right to a review by the sentence of dispossession having been made without the adjudication which was needed for its support.
The order is reversed with costs.