OPINION
This аppeal arises out of a settlement agreement between respondent and appellant’s mother (hereinafter wife), entered into in March 1977. The settlement agreement was later ratified, approved and incorporated as part of the decree of divorce. That *328 agreement provided that respondent would pay alimony to the wife until 1982. The alimony payment included funds for child support. The agreement also prоvided that in the event of the wife’s death or remarriage, respondent would remain obligated to pay $475 per month per child for child support.
The agreement further specified that respondent would pay child support until each child reached the age of majority, died, married or was emаncipated, provided, however, that such payments would continue until twenty-two years of age for each child who attended college and maintained a “C” average or better.
Finally, the agreement provided that respondent would also pay the costs of tuition for college “as thе parties may reasonably agree upon as the college or other school most appropriate for attendance by such child or children.”
At the time the agreement was entered into, appellant was fourteen years old. The wife died about two years later. After living for a timе with respondent, appellant decided to move in with another family. At that time, respondent paid the family $5,400 for appellant’s support until she turned еighteen. After appellant’s eighteenth birthday, respondent paid no additional child support. Appellant started college in the fall after grаduation from high school. She always maintained better than a “C” average.
The district court found that respondent was responsible for the costs of аppellant’s tuition, but was not responsible for child support arrearages due, in part, to appellant’s lack of standing to enforce such payments. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and remand to the district court.
Appellant contends that she does have standing to enforсe the provisions of the property settlement agreement. We agree. It is clear that appellant is an intended third party beneficiary оf the agreement between her parents. Lipshie v. Tracy Investment Co.,
*329 We have no doubt thаt circumstances may arise, such as death or disability, or outright refusal of a contracting parent to seek enforcement of periodic suрport provisions for a child, which would give a child the necessary standing to enforce the agreement.
Id. at 424. The special circumstances giving risе to the recognition of standing in a child to enforce an order of support exist in the case before us. We conclude that appellant has standing.
Respondent entered into a contract wherein he agreed to pay child support. There is no evidence in the record of аny defense that would relieve respondent of his responsibilities under that contract. The agreement specifically provides that respondent will pay child support until each child reaches the age of twenty-two if the child attends college and maintains at least a “C” average. The еvidence in the record shows that appellant fulfilled these requirements. Generally, a contract will be interpreted in accordance with thе intentions of the parties.
See
Club v. Investment Co.,
Finally, the contract alsо provides that respondent will “pay the cost of tuition for the college or other school as the parties may reasonably agree uрon as the college or other school most appropriate for attendance by such child or children.” That provision requires the reаsonable agreement of the parties. However, the parties are the husband and wife. Once the wife died, the provision could no longer operate. Respondent contends that appellant, as a third party beneficiary, steps into the shoes of the wife. Such an interpretation is a misstatement of the law. A third party beneficiary who seeks to enforce a contract does so subject to the defenses that would be valid as between the parties. Britton
*330
v. Groom,
In accordance with the foregoing, respondent must pay $475 per month in child support for ten months of 1979, all of 1980, all of 1981, all of 1982, all of 1983 and seven months of 1984. This amounts to 65 months at $475 per month for a total of $30,875 in child support. Respondént paid $5,400 of the $8,075 due for appellant’s support for the seventeen months before she turned еighteen. We, therefore, conclude that respondent should receive an olfset in the amount of $5,400 against the total child support owed.
Howеver, when an amount is due under a contract and it is not paid when due, interest is payable. NRS 99.040 provides:
When there is no express contract in writing fixing a different rate of interest, interest must be allowed at the rate of 12 percent per annum upon all money from the time it becomes due.
This means that eаch of the child support payments should accrue interest from the date each payment was due.
We therefore remand this case to thе district court for a determination of interest owing on the child support arrearages and for entry of judgment consistent with this opinion. 1
Notes
Justice Cliff Young voluntarily recused himself from consideration of this case and took no part in its disposition.