Moran v. G. & W.H. Corson, Inc.

MORAN, Representative on Behalf for and Personal Catherine Deceased, MORAN, Appellant, Andrew of the ESTATE OF

v. CORSON, INC., Corpora- Valley Penn’s Insulation & W.H. G. Co., Corporation, tion, Pacor, Armstrong Owens- Cork GAF Co., Corp., Fiberglas Corp., Delaware Corning Celotex Keene Appellees. Corp., Company, Sun Oil Insulation MORAN, Representative on for and Personal Catherine Deceased, MORAN, Andrew OF Behalf ESTATE CORSON, INC., Valley Corpora Penn’s Insulation G. & W.H. Co., Pacor, Corporation, tion, Armstrong GAF Owens- Cork Co., Corp., Corp., Corning Fiberglas Delaware Keene Celotex Company. Corp., Insulation Sun Oil CORSON, Appeal of & W.H. INC. G. Pennsylvania. Superior Court of Argued May 1990.

Filed Jan. McFadden, Jr., Media, R. Joseph for in appellant No. 2548 appellee and. No. 2597. Donaldson, Jr., Media,

Matthew S. appellant No. No. appellee CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY, McEWEN, Before OLSZEWSKI, SOLE, MONTEMURO, DEL JOHNSON, ELLIOTT, HUDOCK FORD JJ.

McEWEN, Judge: appeals These consolidated have been taken from the order, entered in response post-trial motions filed (1) all parties, which marked as satisfied the verdict for compensatory damages against defendants, all eleven in Corson, Inc., G. & cluding W.H. Penn’s Valley Insulation Corporation, (herein Corporation1 Delaware Insulation (2) after appellees); prior reversed a order which had delay damages appellant; (3) awarded and struck the of as jury’s punitive damages verdict to each the appel of lees. we find the appealed

While order must from be reversed, reinstated, the compensatory damage verdict the for the imposition case remanded of delay damages has, appeal Corp. 1. by prior The of Delaware Insulation order of this Court, prejudice stay been dismissed without due to the automatic 362(a)(1). provisions of 11 U.S.C. acknowledge to Pa.R.C.P. we pursuant difficulty presented the issues to the trial court and the recent di- at Supreme rection from our Court not available the time the trial court’s order. entry Moran, (hereinafter appellant), personal Catherine (hereinafter of the estate of Andrew Moran representative decedent), the Pennsylvania instituted this action under damages Death and Wrongful Survival Statutes recover as a result of the death of the decedent on sustained mesothelioma, 1, 1973, alleg- from a malignancy November in exposure caused his to asbestos insulation materi- edly supplied employer by appellees. als to decedent’s suppli the manufacturers and against Suit was instituted containing of the insulation materials asbestos which ers an exposed helper, the decedent had been to as insulator insulator, and Oil shop Company fabricator the Sun Refinery from 1936 until his retirement December trial, appellant joint 1972. Prior to executed tortfeasor releases, reduced specifically providing any verdict liability, rata share of the releasee’s with GAF pro Fi Corporation, Armstrong Company, Owens-Corning Cork berglas Corporation, Philadelphia Corporation, Asbestos Corporation, Corporation. jury Keene and Celotex compensatory damage returned a verdict subsequently $240,142.97.2 Puni defendants in the amount of against all each defendant individ damages against tive were assessed $4,500,000.00 damages awarding punitive ually, $500,000.00 in against manufacturing defendants as fol damages against appellee distributors punitive lows: Corson,

$300,000 Inc. against G. & W.H. Corporation. 150,000 Delaware Insulation against 50,000 Corporation. Penn’s Insulation against Valley severally against jointly Compensatory damages awarded were as follows: all defendants 21,872.97 Wrongful $ Action Death 198,270.00 Action

Survival 20,000.00 right Appellant, own her initially argues that the trial court erred Appellant that the compensatory damage when it directed award be satisfied the amount of the marked because settlements by appellant settling joint received from the tortfeasors compensatory damage exceeded the amount of the verdict. agree. We Markets, Eagle Charles v. Giant Court,

The Supreme 474, (1987), Pa. 522 A.2d 1 held a non-settling joint that is not relieved of responsibility tortfeasor of a payment proportionate damages share of where the consideration paid by settling the tortfeasor exceeds his or her proportion ate share of damages by as determined and the pro rata release for reduction of the verdict provides by settling share of the tortfeasor. joint appellees While cor Eagle Giant Markets rectly assert involved the Com Act, 7102, parative Negligence Pa.C.S. which was not § case,3 in the are applicable persuaded instant we not intended to limit the holding of Giant Supreme Court Eagle those cases tried under Comparative correct, if Negligence argument, require Act. This would that the rights contribution of those defendants found liable to a plaintiff under principles contributory negligence or strict liability would be controlled set forth principles Daugherty Hershberger, 126 A.2d 730 (1956), rights while contribution found defendants comparative negligence liable under principles would be Giant Eagle. controlled Such a system would create havoc and preclude involving settlements a case multiple defendants, not all of subject comparative whom were negligence principles.

In Legislature passed the Uniform Contribution Among Act, 19, 1951, Joint Tortfeasors Act July P.L. substantially which has been reenacted § 1976 UCATA that is the current law. 1951 Act altered the effect of a nonsettling release as to joint Comparative Negligence applicable 3. The Act is not in this case since 27, 1978, appellant's prior cause of action accrued June the effec- Comparative Negligence tive date of the Act. Pa.C.S. tortfeasors. It enabled an individual to settle with one joint tortfeasor and still have recourse to the remaining tortfeasors, to the limitations in subject stated the Act. The 1951 Act for provided right of contribution among A joint joint tortfeasors. tortfeasor was entitled to a money judgment for if only contribution he had dis- charged the common or liability paid had more than his pro rata share thereof. A joint release of one tortfeasor would not the other discharge tortfeasors unless provided release, the by but would reduce the claim against the other by tortfeasors the consideration or paid as stated in release, if greater than the paid. consideration The Act specifically provided any right of indemnity under existing impaired. law was not The law has re- mained unchanged by the 1976 legislation. Lines, 214, 218,

Mamalis v. Atlas Van Inc. 522 Pa. 560 1380, (1989). A.2d 1382

The Act, Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors 8326, (hereinafter “UCATA”), 42 Pa.C.S. interpreted was § Supreme Court in v. Daugherty Hershberger, supra, relieving as a non-settling joint responsibil- tortfeasor of the ity payment proportionate of a share verdict to the extent of any paid consideration a settling joint tortfeasor exceeded the settling propor- which tortfeasor’s damages. tionate share of the The Supreme Court Giant Markets, however, Eagle expressly repudiated Daugherty as decided and ... overruled.” “wrongly Charles v. Giant Markets, 4, Eagle 513 Pa. at 482 n. 522 A.2d at 5 n. supra, 4. We believe that if the Court had intended to limit Giant to those cases Eagle only involving Comparative Negli- Act, gence distinguished the court would have rather than overruled Daugherty. Act, 7102,

The 42 Comparative Negligence Pa.C.S. is, terms, express applicable sounding its to actions negligence. It has no applicability involving cases liability. Stevens, Inc., strict Harry See: McMeekin v. M. 580, Pa.Super. (1987), denied, 365 530 A.2d 462 Pa. allo. 518 619, (1988); 541 A.2d 746 Svetz v. Land Tool 355 Company, allo. de 403, (1986), 237-39, A.2d

Pa.Super. City v. Burgan nied, 515 Pa. (1987); A.2d 544 566, 586-88, Pittsburgh, 115 Pa.Cmwlth. denied, (1989).

(1988), allo. 557 A.2d 344 tortfeasors UCATA, however, applicable joint is found they are liable upon of the basis which regardless Thus, has found that the UCATA this Court plaintiff. among effectuate contribution applied “may properly liable of adjudged one tortfeasor where tortfeasors joint of strict concepts under the other liable negligence Stevens, Inc., M. Harry McMeekin liability.” products 588, 530 A.2d at 466. supra, Pa.Super. at Comparative Negli unquestionable While it is for the reexamination impetus gence provided Act Eagle, in Giant did not Supreme Court the UCATA of the UCATA interpretation limit its implicitly or expressly negligence comparative cases decided under only to those court, finding comparative negli The while principles. holding, with its “unquestionably compatible” gence statute properly interpreted, UCATA, supports that “the stated Id., (emphasis 522 A.2d at 513 Pa. at our view.” be, concurring may suggested by It as supplied). that reevaluated Papadakos, Court opinion of Justice of the UCATA as a interpretation its former and discarded policy Comparative Negli embodied result of express terms either Act and not as a result gence statute:4 view, negligence legislative

In was the my comparative formerly imposed the law be- inequities response negligence. contributory of the harsh doctrine of cause noted, was rooted contributory negligence previously As incapable apportioning was in the belief that law defendants, among or defen- plaintiffs and fault between dissent, argued "[b]y Zappala, the stroke of its in his that 4. Justice majority today rewritten the Uniform Contribu- pen, the has not meaningless and Among to render it tion senseless, Tortfeasors Act so as explicit legislated right contribution it has obliterated the joint pursuant 42 Pa.C.S. among § which exists tortfeasors 7102(b)." Eagle, supra, Pa. at Pa.C.S. Giant and 42 J.). (Dissenting Opinion by Zappala, A.2d at dants. That being the chief mischief to be remedied and the occasion statute, for the necessity it is obvious that the legislature, a enacting comparative negli- statute, gence abandoned the premise old an favor of acknowledgement could, and liability in fact, fault be apportioned among a plaintiff defendants. Charles v. Giant Eagle Markets, 492-93, supra at at 10-11 (Concurring Opinion by Papadakos, J.) (emphasis supplied).

Restricting Eagle Giant to cases tried under solely com- parative negligence principles, moreover, illogical while unfair, would create complexities absurd in those cases where defendants, there are multiple some of whom are liable to the only under principles of strict liability. purpose holding Giant Eagle was to encour- age settlements and to permit plaintiffs, who always have borne the risk of settling with a defendant for less than proportionate defendant’s share of the damages as ultimately determined a jury, retain the benefit where a defendant overestimates his proportionate share of the verdict:

Appellees’ concern over a windfall to plaintiff, if appellee were to required its full pay pro share, rata is far overshadowed the injustice of the result they urge. In addition to the erosion such a position would have upon policy encouraging settlements, it is also bottomed on a fundamentally flawed premise. It as- sumes that the jury verdict more accurately measures the tortfeasor’s obligation than that which agreed upon between the parties by way settlement. Such an assumption is without foundation either in reason or experience. There is no for concluding basis the jury verdict must cap serve as a on recovery the total that a plaintiff may receive. The responsibility settling the tortfeasor should finally resolved the by terms of the settlement. Markets, 478,

Charles v. Giant Eagle supra, 513 Pa. at A.2d at 3. however, Corson, petition reargument, in its for

Appellee Avco Corp., Walton decision that our contends (1989),5 that the ver requires A.2d 372 Pa.Super. paid by a result of the amounts satisfied as dict be marked since, pre-trial where settle tortfeasors settling joint the verdict, the “Plaintiff does compensatory exceed the ments pro by the to reduce the verdict option have the not Thus, Corson settling the defendants.” rata shares of the plaintiff since liability it has no concludes that jury’s compensatory exceeded the settlements plaintiffs disagree. verdict. We by parties entered into the releases joint

The tortfeasor reduction of the verdict Walton for provided the amounts determined as follows: greater “by for this re- paid the consideration a. The amount of lease; or rata pro by determined the sum of The amount

b. legal liability or responsibility of legal share [of releases].”

Id., (emphasis A.2d at 382 Pa.Superior Ct. supplied). case, tortfeasor appellant gave joint

In the instant only releases, reduction of the verdict providing share, following defen- rata to each of pro releasee’s stated: for the considerations exchange dants in PACOR $13,125 Armstrong Cork 5,000 Owens-Corning Celotex 35.000 65.000 Corp. Keene GAF 65.000 undisclosed require does not argument, Walton Contrary appellee’s marked satisfied as to all defen- the verdict that we order amounts received if the settlement dants of the compensa- than the amount greater to or equal were Walton panel The jury. awarded tory damages agree- of Avco’s release held that terms specifically “[t]he Avco, 524 Pa. Supreme granted allocatur in Walton v. 5. Court 27, 1989, (1989), arguments in and heard on November 568 A.2d 1249 April the case on Ill ment controls Avco’s right to seek contribution from Hughes. result, Our in this regard is simply unaffected by the Charles decision where the parties to the settlement agreement had merely provided the total claim would be by reduced Eagle’s Giant pro rata share jury Walton, verdict.” supra, Pa.Super. at A.2d at 384 (emphasis supplied).6

Each of the releases in the instant provided case reduction of the verdict by the joint tortfeasor’s pro rata Thus, share. is inapplicable Walton to the instant case. While we confess experiencing some difficulty in constru- ing the provisions of the UCATA and the holding of the Supreme Court in Giant neither Eagle, the holding of the Court not its salutary effect promoting settlements can questioned:

Contrary to the result urged by appellees, where a re- lease executed, has been the verdict is reduced only by the proportionate share the settling The tortfeasor. release, actual amount of the if sum, it exceeds this is of no consequence in the satisfaction of the judgment of the remaining defendants. The fact that the plaintiff may receive a larger dollar amount in damages than that fixed does not militate against such an approach. Charles v. Giant Eagle Markets, supra, 513 Pa. at A.2d at 3 (emphasis supplied).

Moreover, we find the Supreme Court’s reasoning Giant Eagle Markets clearly applicable to cases not tried under the Comparative Negligence Act:

The respective obligations parties between to a lawsuit can be finally determined either by way of a bona fide through settlement or trial. Settlement is a valuable tool in our arsenal of dispute resolution and it should not be undermined. obligation of a tortfeasor as deter- mined by settlement with the should not be language suggests 6. While parties option Walton that the have no joint determine the effect of tortfeasor releases in those instances pre-trial where the settlements exceed subsequently the total amount jury, language awarded this in Walton was dicta. against any verdict subsequent

affected a The inducements for defendant remaining defendants. of certainty agreed-upon obligation settle are the the to vagaries of of trial. The of finality the avoidance the agreement Any subsequent crucial. the settlement should not disturb against remaining the defendants trial the and the set- the resolution reached between equal to a It would be an disservice tling tortfeasor. a policy provide settlement to a windfall to supportive proves settlement to non-settling tortfeasor where the be than As generous subsequent by more the verdict. noted Musmanno, dissent, in in Daugherty the late Mr. Justice (1956): v. 386 Pa. Hershberger, tortfeasor, me that a of the To it is absurd because he is person way of another with whom no generosity fault, except by in should law be excused associated he from what a tribunal of law has determined paying his adjudicated should as a result of own individual pay wrong.

Id., A.2d Appellees’ 386 Pa. at at 735. concern if plaintiff, appellee a windfall to the were to be over share, its full rata is far overshad- required pay pro In injustice they urge. owed result addition a such position upon policy erosion a would have settlements, it is also bottomed on funda- encouraging It mentally premise. jury flawed assumes that ver- accurately obligation dict more measures the tortfeasor’s is agreed upon parties by than between the that which assumption an is without foun- way settlement. Such experience. in or There is no dation either reason basis capa concluding jury verdict must serve as on The recovery plaintiff may responsi- total that a receive. settling finally tortfeasor should be resolved bility of the settlement. terms 477-78, Markets, Pa. at Eagle supra, Charles Giant A.2d 2-3. next that the trial court erred Appellant argues Corson, G. & W.H. striking against appellees, the verdicts Valley, Penn’s and Delaware punitive Insulation for dam- ages, upon based the court’s conclusion that the compensa- tory damage against verdict the appellees had been satis- fied as a result the pre-trial settlements discussed above. Corson, G & W.H. alia, cross-appeal, its inter argues, that the trial court erred submitting punitive issue of damages to the since the evidence was insuffi- clearly cient an support punitive damages. award Appellee alternative, Corson also in the argues, punitive dam- ages not imposed should it in upon light of the fact that the corporation had been dissolved the time of trial. of punitive rule damages set forth in the Restate- (Second) ment of Torts 908 has been adopted in Pennsyl- Martin v. vania. Corp., Johns-Manville 168- 1088, 494 A.2d Merriam, Feld v. (1985); 1096 383, 393-95, (1984); 485 A.2d Chambers v. Mont- gomery, 339, 344-45, (1963); Pa. Neal Mines, Ltd., v. Carey Canadian F.Supp. (E.D.Pa.1982).

Section 908 of the Restatement inter alia: provides, Punitive damages damages are against ... awarded person punish to him for outrageous his conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the future.

Punitive damages may be awarded for that is conduct outrageous, because of the defendant’s evil motive or his reckless indifference of rights others. (Second) Torts, 908(1), (2). (b)

Restatement of Comment § to 908 provides Section that:

[sjince the of purpose punitive damages compensa- is not tion of punishment of but the defendant and deterrence, can damages only these be awarded for conduct remedy which this is is appropriate—which for say, to conduct some involving outrage element of similar usually to that in crime. The conduct found must outrageous, be either the defendant’s acts because are done with or they an evil motive because are done others____ rights with reckless indifference to others and con- rights indifference to the Reckless (See: 500) disregard in of them scious action deliberate puni- state of mind to provide necessary justify may supplied] damages____ [emphasis tive (Second) of Torts defines 500 of Restatement Section disregard” as follows: “reckless safety disregard The actor’s conduct is reckless act fails to do an intentionally if he does an or of another do, knowing or duty it is his to the other to act which lead a to know of facts which would having reason cre- only man to realize not that his conduct reasonable another, to an risk of harm physical ates unreasonable that substantially greater also such risk is than that but negligent. make his conduct necessary to which (Second) 500. The comments Restatement of Torts § alia, reckless, order to be explain, this section inter conduct it unreasonable; reckless must be

must be but be It must not negligent. more than something unreasonable, must a risk of harm to others but it involve necessary excess make substantially easily must negligent. perceptible conduct It involve an harm, physical death or danger substantial substantially it so result must be probability that will negligence____ required ordinary than is greater [emphasis supplied]. recognize that his conduct

The actor to be reckless must that substantially greater risk in amount than involves a negligent. The necessary to make his conduct which in- reckless misconduct and conduct difference between to volving quantum necessary such a of risk as is risk, in the of degree make it is a difference negligent as amount degree this difference of is so marked but to a in kind. substantially difference (Second) (a) (g), Restatement of Torts Comments § “ al- Thus, damages will be Pennsylvania, ‘[p]unitive or so care- maliciously, for committed willfully, torts lowed rights of disregard as to indicate lessly wanton 115 ” Neal v. Carey Mines, Ltd., Canadian party injured.’ supra, quoting Thompson Swank, v. 377, 548 F.Supp. at 158, 159, 211, 317 Pa. A. (1934). 176 211 Punitive damages must on based conduct which is be. “ ‘malicious’, ‘wanton’, ‘reckless’, ‘willful’, or ‘oppres v. Montgomery, sive’----” [Chambers 339, 411 Pa. 344- citing Hughes Babcock, 345, 355, v. (1963) A.2d ] 475, (1944). 349 Pa. 37 A.2d 551 Further, one must look ‘the together act itself with all including circumstances the motive of the wrongdoers Chambers v. and the relations between the parties....’ Montgomery, supra, 345, 411 Pa. 192 A.2d at 358. also, See Pittsburgh Outdoor Advertising Virgi Co. v. nia Apartments, Inc., Manor 350, 436 Pa.

(1970). The state of act, mind the actor is vital. The or the act, intentional, failure to must be reckless or malicious. Merriam, Feld v. supra, 395, Pa. at 485 A.2d at 747-748. Corson,

G. & W.H. challenging the jury’s award $300,000 in punitive it, damages against argues first the evidence was insufficient warrant submission of the issue to the jury, secondly, light of the trial that Nosroc was not a de or de jure ruling court’s facto corporate successor purposes to Corson for imposi- punitive damages, tion of punitive damages were improper- ly Corson, assessed against which had been dissolved.

We need not determine punitive damages whether may see, e.g., Com against assessed corporation, dissolved Lavelle, monwealth 356, 555 A.2d 218 Pa.Super. denied, allo. (1989) 595, (1989); 568 A.2d 1246 5, Corporation Law, 1933, 364, Business Act of May P.L. seq., et 1, art. 20, 1968, as amended Act July §§ P.L. No. 15 P.S. since the evidence § presented by appellant was insufficient to establish the outrageous conduct necessary to submit the issue of puni damages tive to the jury. suffi- following that the evidence was contends

Appellant damages G. & against of support punitive to an award cient Corson: W.H. of testified Evans, agent Corson managing

1. John as prior (probably to his retirement he was aware that 1970) no later than 1969 or as the mid 1960’s but early cancer. was hazardous caused exposure that asbestos to important enough The information was foregoing 2. managers, of him to discuss it with one his Mr. Evans for a Mr. Hinks. knowledge of despite admitted that

3. Mr. Evans not exposure, provide of Corson did hazards asbestos customers, hazards to warnings of such its independent verbally writing. either or to clear had Mr. desired was that Evans evidence so. warnings, he had the means to do such provide not argument warnings that were 5. Mr. Evans’ upon he was manufacturers relying because provided entirely so and was rejected by to do was obligation law under inconsistent his with § of Restatement. 402A the 18). (Brief appellant to we are unable

Contrary arguments appellant, offi- in the record for the assertion that any find support W.H. were employees or G. & Corson managerial cials could in the mid 60’s that fibers exposure aware asbestos Evans, vice-president of G. & in cancer. John result Corson, appel- concerning knowledge testified W.H. follows: agents lee’s as your retirement Evans, you prior Mr. do know

Q. [sic] asbestos-containing were products or health? your hazardous to newspa- that in the reading something

A. I recall about I I retired time retired. prior I think it was pers, I think I about something knew years ago retired, but, I know, it you years before was 15 ago. There has been a lot in the papers recently.

[******] Q. Was you just that information talked about concern- the hazards of of ing general asbestos matter discus- among prior your sion the insulation trade to retirement in 1969?

IA. would I say general discussion do but recall [sic] having one or two conversations with fellow salesmen of cement.

[******] Evans, Mr. Q. did you indicate earlier you that had discussed with some people at Corson the information you that prior your had discovered to retirement about of the hazards asbestos.

IA. said I had discussed that with Bob Hinks.

Q. About that knowledge? discussion, A general A. a light general thing that I had or, know, read about in the paper you not actually getting into detail. what, You

Q. read about sir? A. About publicity that out in I paper comes that you told That giving about. asbestos of prob- some kind lems.

Q. What kind of problems you did read about that asbestos was causing? I say

A. read—I again years was 15 ago—I am not sure what I read—that was I before retired I think— there had been some I problems with think the word was asbestosis or something like that because breathing asbestos and that it. I just was knew that there was a problem. Did

Q. you communicate that Mr. to Hinks?

A. Yes. Now,

Q. Evans, you Mr. did as Vice-President of Corson instruct Mr. Hinks or anyone else to notify custom- your ers about the information that read you had about?

A. No. knowledge prior your retire- your Did Corson to

Q. warnings through sales provide any verbal ment concerning its about information customers people you had read about? hazards asbestos tell if I No, why I like to you may. and would A. you Yes Q. may. manufacturer, we on the Baldwin depended

A. Because nothing had thing. care that kind of We Hill to take of that formulation manufacturing or the do with is in I much of asbestos that. any that. don’t know how some in it. Unless I am sure there was asbestos we a big them realized that there was heard from if me that he had read my one of customers told problem, I had gone right I to that. no that would have about from any customers. complaints Evans, Hill telephone Ehret Q. you Mr. did Baldwin you concerning them what read the information about tell the hazards asbestos?

A. No. felt to

Q. Notwithstanding you responsibility what pro- did Corson your knowledge of the manufacturer to of its either or written warn- any vide customers verbal you have discussed. ings about hazards any warnings. A. No. I had given not you Did from did not receive from Q. you, aside what Corson, manufacturer, on behalf or on behalf your warnings? you provide did those A. No. retirement, Evans, attend, Mr.

Q. you prior your Did involving insulation meetings trade or associations any or buyers? contractors Yes.

A. Q. Company And Insulation a member of was Delaware meetings trade attended any group you whose time?

A. No. evidence, This offered by appellant for the purpose of establishing outrageous conduct on the part of appellee Corson, was certainly insufficient to establish the requisite reckless conduct necessary permit the issue punitive damages to be submitted to the jury. While appellant presented testimony by Barry Castleman concerning arti published cles in medical and journals7 trade in Europe and the United States from the early nineteen hundreds through seventies, the nineteen there was no evidence that anyone at Corson knew or had reason to know of these articles or any medical research studies on the risks involved use of insulation materials containing asbestos. Supreme Court,

Our Johns-Manville, Martin v. Pa. (1985), A.2d 1088 held that the evidence intro- duced the plaintiff Martin as to the knowledge of the defendants concerning the health hazards to which insula- tion workers exposed, were as a result of their use of asbestos, insulation materials containing was insufficient to permit the issue punitive damages to be submitted to the jury. The Court in Martin contrasted the present- evidence ed Inc., v. Sterling Drug, Hoffman (3rd Cir.1973) (evidence F.2d 132 established that defendant knew conclusively by that chloroquine caused adverse retinal changes) and Neal Mines, Inc., Canadian Carey supra (plaintiff proved that defendant took no action in response to medical consultant’s recommendation that the defendant advise its of employees the known risk of con- tracting an condition), asbestos-related and found that in the absence of or knowledge reason to of the know hazards associated asbestos, with materials containing there was a failure “to culpable demonstrate the mental state neces- sary, law, under existing Pennsylvania prove to the reck- lessly indifferent conduct permit which would to award punitive damages.” Id., 177, 508 Pa. at 494 A.2d at Appellant dealing 7. did not differentiate between articles and studies mining manufacturing with the risks associated with the of raw application asbestos and the risks associated with the use and containing insulation materials compare: asbestos. See and Martin v. Johns-Manville, 15, supra, 508 Pa. at n. 175 494 A.2d at 1099 n. 15.

120 Canadian Carey Neal v. omitted). (footnote Cf. 376-377; Fischer v. Johns-Manville Mines, Ltd., supra 466, (1986); 649-52, A.2d 469-470 N.J. Corp., Janssens, 463 So.2d v. Corp. Sales Johns-Manville (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984). 249-250 the dam punitive struck of the order which portion That therefore, is, affirmed.8 Corson age against award in trial court erred argues that the also Appellant motions, order its earlier response post-trial in to reversing, to Pa.R.C.P. We damages pursuant imposing delay of the revisions effected reason agree by to are constrained of the ruling Rule 238 since the upon Court Supreme this taken. appeal entered and trial court was preserved had court, noting appellees The trial damages, sought apply delay propriety issue of the v. Craig Court Supreme announced guidelines Center, Memorial Rehabilitation Magee delay damages. (1986) imposition regarding A.2d 1350 long delay bringing “the concluded that The trial court plaintiff’s neither defendants’ nor to trial was this case ruling impose in its fault”, subsequent thus declined compensatory of the dam- portion damages upon delay were liable. appellees for which age award Court, however, need not determine whether This Supreme Craig interpreted since properly court trial 7, 1988, new Rule 238. Court, promulgated a on November Explanatory Comment change, according This Craig rule, light Rule 238 the new “revises (f) rule for the provides of the new decision.” Subsection after the effec- pending to actions on or rule’s application (November 7, 1988) in which dam- this rule tive date of In determined. the cases have not been ages delay (1989), Noll, A.2d 85 Staats Pa.Super. Nonetheless, punitive cross-appeal. Valley filed a 8. Penn's has not properly against Valley stricken the trial damage Penn’s was award similarly of evidence that Penn’s devoid court since the record supplied by it Valley to know that the materials knew or had reason bodily injury. cause death or serious could Forms, Inc., Miller v. Business Wise 236, 381 Pa.Super. (1989) 553 A.2d 443 this Court en banc has determined Rule 238 is in applicable that new cases on pending appeal adopted on the date the new rule was and made effective, to the resolution of issues properly preserved presented by appellant____ rule, Turning (b) to the new we learn from subsection specified two, two, the rule’s drafters and only time excluded periods of to be from the calculation of “(1) delay damages: any periods of time after which the settlement, defendant has made a written offer of or, offer is continued effect for at least ninety days trial, until the commencement of occurs, whichever first the offer is rejected by plaintiff, and the does plaintiff not recover more than 125 percent (2) of the offer and of time any periods during which the caused Forms, of the trial.” Miller Wise Business delay v. Pa.Super. at 553 A.2d at 446.

The drafters of the new rule “have not allowed for the exclusion of not periods delay caused either party.” Id., 446; 381 Pa.Superior Ct. at 553 A.2d at (empha- added). effect, In award, sis Rule 238 for the provides v. cases, See: Dale appropriate prejudgment interest. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, Pa. (1989). 552 A.2d 1037

King Pennsylvania Transportation Southeastern Au- 420, 424, thority, Pa.Super. (1989). Since has appellant properly preserved presented issue delay damages, pursuant to the decisions of this Court, hearing we are constrained to remand this case for a damages to determine the amount of awarded to delay appellant upon verdict as to each compensatory appel- lee. Corson,

Appellee appeal, argues its cross also that9: light ruling damages, punitive In we of our 'earlier on the issue of argument need not address number 3. 122 refusing court erred in to direct a verdict in

1. trial of G. & W.H. Corson as a result the release of favor defendants; manufacturing evidence, 2. the admission into over of the objection, Castleman, testimony Barry was reversible error war- trial; the award of a ranting new charge punitive 3. the trial court erred its on dam- ages; and of the trial court to special the failure submit inter- separate to the so as to the strict

rogatories liability negligence requiring counts was error reversible of a trial. award new argument predicated initial is

Appellee’s upon its that it and that the only secondarily belief was liable release who, asserts, defendants manufacturing appellee liable, primarily operated as a matter of law to release were defendants, as supplier appellee. such This case tried negligence was under and strict both theories as to all defendants. The liability jury returned a general joint liability verdict of and several as to all defen- dants, all cross-claims for and/or indemnity contribution having prior between defendants been severed to trial. general Appellee’s argument predicated upon is rule in Pennsylvania that the seller of a defective product entitled to indemnification from the manufacturer of the product party primarily responsible as the for the defective Marinelli, product. Walasavage v. 396, 334 Pa.Super. 413- 14, 509, (1984). is, however, general 483 A.2d rule just general applicable only that—a rule—and is certain circumstances. law, our all products liability suppliers

Under a defec distribution, retailers, product tive the chain of whether assemblers, owners, sellers, lessors, partmakers, or any other to the ulti category, potentially relevant are liable Francioni v. Gibsonia mate user the defect. injured by Truck v. 362, (1977); Corp., Grubb 372 A.2d 736 Center, Albert Einstein Medical Pa.Superior Ct. Inc., Bros., Kitzinger Gimbel (1978); (1976). This rule of law A.2d 333 Ct. Pa.Superior injured availability compensation ensures injury of such on place the burden helps party, who, consumer, opportu- unlike the have better parties through its costs spread the defect or to control nity su- Helicopter Corp. v. Brantly See Berkebile pricing. Zern, v.Webb (1975)]; Pa. 337 A.2d 893 pra [462 To further (1966)]. Pa. 220 A.2d 853 supra [422 among poten- do policies justice these achieve defendants, the remedies of Pennsylvania permits tial in so that as those the among and contribution indemnity with, rest or liability may ultimately of chain distribution detect, among, shared those who can best equally 8321-8327; control, 42 or the defect. Pa.C.S. prevent §§ Co., 433 Pa. Supply v. Boiler & Burbage Engineering Trucks, Inc., Mixter v. Mack (1969); 249 A.2d 563 (1973). Indemnity, Pa.Superior 224 Ct. 308 A.2d 139 loss remedy, shifts the entire equitable a common-law Co. v. Supply Builders to another. from one defendant McCabe, (1951). A.2d 368 is 366 Pa. Contribution 8321-8327, statute, requires codified Pa.C.S. §§ of a concurrent character under liability those who have See equally. the relevant tort law to share the loss McCabe, supra; v. Globe Indemni- Supply Builders Co. Inc., (3rd Cir.1972). F.2d 472 These ty Agway against defendants are available even remedies between sue, not and their defendants whom the does of does not commence at the time statute of limitations Boyle, v.Wnek plaintiffs injury. (1953). in “recognized more is Indemnity, remedy, as the drastic consider that community opinion cases where would upon should rest one justice responsibility [defendant] Prosser, of Torts 313 rather than the other.” W. Law Mixter v. Mack (4th 1971) approval ed. with (quoted Trucks, Inc., Thus, supra). indemnity available those are primarily from those are liable to who who merely secondarily vicariously or liable. Builders Sup- McCabe, To ply supra. Co. v. evaluate primary as against secondary courts have liability focused on factors such or passive negligence as active knowledge of or to prevent discover or opportunity the harm. Id. In cases, chain of distribution where there many are levels of product, contact possible with thus several degrees liability, our courts have cited with approval (1936): Restatement of Restitution § Where a person has liable become with another for harm caused a third his person because of negligent failure make dangerous safe a condition land or chattels, which was created misconduct of the which, other two, or as between it was other’s safe, duty to make he is entitled to restitution from the other expenditures properly made in discharge liability. such Trucks, See Inc., Mixter v. Mack supra. Restate- ment of Restitution also addresses a chain indemnity distribution case:

Where person has supplied another a chattel which the supplier’s because of negligence or other fault is dangerously defective for use for it is sup- which plied and both have become liable in to a that third person use, injured by such the supplier is under a duty to indemnify the other expenditures properly made of the of discharge claim the third if person, other or disposed used of the chattel in upon reliance the supplier’s if, two, case and as between the such a justifiable. reliance was of 93(1) (1936).

Restatement Restitution When adapt- ing these standards to liability cases, strict see Burbage v. Boiler Co., & Supply Engineering Mixter supra; v. Trucks, Inc., Mack our supra, courts look facts alone, id., rather than the form liability of and “view trade relations rather realistically than mythically.” Verge v. Co., (3rd Cir.1978). Ford Motor F.2d 384 Thus in determining may who responsible” “primarily required and indemnify products case, a liability our courts of products have evaluated facts light liabili- ty policies, particularly by on focusing opportunity knowledge discover or actual of the defective condition and correcting on the burdens of or relative preventing v. Burbage Boiler & the defect. Supply Engineering Co., Inc., Trucks, supra; Mixter Mack supra; Verge Co., v. Ford supra Motor (relevant facts include trade custom, expertise, practicality). relative Sears, Co., Burch v. Roebuck and Pa.Super. 456-59, (footnotes (1983) 621-623 omitted throughout). observed,

As previously the instant was case also tried on negligence Thus, a to all theory as defendants. the general rules recited above have but limited applicability under the compare: See and circumstances of case. Sirianni v. this Inc., Brothers, Nugent (1986). 506 A.2d 868 the trial court severed all indemnity Since claims for and/or contribution, these issues must be determined initially However, the trial court. appellee is not entitled to have it judgment against marked as a solely satisfied result of releases in the instant case the issue appel- since of lee’s own negligence jury. was also before the

Appellee next argues Corson the trial court permitted erred when it Barry testify Castleman concern ing the knowledge community medical of asbestos “Questions related hazards. admission exclusion evidence are within sound discretion the trial court and will not on an appeal be reversed absent abuse of Sears, Co., supra, Burch v. Roebuck and discretion.” Pa.Super. A.2d at requisite any basic for the evidence in admissibility competent case is that it be and relevant. Though defined, universally

“relevance” has not been or precisely the courts of this Commonwealth stated repeatedly have if, if, evidence is admissible evidence or logically reasonably disprove or tends to a prove issue, material tends a fact more fact in to make such or 126 or affords the for or a probable, supports

less basis regarding or the exist- presumption inference reasonable 502 Pa. Soblotney, of a material fact. See Martin v. ence (1983). 418, A.2d 1022 466 Homeshield, Inc., v. Nichols 384 Pa.Su Myers

Leonard by (1989), denied, 1, 5, 557 A.2d allo. per. (1990). The testimony Barry

575 A.2d 115 Castleman of those knowledge relevant as to defendants who was of the articles identified in his knew or had reason know in included the defendant manufacturers testimony, which Appellees ample opportunity this case. had to cross-exam that they ine Mr. Castleman and establish had neither knowledge or reason to know the articles discussed not, therefore, It error to admit the Mr. Castleman. was Barry Castleman. testimony do find that it was error to refuse Nor we reversible to the special interrogatories jury light to submit indemnity fact that all cross-claims for contribution and/or to trial. it prior might had seen severed While well have preferable special interrogato to have submitted such been ries to the for use the determination of the defen cross-claims, the issues to the jury dants’ submitted were complex require neither so nor as to the use of such lengthy not, therefore, special interrogatories. It was reversible special interrogatories jury. error to refuse to submit to the Corson, in its Appellee petition reargument, rais es for the first time the that “consistent argument with Walton, this case should remand McMeekin have been hearing percentage responsibility ed for a to determine the settling non-settling Only of the defendants. liability manner can it be determined what was the of each settling extinguished defendants which was releases to them given plaintiff.” individual joint Appellees to Sun have referred Oil as tortfeasor who settled appellant prior appear paid to trial. It would that Sun Oil $14,590.03 Act, pursuant Occupational in benefits Disease which provides liability the sole and exclusive of Sun See Barber v. Oil. (1989); Pittsburgh Coming Corporation, Pa. A.2d 766 Co., 392, 396-98, Philadelphia Electric Pa. A.2d Winfree This argument misapprehension evidences a of the princi- ples comparative of as set in contribution forth McMeekin v. Stevens, Inc., M.

Harry supra. liability of each of the The settling plaintiff defendants to the was settled by the terms of the individual releases. The non-settling defendants were each jointly severally liable to the for their pro rata share of the verdict. The principles set forth in McMeekin will be relevant to the instant case if there is a subsequent proceeding for contribution and/or indemnity. The purpose comparative of contribution (committed

“is not a for the Tort recovery against plaintiff,) but enforcement of an equitable duty to done”____ share for liability wrong Thus, a tort- feasor’s to right receive contribution from a joint tort- feasor derives not from his to the liability claimant but equitable rather from the principle that once the joint of liability determined, several tortfeasors has been it unfair impose would be to the financial burden of the plaintiff’s loss on one tortfeasor to the exclusion of the other. It matters not on theory which a tortfeasor has been held for responsible against the tort committed plaintiff. So as the long party seeking contribution has in paid excess of his or her share of liability it would be inequitable under the Act to deny party’s right contribution from a second tortfeasor who also contribut- plaintiff’s ed to the injury. Stevens, Inc.,

McMeekin v. M. Harry supra, Pa.Super. at 530 A.2d at 465. principles

The no comparative appli contribution have cability present posture. to the instant case its Prior to trial, all claims for indemnity contribution and were sev party requested ered. No has the trial court yet proceed determine those issues. Nor has defendant any “in yet upon pay been called excess of share.” [its] (1989); 487 580-82, LeFlar v. Creek Industrial Park No. Gulf (1986); seq. 77 P.S. 1201 et §§ several, appellees’ liability appellant joint 11. Since the verdict, appellant may pro collect the amount of the minus the rata defendants, any appellees. settling share of each six from therefore, not is, contribution comparative issue of this time. Court before properly and reversed part affirmed Order Judgment vacated. in favor entry judgment for the remanded part. Case dam- compensatory against appellees appellant Jurisdiction delay damages. on hearing and for ages relinquished.

CAVANAUGH, J., in the result. concurs MONTEMURO, JJ., concurring file and OLSZEWSKI dissenting opinions. dissenting: OLSZEWSKI, Judge, concurring reasoned, opinion of scholarly I the well agree with of the UCATA interpretation concerning majority Eagle in Charles v. Giant holding of the applicability case. (1987), present 1 to the 474, 522 A.2d Markets, 513 Pa. reached by and result analysis I concur in the Additionally, as well as its damages question delay on the majority cross Corson on by appellee made arguments disposal dissent, however, appli- majority’s from the I must appeal. the facts damages to punitive law on Pennsylvania cation of in this case. presented and evidence dam- punitive states the rule of correctly majority 908, (Second) Torts in the Restatement ages set forth § v. Martin Johns- adopted Pennsylvania. which has been 1088, 154, 168-70, A.2d 1096 Pa. 494 508 Corp., Manville 393-95, 742, 485 A.2d Merriam, 506 Pa. (1985); Feld v. 344-45, (1984); Montgomery, Chambers Mines, (1963); Carey Neal v. Canadian (E.D.Pa.1982). Ltd., F.Supp. the Restatement forth 908 of necessary not to set

It is § has majority as the length, comments at applicable or its however, to reiterate that important, It is done so. damages punitive for an allowance provides section outrageous, because conduct is the defendant’s where of others.” Com- rights “his reckless indifference provides, part: (b) to Section ment Reckless rights indifference to the of others and con- scious action in disregard (See: deliberate of them 500) may provide necessary state of mind to justify puni- tive damages. (Second)

Section 500 of the Restatement of Torts defines disregard” “reckless as follows: The actor’s conduct inis reckless disregard of the safety of another if he does an act or fails intentionally to do an do, act which it is his duty to the other to knowing or having reason to facts know of which would lead a reasonable man to realize not that his conduct cre- ates an risk of physical another, unreasonable harm to but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is to make his necessary negligent. conduct Corson, With I respect G. & W.H. believe evidence was sufficient to support punitive an award of damages under the above standard. The record indicates that the vice-president of G. & W.H. Corson concerning testified his own knowledge knowledge and the of appellee’s agents of (R. 57a-86a). hazards of asbestos exposure. This testimony establishes that officers and agents of G. & W.H. Corson were aware of the health hazards of asbestos-con- taining products and notify failed to or warn its customers Likewise, danger. this made no attempt Corson to alert the suspicions manufacturer about its the safe- regarding Instead, ness of product. the Corson continued to distrib- ute the product knowledge with that its users at a would be health risk and failed to disclose this risk I anyone. believe this evidence to be sufficient to the requi- establish site reckless conduct to warrant necessary submission the issue of to the punitive damages jury.

Because the that stricken punitive damage award was conscience, the trial court shocking was excessive and to the I grant would a new trial for the of deter- solely purpose mining punitive damages.

MONTEMURO, Judge, concurring dissenting: agree I majority’s with the conclusion that the evidence was requisite insufficient to establish the reckless conduct damages issue of punitive to submit the necessary resolution of the I with the agree majority’s also jury. arguments on delay damages appellee Corson’s issue dissent, however, from the majority’s I must cross-appeal. directing court erred in that the that the trial determination marked satisfied because damage award be compensatory appellant Cather- of the settlements received the amount tort-feasors exceeded the settling joint ine Moran from the I believe that compensatory damage of the verdict. amount Corp., v. Avco 383 Pa.Su- this Court’s decision Walton (1989), 524 Pa. A.2d 372 allocatur per. granted, (1989) and 8326 of the Uniform Contri- 568 A.2d 1249 § (UCATA), 42 Tortfeasors Act Pa.C.S.A. Among bution require issue and that 8326, control the resolution of this § to all of the defen- marked satisfied as judgment be dants. provides:

Section 8326 UCATA tort-feasor, joint A of one injured person release discharge or after does not judgment, whether before provides, the release so other tort-feasors unless but other tort-feasors in the against reduces the claim the release or in paid any amount of the consideration that provides or which the release proportion by amount greater reduced if than the the total claim shall be paid. consideration Markets, Eagle 8326. In v. Giant Pa.C.S.A. Charles § 474, 482, (1987), Supreme our Court to the release an parties

noted that 8326 “affords proportion by to determine the amount or which option claim provided total claim shall reduced total (emphasis Id. paid." than the consideration greater (Giant added). In one of the tort-feasors joint Giant Eagle, agreement into which Eagle) entered a settlement I may obtain agreed any recovery “that Eagle other than Giant Mar- corporation ... against any pro of the rata kets, Inc. shall reduced to the extent ... A.2d at Id., 513 Pa. at 522 Eagle.” share of ... Giant returned a verdict jury The case was tried and the 5. was plaintiff. Although figure the the settlement favor of , verdict, amount of the settle jury less than the total the of settling amount the tort-feasor’s ment exceeded the tort nonsettling of the verdict. The share proportionate feasor, Door, argued that the Stanley Magic (Stanley), Inc. amount against by it should be reduced the which verdict Eagle’s Giant Eagle’s payment settlement exceeded Giant verdict, is, of the that that the was share the amount of award minus the jury entitled receive the The that the payment. disagreed, holding Court settlement required the that language clear of both release and § Eagle’s propor reduced Giant jury only by the verdict be Thus, Id., Pa. at A.2d at tionate share. of its for of Stanley responsibility payment was not relieved proportionate damages. its share is in that Eagle While the instant case similar to Giant and the appellant the releases which were executed between total provide damages the settling joint tort-feasors pro settling the share of the shall be reduced rata 40a, 43a, 47a, 50a, 35a, R.R. liability, tort-feasor’s see at 54a, I find this case is different from Giant markedly the in consideration of the paid as total amount Eagle, verdict. In this re- compensatory settlements exceeds Avco, directly point. I find on gard, supra, that Walton (“Waltons” “Tinchers”) Walton, In plaintiffs (Avco) Corpora- Avco Summa Corporation sued the and the of the deaths of two (Hughes) damages arising tion out Id., from a accident. resulting helicopter individuals trial, A.2d Before Avco Pa.Super. at 374. actions for settlement settled both the Walton Tincher verdict entered figures jury which exceeded ultimate release in Hughes. against both Avco Walton damages that the award be reduced provided would (1) paid for the amount the consideration greater (2) rata Avco’s On pro liability. release or share of claim that rejected plaintiffs’ this Court Walton appeal, from entitled to receive they under Giant were Eagle, share Hughes' the full amount Hughes 132

verdict and that Avco was not entitled to contribution from Id., Hughes. 537-38, at Pa.Superior Ct. 557 A.2d at found that portion We no of Hughes’ share of the jury- verdict was owed to the plaintiffs, had, because “by Avco a paying plaintiffs greater settlement amount than the jury awarded to the plaintiffs damages, as ‘discharged the com- mon liability’ Hughes.” Id., Avco and 383 Pa.Superior 384, atCt. 557 A.2d at citing 8324(b). Pa.C.S.A. § Relying on Giant Eagle, this Court stated:

If the settlement amount exceeds the ultimate claim defendants, recovered at trial against all inas the instant case, then parties the executing release agreement have no as to the option amount the by judgment which will be circumstances, reduced. Under those the judgment essentially by cancelled out the previous pay- settlement ment to the plaintiff. It is where the consideration paid previous for the release agreement is less than the total claim ultimately by trial, recovered the plaintiff at as in that the Eagle], parties to a release agreement [Giant option have ‘the to determine the amount or proportion by which the total claim shall be reduced.’ Walton, 541-42, supra, Pa.Super. 557 A.2d at quoting Eagle, supra, Giant 513 Pa. at 522 A.2d at 4. I disagree with the majority’s characterization of this lan- guage dicta, as as the settlement figure Walton was greater than the ultimate jury award. The majority over- plain looks the language of provides which § parties to the release option have the to determine the amount or proportion by which the total claim shall be reduced if the claim is “greater than the consideration paid.” Thus, Pa.C.S.A. 8326. although the releases in § this case provided that the verdict would be reduced pro rata share of the releasee’s liability, and unlike case, release the Walton did not provide that the claim would be released by the amount of the consideration paid release, for the I believe that this distinction is not determi- of the case, native outcome of this because under § case, and the parties Walton do option not have the the claim will be reduced the amount which determine jury exceeds the verdict. figure the settlement where and Giant Eagle with Walton plain Consistent 8326,1 did not appellant have meaning believe award jury to choose the amount which the would option reduced, received in settlement of her as the amount she In paying appel- the ultimate verdict. jury claims exceeded award, settling greater an amount than lant all common discharged liability tort-feasors defendants. the holding

The conflicts with UCATA majority’s further the intent that legislative as the decision frustrates insofar their more than settling paid propor tort-feasors who have from the nonset right share have a to contribution tionate case, the Walton As in three of the tort-feasors. tling the to right here reserved settling expressly tort-feasors agreements. under the their release contribution UCATA Walton, 50a, upheld the 35a, R.R. at 55a.1 In the Court See rights pursue against to its contribution right Avco in its release provided had Hughes, specifically as Avco in the plaintiffs the that its involvement agreement with right continue in so far as Avco retained the lawsuit would Walton, against parties. other to seek contribution liable 540-41, 384. Because 557 A.2d at supra, Pa.Super. amount plaintiffs greater had the settlement paid Avco award, the “discharged had common the Avco jury than defendants, had a to right the and thus liability” of all of Id. Although under 8324 of the UCATA. contribution that agreed also and the tort-feasors here appellant settling to right retain their contribu settling tort-feasors would the tort-feasors, consequence of the against nonsettling tion the right this to to render invalid the decision is majority’s required are to nonsettling If the tort-feasors contribution. appellant, the to liability shares of pay proportionate their pay to contribution they required then cannot be inter- Thus, holding will majority the settling tort-feasors. prior to were severed claims for contribution 1. All defendants’ trial. fere the settling with tort-feasors’ to right contribution the granted UCATA and expressly reserved virtue of their agreements. release

I the policy believe considerations of encouraging settle, both to plaintiffs defendants are which set forth Eagle Giant upon by case, relied majority this way are in no jeopardized my conclusion appellant is not entitled recover full amount of the nonsettling tort-feasors’ share of the jury verdict. As the Walton Court stated:

The encouraged settle in view the fact that he will least recover at amount against verdict entered joint defendants perhaps a greater amount where release consideration exceeds the total jury defendant, verdict. The nonsettling where settling defendant has retained right to seek contribution, has no incentive to go allow the case to hopes trial in of securing a windfall settling at the defen- dant’s expense. settling defendant, protected who his contribution has rights, appropriately reached an agreement which is satisfactory to the plaintiff and has at the same time protected his own in a interests fair and manner. reasonable

Walton, supra, Pa.Super. at A.2d at These considerations also apply case. instant reasons, foregoing

For the I dissent from majority’s case, conclusion that under the facts of this the verdict should be reduced solely by share, releasee’s rata pro rather than be marked satisfied.

Case Details

Case Name: Moran v. G. & W.H. Corson, Inc.

Court Name: Superior Court of Pennsylvania

Date Published: Jan 25, 1991

Citation: 586 A.2d 416

Docket Number: 2548 and 2597

Court Abbreviation: Pa. Super. Ct.