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Moran v. Sturges
154 U.S. 256
SCOTUS
1894
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*1 1893. TERM, Syllabus. her land, testimony quite disposition cerning defective. and her memory evidently unsatisfactory will after 179, the terms square being charged By and her the widow four maintenance support with the death until her and after her life, young- children during was to be sold and the become of should age, proceeds est of the first with a wife, the children be divided between pro- exceed the value of the if the lands so sold should that, viso children of second wife should re- lands, homestead of all ceive to make the shares equal. enough were, ultimate of the will objects provide first of the wife and chil- younger expenses the.maintenance and, second, until became of dren they age; then be divided between them. This should equally equality if the defendant Hannah defeated, would were certainly to share equally proceeds square permitted to receive the whole of the in addition 199. proceeds square to us that the children of It seems the first altogether improbable would have entered into this without an wife arrangement, were also to share proceeds understanding the homestead. belowis, reversed,

The decree therefore, -in remanded with case conformity for further this opinion. dissented Me. Bkewek Me.-Justice Justice-"White ' (cid:127) this opinion. MORAN v. STURGES. THE SUPREME

ERROR TO COURT OE THE STATE NEW- YORK. OE Argued No. March Decided 13,14, May 26, 1894. day July,. Supreme the 31st On were commenced voluntary Court of State of New York for the dissolution of á Steam Company; corporation State, organized Boat Tow laws MORAN STURGES. oí the' Case.

Statement day restraining bringing creditors from made on that and an order November, 1891, cause, day requiring 16th all to on the show action and referee, why prayer petitioner granted. should not be before *2 receiver, appointment made time the of a at the same for An order was entering required give him the duties of to bonds before on his which day, August, of that the 1st of in the forenoon On office. papers in the filed the officeof the clerk and these orders were entered day, Saturday, On the afternoon of the same of the court. Monday, August in the in were filed District on libels and District of York to States for the Eastern New en- Court of United Boat against liens of of said Tow Com- maritime six the vessels force pany’s August marshals for the district fleet. the 1st of seized On six, custody August on the 3d of did into of the and like- and took three August the 4th the receiver filed his the other three. On of wise with bond, upon discharge duly approved, and of entered his official possession day take of six vessels he to duties. On same went Thereupon, in of on and them the the marshal. found libellants, motion, bring process them issued several where, Supreme State, hearing, after before the Court were proceedings libels. enjoined taking any on their This further Appeals, Supreme being of judgment of the affirmed Court Court Supreme being judgment of the latter court remitted to Court judgment, of as libellants sued out writ error and there its entered Held, jurisdiction personam, the state had no That this court. filed; liens the libels were over the libellants holders maritime when stood, was, question jurisdiction for the case one that the as the Dis- instance; that the Court trict to decide in the first District had Court jurisdiction; judgment in effect an and review was that the under unlaw- proceedings ful interference with that court. courts, Though purpose per- protecting their over for subject-matter may enjoin parties are amenable to sons and who their process, and to their from interference with them in respect possession property in their identical controversies therein subsequent parties subject- pending, by same as to the jurisdiction; though, matter in other courts concurrent where competent jurisdic- court of the actual of one tion, court; another cannot disturbed out of record, yet, upon the in this Court facts District was not disclosed required stay hand until termination liens, being as to maritime that court without incapable being displacing them. awas Steam Tow-Boat corporation Schuyler Company On under 31,1891, the laws York. July New organized trustees Supreme filed company petition at cham the State of New York at Albany County, YOb, chy —17 TERM, 1893.

Statement of Case. under for the dissolution bers, voluntary company §§ and 2423 of the of Civil Procedure of State, Code in their for the of a tem petition prayed appointment 2423 as amended, whose powers- porary § N. Y. and duties were Civ. Proc. (Code specified § that the 643, 835, stock, stated 1892, pp. 836.) petition not suffi effects, were corporation which it nor to liable, cient amounts for pay just reasonable deal with it, afford who. those security might that the to the Holland the reasons was indebted corporation York in a Trust New sum of. Company large money whereof had been loan, demanded, demand and that payment no available to meet the same; there were assets defaulted certain claims set already corporation *3 of that other forth in assets; for want such claims set the are either due and that dué; schedule rapidly becoming there is serious of the vessels, danger company’s constituting in of the said libelled the sole property company, being for United States such claims as con admiralty maritime and liens, stitute the claims for services including in rendered said vessels. That the event of said supplies libelled and sold under a vessels decree in admiralty, being of there be little of would value said vessels hope realizing on such of creditors: and stockholders sale, security ” would be that the must be real ; assets seriously imperilled and in sale, ized would be insufficient to all the claims pay full, etc. Thereupon presiding judge, attorney gen York eral of-New and thereto, appearing consenting. signed order to show on named, an cause before referee therein be dis November'16, 1891, should not why company and same order D. Frank solved, Sturges appointed and receiver of the all with temporary powers property, to all the duties that are defined as belonging in receivers in an action temporary appointed § further of said code.” It ordered “that all creditors and be are restrained and corporation, enjoined hereby a.

MORAN STURGES. of the Case. Statement actions the said any against corporation for bringing sun;, and from of a money, recovery taking further in action already commenced against such A the order was purpose.”' copy said corporation at least in each to be once published directed three November immediately preceding weeks and each of served several persons upon specified copy to the attached as a creditor or in schedule stock petition further It was ordered that before corporation. holder duties of receivership said entering in due form of execute and law should acknowledge bond sum of State of $50,000, New payable penal This order was entered and the York, with sureties. petition clerk; filed the office of the and papers' accompanying the forenoon of County Albany August 1, 1891, the afternoon which was- On August Satur 3, 1891, error, Monday, August plaintiffs day, coowners certain filed Moran libels Michael tugs, the District Court the United States for District New York certain Eastern steamboats, which were Process Schuyler Company. the United under said libels to States marshal for issued 1’he aiid and on seized took into his district, August Belle, the steamboats Syracuse, Niagara, , seizure On 3 he seized August his notice thereto. affixed the steamboats Yanderbilt, into his Jacob and took affixed his notice seizure America, Leonard, the receiver went on board the 4, 1891, On thereto. August and ascertained marshal was mentioned steamboats *4 he and also found affixed in thereof his by keepers, notice seizure. boats the to the marshal’s and author duly state court, August applied to contest in court entered said that that ized order day n as therein be to take such other might libels for the in hands to use the funds his purpose advisable, and able, be he in as might required such security giving, 1891, the receiver In. made the libels. September, contesting for an Court order District in1the United States motion TERM, 1893. Statement of the Case. to withdraw from the the marshal directing held under The motion admiralty process. steamboats on that be denied should raised ground question leave was answer accord libels, answer given himself this The receiver availed permission ingly. in one action each vessel filed his answer appeared court. He there contesting court for a writ of an after made prohibi application.to denied November which was Court, 13,1891. tion to the District verified a 10 the receiver addressed November petition On of New in York, of the State which he Court to the Supreme in error herein from enjoined asked that might plaintiffs in filed the libels District prosecuting for the Eastern District of States New of the United Court attached to the on Affidavits were these petition, York. record one of and the justices preceding papers order entered an November of the State Supreme at a term error show cause special plaintiffs should not be en- 14, 1891, November why they further on their libels any joined taking and in the States meantime courts, the United plaintiffs and restrained from further error were any enjoined taking and from libels, action under their attempting proceeding or sale of the steamboats to the condemnation looking them. were Affidavits presented plain- opposition to show cause. tiffs in of the order Cer- error the hearing tain were made moving allegations petition Moran at the time he filed the affidavit of knowledge (cid:127) had been first libel a receiver of company appointed. all forth under oath were and Moran set denied, These sources information on the information and with the to dissolve company, proceedings contemplated if libellants were set forth that permitted dates. petition thereunder, libels and their obtain decrees prosecute the same, and sold to satisfy were condemned steamboats than less it would vessels sold result being their value, and that the interest of the gen- corporation sacrificed; eral creditors be greatly thereof would *5 MOEAN STUBGES. 26.1 (cid:127) of the Case. Statement if sold a fleet; a much larger price vessels would bring to a were entitled creditors who preference having that all could be creditors fully all unsecured pro- liens as well as was advised that a tected in this petitioner proceeding; had been filed did for libels the claims which larger portion en- the nor were libellants vessels, not constitute liens against claims. The of their for to such portion any preference titled the order of under the August further stated that petition to contest all to funds security receiver had not sufficient give the neces- to .security and was unable libels,' wholly give and for to the from the marshal’s custody, release vessels sary restrained the libellants were pros- which unless reason, to the be unable the receiver would libels, prevent ecuting also petition condemnation and sale steamboats. the District Court set forth the receiver’s application of New York an District United for the Eastern States surrender, of the district order the marshal directing denial thereof on ; ground steamboats custody be decided not to jurisdiction ought question the- libels and answer the leave to motion; an- answer; contest the appearance each' steamboat swer in action one brought against he not that court, being purpose testing in order as he to furnish able, security necessary alleged, were some number. answer all the libels, forty It had been made the Dis- a motion was also averred that and that trict of the steamboats, Court for the sale Moran result of the to await the be proceeds deposited the receiver action; the motion opposed answered; he had withdrawn as to the libels which in which the in the actions motion had since been urged that the Dis- answered, and receiver had not appeared the motion would granted trict Court had intimated that of the Dis- November 13. denied the Petitioner at them, the time trict Court over steamboats, at that time were that they libels were and asserted filed, liable of the state On December 7, attachment the marshal. made by TERM, Argument for Defendant in Error. term of the special Supreme granted prayer

the receiver and entered an order for an injunction, enjoining *6 in error plaintiffs further taking proceedings upon their libels in the District Court of the United for States Eastern District of New York the steamboat com- against of that steamboats against pany company, except and from Niagara, action under said whatsoever taking any libels and in to the condemnation and proceedings looking sale of the steamboats, of them, except Niagara.

Plaintiffs in error from that order to the appealed general term, which it then carried affirmed, the case to the Court of of State New which Appeals York, affirmed the order of the 136 N. Y. term, general directed that be made the judgment judgment Court, done Supreme December 6,1892, whereupon out, this writ of error rvas sued

Mr. D. Robert Benedict, whom (with were Mr. James Emer- son and Mr. Carpenter F. Mosher on Joseph for brief,) in error. plaintiffs

Mr. de L. Berier, leave of court, filed a brief on behalf Coal Lehigh Yalley and of Company, the United States n marshalfor the district.

Mr. James W. Eaton defendant in error. order of

By the July thirty-first, appointing receiver, New York state court acquired jurisdiction and that corporation, exclusive as all other coordinate jurisdiction.

This is. established proposition fully decision of the but, Court of in’this case; Appeals decision, prior was decided favor of point our far so as the con- contention, of courts of the flicting jurisdiction same State was concerned, the Christian Jensen 128 Case, N. Y. which is directly was similar to the point. proceeding here- proceeding tofore taken the cáse at and the case is bar, conclusive upon

MORAN v. STURGES. Argument in Error. for Defendant the court appointing proposition the order, attaches from the moment the receiver filing intermediate the levied courts, filing and the process his bond, the receiver the order appointing filing number of void. There cases are, indeed, holding large the receiver to file security while may necessary the cor- him order to to administer the assets give power the act of is not at all essential security poration, filing levied intermediate bond, void. is' and his appointment giving 315; Tallis, v. See v. Rutter Missouri, Bond, 67 Maynard Prac. Sandf. Y. Abb. Steele (N. 610; Sturges, Super. Ct.) 23 Pick. 480 Wiswall ; 442 Atlas Bank v. Nahant ; Bank, 14 How. 52. Sampson,

And this rule has where been cases applied repeatedly *7 such an exercise of state jurisdiction part been held to it exclusive and control cognizance give of a the exclusion Federal court coordinate jurisdiction to,interfere and with the subject-matter dispute; attempting themselves. Trust that, Federal courts See Union too, by-the &c. 6 Wiswall v. Railroad, Bissell, 197; Co. v. Rockford Case, 226; 14 How. 29 Fed. 52; Holladay Rep. Sampson, Walker v. 7 342; Flint, Bruce v. Railroad 19 Fed. Co., Rep. 3 Co., Fed. 97; Fed. v. Railroad 435; Kennedy Rep. Rep. 14 Fed. 869. Red Wing, Rep. v. Tel. 31 Fed. In Judd Bankers' & Merchants' Co., Rep. an action in creditor of insolvent which the .an complainant, the Federal to have court take corporation, sought possession' and distribute the of -the assets corporation already of a receiver it was hands under the state said by Judge “ rule The case Wallace : is one for application the court which first takes of the controversy cognizance retain end of the entitled .to litigation, to take control subject-matter possession of all other courts exclusion investigation interference 20 of coordinate v. Taylor Carryl, How. jurisdiction. Citing 10 Williams v. 8 How. ; Lucas, 107 583; Benedict, Hagans. 334; v. Heidritter v. Eliza Buck 3 400; Colbath, Wall. Pet. 264 TERM, 1893.

(cid:127)Argument for Defendant Error. v. 86 112 U. S. Schuehle N. Y. Co., 294; Reiman, beth 270; 6 Railroad, Bissell, 197; Union Trust Co. v. Sedg Rockford wick 6 v. Menck, Blatchford, 156; v. &c. Young Montgomery And see also recent 606. case of Railroad, Woods, very Porter 149 U. S. 473. Sabin,

The case of Heidritter v. Elizabeth Co. is instructive in this was connection. There seized United States officer for an of Federal law. While thus infringement it of. the States United District Court was seized court to enforce a mechanic’s lien. .under Both were in rem. The United States Supreme that, held the Federal court had taken prop- and that the was exclusive. erty necessarily drawn into res was exclusive thereby dominion of United for the of that States, and, purposes at it was the same time withdrawn from' the suit, of the courts New Jersey. Any proceeding against the control and of it in the latter, while involving disposition in that as if it were a condition, proceeding against prop- in another State. It was vain, void, and, erty nugatory District Court judgment the United States those them, claiming without effect.”

This doctrine was also asserted terms strongest Wallace in the recent case of Central National Bank Judge Hazard, Fed. 293. Bank See also, Attleborough Rep. v. Northwestern 28 Fed. Co., Rep.

In Morrison v. Menhaden Co. in which certain Hun, 522, had been vessels seized filed' to marshal libels en- aby *8 maritime force that the demands, Daniels, J., custody says, the of of the defendant under its seizure property prevented the execution the the It within was applicant. wholly District Court United States jurisdiction authority not the under his exe- seizure levy cution.

The is principle generally property acknowledged of an officer of under possession court, process legal the of that its therefore, within court, possession and, v. STUBGES.

MORAN Argument in Error. for Defendant courts, and the Federal exclusive jurisdiction; replevin cannot disturb Senior v. such process, possession. 31 Fed. v. The E. L. Cams, cases Kressel Pierce, cited; Rep. Fed. 45 Fed. cited; Sternberg, cases Rep. Rep. Tefft v. that these do not to the case It cases apply may argued because not taken into man- here the bar, at property under of the court. But under that, ual possession rule is stated in Gluck authorities, the is not The necessary. The rule stated section as follows: Receivers, the is' court which the first takes controversy cognizance entitled to retain to the end of litigation, jurisdiction of control the res take the incidentally possession . . to the of all other courts . exclusion interference state and Federal courts of coordinate jurisdiction, applies as well as courts of a State. several proper appli- rule, the court first cation of this not does require first its takes of the case shall also take, by if officers, controversy thing tangible lead to such a rule would seizure; only susceptible haste of officers to manual on the pos- unseemly get part the broad session of the To result, avoid property. in- rule is will not be laid down that the court first invoked is re- terfered with another court while tained.” that all examination, will be

Indeed, found, upon the test cases which.hold of manual priority relat- and state are cases between Federal hand on the one of a marshal levy ing levy case of a of a sheriff on and do other, apply (cid:127) In coordinate and receiver. liens are those cases equal, its actual tribunal through first possession, acquiring res. That is control of the only officers,gains complete its execution. court can control way gain as is sheriff not the hand marshal its mandate seizing its' officer execute receiver, suitor. But, of an individual in behalf exercise a.receiver, appointment to be dis- assumes equity powers *9 TERM, 266 Argument Error. Defendant of for the and such an act is concerned, benefit of all posed of assertion and does not its require highest prerogative distinction actual to make effectual. That this seizure it of is number is a cases shown clearly recognized great has made hold that' or marshal even where the sheriff of a receiver, an actual seizure the subsequent appointment under the because sale prevents levy, order the receiver vests the custody property appointing of manual court, without immediately necessity Union Trust Co. v. &c. Railroad Co., possession. Rockford men Barb. 55. last 197; Matter Bissell, Berry, is in this connection. tioned case instructive particularly a before the There made the sheriff levy property order but of an after receiver, making appointment The court will was held void. directing appointment, into take account fractions of a priority day determining Matter v. Central jurisdiction. Berry, People supra; 53 Barb. Bank, 412, 417. If the rule were otherwise than been has above stated, of which was scattered corporation, property over would be area, and the large practically powérless of his frustrated. learned object appointment absolutely counsel in his contention for the error, plaintiffs doctrine that manual is to establish essential juris- n diction, relies the cases wholly conflicting relating claims sheriffs and which, marshals as above out, pointed. no bears to the case of It a receiver a marshal. analogy is true that an undoubtedly execution the hands of sheriff of a binds from the personal debtor judgment time it in the sheriff’s but lodged this doctrine is hands, far true so are concerned, subsequent purchasers no case where application out of issued process courts; two coordinate' learned reasoning counsel as to the between analogy and the order a receiver is therefore appointing fallacious. above

Apply stated, principle, case coordinate, jurisdiction, and follows that conflicting the court the receiver has appointing over the court priority

MORAN STURGES.

Opinion of -the Court. officer, levying, through subsequently *10 the is in the the act of receiver, custody which, by appointing if is taken court. The of what title, of the first any, question to the is immaterial. The real the receiver ques by of the court that of the tion is through the continuance of the The above and during receivership. to most the cases where manual rule applies 400; to be 10 Pet. Lewis, been held v. important. Hagan 24 How. Howe, 20 How. Freeman v. 583; v. Taylor Carryl, 111 3 Covell 450; 334; Heyman, Buck v. Wall. Colbath, 112 U. S. 294; U. S. &c. Co., Heidritter v. Elizabeth 176; 5 Fed. v. Roth, Adler 471; Pulliam v. How. Osborne, 17 The Sailor 625; 31 Fed. Senior v. 895; Pierce, Rep. Rep. 1 Lowell, 173; 1 Loving Ben. The Prince, 237; Caroline, 2 Cliff. 311. Marsh, authorities is conclusion warranted by of its York New by appointment Supreme Court, and exclusive

receiver, gained complete no to interfere. court had and that the Federal delivered case, after stating Fullee, Me. Chief Justice of the court. opinion This court declined to the writ issue prohibition District for the Eastern District- Court United States because the these libels York from New upon proceeding District Court over in the want .alleged due in that court on in course of process. vessels was litigation The state court re 484. In 142 U. S. Fassett, Petitioner, in effect prohibi receiver’s application granted libellants tion which and restrained denied, prose we it was within is whether their libels. The cuting question ? to do this power cannot enjoin proceed rule is that state general held at and this was States, courts of the United ings Circuit reference to day, very early judgment while on 279, 281; M'Kim v. Court; Cranch, Voorhies, 7 the Circuit would determined that hand, was TEEM, 1893. OCTOBEE in a state enjoin court, any attempt that kind was forbidden act of v. Wol Congress. Diggs cott, Cranch, Act March 179; 2, 1793, 22, 5, Stat. c. § In v. Johnson 6 Wall. Riggs County, 195, this Mr. Justice Clifford, said: speaking through “State courts are from all interference Federal exempt tribunals, are destitute of all restrain power either the process national courts. Circuit Courts and state courts act separably of each independently and in their other, respective spheres action, issued the one is as far the reach of beyond other, as if ‘ the line of division between them was traced- landmarks and monuments visible to the . . . Yiewed in eye.’ it is obvious that therefore, light, of a state injunction *11 court is or in control, manner to inoperative affect the any of or a Circuit not process Court, on account of in the latter any paramount jurisdiction courts, because, , in their of action, Circuit Courts are sphere wholly independ ent of state tribunals.” And in United States v. Keokuk, 6 517, Wall. the same 514, learned justice, again speaking observed: Orders court, for an issued injunction state courts are as of the Circuit inoperative upon process Court of that district as would be if they directed to the of a Circuit in other district of the process any United because the States, state Federal in their courts, sphere of are action, such control.” independent any

Mr. Justice was of that to the Story doctrine opinion which the courts of one State in cases to permits proper enjoin within their from persons instituting legal pro- in other or States, from further in ceedings actions proceeding there exists already begun, that the state exception courts cannot enjoin from in the courts parties proceeding States, United nor the latter from them enjoin proceed- in the former an courts, ing based exception peculiar grounds constitutional municipal law. Story Eq. 900 ; Const. 1757. Story § § Act of c. 1

By Judiciary 5, Stat. 2, 1793, March § in granting injunction stay proceedings ST URGES.

MORAN in and it was terms, a State was express prohibited How. even the Dis- 612, 621, Jenness, in Peck held not issue an in could injunc- trict Court sitting, bankruptcy from in a a creditor of tion to stay bankrupt proceeding “It ais doctrine Mr. Justice Grier court, saying: a citation of established authorities too require law long a it has a to decide where right that, jurisdiction, in occurs and whether its cause, every question till or otherwise, reversed, decision correct judgment, in where court; that, other every is regarded.as binding of a right plaintiff his suit in have once cannot it, attached, prosecute another court. be arrested taken away by proceedings rules their foundation, These have merely comity, if one other but on For may may enjoin, necessity. be without and thus the retort injunction, remedy; parties if dare to liable to one, contempt being can one take from other. Neither proceed the other by .process, replevin for this would conflict extremely produce embarrassing v. The administration of In the case Kennedy justice. Eldon at time Lord one Swanston, Cassilis, Earl of an to restrain a injunction party proceeding granted in the Court Sessions of Scotland, which, a suit pending mature he because was reflection, dissolved; admitted, more could restrain if the Court way Chancery proceed the Court tribunal, in an of Sessions ings independent foreign *12 in from parties proceeding chancery, might equally enjoin in and thus would be unable to either court. proceed that an issues to fact, therefore, injunction before the and not to the is no evasion court, parties an to the difficulties result of that are necessary attempt in a is a another exercise over who power party litigant and forum.” independent into the act of forward was carried 1793 provision

section Revised addition 720 with Statutes, “ be author- words in where such cases except injunction may ized to in law by any relating proceedings bankruptcy,” TERM, 1893.

270 Opinion Court. restraint was held author- by injunction under exception 114 U. S. 158. Brewer, in ized Chapman Wall. a 250, cause been v. Hay, properly In French had to the Circuit court Court of the a state United removed and the Circuit Court had acts, the removal States, in rendered the state court and decree a previously vacated for want of and was held that the cause equity, dismissed 'in over the 'Court, jurisdiction personam having Circuit would not cause, control permit over having parties, trenched tribunal, to be by any upon its to the cause from a enjoin party proceeding might properly of the court in contraven the territorial beyond in Dietzsch v. 103 U. So, decree. Huidekoper, of its tion S. in suit a court in a state brought replevin plaintiff Federal court and obtained a it to the removed judg properly but the in his favor, there proceeded try ment render notwith against plaintiff, the cause judgment and an action was then removal, brought standing It bond. was held that the state court replevin of the United States might enjoin prosecution relief action; merely ancillary such being jurisdic effect to own necessary tion give already acquired judgment.

And resort injunction owners under an act of Con limitation liability ship the act of since provided expressly passed gress, claims and the institution all after pro ” Act of March cease; 3,1851, owner shall ceedings Key. 9 Stat. 635 Stat. was sustained ; 4285; 4; c. 43, § § New York Co. & v. Hill Steamship Providence Manufactur U. S. 578, 599, Co., ing ' all cases of an These were issue injunction the. had been ór authorized a state court expressly impliedly court of effectual exercise necessary Congress over States of its lawful the United particular or things. persons 286, 291, Railroad, Bissell,

In v. Fort &c. Gaylord Wayne filed in the of the United States bill was Circuit Court *13 STURGES, MORAN Opinion Court. of tlie Indiana, obtain, among things, the District of an insolvent cor- of a receiver appointment the benefit of the it for creditors. to administer and poration, and an bill been sustained amend- After a demurrer While made, appointed. ment a suit was commenced in Federal court in the were pending in which a receiver was also Indiana court of ap- the state the- took Subsequently who property. pointed, was surrendered by persons the property íó the receiver of the of the state under the receiver he his retained possession and Federal application, upon to rescind order the court ap- refusing property, Court, the Circuit case, In him. disposing pointing is no other safe think that there “We Drummond, J., said: and Federal of state in our mixed juris- rule to system adopt, which first obtains the court than to hold prudence, res, thereby controversy, ... Of is settled. it until entitled to retain litigation was the it is what assumed, has been said, all that course, filed first the bill was fact this case, served issued upon that the duly to its in court and that were jurisdic- parties, court.” was instituted tion before any proceeding J. E. 24 N. C. Howell, (9 In Eq. Home Co. Insurance bill for relief filed its 238, 241, Green) complainant the defendant had which insurance, two alleged policies in Illinois, from obtained fraudulently it. be delivered up the policies might prayed defendant, invalid, might cancelled or declared at law or suit bringing perpetually enjoined them in use of any way them or making equity upon claim for damages against establishing purpose n filed an answer, Defendant complainant. appeared taken.' After were filed, which being proofs replication an action law on at defendant commenced, suit was brought court of Illinois, in a state company policies against into the Circuit on its removed suit was petition District of that State. for the Northern the United States TERM, 1893. *14 in filed its the court of New petition thereupon company to restrain him from an prosecuting injunction Jersey been and an a motion issued, in Illinois, having injunction' suit In it. Chan- motion, to dissolve denying made was- court to hear and This having power said: cellor in first controversy, having determine subject-matter at fully controversy, liberty obtained possession of it. The rule it shall have it until disposed general retain coordinate courts of as between concurrent/and juris- is, States and the Court of United the Circuit diction, (and — in such as that such certain are controversies — dif- between citizens suit, in this example involved court that first obtains ferent States,) without inter- it, be allowed must dispose controversy . . . a coordinate court. Where party from ference a bill of this so that on is within of his this court has filed here, person, properly be situated else- of the suit may subject-matter although injunction where,,it ordinary process may him to desist from com- for contempt, compel attachment in this State or either law, a at foreign suit mencing one commenced of bourse, and, prosecuting jurisdiction, in court.” the suit after bringing 1 Md. Chan. 351, 354, Brooks v. Delaplaine, high In in dismissed a bill Maryland equity, chancery the same con filed suit at the time was involving because concurrent county having pending troversy Mr. Field, the observations of Justice And see jurisdiction. Fed. in Sharon Terry, 36 Kep. in 133 U. S. decided Cole v.

We Cunningham, of the same State as his who a citizen and resident creditor, insti- have been whom insolvent debtor, debtor’s in is bound State, assignment tuted or if he in such seize attempts proceedings, property in another of the debtor situated attach personal in he be restrained may and embraced State, assignment, he the courts of the State injunction Adden, But we also held Reynolds debtor reside. MORAN v. STURGKES.

136 U. S. that a creditor who was not a citizen resident the same State with his debtor might proceed another State there, unaffected against property by insolvency in the State of the debtor’s if in proceédings residence, accord- ance with the law of such other State. debtor in that case was a citizen and residént of where the Massachusetts, were had. The creditor insolvency citizen of New and he attached Hampshire, debtor where Louisiana, the rule was that the transfer of the estate of an insolvent debtor is not by judicial operation the citizens and inhabitants of binding upon Louisiana other State the State which the insolvent except proceed- have taken at ings least until the place, reduced assignee has *15 done, is property what thereto. equivalent In v. 61 in Worthington Lee, suit Maryland, spe- cific of a covenant for the renewal of a performance lease and for an to restrain an action of injunction for the ejectment of the recovery the Court of of premises, Appeals Maryland held, C. J., Alvey, that court, so delivering opinion far as the were within the of the court or parties jurisdiction bound decree, be restrained from they might taking action at law in the courts of for the Maryland recovery but as to in those property, States, parties residing n could not be restrained from they. the state by injunction court from in the Circuit of the United suing States, by which their toso sue must be determined.

It will be invoked in such perceived cases principle v. Railroad and Gaylord Insurance v. Company Company Howell, is, courts for the supra, purpose protecting their over jurisdiction may persons subject-matter enjoin who are amenable to their to their parties from in interference with them jurisdiction property respect n in their or identical controversies therein possessipn pending, as to same subsequent subject- parties matter in other courts of concurrent jurisdiction. in which under proceeding upon petition injunction

consideration was was a in granted, insolvency proceeding state court to dissolve wind Com- Schuyler up

voi.. cr.iv—18 OCTOBER, TERM, 1893. 274

Opinion Court. the statutes New York on its own application, pany it that that could if be conceded pro- behalf, in that over subject-matter by its exercise of tect suits company creditors prosecuting enjoining in that and without the receiver suit- bring- on petition not follow that it does a new suit for that purpose, ing question. grant injunction power in the Dis- not restrain could If state if the Court of the United States; trict if the had not attacked; court over the libellants over vessels Court obtained priority District must be reversed. then this the state judgment is in is a rule It' general application where court of actual one competent jurisdiction, out of another cannot be disturbed by process such possession doctrine been affirmed This court. repeatedly v. 20 How. Lucas, 400; v. 10 Pet. Taylor Carryl, court. Hagan Howe, v. 612, 625; Peck v. 7 How. Freeman 583; Jenness, S. 498; v. 109 U. 450; Davis, Ellis Krippendorf How. 111 U. S. ; 110 U. S. Covell v. 176 276; Heyman, v. Hyde, These were S. cases U. Borer Chapman, v. in. and the lan 614; v. S. 608, cited U. Byers McAuley, Mr. in Covell Matthews Heyman guage Justice this effect: The of the decision Freeman point quoted when taken held that, Howe, supra, .under mesne or of the United final, States, a court process, it is and within the exclusive law, juris- *16 the court has diction of from which the issued, process of the of the officer cannot writ; purposes possession because to dis- court, be disturbed from by process any that would be -invade the turb to jurisdiction possession violate the law held, whose command to is it. that is administer; Avhich jurisdiction any appointed not a Avhose the suit or property party judgment, person, taken and been but under color wrongfully, process,' the court Avithheld, may prosecute, by ancillary proceedings, of the for restitution issued, Avhence process remedy control or its Avhile remaining proceeds property v. ST MORAN URGES. remedies to he but that all other court; be may officers or the with

entitled, against parties, involving from the drawal of the or its of the property proceeds he court, officer and the of tha may pursue jurisdiction state or over the Federal, tribunal, having jurisdiction parties And the same versa, and the vice subject-matter. principle while thus held, by possession process protects disturbance from state courts, proc issuing ess of States; the courts of the United course, excepting, exercise- wherein the latter cases jurisdiction those of the Constitution and supremacy purpose enforcing U. S. Sabin, laws of the United States.” Porter v. In the same 341, 345, 3 Wall. rule Colbath, Buck v. “ and Mr. Justice Miller said: A referred to as settled, lead to the utmost from this rule would confusion, departure concurrent- and to courts of endless strife between jurisdiction but how source; their from same much deriving powers of such a more would be the course, disastrous consequences courts whose the conflict of between are powers while their sources, derived from different entirely is concurrent as to subject-matter parties or limitations; has its rather suit. This however, principle, to. It is while the definition is to be attended just prop or either construc is actually erty possession the court is .that bound, professes protect tively, courts. of other Whenever the possession of the officer or or the ended, litigation with to deal it accord other courts are at liberty discharged, before whether them, those ing rights parties them to take not. rights require effect to be in such cases adjudication given court first depends upon principles possessed property, about the mere familiar to but no contest arises the law; decided without and no conflict but possession, may further It was said : and discreditable collisions.” unseemly It obtained is not true that a court, having before ex it, suit, thereby of a and of subject-matter parties cludes all from the adjudicate other courts *17 OCTOBER, TERM, 1893. (cid:127)276

Opinion Court. those with before connection close a very matters having the decision instances, requiring in some and, court, first into the exclusive char In examining exactly. same questions we must have of such cases, regard acter of the relief character sought, remedies, the nature different suits.” Hence parties identity be sustained in the of trespass might action that an it was held not the marshal levying court state his in his wrrit, although the defendant possession belonging with. interfered have been could not was the was that The reason no other court, merely and, litigation, pending to disturb that could concurrent permitted no constituted while action trespass possession, interference. and like cases arisen in

In this question respect concurrent as to courts of parties subject- matter.

But the case at bar arises question respect a District Court of United States, whose of all civil causes maritime admiralty cognizance juris- diction the Constitution and the ninth is, section Act of 1789, in Bev. Judiciary Stat. (reproduced 711,) § The Nav. Lexington, Jersey Co. exclusive. v. [New Merchants' The How. 344, 390; Bank,] 6 Taylor, 4 411; Wall. Moses Hine, Wall. Lottawanna, John 555; 21 Wall. 580; son &c. Co., Elevator Chicago 388, 397 The J. E. 119 U. S. ; Rumbell, 148 U. S. 1, 12. As said Mr. Justice Miller: “ It must be as the taken settled law court, wher- ever the District Courts of the United States have original causes, virtue of act of cognizance and no other cognizance exclusive, state of can exercise national, with it,, of such exception always concurrent the common law.” remedy Wall. is'given by act 568. The saves suitors cases “the of a com- alb mon law where the common law remedy, is competent give ” it; is, law remedy courts, common a- common Suitors are .not to seek such remedy. law compelled

MORAN STURGES. *18 if it exist, nor.can if remedy, be they, entitled, deprived their in a court of right proceed and the admiralty, courts have no to hear and authority determine a suit in rem to enforce a maritime lien. The 7 Wall. Belfast, 624, 644; The 39 N. Y. Josephine, 19, 27.

A to wind statutory proceeding is not up corporation common law and a maritime remedy, lien cannot be enforced by any at'common law. These proceeding libellants were entitled to have their in- causes- tried the court of admiralty, to the rules and according and that practice admiralty, could not be right taken nor away them, would the decree or of the state court be judgment in bar to pleadable their libels. If, the receiver had first then, taken actual pos- session of these vessels sold them, and such sale would not have cut off liens and the to have them maritime en- right and while it be true forced, the state exer- may courts, in the distribu- cising equitable jurisdiction, undertake, might tion of save holders maritime property, rights it liens, is certain that those yet courts would have no power a sale under statute to their by liens unless destroy submitted theihselves to that voluntarily jurisdiction.

In 20 How. it Taylor 583, 601, was held Carryl, where a vessel had been seized under at process foreign tachment from a state court and Pennsylvania, issuing motion an order in that court.for of sale, pending issued under a libel filed District Court of the Unitód States for Could mariners’ not divest supplies, wages over authorities of the State'of their authority vessel; of the two sales one the sheriff and one made, the mar by the sale must be considered shal,- sheriff as conveying sale title marshal legal property, And while the this levied inoperative. because inwas of one upon actual should jurisdiction, not be taken an officer another. Mr. Chief acting Justice and three of his associates dissented Taney that the not one between the ground- question relative of a and the United powers States, State their acting through relative tribunals, judicial merely upon powers TERM, 1893. Opinion the Court. common court of law and a of duties a court lien.” Chief Justice maritime the case an admitted “-The were undisputed: stated following propositions n is to all lien for their paramount of seamen wages prior must' be first By on the vessel, paid. claims court States, of the United and laws Constitution is to enforce authorized over this lien, that has jurisdiction of that and it is the court of duty it, admiralty, entitled to matter are- as a seamen, to do so. right, . enforce payment prómptly, .process left without the order penniless, they may (cid:127) And of- on shore. remedy means support *19 to the as the as well established firmly paramount or law can enforce lien. No court common displace this nor to . over it, lien. It has obstruct any right no.jurisdiction to the the which is lien, or interfere with the or remedy given has no lien on creditor of the owner A ship seaman. general n in this When she is attached the (as case) process vessel. or can be law, taken, from a-'court of common nothing of the the but interest owner after taken, remaining The seizure maritime liens are satisfied. does reach (cid:127) not the whole interest in them. The taken is thing ship. which. this can seize is a interest secon- process And. to the interest, subordinate dary. superior will be the claims for seaman’s wages.; paramount what ampunt or would remain to claims, of those whether anything until court of common law cannot know attached, be court of Mr. are heard and decided- admiralty.” of the Justice who delivered the opinion majority, .Campbell, at case rendered observed, view.taken close, it to relative to the consider any question respec- unnecessary and of the creditors, tive liens of seamen attaching as or to the effect the sale as wages, property ” and he cited them; or as chargeable perishable upon case Mr. of The which Justice Curtis, 414, Oliver Jordan, a in the of State, Curtis held law property be from a under an cannot arrested a warrant attachment, to in the in a District Court, admiralty, sitting proceeding STURGES, MORAN declined to then order material-man, the lien oi enforce “the state be so to dismissed as libel process may it in the render practicable proceed terminated the vessel.” against it held Buck Colbath, out, As already pointed in the court where the that whenever litigation supra, ended, is first seized then other are at- or its officers is discharged, deal to the with rights parties liberty according those them take them,- whether before rights require This view illustrated not. in the Mr. Courts, decisions District applied by many then district The Sailor Blatchford, Prince, Justice judge, Ben. of a libel seamen recover That was case wages the marshal made wherein ship freight money, against h,ad to the that he not attached the but' vessel, return in the attached the hands had freight money parties it. suit had held Prior service who process, been owners of vessel, brought issued, of attachment been under which warrants had when and was her the marshal the sheriff seized holding also to seize her. He had served came warrants copies with on the held money, who notice- parties freight that, held it. Blatchford he attached But seamen Judge *20 the lien their had a upon wages freight paramount money, be administered and that such lien was to the court of by of that.as a service lien admiralty by against process; in Taylor of that established v. character, principle Carryl not to extended; .that ought, application prin- from of that an attachment a state court' case to issuing ciple in the of á vessel worked only against delay enforcement that, her, of lien it application sailor’s wages upon to an attachment would work the money against freight that, the of entire destruction of the lien; possession sheriff, otherwise, constructive money freight by in of v. Taylor as the' the vessel such Carryl, possession or such as the marshal from prevented levying process TEftM, 1893. to it in so as it, District. give upon the cases of learned considered The v. Taylor rem. judge and Buck and Howe, Freeman v. Colbath; regarded Carryl, on in at Carryl best, as a Taylor the principle proceeded a court of by admiralty rule of relinquishment comity; court, “in favor of state which cannot its clear jurisdiction, and has no lien, such over it, enforce displace for the time to' the state court right, being, giving lien and and with the interfere with obstruct remedy or rule of is, That comity the seamen. principle according to a be sustained vessel which regard v. Carryl, Taylor lawful is sheriff been seized by so as it is in court, the state such long process at when the the Federal court liberty, being litiga custody, or when ended, court is in the state- tion is to take of the vessel the sheriff discharged, Now, it . . . liens. enforce admiralty thus and administered, rule-of comity, regarded limited work no other cases, mischief than ordinary perhaps, may, harsh in the delay enforcement of unnecessary to cause men whose a class of paramount their rights superior the codes law of all commercial are claims recognized can state court seize sell interest countries. over and in the the amount of vessel beyond of the owner and can no seamen, convey absolute liens vessel to a whole purchaser. Legally, to be enforced the moment the hand of the remains, lien i"s- from the vessel. And the vessel, officer withdrawn remains -in so as atTeast, tobe theory specie, process enforcement of such But that lien.” learned fo# judge to -extend that so far as to the state permit declined principle to the- inferior money court payment appropriate of creditors attached it claims who were, state, if this the lien done, of -the court, seamen for their out wages' ..money gone, extinguished^ put in the face an existence, the act. of admiralty of common law. to abne- á functions-which, are conferred the Constitu- gate *21 v.'

MORAN STURG-ES.

Opinion Court. enforce a admitted tion and to refuse to laws, -clearly court can enforce which no other lien, paramount admiralty officer has, or because a state destroy directly supersede, under attached a sum of from a state court, money is the which of such is to lien, subject permit of an inferior court to to the apply money payment not- claim founded on a and thus lien, indirectly destroy lien and to all intents practically purposes.”

A similar in The 1 Lowell, arose Caroline, question and it was held that was not a defence to petition good into the to be freight might brought answer and- mate- suits mariners’ wages exigency rials, before the libels were filed, was consignee, as summoned trustee or owner ship garnishee court of common the courts of common law of law; Massachusetts had no to maritime liens adjust power a fund attached attachment law that foreign to an State, at consequence giving priority tachment that a liens; be destruction might of common law would be bound' conse guard against till trustee, by waiting quence discharging supposed were liens and that the District adjusted; might the. order liens and adjust freight proceed might J., for that said: The de Lowell, brought purpose; in Freeman v. Howe, cision in v. Taylor Carryl, explained and in to defeat the Colbath, Buck v. does para operate their enforcement, mount delay maritime liens, only owner,' because the sheriff can sell ship find I effect of which those liens; practical to be that when libels waives his sheriff usually are of-little filed for becomes maritime because his title liens, or no market come back value. we have pretty So that much case before practice prevailed leading The views of Blatehford respect decided.” Judge the attachment of destruction credits, thereby maritime And liens, were concurred in. see fully Clifton Foster, 103 Mass. 132 Mass. O’Hara, 233; Fddy

In The E. L. 45 Fed. sheriff Cain, Rep. *22 1893; TEEM, OCTOBEB 282 , and turned over to a .attached tug appointed by court. After that marshal, the state under process upon filed'for seamen’s libels seized wages supplies, vessel, “ held that but the District Court been taken tug, having of the state by process by in the it could receiver, not be held custody placed out of until this court order discharged by “ court.” And J., said: for the Simonton, So, court can no this further. But the liens set present, proceed in court are maritime liens, which cannot be (cid:127)up adjudi- in the state court. Over these cated liens the passed-upon of this court is exclusive. will be They protected The in this court.” cause was continued until the state court in ordered a sale or other mode released its in effect, To the same The James Brown, J., Roy, tug. Fed. 784. 59 Rep. 53 Fed. 2186 of the Elexena, Code of Rep.

In § the sale of a vessel forfeited by pro providing Virginia, laws of the in state court violating’ oyster ceedings clear in the and absolute title,” vest purchaser shall State J.,’ to divest' liens held maritime by Hughes, inoperative before the arrest the vessel, attaching innocent parties seized the hands the vessel might subsequently and that. to such -liens subjected purchaser courts. in the admiralty for a lien is not divested forfeiture breach

A maritime áby 9 Wheat. nor law; 409; St. & Cuba, of municipal Jago notice. The Chusan, to a Iona without a sale purchaser fide The Bold 3 W. Rob. 455; 220; 2 S. C. 7 Buccleugh, Story, “ it It is has been Moore P. C. 267. settled jus re; know not its that a that we so beginning, suit long, enforce and execute a is not an action lien, admiralty or forbear him to do person compel any particular against rem, a claim all a suit mankind; anything; ag of the libellant to the "against asserting thing, claim Mechanic, all the world.” Curtis, Young The J. E. 213; Rock Island Wall. also The Bridge, See 148 U. S. 1. Rumbell,

MORAN STURGES. tjie Opinion of Court. court is without as a state that, clear "Wethink it entirely to, so it is enforce maritime liens, incapable under the rule laid and, therefore, them, though displacing the state court v. Carryl, down Taylor not be disturbed, liens will yet to. thereto,- deal can with that court property subject has determined its when may proceed. this record, District But the facts disclosed wasothe hand until the termination of the stay required It is admitted that court? re- in the state *23 and of the vessels, took actual

ceiver never possession had taken the marshal until after did not such he qualify but -it is as-his that, said libels; under the appoint- possession filed, when before the libels were 31, made on July ment was filed in the office and executed, bond was approved, his his title to court for of the Albany County, the clerk and the time of back to appointment, related of that which con- date, he as had constructive possession marshal. possession structive overreached possession York statutes Stats. Part (Rev. New Certain sections Proc. 1891, Code Civ. 8, 66, 67; App. 1167) c. provide §§ “ duties of his on the that a before appoint- receiver entering State-, and such ment shail security people give ” and receiver direct; court shall such as the such penalty and of such all the real estate, shall with personal, be vested security filed the time of his from the having corporation' hereinbefore required.” the title not these vessels contention is only in the and a case that, as of such

vested receiver July actual this, the- constructive is equivalent possession, did not until after the the receiver that although qualify he became the marshal, seizure by thereupon constructively as of and jurisdiction vessels July possessed if But Court was ousted. jurisdiction the District thereby be attached, it would not defeated even withdrawal court, and, for the of the state more- purposes the property As the doctrine of relation has no between over, application. OCTOBER*'TEEM, 1893. coordinate of concurrent jurisdiction, having two like over controversy, subject-matter jurisdiction retain it is entitled to first obtains court which of its to do be cannot interference, without deprived first obtained have so because may physical is not But where the dispute. one is concurrent litigation subject-matter while actual even of the other,, not within cognizance in order for the time may, being, constructive possession the one from collision, avoid disturbing unseemly prevent neither actual nor there is construc- where possession, yet and action there is no obstacle tive proceeding, That taken relation. doc- thus cannot invalidated for the advancement and, trine is resorted to justice, un- fraudulent, to defeat statutes, under these state adopted debtor’s and unjust dispositions property, warranted v. N. Y., ends. Herring accomplish just equitable Lake Erie &c. Railroad, 105 Y. 340, N.

At the time these libels were filed and marshal seized , it had not or when been whether property, developed would or security might give required of his and he had neither duties, enter discharge nor actual constructive possession. subject-matter over *24 of the of the and the distribution

of winding corporation up claim's of the its did not embrace the assets disposition holders of libellants these nor as mari vessels, were they time liens the when he as represented attorney general mere of that to the order of as creditors sented July that order The were.' Schuyler Company adjudication n to have so on the title of the parties may operated respect in the cus that suit as to the constructively place of but not as to all date, law as tody persons to all are unable (cid:127)for Under- circumstances we the purposes. wind-, the the institution conclusion accept simply by which that1 to liens over up ing proceeding, property, subject could not invitum, court exercise was placed jurisdiction a situation in of to such liability being ultimately respect v. STURGES.

MORAN the District Court of the court that within brought of for the ascertaining not obtain could jurisdiction purpose liens in of which those respect enforcing Court violated It to us that exclusive. District appears rule in nor other entertaining rule of no comity libels. between the receiver

The title and the as have and the creditors of the vested may Schuyler Company to divest but this could not jurisdic- as operate July whiph no actual exercise tion, concurrent, impedi- been seen, at As has ment existed the rime it was invoked. liens are incumbrances on vessels maritime by operation placed the owner and neither the nor the law, death insolvency can divest them or transfer over extinguish decedents them to courts for settlement the estates of such settle- insolvents, merely although purposes tribunals. In the ment these are orderly appropriate such estates administration justice representatives which alone should apply cognizance in the and enforce these interests ascertain thing exceptional it and into whoseso- it wherever itself, goes accompany and which cannot be comes, ever hands displaced by of other courts in invitum. action applied properly accordingly or to take

for leave to libels contest proceed- authorized advisable, therein was duly ings might so to he made a motion District Court do. Thereupon marshal to withdraw for an order from the cus- directing held under the the steamboats tody admiralty process, Avhich motion denied on the question ground be raised to the libels. receiver then should answer and, in one each vessel filed action appeared court. ansAver contesting he could adverse, If the decision of that court had been have to have tested its correctness on but he seems been appeal, to abide the and to have entertained the result, unwilling District view that while Court, *25 become a he he had were into Avhich could go party, pending, TERM, 286. Brewer, White, Opinion:

Dissenting JJ. it and ask to determine the state court question juris- > its decision by injunction diction prevent by anticipation it to which had him to tribunal resort. authorized made, he an to this court so, application Not only pro- District Court This hibit exercising jurisdiction. involved was in due course denied because question .was n of decision below, thereafter and the receiver obtained from the effect under Apart legal consideration. injunction District we Court, submission with this that we are cannot say course favorably impressed less so since application proceeding, original tq the 31 it that theré was averred July libelled in the serious vessels danger being of the United such claims as constituted mari- States for ren- liens, time claims services including supplies dered said vessels.” are of that the had no

We state court opinion maritime over the libellants as holders of liens personam the libels were filed; when question as the one for the District Court to decide in was, stood, case instance; first the District Court jurisdiction; and that the was in effect an review unlawful judgment interference in that court. with is cause remanded reversed and the judgment for fur- with this inconsistent opinion. ther

Mr. Mr. Justice with whom concurred Justice Bbewer, White, dissenting.

While I with all that said the opinion, agree nearly I unable to concur in reached am finally conclusions rule of ordered. I is a that-“it general judgment agree in the actual that where possession application. cannot one court of competent jurisdiction I court;” out of another disturbed may by process court has that I further that when' a say agree suit restrain the may bringing order an to disturb possession, *26 n MOEAN STUEGES. White, Opinion: Brewer, Dissenting JJ. within

such all its restraint upon operates persons jurisdiction, if be, need for a con- enforced, can as by proceedings but I with brethren as the matter of ; tempt disagree my In the the court the of of the possession possession. opinion the I that officer is deemed matter. submit that important it as the of is bears significant only upon question possession the one would act of á the court. No that mar- pretend shal sheriff in of would have or a taking possession property some unless were execution of order any significance is of itself such as to the of the court. If the put proceeding that is court, into of the the enough, property possession the of officer the there is no need of' as whether inquiry it. court in his hand statu- Now, fact upon placed — a instituted- this insolvent tory corporation proceeding — of York involved a surrender creature of the State New of court. Such is its property its court statutes construction placed highest it seems to is bind- construction, me, and that York; New views, in It with this court. is that harmony ing upon of the Federal courts. have been expressed by judges act authorized voluntary Congress bankrupt of New York authorize volun- as do the statutes bankruptcy, of its tary part corporations insolvency. In a In re Blatch. as Vogel, question presented as that the bankruptcy court”, in obedience a writ of a whose officers manual had taken before property replevin former, it, touched and the court officer any held from time of the bank- that filing petition over the that court attached. ruptcy Blatchford, I of District whose Judge quote language Nelson : was sustained Mr. Justice opinion from these when volun- manifest, It provisions, in due files his form, tary petition bankruptcy petitioner so far as instanti, he eo interference becomes, any bankrupt, is concerned, named in his with the property inventory into the thereby brought bankruptcy in its and under as court, placed custody protection, TERM, 1893. of the Case. Statement into visible if brought presence actually fully no in the court, bankruptcy court. Being no acting court, person other without can, permission court, bankruptcy to so is a with it; and, interfere, interfere contempt court.” bankruptcy the one the rule thus stated is to be applied Believing when the that, petition I hold case, insolvency in this the owner possessor filej, property, corporation, *27 no it to the state pro- surrendered subsequent be disturbed. court could ceedings of state respective jurisdiction I cannot agree a scramble be determined between is to Federal marshal possession. sheriff I concur most of the while reasons, these reasoning For from the I constrained to dissent am judgment. of the opinion, Me. Justice White concurs authorized say I am views. in the foregoing PACIFIC RAILROAD NORTHERN

BARDEN COMPANY. THE UNITED STATES FOE THE OF COURT TO THE CIRCUIT EEEOE OF MONTANA. DISTRICT Argued 1894. Decided 11, May 26, 1894. No. April Company public the Northern Pacific Railroad By made to grant of land 365, 2, 1864, c, July all mineral lands other Stat. the act operation, from its whether known or coal are excluded iron than lands, provided specially unknown; not otherwise all such mineral States, exclusively making to the United grant, are reserved the act unoccupied unappropriated company having to select road, sections, in lieu line of the in odd nearest agricultural lands thereof. Weibbold, Hawke, U. S. and Davis v. S. U. Deffeback explained distinguished. of certain parcels was au action

This of rock gold, lodes bearing place land veins containing in the schedule which were secured notes attached, forth which,had been refused presented payment “ payment

Case Details

Case Name: Moran v. Sturges
Court Name: Supreme Court of the United States
Date Published: May 26, 1894
Citation: 154 U.S. 256
Docket Number: 892
Court Abbreviation: SCOTUS
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