This is an appeal by the defendants Beaumont Irrigation District, a public corporation, and others from a preliminary injunction restraining them, pending trial, from enforcing portions of a certain stipulated judgment between them and plaintiff Moreno Mutual Irrigation Company, a corporation. The latter corporation brought this action to quiet title to alleged water rights-and to set aside the stipulated judgment, and sought temporary injunctive relief.
Counsel have adopted, for convenience sake, brief designations of the several parties, title of actions, property involved, and have referred to them as follows :
“ (a) ‘Moreno’ shall mean Moreno Mutual Irrigation Company, a corporation.
“(b) ‘Beaumont-Yucaipa parties’ shall mean Beaumont Irrigation District, a public corporation, and six other mutual water companies.
“(c) ‘ 1926 action’ shall mean that certain action No. 24570 brought by the Beaumont-Yucaipa parties against Moreno in the Superior Court of San Bernardino County entitled ‘Yucaipa Water Company No. 1, a corporation, et ah, plaintiffs, v. Moreno Mutual Irrigation Company, a corporation, et al.
“(d) ‘1929 Stipulation’ means the stipulation for judgment in the 1926 action.
“(e) ‘1929 Judgment’ means the judgment in the 1926 action, copy of which is annexed to Moreno’s Second Amended Complaint in the pending litigation as Exhibit C.
“(f) ‘752 acres’ means the land described in paragraph VII of Moreno’s Fourth Amended Complaint in this action.
“(g) ‘Beaumont-Yucaipa Basin’ means that certain area defined in paragraph XXIII of the 1926 Complaint.”
The Moreno Valley Res southwesterly and some miles distant from, the Beaumont-Yucaipa Basin, and intervening between Moreno Valley and Beaumont-Yucaipa Basin is a range of hills known as the “bad lands.’’ According to the pleadings, in 1920, Moreno conceived the idea of developing water in the Beaumont-Yucaipa Basin, and transporting it across the bad lands to Moreno Township. To this end Moreno obtained a deed to 752 acres of land in the Beaumont-Yucaipa Basin. In 1921, the Beaumont-Yucaipa parties threatened suit and in that year the parties entered into a written agreement refraining from suing for a period of one year. In 1926, the Beaumont-Yucaipa parties instituted the 1926 action, after Moreno had drilled three wells on the 752 acres.
Defendant Moreno answered, denied generally and specifically the allegations of the complaint and in particular denied “that there is no surplus water in excess of the amounts of water reasonably necessary to supply or maintain the rights, needs or uses of the plaintiffs in said basin.” It denied “that there is no unappropriated water under said basin ... or under any basin . . . and deny that the wells sunk by these defendants as alleged in paragraph XXVI are sunk into any basin connected with the basin or water supply of the plaintiffs or any of them or touch the main source of water supply of the plaintiffs, and the defendants deny that the tract of land in the district in which the defendant Moreno . . . expects to supply is outside of the basin from which said defendant expects to take and carry water thereto; deny that any of the water underlying the defendant’s land ... is in any manner connected with the water supply or basin from which the plaintiffs . . . draw their water supply.” Defendants then alleged “that the lands of the plaintiffs and defendants are in the Santa Ana watershed and that the underground water supplies in said watershed lie in the same general basin and that any water extracted from the lands of the defendant Moreno . . . transported to its district and used thereon for irrigation would naturally return to the said Santa Ana basin.” And they deny that the taking of any water would in anywise injure plaintiff’s lands.
It appears from an affidavit of one of the engineers then employed to make investigations, which affidavit is filed in the instant proceedings, that there were considerable negotiations between the respective parties looking toward the settlement of the litigation and that they accordingly agreed to a stipulated judgment which was subsequently entered. The stipulation to enter the judgment, signed by all parties in 1929, recites that the “making of any findings of fact and conclusions of law is hereby expressly waived.”
By the 1929 judgment it was agreed and ordered that “each of said plaintiffs, as against said defendants, is the owner of the right to take and use water from the lands and water
The judgment, as entered, respecting the settlement arrived at by the parties, provided in considerable detail that one of the wells on Moreno’s property would and should act as the index or barometer well. The judgment recites that after 1930, the barometer well shall be used as a basis for ‘ ‘ determining the quantity of water which said defendants or either of them shall be permitted to pump or extract from any well or wells, tunnel or any underground water development now or hereafter existing in said area.” An elaborate scale was prepared and included in the judgment and provided that where the water level in the “index well” reached a specified level downward, the amount of water Moreno could take from said wells was reduced accordingly, and when that index reached a certain figure all transportation or diversion of water to Moreno Township should cease. However, this did not affect Moreno’s right to pump water for the benefit of its 752-acre tract. The parties had access to the readings at the “index well” under the judgment. A wier was installed by Moreno for the purpose of measuring water diverted from the wells of defendant and the recording sheets of the nilometer subsequently installed were made accessible to all parties at all times. It is further provided therein that none of the several maximum quantities of water which either of said defendants is permitted thereunder to pump from said area shall be increased or affected by the future acquiring of any additional
It should be here noted that the 752 acres belonging to Moreno and the wells drilled thereon were alleged to be within the area described in paragraph XXIII of the complaint.
The judgment further provided that ‘ ‘ each of said defendants . . . are hereby perpetually restrained and enjoined from directly or indirectly pumping any water in any part of said area or receiving or diverting any water at any time pumped in or from said area except as herein decreed, and from asserting any right to pump water in said area or any part thereof, or to divert or receive any water pumped from said area except as herein decreed. ...”
Recognizing that the need for water might later cause Moreno to attempt to take water and to make claims contrary to the provisions of the 1929 judgment, it expressly provided: “In the event of any violation on the part of either of said defendants of any provision of this judgment neither advice of counsel, nor urgent need of water supply shall furnish any grounds of excuse or justification whatever for any such violation, and during the continuance of any such violation the right of either of said defendants to directly or indirectly pump any water in said area or receive any water pumped therein shall be suspended ...” and that “No pumping of water in said area nor diverting of pumped water therefrom by either of said defendants shall ever be deemed adverse to the rights of any of said plaintiffs, nor shall the defense of laches, estoppel or any statute of limitations be ever pleaded
For a good many years after the rendition of the 1929 judgment Moreno respected the limitations imposed by that judgment and adjusted the pumping from the BeaumontYueaipa Basin to the schedule mentioned. About the summer of 1943, according to the “index well,” the water level had dropped to such extent that further diversion of water by Moreno was threatened. Moreno wrote to the BeaumontYueaipa Protective Committee asking temporary relief from the 1929 judgment. As a “neighborly accommodation” this request was granted with the understanding that such pumping should never be deemed adverse to the rights of plaintiffs.
After an unsuccessful attempt to have the judgment modified by court action, Moreno then brought this action against the same Beaumont-Yueaipa parties in 1945, in the form of an ordinary quiet title action, alleging generally that plaintiff was the owner of the 752 acres described as “BeaumontYueaipa area”; that underlying said acreage there exists a “large, natural underground basin of water” generally known as “Beaumont-Yueaipa basin” which basin is one of six contiguous and adjoining basins, all of which are located within the “Beaumont-Yueaipa area”; that the subterranean waters thus gathered into each of said basins constitutes a separate and distinct water plane from the other basins within the
area
and that the supply and amount of water within the “Beaumont-Yueaipa basin” is dependent largely upon the underground flow of water from the other five subbasins. It is then alleged that at the time of the acquisition of the 752 acres of land overlying said “Beaumont-Yueaipa basin” by plaintiff, there were two water wells thereon in operation and producing water from said “last mentioned basin”; that thereafter, plaintiff drilled and bored several additional wells upon said land, installed pumping plants and constructed the necessary pipe lines and tunnels to convey water from said basin to the Moreno valley. It is then specifically alleged that “there is no unappropriated surplus water, or any other water, of or within said six basins, or any of them, or within said Beaumont-Yueaipa Area, susceptible or available for additional development or appropriation without depriving the plaintiff corporation of .its equitable and reasonable proportion thereof, . . . That the defendants, and each of them, assert and claim an interest and right adverse to plaintiff in
Moreno’s first amended complaint reiterates the allegations of the original complaint, alleges that there are in fact six contiguous and adjoining subbasins within the “BeaumontYucaipa sub-basin” and claims title to certain specified water rights therein.
The Beaumont-Yucaipa parties answered the first amended complaint and denied generally the allegations thereof and alleged that any and all waters appropriated, produced, taken or extracted by Moreno by or through any wells on the 752-acre tract of land during the period mentioned were so taken under the terms and provisions of the stipulated 1929 judgment, which judgment was attached to the answer as an exhibit, and there was the claim that by said judgment the respective rights of Moreno and the Beaumont-Yucaipa parties were finally determined, settled and adjudicated in and to the subject-matter of this action, i. e., the amount of waters the Moreno was entitled to take from the 752-acre parcel described in its complaint, and that the issues there involved are the same issues attempted to be raised in this quiet title action. A copy of the complaint and answer in the 1926 action was attached as an exhibit.
A second amended complaint was, by leave of court, filed by Moreno in the form of a quiet title action, with the same general allegations. The 1929 judgment was thereto attached and made a part thereof. It is then claimed that the judgment is unjust, illegal and inoperative against the claims of the rights of the plaintiffs and that snch invalidity consists of (1) that the judgment is void for uncertainty in that it fails to declare the existence or extent of a common, single, and unrelated subterranean reservoir of water underlying the area described in said complaint; (2) that the judgment is void because it fails to define and specify the amount of water required for use, or that is being used, for beneficial purposes by the respective parties thereto; (3) that it is void for uncertainty in that it does not provide or declare how or in what
Moreno then filed a third amended complaint by leave of court with the same general allegations and makes the additional claim that the 1929 judgment is void for the additional reasons that the judgment fails to find and adjudicate the amount of water required for beneficial use and being beneficially used by the plaintiffs in that action, and whether there is a surplus of underground water in the area described after supplying the beneficial needs and uses, if any, of the plaintiffs or the amount of such surplus, and for the further reason that the judgment failed to declare the existence of a common underground water basin in the area described in the complaint in that action. It is then alleged that plaintiff did not know, and had no means of knowing, that its belief in the existence of a common basin and natural underground reservoir for the storage of water in said area was a mistaken belief until its said geologists submitted to plaintiff a preliminary report of the geological and hydrological conditions in said area on or about the first day of May, 1947. In considering the demurrer interposed to the third amended complaint by defendants the trial court overruled the demurrer as to the sufficiency of the allegations to authorize the court to declare the 1929 judgment void as contrary to public policy, but held that there were not sufficient allegations to declare the judgment invalid on the ground of mistake.
Moreno then filed a fourth amended complaint elaborating
In support of the temporary restraining order, in addition to these pleadings enumerated, both parties presented affidavits of eminent geologists, who gave conflicting opinions as to the various geological formations involved in the BeaumontYueaipa region, and as to whether the pumping of water from the wells located on Moreno’s 752 acres affected the water supply of the Beaumont-Yueaipa parties and whether the said wells were in the Singleton Basin or in the Beaumont-Yueaipa Basin.
It is the position of the Beaumont-Yueaipa parties that no cause for relief from the 1929 judgment is stated in the pending action and that lacking such statement of a cause of action, no injunction can be supported since on its face the 1929 judgment controls the situation, and that the order granting the preliminary injunction should be reversed.
A preliminary injunction is warranted only if there is on file a complaint which states a sufficient cause of action for injunctive relief of the character embraced in the preliminary injunction.
(Bank of America
v.
Williams,
Stripped of all unnecessary minutiae, the purpose of the instant action is a collateral attack upon the validity of the 1929 judgment. If, therefore, the judgment is valid and not subject to such attack, the restraining order preventing its enforcement is unauthorized. It is well settled in this state that a collateral attack on a judgment will not lie against such judgment unless the judgment is void on its face, that is, void as appears from an inspection of the judgment roll.
(Svetina
v.
Burelli,
The public policy Moreno claims is violated by the judgment appears in article XIV, section 3 of the Constitution which, in effect, recites that the welfare of the state requires that its water resources shall be beneficially used as fully as possible; that the waste of water in this state is to be prevented; that the conservation of water in this state is to be exercised with a view to the public welfare; that the right of anyone to water from any natural stream or water course is limited to that which is reasonably required for beneficial use; and that a riparian right in a stream or water course extends only to so much of a flow as may be used or required consistently with this section of the Constitution. The 1929 judgment was based upon stipulation. Moreno was as much of an actor in obtaining it as were any of the Beaumont-Yucaipa parties. Whether or not one is entitled in a collateral proceeding to claim that the judgment is void under such circumstances is discussed in
Driver
v.
International Air Race Assn.,
From an examination of the judgment roll in the 1926 action it cannot be fairly said that the Beaumont-Yucaipa parties did not present the issues here attempted to be reviewed by this action to declare that judgment void. It was specifically alleged, as heretofore pointed out, that “all of the lands, waters and wells described do lie within the Beaumont-Yucaipa
No sufficient grounds are stated which would justify the trial court’s order restraining the enforcement of the judgment based upon that ground.
The allegation of mistake, upon which Moreno relies to set aside the judgment, consisted of the belief of Moreno, as well as the belief of the Beaumont-Yucaipa parties “That there existed a subterranean reservoir or basin of sub-surface water in the alleged ‘ Beaumont-Yucaipa basin, ’ and that plaintiff’s pumping, extracting and exporting of water from its wells would and did adversely affect and diminish the water supply of the other parties . . . whereas in fact no such reservoir or basin existed.” And as alleged in the fourth amended complaint: “That during the period commencing in the year 1921, and ending in May, 1929, the water level in the so-called ‘Barometer Well’ had been lowered approximately 10 feet, and because of such lowering both the plaintiffs and the defendant in the said (1926) action concluded and believed that said lowering . . . was due largely to plaintiff’s pumping and taking of water from its nearby wells. That because of such conclusion and belief, plaintiff entered into the aforesaid stipulation. . . . That plaintiff’s said conclusion and belief and the stipulation agreed to as a result thereof were based on a mistake of fact . . .,” as alleged above. 6 California Jurisprudence, sections 46-47, pages 78-80, considers the code sections on the subject of mistake and recites: “ ‘ The mistake of which a party to a written contract may be heard to complain in equity can arise in only one of three ways: First, it may be a mistake of law. . . .; Second, it may be a mistake entertained by the plaintiff with the knowledge of the defendant arising under circumstances which impose the duty
Applying these rules, no mistake of law is claimed and the second ground is not established. The third ground does not apply under the exception as italicized. 17 Corpus Juris Secundum, pages 486-487, and 499, states the doctrine as follows:
“Where a party enters into a contract ignorant of a fact but meaning to waive all inquiry into it, or waives an investigation after attention has been called to it, there is no mistake in the legal sense. Moreover, mere ignorance of the facts is not necessarily a ground for relief, nor will the courts relieve one from the consequences of his own improvidence or poor judgment. Parties must exercise ordinary diligence in the execution of contracts and are chargeable with such knowledge as diligence would have disclosed, and may not avoid a contract on the basis of mistake where it appears that ignorance of the facts was the result of carelessness, indifference, or inattention . . . Where, . . . the contract concerns a matter about which there may be some doubt, and it appears that the existence of the thing was not an implied condition, but that the party intended to take the risk, then it is no answer to the enforcement of the agreement that the thing did not actually exist. ’ ’
After operating jmder this judgment, as agreed upon, for over 16 years, Moreno now claims that it first discovered its mistake to wit: (1) that the taking of water by Moreno did not adversely affect the Beaumont-Yucaipa parties, which question was adversely determined against it by the judgment and pleadings in the prior action; and (2) that there was no
The other grounds of complaint are sufficiently disposed of by the pleadings, presumptions, stipulation and judgment in the 1926 action.
The temporary order enjoining defendants from enforcing the judgment is reversed.
Barnard, P. J., and Mussell, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied December 19, 1949, and respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied January 19, 1950. Shenk, J., and Carter, J., voted for a hearing.