13 Mich. 367 | Mich. | 1865
The original hill was filed to quiet the title of complainant to lot (thirty-seven in section eight, according to the Governor and Judges’ plan of the City of Detroit. The bill alleges that the Governor and Judges conveyed the lot to Barnabas .Campan, December 21, 1833; that the deed thereof was duly recorded in the Register’s dffice of the City of Detroit, December 19; 1834, and again,
The defendants filed an answ'er, claiming an undivided one-third of the lot as heirs at law of Friend Palmer, senior, by virtue of the foliov'ing conveyances: From the Governor and Judges to Michael Mayet, February 17, 1809; from Mayet to Jacob Smith, July 7, 1820, and from Jacob Smith to John, Thomas and Friend Palmer, July 16, 1820. The answer also shows that, under the said
We have thus presented to us'the anomaly of a jjarty Avho asserts that he is possessed of a complete legal title to lands which are occupied by him, and Avho points out no difficulty in the A\ray of his exhibiting and establishing such title, appealing to a Court of equity for relief against the claims of other parties AArho are pressing their claims against him at law, 'and .have already obtained an adjudication in their faA'or. Argument to show that this bill cannot be sustained, is entirely unnecessary. If the facts, as above stated, Avere fully set forth in the bill, it Avould be demurrable, and being presented by Avay of defence, they are a complete, answer to complainant’s case. A Court of laAV is the appropriate tribunal for the trial of titles to land. — Abbott v. Allen, 2 Johns, Ch., 520; Devaux v. City of Detroit, Har. Ch., 98. The claimant of a legal title has a right to have the facts upon which his claim is based submitted to a jury, and it is only when the remedy at law is inadequate that resort can be had to equity. Nothing is better settled than that equity Avill not aid in clearing a title to land Avhen complainant’s remedy at law is complete, Alton Marine and Fire Ins. Co. v. Buckmaster, et al., 13 Ill., 201; Smith v. McConnell, 17 Ill., 135; Ritchie, v. Dorland, 6 Cal., 33; Wolcott v. Robbins, 26 Conn., 236; Munson v. Munson, 28 Conn., 582; Shotwell v.
The facts proved in this case, however, do not, in our opinion, establish a legal title in complainant; and it remains to be seen whether he can have any relief based, upon equities which he may have shown to exist in, himself against the title asserted and proved by defendants. These equities spring from estoppels en pais, which are riot alluded to either in the bill or in the answer, though the facts from which they are supposed to spring have been fully proved. They are of a nature which, it is argued, should preclude the defendants from setting up and relying upon their legal title as against the equitable rights of complainant; but it is of little moment to complainant that they have been proved uriless the issue is so framed that, according to the rules of equity
• The rule of pleading in equity is that “ every i fact essential to the plaintiff’s title to maintain the bill and obtain the relief must be stated in the bill, otherwise the defect will be fatal. For no facts are • properly in issue unless stated in the bill, and, of course, no proofs can be generally offered of facts not in the bill; nor can relief be granted for matters not charged, although they may be apparent from other parts of the pleadings and evidence, for the Court pronounces its decree secunchim allegata etprobata. — Story's Eq. Pl., §257. See, also, Shepard v. Shepard, 6 Conn., 37; Cowles v. Buchanan, 3 Iredell Ch., 374; Parker v. Carter, 4 Munf., 273; Ellston v. Blanchard, 2 Scam., 420; De Tastet v. Tavernier, 1 Keene, 169. The Courts of this State have frequently decided that no relief can be given on evidence establishing a case not made by the bill. — Cicotte v. Gagnier, 2 Mich., 381; Warner v. Whittaker, 6 Mich., 133; Bloomer v. Henderson, 8 Mich., 395; Boniver v. Caldwell, 8 Mich., 463; Barrows v. Baughman, 9 Mich., 213; Wurcherer v. Hewitt, 10 Mich., 453; Dunn v. Dunn, 11 Mich., 284; Peckham v. Buffam, 11 Mich., 529; Thayer v. Lane, Wal. Ch., 200. Even if the answer should disclose a clear title to relief, it cannot be resorted to as supplying allegations essential to the bill. — Gres. Eq. Ev., 23; Savage v. Lane, 6 Har., 32; Jackson v. Ashton, 11 Pet., 229; Knox v. Smith, 4 How., 298; Thomas v. Warner, 15 Vt., 110.
No relief, therefore, can be granted to complainant based upon the equitable title which he claims to have established, not only because such relief must be given upon a case radically different from that set forth, but also because the equitable circumstances relied upon would require to be specifically set forth. Estoppels, when they form the foundation of the relief asked, and are relied
The defendants, however, have filed a cross-bill to have the undivided one-third interest which they claim in the premises partitioned and set off to them; and the issue taken upon this is so full and complete that we find the whole merits of the respective claims to this lot fully presented. The evidence was all taken to be used in both suits, and the bill and cross-bill were brought to a hearing together; and as the facts are for the most part undisputed, and all, which wo deem material, are either admitted or established to our satisfation, wo shall now proceed to consider them Avith reference to the relief' prayed by the cross-bill. .
' February llth, 1809, the Governor and Judges of Michigan Territory executed to Michael Mayet a deed of the lot in controA’ersy, as his donation lot under the Act of Congress, “ To juovide for the adjustment of titles of land in the toAvn of Detroit. and Territory of Michigan, and for other purposes,”- approved April 21, 1806. Mayet deeded to Jacob Smith July Ith, 1820, and Smith, on the sixteenth day of the same month, conveyed the lot to John,. Thomas and Friend Palmer, then composing a mercantile firm in Detroit, in satisfaction of a debt due by him to the firm. The partnership continued to OAvn the lot until January 31, 1824, Avhen Thomas Palmer, Avho seems to have been the active member of the partnership at Detroit, made an arrangement AArith the Governor and Judges on the mistaken supposition that the lot had been conveyed by them to another person previous to the deed to Mayet, in Avhich arrangement it was.
September 19, 1829, the Governor and Judges, supposing the lot now in controversy to be subject to sale by them like all the other portions of the public lands which they were authorized to dispose of, caused the same to be offered for sale at public auction, and it was struck off to Barnabas Campau, who bought in good faith for the consideration of $270, which he subsequently paid and received his deed, bearing date November 20, 1833. Campau took actual possession of the lot in 1845, and valuable improvements have since been made upon it. Complainant's title is derived through Campau, and no adverse claim seems to have been made until about the year 1853, when it was claimed, on behalf of John Palmer and the heirs of Friend, that the release of Thomas Palmer to the Governor and Judges only operated to convey to them an undivided one-third of the lot, and that, therefore, they had conveyed that interest only to Campau. John Palmer afterwards released to Campau, but the heirs of Friend Palmer declined to do ’so, and brought suit in ejectment, as before stated.
First. Under the recording laws. The deed from the Governor and Judges to Mayet has never been recorded, and it is not alleged that Campau had knowledge of it at the time he purchased and paid for the lot. The deed to Campau was recorded in December, 1834, but at that time it had not been authenticated by acknowledgment or proof in the maimer required by the recording laws, and it was again recorded, in 1859, after having boon proved in duo form of law. And Moran, the defendant in the cross-bill, now claims that the deed to Mayet is void as against the subsequent ’ deed to Campau, who bought 'in good faith, and without notice, and whose conveyance is first upon the record.
It is to be borne in mind that the Governor and Judges were not owners of the soil, but that they were mere donees of a power, and that the conveyances executed by them were made on behalf of the United States. It has been repeatedly held that patents of land from the United States do not come within the purview of the recording laws, where the terms employed do not specially include them. — Lyell v. Maynard, 6 McLean, 15; Graves v. Bruen, 1 Gilm., 167. The record of a patent, therefore, under, the ordinary recording laws, is not even evidence. A statute authorizing their record was passed in this State in 1837, (Comp. Laws, §2764, §2765); but that statute only authorized the record, or a transcript thereof, to be used as evidence, and did not
Second. Through equitable estoppel. Thomas Palmer, having represented to the Governor and Judges that he was the solo grantee of Jacob Smith, and they having, in reliance upon this representation, received the release from him, and conveyed a lot of equal value, in consideration thereof, the avails of which were subsequently received by the partnership of which the ancestor of the complainants in the cross-bill was a member, it is insisted that they are now estopped in equity from setting up any claim to the lot so released.
It is unquestionably true that the lot having been conveyed by Smith to the Palmers in' satisfaction of a
But without now stopping to inquire into the force and effect to be allowed the release of Thomas Palmer, as a written instrument, we are of opinion .that the position taken by Moran, in respect to this branch of the case, is correct, and that the heirs of Friend Palmer are estopped from setting up any claim to this lot adverse to that claimed under the Campan deed. It is a well settled principle of equity, that if a man, having a title to an estate which is offered for sale, knowingly allows another to sell it to a purchaser who supposes the title to be good, without, at the time, asserting his title, he shall be bound by the sale, and neither he nor his privies shall be allowed to dispute its validity. — Wendell v. Van Rensselaer, 1 Johns. Ch., 354; Storrs v. Barker, 6 Johns. Ch., 166; Tilton v. Nelson, 27 Barb., 595; Cochran v. Harrow, 22 Ill., 345; Beryan v. Ramiser, 8 Cal., 461; Cicotte v. Gagnier, 2 Mich., 386; Story's Eq. Juris., §385. Especially should this be the rule of equity when
That Friend Palmer knew of the arrangement made between Thomas Palmer and the' Governor and Judges, and of the subsequent sale of the lot received in exchange, we think, is to be presumed. Each partner is the general agent of the others in all matters within the scope of the partnership business, and what is known to one is supposed to be known to all. If the original arrangement can be regarded as exceeding the powers of Thomas Palmer as partner, and therefore not presumptively within the knowledge of his co-partners, the subsequent receipt of the consideration' money for the lot sold would stand upon a different footing, and must be held to bring home to all a knowledge of the original transaction. Had it been repudiated alj that time, an adjustment might have been made, which would have prevented a re-sale of the lot, and no one would have been put in a position to be damnified by a claim after other rights had intervened. But Friend Palmer, having neglected to repudiate the arrangement at the time a purchaser has been induced, by • his silence, to buy on the supposition that he was acquiring a good title, and the lot has been largely increased in value since by the improvements which he or those deriving title from him have made upon it. To hold the heirs of Friend Palmer estopped from asserting their legal title at this time, it does not become necessary to apply the maxim that “where one of two innocent persons must suffer, he shall suffer who, by'his own acts, occasioned the loss,” for Friend Palmer’s heirs suffer no loss, and the equitable estoppel only prevents loss to the other party.
We are, therefore, of opinion that the complainants in
In our examination we have left entirely out of view ••some questions discussed on the argument, but which, in the, view we take of it, would not affect the case between the parties; and we have not' found it necessary to consider how far the defendants in the original suit might be affected by the improvements made upon the premises had the complainant’s title to relief rested uqion those alone.
