32 Cal. 289 | Cal. | 1867
Ejectment. The plaintiffs allege title to an undivided half of the “ Plain of San Ignacio,” parcel of the Rancho “ Los Tulareitos ” in Santa Clara County, which was granted to José Higuera, now deceased, by the Mexican Government.
The defendants deny the title of the plaintiffs and allege title in themselves. They also plead in bar a former judgment of the Court in another action, to which plaintiffs and defendants were parties, in which it was adjudged and determined that the plaintiffs had no title to the premises.
At the trial the plaintiffs made a case which entitled them to recover and rested. The defendants then offered in evidence the judgment roll in the suit of Scott v. Higuera et al. in support of their plea in bar, to which objection was made by the plaintiffs upon the ground that it was irrelevant and incompetent.
Both parties claim title under the Mexican grant to José Higuera. The suit of Scott v. Higuera was for a partition of the Rancho Tulareitos y San Ignacio, instituted by Scott against Higuera and others, among whom were the plaintiffs to this action. All parties claimed under the Higuera title. The plaintiffs were personally served with summons, but ndver appeared. As against them the allegation of the complaint
It is contended on the part of the appellants that the judgment in Scott v. Higuera does not estop the plaintiffs from setting up their title, and that it is not evidence against them or their title. And in support of this view it is argued—first, that an action for a partition has a special purpose, to wit : the division of land among tenants in common, etc., and that nothing else can be done; that the titles or interests of the tenants cannot be litigated and determined; that if anything of that character has to be done, it must be done elsewhere. Second, that if this can be done in an action for partition, it was not done in this case; that no issue as to the title or interest of the plaintiffs was made and no trial was had, and that therefore the decision of the Court that they had no title has nothing to support it, and is therefore corarn non judice. That if Scott desired to try and determine the plaintiffs’ title he should have tendered an issue in his complaint upon that subject, but that he did not, and hence there was no such issue in the case, and hence upon the general principles upon which the doctrine of res adjudicata rests, the judgment of the Court that the plaintiffs had no title is no bar.
In support of the first of these points the learned counsel for the appellants has filed a very able brief, which would be
The second point is founded upon a mistaken notion as to the averments and prayer of the complaint. The complaint avers that the appellants have, or claim to have, some interest in the land of which partition is sought, the character and extent of which is unknown to the plaintiff, and prays that they may be required to come into Court and exhibit and establish the same by proof. It is true that the plaintiff in an action for partition is required to set forth in the complaint specifically and particularly the respective interests of all parties, whether such parties be known or unknown to him, so far as such interests are known to him (Sec. 265); but it would be idle to require him to set forth specifically interests of the character and extent of which he is ignorant. As to such interests he can only make the general and indefinite allegation which was made in this case, and such an allegation
An action for partition under our statute is, to some extent, sui generis. The parties named in the complaint, whether as plaintiffs or defendants, are all actors, each representing his own interest. Whether plaintiffs or defendants, they are required to set forth fully and particularly the origin, nature and extent of their respective interests in the property. (Secs. 265, 270.) This having been done, the interest of each, or all, may be put in issue by the others; and, if so, such issues are to be first tried and determined (Sec. 27), and no partition can be made until the respective interests of all the parties have been ascertained and settled by a trial. That they may thus litigate their respective interests is further shown by section three hundred and eight, where it is provided that the costs of such litigation as may arise shall be charged only against the parties who make the issues which are tried.
That the judgment in Scott v. Higuera et al. is conclusive against the right of the plaintiffs to recover in this case is therefore too plain for argument. We find it unnecessary to notice the argument of counsel for the plaintiffs as to the force and effect of a former judgment between the same parties and their privies at common law. To do so, in the presence of the plain and positive provisions of the statute by which the whole matter is regulated, which require no reference to the common law for the puiposes of interpretation, would be to go aside and discuss principles which have no direct application to the case. The force and effect of a final judgment in an action for partition is clearly and explicitly stated in the statute (Sec. 278.) Such a judgment is declared to be binding and conclusive forever upon all persons who are named in the complaint as parties to the action and have been served with a summons, and their legal representatives. The plaintiffs having been named in the complaint as parties to the action, and having been served with a summons, the Court acquired
Judgment and order affirmed.